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Abstract
Seizing Civilization uses the Shanghai Museum as a case study to examine an extraordinary 
process of art appropriation that persisted from 1949 to 1996 in the People's Republic of China 
(PRC). At the heart of this story is the museum's destruction of the preexisting art market, its 
wholesale seizure of privately-owned antiquities, and its sale of these objects on the international 
market. My findings show that museum employees used these events to create public art 
collections in the PRC. The Shanghai Museum pioneered the techniques that Chinese museums 
use to transform craft objects, as well as select ancient paintings, ceramics, and bronzes, into 
canonized cultural relics. I argue that the application of these techniques explains the erasure of 
provenance at Chinese Museums, and demonstrate how state cultural institutions render 
acquisition ledgers, private collecting records, and connoisseurship disputes invisible.
I examine cultural relics' transformation into Chinese cultural heritage in five chapters.  I first 
demonstrate how museum employees appropriated private collections during nation-building 
campaigns such as the nationalization of industries (1956).  Second, I investigate changes to the 
Chinese art historical canon, placing them in the context of art market takeovers, the wholesale 
acquisition of ethnic minority artifacts, as well as municipal programs in salvage archaeology. 
Then, in two chapters, I reveal the Shanghai Museum's active participation in antiquities 
confiscation and divestment during the Cultural Revolution (1966 – 1976), which enriched 
public art collections on a previously unprecedented scale.  I conclude with an examination of 
the mass restitution of expropriated property in the 1980s and 90s, which underpinned the 
museum’s dual function as both a preservationist institution, as well as a political and 
commercial enterprise.  The antiquities and events I analyze not only explain the ascendency of 
a dominant narrative about Chinese civilization, but also reveal the limits, contradictions, and 
challenges of PRC national patrimony.  iv
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Foreword
Research for this dissertation began in June 2008 and ended in June 2011, with twelve 
months of fieldwork and archival research in Shanghai, China.  During the summer of 2010 I 
also took a week-long trip to Hong Kong to conduct interviews with the overseas Chinese art 
dealing community.  In addition, I conducted six months of fieldwork, museum and archival 
research in the United Kingdom, during which time I was based in London and made sporadic 
trips to Oxford, Princes Risborough (Buckinghamshire), and East Grinstead (West Sussex).  My 
work was funded by the Institute of International Education's Fulbright Cultural Exchange 
Fellowship, an Institute for Historical Research Mellon Fellowship in the Humanities, and a 
Center for Advanced Study in the Visual Arts Andrew W. Mellon Predoctoral Fellowship.  In 
addition, the Research Councils UK and the Harvard Yenching Institute sponsored workshops 
focused on Globalization and Urban History that shaped the trajectories of my work. 
I conducted my fieldwork in Shanghai during one visit in the summer of 2009, plus a 
more extended trip from November 2009 to July 2010.  On-site research included interviews, 
museum and household visits, material collection from private homes and municipal archives, as 
well as participation in the Shanghai Museum Retired Employees' monthly gatherings.  My 
fieldwork in Britain took place in the fall of 2009, plus a more extended trip in the fall and winter 
of 2010.  On each trip I presented myself as a student interested in Chinese museums and art 
markets.  Depending on their nationality and history with the People's Republic of China, the 
individuals that I interviewed on my trips yielded different types of information, whose impact vi
on my research I address as follows. 
In May of 2009 I met Zheng Zhong, a reporter who had worked on the Wenhui 
newspaper's Shanghai Museum beat for the past three decades.  During the 1990s the Shanghai 
Museum commissioned Zheng Zhong to write a monograph about the museum's major donors. 
As part of that commission he gained unrestricted access to both the museum's internal archives 
as well as its employees, many of whom had worked for the museum since 1952.  After I 
explained my project, Zheng Zhong gifted me with Shanghai Museum documents that he 
photocopied and kept whilst he conducted the research for his monograph.  He also introduced 
me to many of the museum employees he interviewed for the same purpose.  These employees 
include Li Junjie and Huang Xuanpei, both former associate director at the museum, Zhong 
Yinlan and Chen Peifen, senior painting and bronze researchers, respectively, Xu Yongxiang, 
former director of the museum's Customs inspections team, and Sun Jian, senior painting 
restorer.  These veteran employees invited me to the Shanghai Museum's Retired Employees' 
monthly gatherings, where I met yet more former employees.  Li Junjie also helped me contact 
retirees that played a role in the museum's political, administrative, and curatorial divisions but 
did not frequent the monthly gatherings.  
Between May 2009 and July 2010 I conducted interviews with twenty-two veteran 
Shanghai Museum employees in Shanghainese.  I also interviewed the former and current 
directors of Duo Yunxian, a Shanghai art dealership that opened in 1900.  When verbal consent 
was granted, I recorded these interviews in audio and transcribed them into English.  During my vii
visits I also presented my interviewees with archival documents I retrieved from the Shanghai 
Municipal Archives (SMA).  The documents helped jog my interviewees' memories and place 
specific inquiries in context.  When asked, I provided my interviewees with copies of my archival 
findings, which inspired some interviewees to share related documents and artifacts that they 
had kept in their homes for personal reasons.  Initially my interviewees were introduced by 
Zheng Zhong or individuals I already interviewed.  By the winter of 2010 I found the majority of 
my interviewees through regular attendance at the retiree's gatherings, or had pointed out to me 
by previous interviewees.  These interactions gave me invaluable insight into the Shanghai 
Museum's unpublished history, particularly with regard to events and occurrences whose 
primary documents remain classified by the Chinese state.  
I interviewed and presented documents to five individuals extensively over the course of 
my research: the Shanghai Museum's former Associate Director Li Junjie, former Bronze 
Curator and Senior Researcher Chen Peifen, former Paintings and Calligraphy Curator and 
Senior Researcher Zhong Yinlan, Bronze Conservator Gu Youchu, and former First in 
Administrative Command Xia Shunkui.  I selected these individuals based upon the diversity of 
their working roles, the longevity of their employment, and the first-hand insight they possessed 
during major vicissitudes in the Shanghai Museum's history.  I also chose these five individuals 
based on their own interest in my research, as well as personal sympathies that we shared and 
developed over the course of two years.  Their perspectives, personal documents, life histories, 
and the sensitivities they maintained regarding specific events and individuals transformed my viii
understanding of Shanghai's history and enriched every part of this project. 
In the summer of 2008 I met Michael Knight, senior curator of Chinese art at the Asian 
Art Museum of San Francisco.  Michael provided me with a list of contacts in New York, 
London, and Hong Kong who either had extensive family history with or played crucial roles in 
the international Chinese art market, PRC museums, and Chinese art collecting.  From 2008 to 
2010 I contacted these individuals and interviewed them in New York, London, and Hong 
Kong.  These individuals spoke to me about their personal and familial history with the Chinese 
art trade as well as China's museums, and in some cases gave me access to personal archives that 
contained documents, photos, and interview transcriptions that no longer exist in mainland 
China.  In particular, interactions with Anthony Carter, Doninick Jellineck, John Ayers, Roger 
Keverne, Philip Constantinidi, Paul Moss, Hugh Moss, Julian Thompson, Helen Shepard, James 
Watt, Carol Conver, Lois Katz, Patty Tang, Diane Woo, and Jim Lally enhanced my 
understanding of the relationship between PRC cultural institutions, overseas Sinophiles, and 
the international art market.  
The vast majority of my interviewees in both Shanghai and abroad consented to my 
naming and recognizing them in my study.  Some, however, chose not to have their names 
associated in conjunction with certain sensitive topics of discussion, such as cash donations to 
the Shanghai Museum, the secret storage of Shanghai Museum artifacts in Anhui, and the 
beating and resultant death of Shanghai Museum employees during political campaigns such as 
the Anti-Right movement and the Cultural Revolution.  In order to explore these events and ix
their impact on perceptions of Chinese cultural heritage, I chose to identify my interviewees by 
name whenever they granted me consent.  In cases when consent was not granted but context 
remained important, I analyze my interviewees' rejection of identification with the particular 
topic in mind.  For example, when interviewees told me about raiding private homes for 
antiquities or the museum's treatment of counterrevolutionary art dealers, I asked my 
interviewees why they do not want their names associated with these accounts and analyze their 
responses with respect to the initial act, as well as its perceived consequences for the interviewee. 
Nevertheless, unless my interviewees granted consent, I anonymized any information that might 
negatively affect the interviewee's relationship with their work unit or social world. 
Most of the museum employees, art dealers, philanthropists, and collectors I interviewed 
and directly cited in this thesis met me as a history student studying the Shanghai Museum and 
the international market for Chinese art.  I understand, however, that personal circumstances 
mediated both my interviewees' perception of my identity and their interactions with me.  My 
Shanghai-born identity and ability to speak the local dialect positioned me as a co-hometowner 
with Shanghai natives.  My English language ability and educational standing as a doctoral 
student encouraged some to open up to me as a perceived outsider-amongst-insiders, and others 
to limit or reject interacting with me for fear of what I might do with the information they gave 
me.  While comprehending my cultural and social identities as unfixed through specific 
circumstances and interactions, as a historian I often welcomed context-based interactions in my 
fieldwork.  My above-mentioned identities underlined the information I retrieved.  Therefore, x
my dissertation highlights the context of my interviews throughout, particularly as they 
illuminate the relationship between museums and art markets, as well as between individuals, 
cultural institutions, and cultural heritage.  xi
Note on Translations
Unless otherwise noted, I am the author of all translations and transcriptions in this study.  I 
rendered all Chinese names and titles in hanyu pinyin romanization, simplified Chinese 
characters, and Chinese surname order, unless standard citation styles mandate formulations 
otherwise.  The accompanying index includes frequently referenced names and titles. 
Cultural Relics (wenwu 文物) refers to Chinese antiquities as the objects have been defined and 
shaped by the State Administration of Cultural Heritage since 1949.  Museum (bowuguan 博物
馆) refers to cultural institutions for the acquisition, preservation, and exhibition of cultural 
relics as they are established and transformed by the Ministry of Culture since 1949.  
I consistently use English equivalents for Chinese terms that define professional identity in the 
PRC's cultural institutions, such as art dealer (wuwan shang 古玩商), apprentice (tudi 徒弟), 
collector (shoucang jia 收藏家), acquisition (zhengji 征集), exhibition (zhanlan 展览), 
warehouse (kufang 库房), revolutionary rebel (zaofan pai 造反派), segregated interrogations 
(geli 隔离), restitution (luoshi 落实), and donation (juanxian 捐献).  Certain terms, however, 
encompass a range of meanings (zhuanjia 专家) and even evolve and change as they become 
associated with particular individuals, events, and time periods (hongse jieban ren 红色接班xii
人).  In these cases I use a variety of English equivalents which express their meaning with 
respect to context.  The accompanying index also contains terms repeatedly used in the thesis.xiii
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Introduction: Welcome to the Shanghai Museum2
Figure 0.1. Cover art for the first Shanghai Museum exhibition catalog, 1952.  Catalog obtained 
and photographed with permission from Xia Shunkui.
Welcome to Five Thousand Years of Chinese Civilization
The Class of 1952, so-named for the year its members started work at the Shanghai 
Museum, had little experience.  The museum hired all 126 of them to work as antiquities buyers, 
catalogers, gallery guides, and security guards at its newly-opened facility on #325 West Nanjing 
Road, next to the People's Park in downtown Shanghai.  A glance at the Class of 1952's 
qualifications, however, would have raised even the most callow visitor's eyebrows.  Chen Peifen 
had just completed her second year of high school.  Zhong Yinlan, who applied to work as a 3
gallery guide, put melon seed inspector and chicken hatchery attendant in the Professional 
Experience section of her résumé.  Li Junjie and Huang Xuanpei had no previous work 
experience.  Shen Minren, who did well on her employment exams, had an alarming mark on her 
personnel file – it labeled her a candidate for reeducation because her father had fled for Taiwan 
as soon as the Communists won control of Shanghai in 1949.  The Class of 1952 were paid to 
show all visitors “the cultural inheritance of our people”, yet none were alive when the dynastic 
system collapsed in 1911 – ostensibly the impetus for the creation of the modern Chinese state 
and the fount of cultural heritage production on the mainland.
1 
The Class of 1952's lack of experience did nothing to dampen the popular frenzy to see 
Chinese antiquities in museums.
2  The third largest collection of Chinese antiquities in the 
world and the only one assembled after 1949, the Shanghai Museum became a formative 
element with which to portray the nation as a single, unbroken entity, with territory that 
stretched from the icy Tibetan alps to the tropical beaches of Hainan island.  Visitors nodded 
eagerly as the new hires pointed out artifacts that stood for Five Thousand Years of Chinese 
Civilization, the ancient culture that began with the rule of the Yellow emperor and stretched 
1 Zhongshi wenwu guji jiaqiang baohu guanli [Paying Attention To Cultural Relics And Ancient Sites, 
Strengthening Protection And Management] Wenwu cankao zhiliao 1, no. 1- 6, (1950): 11.
2 For period records on the popular response to museums see Beijing Bowuguan Xuehui, ed., Beijing Bowuguan 
Nianjian [Annals of the Palace Museum] (Beijing Shi, 1989): 33; Guoli Nanjing bowuyuan zhengshi chengli 
[State-Established Nanjing Museum Officially Inaugurated] Wenwu cankao zhiliao 4, no. 1- 6, (1950): 55-56; 
Mengjia Chen, “Haiwai zhongguo tongqi de shoucang yu yanjiu” [Overseas Chinese Bronze Collections And 
Research], Tianjin Minguo Ribao, February 6, 1949, Collected in Menjia Chen, Menjia baocunwen [Mengjia's 
Precious Collected Writings] (Beijing, 2006): 303-309; Zhengduo Zheng, Baocun guwu zhenyi [The Debate 
On Preserving Ancient Objects] in Gugong bowuyuan, Ed, Juanxian Dajia – Zhen Zhengduo [A Donation To 
All – Zhen Zhengduo], 2 vols. (Beijing, 2005), 2: 27-28.4
through succeeding dynasties to the current state – the People's Republic of China (PRC).  
The Department of Cultural Affairs, an administrative unit that housed the Class of 
1952's immediate municipal superiors, asked the new hires to “develop the excellent traditions 
of Chinese civilization's art and culture, publicize and implement the party's policies on the 
protection of cultural relics, and conduct nationalist and socialist education for the multitudes.”
3 
This directive pushed Shanghai to elaborate and popularize a particular position on China's 
place in the world – a perspective that privileged antiquities, dubbed wenwu (cultural heritage), 
as the representatives of a civilization unlike any other in history.
4  The museum collection gave 
this position great immediacy.  As the Class of 1952 told visitors everyday, the value of Chinese 
antiquities underlined China's special destiny.  Chinese cultural heritage outranked the brashly 
young United States, and stood impervious to any slights that foreign imperial powers have left 
on its soil since the First Opium War (1839 – 1942).
5  
Shedding new light on the transformation of cultural heritage in the twentieth century, 
Seizing Civilization interrogates four conceptual frameworks that underlie all origin narratives 
3 Shanghai shi wenhua ju suo shu Shanghai bowuguan fazhan shi gao (cugao) he zai qingzhu guoqing hui shang de 
jianghua gao [Shanghai Municipal Cultural Bureau's Draft For Shanghai Museum Development History (First 
Draft) And Speech Draft For National Day Galla Evening Speech] January 2
nd, 1959 – September 28
th, 1959, 
B172-5-103, Shanghai Municipal Archives (SMA), Shanghai. 
4 For more information see Tu Wei-ming, “Cultural China: The Periphery as the Center”, Daedalus, 120, no. 2, 
(1991): 1-32;
5 Exhibition schema and interpretations for Shanghai Museum Junior Staff, Private collection of Xia Shunkui; 
Investigations into China as part of an international order include David Shambaugh “Introduction: The 
Emergence Of 'Greater China'” The China Quarterly 136, (1993): 653-659; Amy Chua, Day Of Empire: How 
Hyperpowers Rise To Global Dominance – And Why They Fall (New York, 2007).5
such as that which the Class of 1952 learned to recite from their first day on the job.
6  The first is 
the distinction between museums and the art market, in particular the notion that commercial 
interests only erode the integrity of a civilization's heritage.  I explore the simultaneous 
development of cultural institutions and markets in the PRC context, examining the former's 
strong investment in regulating, developing, and profiting from the latter.  The second 
framework is an immutable art historical canon, which in the Chinese context is defined as both 
a greatest hits list as well as a set of categories that delimit art (bronzes, ceramics, paintings and 
calligraphy, etc.).  I investigate the canon's so-called immutability, its dependence on a 
distinguished cohort of taste-makers, as well as its immunity from the vicissitudes of the art 
market.
7  I use the Shanghai Museum as a case study to demonstrate that canon-formation is an 
open and dynamic process, open to institutional intervention as well as social, economic, and 
political vicissitudes.  
The third framework is the philanthropic nature of donations, that antiquities and cash 
are free gifts that private individuals bequeath museums throughout their institutional history. 
6 The most prominent example of using antiquities to establish an origins narrative in the Chinese context is the 
Guomindang state's removal of the Palace Museum's collection in 1949.  For a first hand account of the removal 
and its justification see Lih-wu Han, Zhonghua Wenwu Boqian Ji [The Transfer Of Chinese Cultural Relics] 
(Taibei, 1980); A more recent account of the events in English is Jeannette Shanbaugh Elliot, The Odyssey Of 
China's Imperial Art Treasures (Seattle, 2005).  For non-Chinese contexts see Wendy M. K. Shaw “Islamic Arts 
in The Ottoman Imperial Museum, 1889-1923” Ars Orientalis, 30, (2000): 55-68.
7 For further discussion on canonicity see Yasser Tabbaa “Canonicity and Control: The Sociopolitical 
Underpinnings of Ibn Muqla's Reform” Ars Orientalis, 29 (1999): 91-100; taste-makers are defined in Marilyn 
Jenkins-Madina “Collecting the 'Orient' at the Met: Early Tastemakers in America” Ars Orientalis, 30, (2000): 
69-89; A discussion of both in the context of a market for Chinese art can be found in Ankeney Weitz “Art and 
Politics at the Mongol Court of China: Tugh Temür's Collection of Chinese Paintings” Artibus Asiae, 64, no. 2 
(2004): 243-280; 6
People rarely give donations freely.  Different constituents grant and solicit donations, actively 
and intentionally, for myriad purposes.  My findings show, for example, that the Shanghai 
Museum used the language of donation to transform appropriations into bequests.  I propose 
that donations are elegant fictions that legitimize museums' self portrayal as the “custodians of 
cultural heritage”.  Furthermore, the tropes of donation change over time.  In the PRC context, 
the language of donation, have transformed from highlighting nationalism, in the 1950s and 60s, 
to highlighting consensual exchanges between private collectors and public cultural institutions. 
I argue that this cult of consent, as it is portrayed through institutional ceremonies and merit 
awards, underwrites the very invention of cultural heritage, both in China and overseas.  
The fourth and last framework I explore is the museum's role in creating the “state 
effect”, the illusion that a monolithic Chinese state encompasses everything from sports to 
foreign trade.
8  Seizing civilization makes visible the entire cast of characters whose joint efforts 
created the appearance of a coherent state apparatus: middling curio traders and art repairers, 
junior museum employees, sales girls at state-run antiquities stores, and high school drop-outs – 
state and non-state actors alike whose collaboration outlined the contours of social and political 
order in the PRC.  With the collaboration of domestic and foreign constituents, these state and 
8 Damien Ma, “Li Na: The Face Of Chinese Soft Power” The Atlantic Monthly, June 4
th, 2011, visited June 5
th, 
2011 from http://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2011/06/li-na-the-face-of-chinese-soft-
power/239923/ For similar portrayals of the PRC see Jasper Becker, Hungry Ghosts: Mao’s Secret Famine (New 
York, 1998); Brahma Chellaney “Autocratic China Becoming Arrogant” Times Of India, November 15
th, 2006; 
Michael P. Colaresi, Scare Tactics: The Politics of International Rivalry (Syracuse, 2005); Thomas Friedman, 
“Our One Party Democracy” The New York Times, September 8
th, 2009; Zhengyuan Fu, Autocratic Tradition 
And Chinese Politics (Cambridge, 1993).7
non-state actors co-created the ways in which Chinese art is acquired, evaluated, and 
institutionalized in the twentieth century.  The fabrication of Chinese cultural heritage would 
not have occurred without these vastly different individuals, who persuaded each other of 
antiquities' primacy in the history of Chinese civilization.
Seizing Civilization shows that Chinese museums are more than sites of Red propaganda. 
It explains how the Shanghai Museum stripped its collection of provenance, and rendered 
acquisition ledgers, private collecting records, and connoisseurship disputes invisible.  Like 
many achievements, this one is both exquisitely simple and fiendishly problematic.  Elite 
connoisseurs, new museum employees, municipal administrators, in conjunction with state 
policy makers, recast privately-owned antiquities as cultural inheritance and marketed that 
vision to both domestic and international audiences.  In the process, the museum obtained 
unprecedented municipal collaboration in the systematic expropriation of antiquities from local 
denizens.  Shanghai, for example, pioneered the wholesale acquisition of ethnic minority 
artifacts, as well as the artifacts' subsequent establishment as a category of art that demonstrated 
the common heritage of the Han majority and all fifty-five ethnic minority peoples living in the 
PRC.
9  Furthermore, the Shanghai Museum expropriated privately art collections to exhibit as 
the cultural inheritance of all Chinese, transforming antiquities from private to public property. 
In short, the museum made the erasure of provenance integral to the creation of cultural 
9 The “culturalization” of ethnic minorities receive extended treatment in Ma Rong “The 'Politicization' And 
'Culturalization' Of Ethnic Groups” Chinese Sociology And Anthropology, 42, no. 4, (2010): 31 – 45. 8
heritage. 
Shanghai didn't invent the erasure of provenance.  The idea was new to the PRC but also 
very old – utilized in so-called autocratic and democratic nation-states alike.  When the the 
Louvre Museum opened to the public in 1793, its paintings didn't bear any mark of their 
appropriation from French Catholic churches, nor did public exhibitions mention the paintings' 
provenance throughout the subsequent French empires, republics, and administrations.
10 
Similarly, Catherine The Great's Hermitage Museum collection “served as a visible sign of 
cultural enlightenment” with no gesture towards the dense network of envoys and previous 
owners that assembled the bricolage.
11  The systematic erasure of provenance in Shanghai fits 
into an existing, established process; audiences worldwide have long reconciled national 
museum collections' expropriated nature with the institutions' representation of individual 
nation-states, civilizations, and indeed world heritage.
12  To summarize, the history of the 
10 Paul Jamot “The Acquisitions of the Louvre during the War, 1914-1919” The Burlington Magazine for 
Connoisseurs, 36, no. 207 (Jun., 1920):287- 289, 292-293; James Kearns “From Store to Museum: The 
Reorganization of the Louvre's Painting Collections in 1848” The Modern Language Review, 102, no. 1 (Jan., 
2007): 58-73; Andrew L. McClellan “The Musée du Louvre as Revolutionary Metaphor During the Terror” 
The Art Bulletin, Vol. 70, No. 2 (Jun., 1988), pp. 300-313; 
11 Katia Dianina “Art and Authority: The Hermitage of Catherine the Great” Russian Review, 63, no. 4 (Oct., 
2004): 630-654; For later histories of the Hermitage see O. Neverov “The Lyde Browne Collection and the 
History of Ancient Sculpture in the Hermitage Museum” American Journal of Archaeology, 88, no. 1 (Jan., 
1984): 33-42;
12 For an introduction to the vast literature on museums and expropriated property around the world, see Ann 
Fienup-Riordan “Collaboration on Display: A Yup'ik Eskimo Exhibit at Three National Museums” American 
Anthropologist, 101, no. 2 (Jun., 1999): 339-358; John Henry Merryman “Thinking About The Elgin Marbles” 
Michigan Law Review, 83, No. 8 (1985): 1880 - 1923 ; David Rudenstein, “Cultural Property: The Hard 
Question Of Repatriation The Rightness And Utility Of Voluntary Repatriation” 19 Cardozo Arts And 
Entertainment Law Journal, 69, (2001); Nora Niedzielski-Eichner “Art Historians And Cultural Property 
Internationalism” International Journal Of Cultural Property, 12, (2005): 183 – 200; Lyndel V. Prott “The 
International Movement Of Cultural Objects” International Journal Of Cultural Property, 12, (2005): 225 – 248; 9
Shanghai Museum's systematic appropriations of art provides rich analytical purchase because it 
demonstrates how cultural institutions integrated antiquities into the modern state apparatus. 
Studying Chinese museums, and writing a Chinese museology, then, serves a dual purpose.  It 
both reveals the limitations of the autocratic Chinese state narrative, and the shortcomings of 
envisioning western cultural institutions as the fount of heritage preservation.  
In its methodology and sources, Seizing Civilization utilizes the “polyphonic” resources 
of three different kinds of sources to elicit the Shanghai Museum's multifarious inhabitants: 
archival records, oral interviews, and statistics.
13  I read government edicts, small-business 
records, monthly ledgers, as well as a diverse array of texts from print and visual culture, such as 
museum exhibitions, training manuals, speaking scripts, photographs, and private notebooks. 
Two years of oral interviews with people from this era helped me to connect archival documents 
with the experience and consciousness of individuals.  I not only investigated personal accounts 
but also scrutinized archival sources with the record keepers themselves, including museum 
employees, art dealers and collectors in China, Hong Kong, America, and Britain.  These 
sources, as I have interpreted them, inhabit a shared discursive field – a syncretic dialogue about 
Chinese cultural heritage articulated not only in institutional boardrooms and at state 
ceremonies, but also in the lives and imagination of “ordinary” people.  As such, this dissertation 
Barbara T. Hoffman, “International Art Transactions And The Resolution Of Art And Cultural Property 
Disputes: A United States Perspective” in Barbara T. Hoffman Ed., Art And Cultural Heritage Law, Policy And 
Practice (Cambridge, 2006) :159 – 177; John Henry Merryman, ed., Imperialism, Art And Restitution 
(Cambridge, 2006); 
13 Paul Gilroy, The Black Atlantic: Modernity And Double Consciousness (Cambridge, 1993): 115-119. 10
resists the kind of ideology that imagines behavioral divisions wherein “Capitalist” and 
“Communist” cultural institutions arbitrarily inhabit the same world but pass by each other like 
ships in the night.  Above all, I want to reveal how different constituents used the museum as an 
instrument to make cultural heritage up as they went along.  Shanghai's experience reveals the 
ways in which these origin narratives unfix objects from history, infusing them with new 
national, aesthetic, market, and institutional value.
14   
Creating Cultural Heritage
The museum's international ubiquity makes it compelling as a site for the articulation 
and creation of origin narratives.  The proliferation of public museums in eighteenth century 
France and nineteenth century England drew strong attendance, whether they treated the 
institution as a tribute to the downfall of unpopular regimes or an arena in which to practice 
civilized behavior.
15  Facilitated by art dealers, personal travel, as well as an imaginary of exotica 
as projected by their respective nation-states/empires, individual collectors amassed antiquities 
collections from both domestic and overseas sources – many of which became signature 
14 For further discussions of the ideas surrounding cultural heritage and its distinction from historical narrative, 
see John Henry Merryman, “'Protection' Of The Cultural 'Heritage'?” The American Journal Of Comparative 
Law, 38, (1990): 513 – 522; Susan A. Crane, “Memory, Distortion, And History In The Museum” History And 
Theory, 36, no. 4 (1997): 44 – 63; David Lowenthal, “Fabricating Heritage” History And Memory, 10, no. 1, 
(1998): 5 – 24; Janet Blake, “On Defining The Cultural Heritage” The International And Comparative Law 
Quarterly 49, no. 1 (2000): 61 – 85; Tammy S. Gordon, “Heritage, Commerce, And Museal Display: Toward A 
New Typology Of Historical Exhibition In The United States” The Public Historian, 30, no. 3, (2008): 27 – 50.
15 Frances Borzello, Civilising Caliban: The Misuse Of Art, 1875 – 1980, (London, 1987); David J. E. Gilks, A.C. 
Quatremère de Quincy And Regenerating The Visual Arts In France, c. 1770-1810 Unpublished Dissertation, 
University of Cambridge, Faculty of History (Cambridge, 2008); Tony Bennett, The Birth Of The Museum: 
History, Theory, Politics (London, 1995); James Hevia, English Lessons: The Pedagogy Of Imperialism In 
Nineteenth-Century China (Durham, 2003)11
museum collections themselves.
16  Commentary on museums came in the form of political 
speeches, advertisements, newsreels, journals and newspapers, film and television productions, 
and museums themselves.  The art collections inspired poems, novels, essays, posters, as well as 
countless reproduction souvenir and curios from full-sized paintings to hand mirrors.  This rich 
and profound culture of antiquities brought museums into everyday life across the globe, even 
though only a small fraction of the world could afford to collect, much less develop an interest in 
“culture”.  
While the study of museums and collecting have shaped our understanding of 
Imperialism, the use of art in the age of the nation-state has been less explored.
17  Seizing 
16 Elizabeth Hope Chang, Britain's Chinese Eye Literature, Empire, And Aesthetics In Nineteenth Century Britain 
(Stanford, 2010); Sarah Cheang, “The Dogs Of Fo: Gender, Identity And Collecting” in Anthony Shelton, Ed., 
Collectors, Expressions Of Self And Other (London, 2001): 55 – 72; Warren I. Cohen, East Asian Art And 
American Culture: A Study In International Relations (New York, 1992); Christine Guth, Art, Tea, And Industry: 
Masuda Takashi And The Mitsui Circle (Princeton, 1993); Judith Green, “'A New Orientation Of Ideas': 
Collecting And Taste For Early Chinese Ceramics In England: 1921 – 1936.” in Stacey Pierson, ed., Collecting 
Chinese Art: Interpretation And Display (London, 2000): 43 – 56; Jordana Mendelson, Documenting Spain: 
Artists, Exhibition Culture, And The Modern Nation, 1929 – 1939 (University Park, 2005); Thomas Lawton and 
Linda Merrill, Freer: A Legacy Of Art (New York, 1993); Maya Jasanoff, Edge Of Empire: Lives, Culture, And 
Conquest In The East, 1750 – 1850, (New York, 2005); Jason C. Kuo, Martha Ann Bari, Fan Dongqing, eds, The 
Helen D. Ling Collection Of Chinese Ceramics (Seattle, 1995); Nicky Levell, “Scholars And Connoisseurs: 
Knowledge And Taste.  The Seligman Collection Of Chinese Art” in Anthony Shelton, Ed., Collectors, 
Expressions Of Self And Other (London, 2001): 73 – 90; Lara J. Netting, Acquiring Chinese Art And Culture: The 
Collections And Scholarship Of John C. Ferguson (1866-1945) Unpublished Dissertation, Princeton University 
(Princeton, 2009); Stacey Pierson,  Collectors, Collections And Museums: The Field Of Chinese Ceramics In 
Britain, 1560-1960 (Oxford, 2007); Julia B. Rosenbaum, Visions Of Belonging: New England Art And The Making 
Of American Identity (Ithaca, 2006); Yiyou Wang, The Loouvre From China: A Critical Study Of C. T. Loo And 
The Framing Of Chinese Art In The United Atates, 1915-1950 Unpublished Dissertation, Ohio State University 
(Ohio, 2007).
17 The seminal works in the studies of art appropriation and museum building come from scholars working on the 
history of Nazi Germany, including Lynn H. Nicholas, The Rape of Europa: the Fate of Europe's Treasures in the 
Third Reich and the Second World War (New York, 1994); Jonathan Petropoulos, Art as Politics in the Third 
Reich (Chapel Hill, 1996); Frederic Spotts, Hitler and the Power of Aesthetics (Woodstock, 2003). 12
Civilization argues that museum-building galvanized the formation and articulation of a new 
Chinese cultural heritage: a world view that allowed Chinese to embody antiquities with a 
continuous, five-millennia-old civilization whose physicality is not only tangible, but collectable, 
malleable, and worth displaying to both domestic and international audiences.  The rise of 
public museums in the PRC inspired individuals to re-imagine the world and the trajectory of 
their civilization within it.  
From the perspective of social and political historians in China and the West, the PRC's 
1950s museum-frenzy seems remarkably late.  Nationalist pride in a post-dynastic republic and 
popular antiquarianism fostered enough philanthropic movements to establish public museums 
several times over.
18  As the Shanghai Museum itself announced on its inaugural banners: “our 
people will never again be one battered by others, we have stood up, our revolution has already 
received the world's empathy and celebration.”
19  Indeed, museum exhibitions introduced a new 
18 For nationalism as an explanation for communal imaginaries see Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: 
Reflections On The Origin And Spread Of Nationalism (New York, 1991); For the case of China specifically, see 
Chalmers A. Johnson, Peasant Nationalism And Communist Power; The Emergence Of Revolutionary China 
(Stanford, 1962); John Fitzgerald, Awakening China: Politics, Culture, And Class In The Nationalist Revolution, 
(Stanford, 1996); Henrietta Harrison, The Making Of The Republican Citizen: Political Ceremonies And Symbols 
In China, 1911 – 1929 (Oxford, 2000); Rana Mitter, The Manchurian Myth: Nationalism, Resistance And 
Collaboration In Modern China (Berkeley, 2000); Rebecca E. Karl, Staging The World: Chinese Nationalism At 
The Turn Of The Twentieth Century (Durham, 2002); Stephan Anthony Smith, Like Cattle And Horses: 
Nationalism And Labor In Shanghai, 1895 – 1927 (Durham, 2002); Karl Gerth, China Made: Consumer Culture 
And The Creation Of The Nation (Cambridge, 2003); Diana Lary, “Regions and Nation: The Present Situation 
in China in Historical Context”, Pacific Affairs, 70, no. 2 (1997): 181-194 ; Zuoyue Wang “Saving China 
Through Science: The Science Society Of China, Scientific Nationalism, And Civil Society In Republican 
China” Osiris, 17 (2002): 291-322.
19 Exhibition schema and interpretations for Shanghai Museum Junior Staff (circa 1952), Private collection of Xia 
Shunkui.  This parallels Mao Zedong's PRC inauguration speeches, as noted by Roderick MacFarquhar “On 
'Liberation'” The China Quarterly, 200 (2009): 891-894.13
world order, one in which the PRC stood shoulder-to-shoulder with the United States, Britain, 
France, and all the other countries that once occupied Shanghai's International Settlement. 
While the Shanghai Museum fostered national interest in Chinese cultural heritage, it 
also represented the persistence of Shanghai's regional power.  The city's well-stocked coffers 
allowed its museum to acquire top-tier antiquities from poorer neighbors, such as nearby 
Suzhou and Hangzhou, as well as faraway Tibet and Yunnan.  The prestige of these acquisitions 
enabled Shanghai to refuse appropriation demands from Beijing, establishing itself as a 
collection that defined ancient Chinese civilization with antiquities that museums in the nation's 
capital could not obtain.  Unusually skilled conservators, whom the museum recruited and 
trained since the mid-1950s, made such a profound impact on the restoration of damaged 
artifacts that institutions outside Shanghai clamored to take lessons from its museum.  Thus, the 
city that once earned renown from its foreign concessions became a sophisticated repository 
that literally restored Chinese antiquity.  Furthermore, the expansion of municipal borders into 
hinterland counties such as Qingpu and Songjiang allowed museum archaeologists to unearth 
excavated artifacts that demonstrated that Shanghai, in its new conglomeration, wielded a 
history as old as ancient Chinese civilization itself.  These additions to the museum's permanent 
collection allowed the institution to argue that Shanghai's history did not stop at the 
International Settlements, but reached further back to ancient cultures that pre-dated the Tang 
dynasty.  By the 1960s, the museum's facilities, collection, and staff reversed the infrastructural 14
hierarchy that put Beijing at the center of cultural heritage narratives.  
Thus, despite the ready logic of a nationalist explanation, this study seeks to challenge 
the conceptual dichotomies that underlie the integration of antiquities into Chinese cultural 
heritage.  Reducing museums to propaganda instruments, or sites of nation-state building, 
occludes a more complex historical drama.  In the Shanghai Museum's case, the Manichean 
framework in which we might interpret its exhibitions resurrects a Cold War-mentality that 
historians are beginning to reject: that Socialist-era Chinese statesmen used top-down strategies 
to shape a faceless, heritage-proud population that privileges the continuity of Chinese 
civilization over all else, whereas the democratic West utilized its public sphere to foster 
multivalent narratives and artifacts about its recent and distant past.
20  Upon closer examination, 
these generalizations seem overly simplistic.
21  Individuals from a whole spectrum of social and 
political backgrounds peopled the Shanghai Museum.  In 1952, the staff roster included junior 
high school graduates and elite connoisseurs, art dealers and cultural heritage preservationists, 
craft repairers and scientists, each with their own agendas for pursuing municipal employment, 
as well as their own interests in the construction of a public dialogue on Chinese cultural 
heritage.  Also, the museum was never for Chinese, by Chinese.  Foreign tourism fueled the 
20 Orville Schell “China's Hidden Democratic Legacy”, Foreign Affairs, 83, no. 4 (2004): 116-124; Robert S. 
Snyder, “The End of Revolution?”, The Review of Politics, 61, no. 1 (1999): 5-28; 
21 In recent years, scholars have come to question the outdated framework that the Cold War imposed on East 
Asia.  For a selection of these interrogations see Harry Harootunian “The Black Cat In The Dark Room” 
Positions, 13, no.1 (2005): 137 – 155; Xiaobo Lu and Elizabeth J. Perry, “Introduction”, ed. Xiaobo Lu and 
Elizabeth J. Perry, Danwei: The Changing Chinese Workplace in Historical and Comparative Perspective (New 
York, 2004): 3-20; Elizabeth J. Perry “Studying Chinese Politics: Farewell to Revolution?” The China Journal, 
no. 57 (2007): 1-22.15
demand for Chinese cultural artifacts and museums, as well as the vast international market for 
Chinese art in America, Western Europe, and the Middle East (Figure 0.2).
22  If the Shanghai 
Museum's history characterizes Communist-Capitalist binaries, then the interpretive framework 
only affirms preexisting identifications in the minds of its visitors.  
Figure 0.2. A gallery guide walking members of the Women's International League for Peace and 
Freedom through the Tang dynasty exhibition galleries at the Shanghai Museum (1957).  Photo 
obtained from the Shanghai Municipal Archives (SMA)
22 For examples of non-state actors who campaigned vigorously for museum building in the PRC, see Qi Gong, Qi 
Gong Cong Gao [Qi Gong's Collected Drafts] (Beijing, 1981); Zhang Boju, Chun You She Suo Tan, Su Yue Lou 
Lian Yu [The Spring Outing Society's Trifling Chats, The Plain Moon Building's Couplets] (Beijing, 1998); 
Ding Yanfeng “Fu Zengxiang Yu Haiyuan Ge Yishu” [Fu Zengxiang And Books From The Haiyuan Ge Library] 
Guojia Tushu Guan Xuekan 15, no. 4, (2006): 67 – 73; Sun Ronglei, Jindai Cangshu Dajia Fu Zengxiang Yanjiu 
[Research Regarding Modern Bibliophile Fu Zengxiang] Unpublished Dissertation, Shandong University 
(Shandong, 2007).16
Seizing Civilization neither seeks to demonstrate the West's monolithic portrayal of 
China nor to champion forgotten interpretations of ancient Chinese civilization.  If the master 
narrative about Chinese authoritarianism and Western multiculturalism sounds stagnant, so too 
does the counter-narrative that populates the Chinese art historical canon with eremitic artists 
and impoverished scholar-amateurs who protest through obscure references, or paint Western 
museology as the source of cultural imperialism and racial bias.
23  Shanghai Museum acquisitions 
targeted folk embroideries as well as ancient bronzes.  As authenticators of Chinese art for 
Shanghai Customs, its employees enforced export regulations on dynastic relics and shaped the 
boundaries of contemporary Chinese art.  The museum’s staff-recruitment practices targeted 
illiterate craftsmen as well as college graduates; while its exhibitions had featured in-house 
displays as well as traveling poster shows, illuminated projector displays.  Furthermore, the 
museum’s retail channels drove the sale of reproduced antiquities from the moment of the 
institution’s creation in 1952.  This integration of “high” and “low”, “not for profit” and “retail”, 
23 Mark C. Elliot most poignantly highlighted this fallacies when he quipped “I don't think all these people went 
around saying 'oh I just can't take this nineteenth century'!”, AAS Chicago, 2009.  Art historical inquiries that 
address and seek to go beyond the literati-professional painter divide include Anning Jing “The Portraits of 
Khubilai Khan and Chabi by Anige (1245-1306), a Nepali Artist at the Yuan Court” Artibus Asiae, 54, no. 1/2 
(1994): 40-86; Sherman E. Lee “Yan Hui, Zhong Kui, Demons and the New Year” Artibus Asiae, 53, no. 1/2 
(1993): 211-227; Jerome Silbergeld “The Evolution of a "Revolution": Unsettled Reflections on the Chinese 
Art-Historical Mission” Archives of Asian Art, 55 (2005): 39-52; Peter C. Sturman “The Donkey Rider as Icon: 
Li Cheng and Early Chinese Landscape Painting” Artibus Asiae, 55, no. 1/2 (1995): 43-97; Richard Vinograd 
“Origins and Presences: Notes on the Psychology and Sociality of Shitao's Dreams” Ars Orientalis, 25, (1995): 
61-72; For similar insights on western museums see Miriam R. Levin “Museums And The Democratic Order” 
The Wilson Quarterly 26, no. 1, (2002): 52 – 65; Robert S. Nelson “The Map of Art History” The Art Bulletin, 
79, no. 1 (1997): 28-40.17
suggests that “elite”, “connoisseur”, and even “antiquity” are mutable terms whose meanings 
become unfixed in the invention of heritage.  As I show throughout this study, the articulation of 
heritage narratives presupposes a nation of antiquities enthusiasts unbound by the distinctions 
of class, and fills works of art, as well as the individuals who own, trade, and engage with them, 
with new cultural, social, and political values.  
Commodifying The Canon
In both its origins and practice, narratives of cultural heritage operate on an implicit 
binary that places cultural institutions in a separate category from the art market.
24  Chinese 
museums, however, regulated sales from the moment the PRC’s Cultural Relics laws designated 
museum employees as Customs inspectors for the export Chinese art market in 1949.  Art 
dealers worked as authenticators for the Shanghai Museum, while local art markets had an 
implicit understanding to funnel choice acquisitions to the museum at cut-rate prices, as well as 
to help the state predict collecting trends both on the mainland and abroad.  More importantly, 
throughout the Shanghai Museum's history its staff, as did cultural institution employees all over 
24 The narrative of cultural heritage is most visible in the study of architectural and archaeological preservation, as 
presented by Chen Xingcan, Zhongguo shi qian kaogu xue shi yanjiu, 1895 – 1949 [Before Chinese History: A 
History of Archaeological Studies 1895 – 1949] (Beijing, 1997); Cherie Wendelken-Mortensen, Living with the 
Past: Preservation and Development in Japanese Architecture and Town Planning Unpublished Dissertation, 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Cambridge, 1994); Magnus Thorkell Bernhardsson, Reclaiming a 
Plundered Past: Archaeology and Nation Building in Modern Iraq (Austin, 2005), Talinn Grigor, Building Iran: 
Modernism, Architecture, and National Heritage under the Pahlavi Monarchs (New York, 2009); in recent years, 
further studies on organizations such as UNESCO have broadened the dialog towards an understanding of 
world cultural heritage, as discussed by Lucia Allais, Will to War, Will to Art: Cultural Internationalism and the 
Modern Aesthetics of Monuments, 1932 – 1964 Unpublished Dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
(Cambridge, 2008).18
China, inventoried expropriated antiquities and determined which the museum acquired, which 
the dealerships sold for profit, and which were simply not art.  These intersections between 
museum and market demonstrate the persistent interest that cultural institutions maintain in 
profiting from the sale of art, both in China and overseas.  
Narratives of cultural heritage often propose that cultural institutions “preserve” art from 
commercial interests.  They assert that museums only expand acquisitions – the permanent 
collections don't change institutions, go up for sale, nor do institutions reproduce specific 
artifacts for profit.  Increasingly, however, art historians have noted that cultural institutions 
participate in commerce and even sell artifacts, often as part of the collecting tradition.
25  As 
such, the Shanghai Museum's history demonstrates a syncretic process in which individuals 
working in both museums and the art market – none of whom adhere to the boundaries that 
their professions suggest – co-created value and meaning, in the service of heritage.  It is through 
this process that the abovementioned cast of characters assembled the collections that underline 
our notion of the Chinese art historical canon. 
As a collection of “cultural relics from all ages” and part of “one of the first countries in 
the world to develop civilization”, the Shanghai Museum's antiquities derive their value from 
representing the canon.
26 This includes both an immutable coterie of objects that define Chinese 
25 Susan A. Crane, “Memory, Distortion, And History In The Museum” History And Theory 36, no. 4, (1997): 44 – 
63; Donald Preziosi, Brain of The Earth's Body: Art, Museums, And The Phantasms Of Modernity (Minneapolis, 
2003); Craig Clunas, Fruitful Sites: Garden Culture In Ming Dynasty China (London, 1996); Craig Clunas, 
Superfluous Things: Material Culture And Social Status In Early Modern China (Honolulu, 2004); 
26 Shanghai Museum Chenlieshi shuomingshu [An Interpretative Guide to the Exhibitions] (Shanghai, 1952): 4. 
The book is out of print.  I found my copy in the private collection of Xia Shunkui.19
civilization, as well as a set of artistic categories that represent the “essential criteria of 
antiquities” in China.
27  Seizing Civilization interrogates the idea that such a canon exists. 
Especially when filtered through the lens of shifting acquisition programs, policy foci, and active 
museum intervention in the art market, a fixed Chinese art historical canon is conceptually 
ineffective when we consider the history of the Shanghai Museum in greater detail.  Its 
acquisition ledgers, as well as the various constituents of people who carried out acquisitions, do 
far more than reproduce a pre-ordained list of Chinese art's greatest hits.  Museum employees 
introduced new categories of collecting, such as coins, ethnic minority artifacts, furniture, and 
stone buddhas.  State and municipal recycling projects salvaged texts and bronzes, many of 
which predate the Ming (1368 – 1644) and Qing (1644 – 1911) dynasties, from industrial 
refineries so that the objects could be acquired by regional and national museum collections.  In 
fact, my findings show that Shanghai's metal recycling projects retrieved and distributed 532 
first-tier bronzes relics throughout the country at a time when the Shanghai Museum only 
owned 105 of the same – an achievement that accounts for the strong representation of ancient 
bronze relics in PRC museums.
28  The museum staff's Customs inspection duties kept 
27 I take this phrase from the Gegu yaolun, the eponymous fourteenth century text on Chinese antiquities.  It lists 
the categories, in order of importance, as ancient bronzes, ancient paintings, ancient calligraphy, ancient zithers, 
ancient ink stones, precious objects (jades, agates, crystal, etc), metals (brown gold, silver, steel, etc), ancient 
porcelain, ancient lacquer, textiles, rare woods, rare stones, and studio objects.  Cao Zhao, Chinese 
Connoisseurship: The Ko Ku Yao Lun, The Essential Criteria of Antiquities Trans. Sir Percival David (New York, 
1963): xv – xxx.  Craig Clunas pioneered the social analyses of these categories in Craig Clunas, Superfluous 
Things: Material Culture And Social Status In Early Modern China (Honolulu, 2004).
28 First-tier refers to antiquities that the museum inventory categorizes as the best of the best – normally less than 
1% of any collection.  Information compiled from Huadong wenhua bu, Shanghai shi wenhua ju guanyu wenwu 
zhengli cangku ku cun tongqi waili wenti de baogao, pifu [The China Eastern Cultural Affairs Administration and 20
antiquities made before 1795 from export, while its enforcement of Cultural Relics laws 
succeeded in pushing the legal definition of exportable art to objects made after 1911, and more 
recently to extend commercial restrictions to specific artists' signature works, such as that of Qi 
Baishi, Xu Beihong, and Wu Hufan.
29  
The canon of Chinese art is a trope that reinforces temporal boundaries and erases the 
density of local, national, and international transactions that cast antiquities as representative of 
China in the first place.  For example, the 1795 demarcation for art exports privileged the quality 
of artistic production before and during the Qianlong emperor's reign – establishing the sixtieth 
year of the Qianlong emperor’s reign as a temporal marker of distinction both in China and 
overseas.
30  Selective export restrictions on art made after 1911 created two distinct collections, 
one gradually accumulated by overseas buyers as Cultural Relics laws came to regulate the 
the Shanghai Cultural Affairs Administration's Report and Responses To The Disposal Of Bronze Objects 
Stored In the Cultural Relics Rescue Warehouse] September 1
st, 1953 – November 4
th, 1955, B172-4-422, 
SMA, Shanghai; Wenhua bu, shanghai shi wenhua ju guanyu bianzhi, chuban shanghai bowuguan yiji cangping 
jianmu, huace, tupu de tongzhi, baogao, zongjie [Cultural Division and Shanghai Ministry of Culture's Reports 
and Rescripts Regarding Publishing the Shanghai Museum's First Tier Collections' Index, Illustrated Album, 
and Graphics Archive], February 1963 – November 1963, B172-1-443, SMA, Shanghai; Shanghai shi wenhua ju 
guanyu shangbao shanghai gemin lishi jinian guan, shanghai bowuguan, shanghai luxun jinian guan yiji cangping de 
baogao, mulu [Shanghai Cultural Affairs Administration's Report and Table of Contents Regarding First Tier 
Collections at the Shanghai Revolutionary History Museum, Shanghai Museum, and Shanghai Luxun Memorial 
Museum], August 1960 – October 1965, B172-1-498, SMA, Shanghai. 
29 Interview with Zhang Qinghao, December 24
th, 2009; 
For the 1949 version of Cultural Relics law see Zhongyang renmin zhengfu zhenwu Yuan “Fenfa 'jinzhi 
zhenggui wenwu tushu chukou zanxing banfa' ling” [Announcement 'Provisional Plans For Preventing the 
Export of Precious Cultural Relics and Books] Wenwu cankao zhiliao 1, no. 1- 6, (1950): 5 – 7.  
For the more recent version of this law see State Administration Of Cultural Heritage, Zhonghua renmin 
gongheguo wenwu baohufa shishi tiaole [Implementation Regulations For The People's Republic Of China's 
Cultural Relics Protection Law] Zhonghua renmin gonghe guo gowu Yuan ling #337 visited on May 8
th, 2011 from 
http://www.sach.gov.cn/tabid/311/InfoID/381/Default.aspx
30 Chapter 1 discusses the application of PRC Cultural Relics Laws in detail.21
international market for Chinese art, and another enshrined in collections throughout the 
mainland – resulting in two disparate canons of modern and contemporary Chinese art.  Since 
the 1970s, collecting trends have also rendered snuff bottles, Maoist posters, and even cigarette 
cards into artistic categories.  Exhibitions that feature these objects lavish praise on their 
“ambiguous appeal”, suggesting that these genres possesses a timeless quality comparable to 
more traditionally accepted categories of Chinese art, such as bronze relics, ceramics, and 
painting and calligraphy.
31
The constant promotion and demotion of objects from a “definitive” canon 
characterizes the narrative of cultural heritage.  This condition does not only refer to museum in 
the PRC, but also international cultural committees and their assemblage of a world cultural 
heritage.  The fiction of immutable greatest hits and categories, as well as the manufactured 
aspect of value in “signature pieces” depends on an art historical trope that designates specific 
objects as masterpieces which together tell the “story of art”.
32  This schema is shared by art 
historians from Heinrich Wölfflin to Qi Gong, a calligraphy specialist whose commentaries 
remain in use at institutions like the National Palace Museum in Beijing.
33  Canonical objects are 
31 Quoted from the exhibition introduction of University of Westminster, Poster Power: Images From Mao’s China, 
Then And Now, (London, 2011), visited June 7
th, 2011 from http://www.westminster.ac.uk/about/news-and-
events/events/2011/poster-power; for related collecting interests see the China Posters Foundation at 
http://chineseposters.net; for snuff bottles see Elsa Glickman, Chinese Snuff Bottle Mania: Stories Of Collectors, 
Trade, Intrigues And Gotham's Auctions (Hong Kong, 2006)
32 I take this phrase from its eponymous book, E. H. Gombrich, The Story Of Art (1950; repr. ed., London, 1995)
33 For examples of Qi Gong's work in creating a canon of Chinese calligraphy see Qi Gong and Yang Renkai, eds., 
Sui Tang Wudai Shufa [Calligraphy From The Sui, Tang, And Five Dynasties] (Beijing, 1989); Qi Gong and 
Shen Peng, eds., Song Jin Yuan Shufa [Calligraphy From The Song, Jin, And Yuan Dynasties](Beijing, 1986); Qi 
Gong, ed., Shang Zhong Zhi Qin Han Shufa [Calligraphy From The Shang, Zhong, Through The Qin and Han 22
uniformly defined as stand-alones, unfettered by market vicissitudes.  Although preservation 
without market or institutional intervention is hardly imaginable even in the case of the “great 
masters”, the value of the work of art’s independence from either is, ironically, a minimum 
criterion for membership in the canon.
34  Museums are thus consistently positioned as 
custodians, thereby “preserving” the distinction between price and value.  I propose, however, 
that so long as museums remain primary sites for the assemblage and exhibition of an artistic 
canon that represents “civilization”, their role may always be seen as “seizing civilization”.
If this caricatures the process of canon formation, founded on the presupposition of 
inviolate greats and their progeny, it only further evinces how unabashed references to “Five 
Thousand Years of Chinese Civilization” lends itself to the modern Chinese state's 
dissemination of cultural essentialisms.  The assemblage of any official canon of art depends on 
the existence of objects, as well as cultural arbiters, that stand apart from the impact of social, 
cultural, political, and economic change.  In recent years, however, art historians from Donald 
Preziosi to Craig Clunas have challenged this presupposition, raising the possibility that 
different constituents of people, institutions, and nation-states “did not merely reflect, but 
served to create, social and class identities, or qualities like 'elegant' and 'vulgar', or 'the values 
and tastes of the educated elite.'”
35  I argue in this study that cultural institutions create heritage, 
Dynasties] (Beijing, 1987).
34 Winnie Wong's dissertation helped me unpack language of canonization in the art historical establishment. 
Winnie Won Yin Wong, After The Copy: Creativity, Originality And The Labor Of Appropriation, Dafen Village, 
Shenzhen, China (1989 – 2010) Unpublished Dissertation, Massachusetts Institute Of Technology 
(Cambridge, 2010).
35 Craig Clunas “Ginger Cheng-Chi Hsu. A Bushel Of Pearls: Painting For Sale In Eighteenth-Century 23
and erase provenance.  For constituencies of the modern Chinese state, ever sensitive to 
evaluations from within and without, heritage is a matter of self-invention and performance, 
particularly as the acquisition and exhibition of antiquities continue to shape the reception of 
China.  The vast arrays of individuals who placed antiquities in the Shanghai Museum's custody 
reveal that no individual, or artifact, enters the museum as a blank cultural slate.
36  The 
individuals who acquired, preserved, sold, exhibited, and narrated the story of Chinese art 
engage in ongoing negotiations that keep terms like that “elite”, “connoisseur”, and “antiquity” 
under construction, and therefore meaningful.
Inventing Donors
  Art museums are hardly the first medium to facilitate cultural heritage narratives.  The 
antiquarian Zhang Yenyüan (ca. 815 – after 875) and his literary audience looked to ancient 
artifacts as both a confrontation with mortality and a tool with which to reach beyond time, 
which in turn inspired antiquarians of the early seventeenth century to identify antiquarian 
manuals and encyclopedias as an extension of themselves and a shared classical heritage.
37 
When archaeologists associated with the Great Game discovered the Dunhuang caves, both 
Chinese and international audiences dubbed the sites “treasures” and immediately incorporated 
Yangchow” The American Historical Review, 107, no. 4, (2002): 1202.
36 I borrow the term inhabited museum from Roberta Bonetti, “The Museum As An Inhabited Object” RES: 
Anthropology And Aesthetics no. 52, (2007):168 – 180.
37 For the interest in manuals see Wai-Yee Li, “The Collector, The Connoisseur, And Late-Ming Sensibility” 
T'oung Pao, 81, fasc. 4/5 (1995): 269 – 302;  For encyclopedias see Carla Nappi, The Monkey Of The Inkpot: 
Natural History And Its Transformations In Early Modern China Unpublished Dissertation, Princeton University 
(Princeton, 2006); Bruce Rusk The Rogue Classicist: Feng Fang (1493 - 1566) And His Forgeries Unpublished 
Dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles (Los Angeles, 2004); 24
them into often conflicting narratives about Chinese civilization.
38  Langdon Warner, amongst 
the first to recognize the value of Dunhuang's artifacts, considered his expedition to the 
Taklamakan dessert “a labour of love”, particularly as they yielded ancient Chinese “works of 
art” that “no vandal hand but mine had disturbed...for eleven hundred years.”
39  Archaeological 
discoveries in northwest China expanded the borders of Chinese cultural heritage into the 
Central Asia, while ongoing disputes over the Dunhuang artifacts enlisted British, Swedish, 
French, American, Canadian, and Chinese alike as potential authorities of Chinese cultural 
heritage.
40
Even in its own time, the public Chinese art museum was not unique in its ability to 
38 Peter Hopkirk, Foreign Devils on the Silk Road the Search for the Lost Cities and Treasures of Chinese Central Asia 
(Amherst, 1980); Jeannette Mirsky Sir Aurel Stein Archaeological Explorer (Chicago and London, 1977);
39 Langdon Warner, The Long Old Road In China (Garden City, 1926): 144.
40 For period writings see “Chinese Expedition of Andrews Banned Commission for Preservation of Antiquities 
Says American’s ‘Arrogance’ is to Blame”, New York Times July 3, 1931; Folke Bergman, Archaeological 
Researches In Sinkiang, Especially The Lopnor Region (Stockholm, 1939); Mildred Cable And Francesca French, 
Through Jade Gate And Central Asia; An Account Of Journeys In Kansu, Turkestan And The Gobi Desert (London, 
1927); Albert Von Le Coq, Buried Treasures Of Chinese Turkistan (New York, 1988); Sven Hedin, Across The 
Gobi Desert (London, 1931); Aurel Stein, Ruins Of Desert Cathay: Personal Narrative Of Explorations In Central 
Asia And Westernmost China (London, 1912); Chang Shuhong “Jingao Quleisi. Jeni he tamen de zhuzi men” [A 
Warning To Charles Jenning And His Masters] Wenwu, no. 8, (1955): 3 – 4; Langdon Warner, Buddhist Wall 
Paintings, A Study Of A Ninth Century Grotto At Wan Fo Hsia (Cambridge, 1938).
For how Dunhuang archaeological artifacts continue to change conceptions of the landmass and authorship of 
Chinese cultural heritage see Christopher Atwood, “Life In The Third Fourth Century Cad’ota: A Survey Of 
Information Gathered From The Prakrit Documents Found North Of Minfeng (Niya)”, Central Asiatic Journal 
35, no. 3 – 4, (1991): 161 – 99; Xincan Chen, Zhongguo shiqian kaoguxue shi yanjiu, 1895 – 1949 [Before 
Chinese History: A History of Archaeological Studies 1895 – 1949] (Beijing, 1997); Valerie Hansen, “The Path 
Of Buddhism Into China: The View From Turfan” Asia Major, Third Series, 11, no. 2, (1998): 37 – 66; James 
A. Millward “Coming On To The Map: Western Regions Geography And Cartographic Nomenclature In The 
Making of Chinese Empire In Xinjiang” Late Imperial China 20, no. 2, (1999): 61 – 98; Laura J. Newby, “The 
Chinese Literary Conquest of Xinjiang” Modern China 25, no. 4, (1999): 458 – 9; Prods Oktor Skjærvø, 
Khotanese Manuscripts From Chinese Turkistan In The British Library (London, 2002); Mariko Namba Walter, 
“Tocharian Buddhism In Kusha: Buddhism Of Indo-European Centum Speakers In China Before 10
th Century C. E.” 
Sino Platonic Papers, 85, (October, 1998): 1 – 30; 25
articulate Chinese cultural heritage.  Around the turn of the twentieth century, an efflorescence 
of new associations, modes of communication, and inland-to-coastal migration on the mainland 
revolutionized perceptions of China and its ancient civilization.  Regional and international 
Chinese art exhibitions changed the material representation of China.
41  The dissemination of 
rare texts and the revival of architectural history made China's distant and recent past palpable 
to both domestic and overseas audiences, while the expanding wealth of port cities like Shanghai 
and Guangdong brought the interests of elite Beijing connoisseurs to new antiquarians on the 
southeastern coast.
42  
41 Lisa Claypool, “Zhang Jian And China's First Museum” The Journal Of Asian Studies, 64, no. 3, (2005): 567 – 
604; Nick Pearce, “Shanghai 1908: A. W. Bhar And China's First Art Exhibition” West 86
th, 18, no. 1 (2011): 4 – 
25; Alfred Salmony, “Chinese Art.  The First Exhibition Of The Friends Of Far Eastern Art” Parnassus, 6, no. 7, 
(December 1934): 14 –16; Alfred Salmony and David E. Berenberg “Peking As A Museum City” Parnassus, 3, 
no. 1, (January 1931): 35 – 37; Shenyang Yigong Lianglingzhi Bianzuanweiyuan Hui, eds., Shenyang Gugongzhi 
[Shenyang Imperial Palace Gazetteer] (Shenyang Shi, 2006); Zhuang Yan, Qiansheng zaoding gugong yuan [My 
Predestined Life At The National Palace Museum] (Beijing, 2006).
Thought provoking accounts of related movements in Japan include Lisbeth Kim Brandt, Kingdom Of Beauty: 
Mingei And The Politics Of Folk Art In Imperial Japan (Durham, 2007); Stefan Tanaka, Japan's Orient: Rendering 
Pasts Into History (Berkeley, 1993); Alice Yu-Ting Tseng, Art In Place: The Display of Japan At The Imperial 
Museums, 1872 – 1909 Unpublished Dissertation Harvard University (Cambridge, 2004); 
A contemporary equivalent of these museum projects may be the Confucius Institutes, as described by James F. 
Paradise, “China and International Harmony: The Role of Confucius Institutes in Bolstering Beijing's Soft 
Power” Asian Survey, 49, no. 4 (2009): 647-669
42 For studies on the Beijing-Shanghai connection with regards to antiquities, see Zhongyuan Chen, Guwan 
shihua yu jiangshang [Antiquities: Its History And Connoisseurship] (Beijing, 1990); Hua Deng, ed. Qingdai 
Dashoucangjia Chen Jieqi [Chen Jieqi, a Major Qing Dynasty Collector] (Beijing, 2005); Gail King “The Xujiajhui 
(Zikaiwei) Library Of Shanghai” Libraries & Culture, 32, no. 4 (1997): 456 – 469; Weiji Li, ed. Cangshi fenyunlu 
[A Record of Collecting Tales] (Beijing, 2004); Jizu Luo, Tingwen Yilue : Huiyi Xufu Luo Zhenyu de Yisheng 
[Tales Remembered and Heard from the Hall: a Memoir of the Life of my Grandfather Luo Zhenyu] 
(Changchun Shi, 1987); Mayuyama & Company, Mayuyama, Seventy Years, Vol. 1, (Tokyo, 1976); Sadajirō 
Yamanaka, Tenryusan sekibutsushu [Stone sculptures of Tianlong Mountain] (Osaka, 1928); Renkai Yang, 
Guobao Chenfulu: Gugong Sanyishuhua Jianwen Kaolüe [The Emergence and Disappearance of National 
Treasure: a Record of the Texts and Paintings that Dispersed from the Forbidden Palace] (Shanghai, 2007).26
Yet if museums were not wholly unique in their ability to shape Chinese cultural 
heritage, they nonetheless did so in distinctive ways.  Imbued with state authority, its staff could 
seize private property at the same time as it praised philanthropists for their generous donations 
to the museum.  For example, in the first ten issues of Wenwu, the PRC's premiere art and 
archaeology journal, the regime of nationalism led museum visitors to believe that cultural 
institutions accrued their antiquities from an outpouring of jingoistic donations during the early 
1950s.
43  Only the so-called imperialist oppressors, such as the United States and the defeated 
Guomindang state, would requisition antiquities from Chinese families.  Statistical analysis on 
the Shanghai Museum and the Palace Museum in Beijing's acquisition ledgers demonstrate, 
however, that the rhetoric of “spontaneous nationalism” overreaches itself.
44  Cultural 
Revolution acquisitions confirm that the Shanghai Museum's collections took an exponential 
leap due to the museum staff's participation in house raids.
45  Post-Cultural Revolution 
restitution plans show that even celebrated donations in the 1980s and 90s bear the imprint of 
an iron fist that refused to lose its grip on confiscated art.
46  Indeed, the fiction of donation 
smoothes over a consistent process of requisitions and divestment bonanzas that explain how 
institutions like the Shanghai Museum could acquire, over mere decades, one of the foremost 
        For similar studies with regards to architectural and archaeological artifacts see Nancy Shatzman Steinhardt 
“The Tang Architectural Icon And The Politics Of Chinese Architectural History” The Art Bulletin 86, no. 2, 
(June 2004): 228 – 254; Sigrid Schmalzer The People's Peking Man: Popular Science And Human Identity In 
Twentieth Century China (Chicago, 2008).
43 For one example see “Juanxian” Wenwu, no. 1 (1950) 81 – 89.
44 I discuss statistical anomalies in museum donations over time in detail in chapter 1.
45 For more on how the museum profits through the Cultural Revolution chapters 3 and 4.
46 My discussion on post-1980s “donors” and their requests appears in chapter 5. 27
collections of Chinese bronzes, ceramics, calligraphy, and painting in the world. 
 The Shanghai Museum's transformation of confiscations into philanthropic narratives 
represents both a reverberation and an inversion of the donation fiction.  Its collection is a 
conglomeration of objects requisitioned from various constituents of people at multiple 
impasses in PRC history, starting in 1949 and continuing to the present.  Every day, visitors from 
China and abroad arrive hoping to immerse themselves in Five Thousand Years of Chinese 
Civilization, at the same time as some revisit family heirlooms that they could not behold 
otherwise.  Other visitors receive special treatment from museum staff and municipal officials 
because they contributed cash, private collections, or helped the museum contact individuals 
from whom it wishes to acquire yet more antiquities.  All these individuals hope to benefit from 
the fiction of donation, which signifies status at national museums.  Yet, as an appropriating 
entity that seizes the same antiquities that it praises its donors for contributing, the Shanghai 
Museum also stands for the oppressive entity against which it touts its own record of preserving 
antiquities.  In order for the Shanghai Museum to become a philanthropic cultural institution, 
the affectation of donation – possessions given free of charge – must be named, celebrated, and 
promulgated.  Thus, Seizing Civilization examines not only the Shanghai Museum's acquisition 
records, but the policies, practices, and “collector psychology” that the institution utilizes to 
renew the fiction of donation.  
    My findings show that Chinese museums utilized the fiction of donation over and over 28
again, both in the articulation of Chinese cultural heritage and the fabrication of Red 
antiquarians, the individuals whose contributions shaped that heritage.  This fiction relies on the 
formation of an elite community that self-consciously identifies its philanthropic purposes, and 
that museums hold up for institutional legitimacy.
47  The emphasis on philanthropy arose as part 
of American and European museologies' focus on patrons and their bequests.
48  Public Chinese 
museums adopted this rhetoric in the 1950s, largely as a way to both appease the top strata of 
elite society and to rally favor and popular interest in their institutions' growing collections.
49 
47 Prominent examples include the life of Zhang Boju and the Guoyun Lou Collection.  For Zhang Boju see 
Shixiang Wang, "XiJin Lu Ji pingfu tie liuchuan kaolue." [The Provenance Of Western Jin Master Lu Ji's 
Restoration Scroll] Wenwu can kao ziliao no. 1, (1957): 12 – 14; Luxia Song,  Bainian shoucang: 20 Shiji 
zhongguo minjian shoucang fengyun Lu [A Hundred Years Of Collecting: A Record Of Twentieth Century 
Private Collecting In China] (Shanghai, 1999); Boju Zhang, "Tan Jindai de shufa." [About Jin Dynasty 
Calligraphy] Wenwu can kao ziliao no.1, (1957):  15; Yihe Zhang, Wangshi binbu ru yan [The Past Is Not Like 
Smoke] (Beijing, 2004);
For Guoyun Lou see Shanghai Bowu guan, ed., Gu Gongxiong jia shu juan zeng Shanghai bowu guan guoyun lou 
shu hua jicui [The Select Painting And Calligraphy Treasures From Guoyun Lou That The Gu Gongxiong 
Family Donated To The Shanghai Museum] (Shanghai, 2002); Zhong Zheng, Bowu guan yu shoucang jia 
[Museums And Collectors] (Shanghai, 2000); Zhong Zheng, Haishang shoucang jia [Collectors In Shanghai] 
(Shanghai, 2003).
48 Pierre Bourdieu and Alan Darbel, The Love of Art: European Art Museums and Their Public (Cambridge, 1991); 
Rosalind P. Blakesley “Art, Nationhood, And Display: Zinaida Volkonskaia And Russia's Quest For A National 
Museum Of Art” Slavic Review, 67, no. 4, (2008): 912 – 933; Ann Day and Ken Lunn “Tales From The Sea: 
Oral History In British Maritime Museums” Oral History 32, no. 2, (2004): 87 – 96; Barbara Franco “The 
Challenge Of A City Museum For Washington, D. C.” Washington History 15, no. 1, (2003): 4 – 25; Donald 
Preziosi “Epilogue: The Art Of Art History” in Donald Preziosi, ed., The Art Of Art History: A Critical 
Anthology (Oxford, 2009): 488 – 504; J. Donald Ragsdale, Western European Museums And Visual Persuasion: 
Art, Edifice, And Social Influence (Newcastle, 2009); Alex Wexler, “Museum Culture And The Inequities Of 
Display And Representation” Visual Art Research 33, no. 1 (2007): 25 – 33; 
49 For a brief introduction to state strategies towards cultural infrastructure building, see Kirk A. Denton 
“Museums, Memorial Sites And Exhibitionary Culture In The People's Republic Of China” The China 
Quarterly, 183, (2005): 565 – 586; Chang-tai Hung, “Revolutionary History In Stone: The Making Of A 
Chinese National Monument” The China Quarterly, 166, (2001): 457 – 473; Wu Hung “Tiananmen Square: A 
Political History Of Monuments” Representations, no. 35, (1991): 84 – 117; Richard Kraus The Party And The 
Arty In China: The New Politics Of Culture (Oxford, 2004); Rana Mitter “Behind The Scenes At The Museum: 
Nationalism, History And Memory In The Beijing War of Resistance Museum, 1987 – 1997” The China 29
The affectation of donation, however, reinforces nationalist claims and erases the different 
constituents of people, institutions, policies, and contingencies that made donations the 
operative fiction driving Chinese cultural heritage. 
Bequest ceremonies, state merit awards, and exclusive museum memberships are some 
of the techniques that museums use to give the fiction of donation tangibility.  These rites also 
gave donations the palpable, quantifiable marker of consent, especially as traumatic upheavals in 
the 1960s and 70s made the link between antiquities and nationalism untenable.  This 
phenomenon, which I call the cult of consent, became the platform on which the Shanghai 
Museum built a cultural heritage devoid of provenance.  By gaining legitimacy for its 
appropriations through consent, the museum erased private collecting as a mode of art 
appreciation.  Donation, or rather, obtaining a consensual donation, became the prerogative 
with which museums restored antiquities to their “true” value.   
Seizing Civilization charts the assemblage of the Shanghai Museum collection through 
time, from its shaky beginnings in the 1950s to its emergence as one of the world's three largest 
collections of antiquities in the 1990s.  Requisitions featured prominently in the museum's 
history.  When Mayor Chen Yi (1901 – 1972) made his grand entry into Shanghai in 1949, he 
found himself in a city full of military-occupied spaces.  The military commander “personally 
Quarterly, 161 (2000): 279 – 293; Susan Naquin, “The Forbidden City Goes Abroad: Qing History And The 
Foreign Exhibitions Of The Palace Museum, 1974 – 2004” T'oung Pao, 90, fasc. 4/5 (2004): 341 – 397; 
Michael Sullivan “Art In China Since 1949” The China Quarterly, no. 159, (1999): 712 – 722.  For examples of 
southern and southeastern Chinese museums, see Ankeney Weitz, “Notes On The Early Yuan Antique Art 
Market In Hangzhou” Ars Orientalis, 27, (1997): 27 – 28; Qin Shao “Exhibiting The Modern: The Creation Of 
The First Chinese Museum, 1905 – 1930” The China Quarterly no. 179 (2004): 684 – 702.30
went to look for places to put the Shanghai Museum”, and after rejecting “a lot of houses that the 
foreigners left behind”, Chen Yi finally decided on the Shanghai Race Club headquarters in the 
People's Square.
50  Established by five English businessmen as a recreation space in 1850, the 
club occupied one of the largest green spaces in the city and was both an international icon and a 
prominent destination for foreign tourists in Shanghai.  The field army requisitioned the 
building from the British colonial administration in 1946, which had just re-requisitioned the 
space from the Japanese Imperial Army in 1945.  Chen Yi, in turn, “had the authority” to 
requisition the club from the field army and “once the building was fixed up it became the library 
and museum.”
51  Thus, not only does the Shanghai Museum's collection bear the imprint of 
many different individuals, entities both requisitioned and purchased, domestic and foreign, 
regional and national also marked its very creation.  In the following chapters, I trace the 
museum's move from a borrowed semi-colonial structure to its current, self-designed building in 
the middle of the People's Square.  I also outline the genealogy of the museum's acquisition 
program, from donor-relations programming to its so-called “collector psychology” approach.
52 
In the process, I present the history of the Shanghai Museum as a starting point from which to 
explore historiographic questions about cultural institutions, canonization, and the articulation 
of cultural heritage. 
50 Interview with Li Junjie, January 21
st, 2010.
51 Interview with Li Junjie, January 21
st, 2010.
52 I gratefully borrow this term from reporter Zheng Zhong, who uses it to describe PRC cultural institutions' 
long-term courtship of individual “donors” as part of their acquisition program.31
Manufacturing The State Effect
Seizing Civilization is, fundamentally, a history of cultural identity and its embeddedness 
in things, institutions, and people.  My findings show that these disparate entities, together, 
“enabled mundane material practices to take on the appearance of an abstract, nonmaterial 
form”, also known as the party-state.
53  Permeating the distinction between state and society, the 
Shanghai Museum's conglomeration of individuals and things maintained “Five Thousand Years 
of Chinese Civilization”, a social and political order so deeply ingrained that we often see 
overseas cultural institutions, as well as mainland Chinese, repeat the same when referring to 
China.
54  Historian Prasenjit Duara has described such sinocentrism as part of “the contingency 
and contestedness of nations...the false unity of a self-same, national subject evolving through 
time” which “allows the nation-state to see itself as a unique form of community which finds its 
place in the opposition between tradition and modernity, hierarchy and equality, empire and 
nation.”
55  In other words, the rhetoric of Chinese exceptionalism presupposes a monolithic 
53 Timothy Mitchell, “Society, Economy, And The State Effect” in Aradhana Sharma and Akhil Gupta, eds., The 
Anthropology Of The State (Malden, 2006): 170.  Philip Kuhn addresses this phenomenon in the Chinese 
context in Philip A. Kuhn, “Ideas Behind China's Modern State” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, 55, no. 2 
(Dec., 1995): 295-337.
54 In addition to the ubiquitous references to “China has five thousand years of history” amongst Chinese popular 
culture, we also see overseas sinophiles touting the same.  In A History Of The World In One Hundred Objects, 
a 2010-2011 British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) program that proclaimed museum antiquities as the 
representatives of world history, the anonymous contributor of a Chinese coin wrote that it “is a constant 
reminder to me of how ancient the Chinese civilisation is and how different their ways are to ours...I like to hold 
it and think of the ancient times so far away in China.”  Chinese Coin,  A History Of The World In One Hundred 
Objects, Produced By BBC Radio 4 And The British Museum, (2010), visited on May 7
th, 2011 from 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/ahistoryoftheworld/objects/uqu0lqOXQSiC9sDe0ZpcjA
55 Prasenjit Duara, Rescuing History From The Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China (Chicago, 1995): 4.32
party-state whose machinations invented a nation, China, that stands apart from political 
disputes, social fissures, and temporal erosion.  The making of Shanghai's collection, however, 
demonstrates that the party-state is not a singular actor.  It is itself a collection of constituents 
that produce the effects of a freestanding entity called the state.
56  
In Shanghai, an entire cast of characters made up Chinese cultural heritage as they went 
along.  While the Central Committee deemed some of these individuals “taste-makers” for their 
antiquarian skill sets, most, like the Class of 1952, were simply there to make a living.
57  As the 
museum developed and changed over time, so too did its staff, visitors, and benefactors. 
Together, their experiences demonstrate the particular practices, processes, and techniques that 
“have continually reproduced the ghost-like abstraction of the state”.
58
Professionalization played a key role in reifying the state effect.  The history of the 
Shanghai Museum bears out this point.  In the decade beginning in 1949, civil service 
employment offered great advantages to young, ambitious Chinese.  Museum salaries adjusted 
for inflation.  Museum-affiliation offered access to stability at the same time as museums 
56 For a discussion of similar constituents in the non-museum context see Hung-Yok Ip “Politics and Individuality 
in Communist Revolutionary Culture” Modern China, 23, no. 1 (1997): 33-68; Philip C. C. Huang “Rural Class 
Struggle in the Chinese Revolution: Representational and Objective Realities from the Land Reform to the 
Cultural Revolution” Modern China, 21, no. 1, (1995): 105-143; Danke Li “Popular Culture in the Making of 
Anti-Imperialist and Nationalist Sentiments in Sichuan” Modern China, 30, no. 4 (2004):470-505.
57 The blurring of “popular” and “elite” in the making of cultural capital is not limited to museologies.  For a select 
bibliography see Stuart Davies and Crispin Paine “Talking about Museums: The Insider's Voice” Oral History, 
32, no. 2, (2004): 54-62; Elizabeth Wichmann-Walczak “'Reform' at the Shanghai Jingju Company and Its 
Impact on Creative Authority and Repertory” TDR, 44, no. 4 (2000): 96-119; Barry D. Wood “'A Great 
Symphony of Pure Form': The 1931 International Exhibition of Persian Art and Its Influence” Ars Orientalis, 30, 
(2000): 113-130; 
58 Timothy Mitchell, “Society, Economy, And The State Effect” in Aradhana Sharma and Akhil Gupta, eds., The 
Anthropology Of The State (Malden, 2006): 176.33
rendered the livelihoods of private-sector art dealers precarious.  Cultural industry employees' 
exalted social and political role received further confirmation in the 1960s, when rigorous 
training programs imbued antiquarianism with new value and cast junior museum employees as 
the PRC's first generation of Red antiquarians.  Employment at the Shanghai Museum 
legitimized specific staff members as custodians of a modern institution of cultural heritage, 
inheritors to precious cultural knowledge that the vast art market in China and abroad could 
only hope to attain.  Moreover, the employees' involvement in campaigns like the Cultural 
Revolution highlighted their worth, as their participation opened access to previously 
unprecedented quantities of art, as well as the authority to judge to their value. While 
antiquarianism and connoisseurship are said to have lost their purchase in PRC political 
movements, the institutionalization of Chinese cultural heritage has conversely strengthened 
their power and reach.  Seizing Civilization aspires to examine how museum employees made 
Chinese cultural heritage palpable, for reasons that resonated with professional interests.  Just as 
Pierre Bourdieu located cultural distinction in social status, I interpret cultural heritage as a 
contextually constituted category, not the blank canvas upon which a civilization reveals itself.
59 
Looking at China through the perspective of the Shanghai Museum explains how individuals in 
both China and overseas came to envision Chinese cultural heritage, at a time when the 
systematic appropriation of antiquities made such visions possible.  
To conclude, I do not intend to provide a comprehensive social history of the Shanghai 
59 Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique Of The Judgement Of Taste Richard Nice, Trans. (London, 1986)34
Museum or to offer a holistic portrait of the complete range of individuals who passed through 
its galleries.  As I argue throughout Seizing Civilization, the different constituents that I portray 
do not neatly lend themselves to the categorizations that their official titles impose upon them. 
Museum professionals perform similar job functions as art dealers, donations often act as 
payments and purchases, commodities become canonical relics, and non-state actors often 
produced the effects of an intricate and omnipresent state apparatus.  These categories are not 
mutually exclusive precisely because of the role they play in the invention of cultural heritage.  I 
present the cast of characters that I do because the exigencies of my argument warrant this 
interconnectedness, and also because I have observed these different individuals as such. 
Visitor's Guide (or Chapter Outline)
Spanning five decades, Seizing Civilization charts the history of the Shanghai Museum 
from its regionalist origins in the years following liberation, to the nationwide requisition of 
antiquities in the early nation-building years, through its acquisition of formerly marginalized 
persons and categories of art, across the organized appropriation and sale of privately-owned 
antiquities in the Cultural Revolution years, to its fully elaborated international mark on Chinese 
cultural heritage – a mark which, I argue, cohered during the Socialist era (1949 - 1976) and 
reached overseas audiences by the Reform years (post-1978).  The imaginary cartography of my 
project is neatly captured in the museum's different locales from 1952 to 1993 (Figure 0.3).
60
60 Image taken from the Shanghai Museum website on May 8
th, 2011. 
http://www.shanghaimuseum.net/cn/lsyg/lsyg.jsp35
Figure 0.3. Shanghai Museum sites (from left to right): Old Jockey Club headquarters on #325 
West Nanjing Road (1952 – 1959), Chinese Remittance Bank Building on #16 South Henan 
Road, and Shanghai Museum Building on #188 Wusheng Road.
As mentioned earlier, in 1952 the museum occupied a foreigners-only jockey club, as is typical of 
Old Shanghai's treaty port days.  By 1959 it moved to the requisitioned Chinese Remittance 
(Zhonghui) Bank, a symbol of Shanghai's industrial and financial potential and the impetus of 
its regional dominance south of the Yangzi river.  Finally, in the early 1990s, domestic and 
international funds raised the new Shanghai Museum building, an international icon and “ultra-
modern repository for 5,000 years of history and tradition”.
61   
Between 1949 and 1956, the proliferation of cultural institutions reanimated 
longstanding narratives about Chinese cultural heritage's longevity, its special aptitude for 
scientific innovation (in particular inventing the compass, gunpowder, paper-making, and 
printing), as well as the civilization's recent emergence from centuries of foreign oppression. 
CHAPTER ONE, “INVENTING THE SHANGHAI MUSEUM”, examines how specific 
61 As described by the American Friends Of The Shanghai Museum website's introduction on the Shanghai 
Museum, cited and visited on May 8
th, 2011. http://www.shanghaimuseum.org/shanghaimuseum.htm36
constituents on the mainland defined and promoted antiquities as China's most enduring 
achievement and symbol – a material representation of Chinese civilization that links past, 
present, and future.  Neither antiquities nor Shanghai had pre-destined claims to this arena. 
Multiple institutions, such as libraries and curio markets, emerged as possible candidates for the 
dissemination and commercialization of Chinese cultural heritage.  Meanwhile, Beijing, 
Shanghai, and other wealthy cities competed for select antiquities in a nationwide acquisition 
program that sent new employees on buying trips to hitherto untraveled hinterlands.  
Two key events, however, soon transformed Shanghai into a regional center for the 
integration of antiquities into Chinese cultural heritage.  Firstly, the museum took advantage of 
an antiquities bonanza wherein private individuals divested collections due to the emergence of 
new financial challenges, as presented by campaigns like the Three-Anti (1951) and Five-Anti 
movements (1952).  Municipal cooperation also enabled museum staff to enter defunct 
institutions and private homes, expropriating antiquities with unprecedented efficiency. 
Secondly, the nationalization of industries recast the professional identities of museum staff and 
art dealers.  A newly created profession, museum employment, came to stand for the execution, 
legitimization, and representation of proper cultural heritage preservation.  The export of 
smuggled artifacts, on the other hand, tainted art dealing – transforming dealers into suspicious 
traitors of the Han race whose industry cried out for Socialist reform.  I argue that the creation of 
cultural institutions like the Shanghai Museum transformed antiquities from private to public 37
property, and turned export curios into cultural relics that contended for the title of guobao 
(national treasure).
Between 1956 and 1966, an expanding collection of artifacts and professional expertise 
extended the Shanghai Museum's presence across the nation.  CHAPTER TWO, “FROM 
TRASH TO TREASURE”, explains how the museum integrated previously marginalized 
categories of art and artisans into its institutional infrastructure.  The chapter also explores the 
museum's ongoing machinations in the art market – particularly the regulation of exports and 
the evaluation of art prices.  Creating connoisseurship training programs and antiquities 
conservation apprenticeships proved particularly conducive to museum objectives in the arena 
of antiquities preservation, as it elevated the institution's cultural, political, and social status in 
the PRC without the “capitalistic” trappings of “elitism”.  Indeed, how could any political 
campaign call salvaging antiquities at Shanghai's steel mills elitist, especially as those museum 
employees retrieved ancient bronze relics from smelting pits?  Similarly, training bronze, 
ceramic, and painting conservators reinforced the museum's privileging of practical experience, 
as professionalization placed skilled, albeit illiterate, craftsmen in previously unreachable careers. 
At the same time that the Shanghai Museum flouted its promulgation of cultural relics 
amongst ordinary people, it literally moved across the tracks, settling into a new and prominent 
location at the old Chinese Remittance Bank building on #16 South Henan road.
62  I argue that 
62 This address placed the museum in the center of downtown Shanghai’s business district, within viewing 
distance of the Bund, the Yu Family Gardens, and other prominent markers of municipal history and tourism.  38
the institution's regional clout enabled its collection to rival that of Beijing's National Palace 
Museum and established Shanghai as an independent authority on matters of Chinese 
civilization.  Concurrent movements to establish major Chinese art collections in Britain and 
America placed Shanghai as an influential player in the narration of Chinese civilization, and its 
antiquities as distinct markers of Chinese cultural heritage. 
Because the Cultural Revolution (1966 – 1976) shaped the coherence of Chinese 
cultural heritage as such, Seizing Civilization devotes two chapters to this period.  These chapters 
focus respectively on the organized seizure of antiquities from private individuals at all strata of 
society between 1966 and 1969 (Chapter three), and the subsequent commercialization, 
exhibition, and dissemination of those antiquities in both China and abroad (Chapter four).
CHAPTER THREE, “RAID AND SORT”, challenges the assumption that the 
Cultural Revolution marked a decade of chaos that “nuked and burned” China's cultural arena.
63 
Using a combination of oral interviews, statistical analysis, and archival documents, I show that 
the Shanghai Museum actively participated in both the random house raids of 1966 – 1967 and 
the work unit-led confiscations of personal property from 1967 to 1969.  Museum staff seized all 
personal property that they considered cultural relics for the museum's storehouse, where 
sorters promised to preserve and catalog the objects as relevant to their place in Chinese cultural 
heritage.  Select employees also worked for Sorting Committees, extant all over the PRC, which 
63 I borrow this phrase from Thomas Mullaney, whose colorful terminology neatly captures assumptions about the 
Cultural Revolutions that persist in both China and abroad.  Scheduled Discussion, May 4
th, 2011.39
sifted through personal property that the municipality's various work units confiscated in their 
own independent house raids.  Sorting Committee employees separated works of art from 
ordinary confiscated property.  The sorters then inventoried works of art as either cultural relics 
that the Shanghai Museum automatically acquired as part of its permanent collection, or curios 
that the newly established China National Arts & Crafts Import & Export Corporation 
(CNART) sold abroad for profit.  I argue that, far from shutting down, cultural institutions 
profited enormously from Cultural Revolution campaigns.  Organized raids and antiquities sort 
programs enabled the Shanghai Museum to gain unprecedented access to both elite and 
ordinary art collections, while nationalized art dealerships literally profited from the wholesale 
export of confiscated property to “international customer resources” in Hong Kong, Singapore, 
and beyond.
64
CHAPTER FOUR, “UNACCOUNTED GAINS”, chronicles the rise of the “Crimson 
Successors”, new employees that the Shanghai Museum's first generation of new hires recruited 
from the Shanghai countryside and trained for museum work in 1972.  Based on their respective 
years of entry into cultural institution careers, I dub these two groups the Class of 1952 and the 
Class of 1972.  The experiences of both classes suggest that our existing rhetoric of segregation 
and rehabilitation, so often used to describe difficult Cultural Revolution realities, do not 
account for the career gains and experiences that young professionals earned through active 
64 Quoted from the company history section of Corporation Introduction, China National Arts & Crafts Import & 
Export Corporation, visited May 9
th, 2011 from http://www.cnart.com.cn/40
participation in Cultural Revolution activities, like raiding residences and confiscating property. 
I argue that the forced incapacitation of senior museum staff gave new opportunities to younger 
employees, granting them with unprecedented access to cultural resources and artifacts, as well 
as the opportunity to evaluate their worth.  This turn of events transformed inexperienced 
younger employees at the Shanghai Museum into Red antiquarians – the custodians of Chinese 
cultural heritage.  
The post-1978 years marked China's explosive social and economic changes on the 
world stage, where high export revenues and new trading zones signified the prowess and 
potential of the ascendant Chinese Century.
65  Even at this point of trajectory, however, the 
dialog of Chinese cultural heritage grappled with limits and internal contradictions, as well as 
external resistance.  CHAPTER FIVE, “INCOMPLETE RESTITUTION”, explores the 
Shanghai Museum's navigation of policies like the luoshi zhengce (restitution plan), where 
“rehabilitated” individuals could ask Chinese cultural institutions to return any and all 
antiquities seized between 1949 and 1976.  The municipal administration worked closely with 
Shanghai Museum staff to keep confiscated antiquities in the museum's collection, at the same 
time as the museum promulgated its preservation of Chinese cultural heritage during the 
65 Historian Jonathan Spence first used the term the Chinese Century to refer to China's dramatic twentieth 
century history, in particular its turn from imperial power to nationalist republic to socialist state to 
contemporary superpower; see Jonathan D. Spence and Annping Chin, The Chinese Century: The 
Photographic History Of The Last Hundred Years (New York: 1996).  For more recent interpretations for the 
Chinese Century and China's potential as a world power see Geoffrey Murray, China: The Next Superpower: 
Dilemmas In Change And Continuity (New York, 1998); Ted C. Fishman “The Chinese Century” The New York 
Times Magazine, July 4, 2004; William Rees-Mogg “This Is The Chinese Century” The Times, January 3, 2005; 41
difficult Cultural Revolution years.  The issuance of restitution thus served the interest of the 
Shanghai Museum, at the same time as it became a channel of negotiation for un-purchasable 
needs, like the return of sons and daughters from hard labor, accelerated access to services like 
hotels and transportation, as well as the exoneration of personal and public reputations through 
the PRC media.  
Seizing Civilization ends in 1996, when the Shanghai Museum celebrated its third grand 
opening in the People's Square, the cultural and commercial center of downtown Shanghai.  The 
museum's impact on Chinese cultural institutions both domestic and abroad grew gradually 
rather than instantaneously.  However, the international vetting process wherein museum staff 
tweaked, exhibited, and promoted their permanent collection, to the overwhelming response of 
sinophiles' enthusiasm for the objects themselves, transformed its narrative of Chinese cultural 
heritage from local to international.  As cultural institutions shifted from discussing a history of 
the nation-state to a history of the world, the Shanghai Museum began to cast its antiquities in 
the light of human history, co-creating a dialog of world cultural heritage that positions the 
Chinese Century as an era in which the People's Republic might regain its position as the 
cultural and economic center of the world – thereby justifying its abbreviated title as the Middle 
Kingdom.  In the CONCLUSION, “FAMILY VALUES”, I briefly analyze the museum's 
rehabilitation and continuing financial support of the Gu family, the former owners of the great 
Guoyun Lou art collection.  I use personal, public, and official accounts of this family's history 42
with the Shanghai Museum to epitomize the ascendance of antiquities' mark on Chinese cultural 
heritage, as well as the museum's internal and external challenges.  It is no coincidence that 
antiquities feature prominently in international celebrations like the 2008 Beijing Olympic 
Games, nor is it insignificant that “scar literature” authors leverage the seizure and destruction of 
antiquities as a way to criticize the modern Chinese state.  Even as the material representation of 
Chinese cultural heritage becomes omnipresent instead of situational, antiquities have 
continued to refract the contested meanings of China's return to the United Nations.  The 
Shanghai Museum's galleries not only characterize the rhetorical underpinnings of Chinese 
cultural heritage, they also reveal the cracks in its foundations.  
As the Class of 1952 soon learned, they would need years of training before they could 
become custodians to one of the world's largest repositories of Chinese art.  For the moment, 
however, we return to their first day in the public eye, shortly after Mayor Chen Yi inaugurated 
Shanghai's new museum and library complex at the Old Jockey Club on West Nanjing Road. 
Uniformed gallery guides shifted nervously, while a crowd of thousands waited in front of the 
museum's doors, eager for a glimpse at Five Thousand Years of Chinese Civilization.  43
Chapter One: Inventing the Shanghai Museum, 1949 – 
195644
Figure 1.1. Shanghai Museum employees admiring antiquities with the Gu family donors.  From 
left to right, Shen Minren, Mrs. Gu Lijiang, Gu Lijiang, Zhong Yinlan, and Ma Defu.  Photo 
obtained from the private collection of Zheng Zhong, Shanghai. 
New State, New Jobs
Zhong Yinlan's family ran out of money for junior high school in the 1940s – she doesn't 
remember the exact year (Figure 1.1).
66  Her father spent the decade unemployed and with five 
kids to raise her mother never worked outside the house.  During melon season Zhong 
inspected seeds at the local processing plant.  In between melon seasons, she worked for a 
chicken hatchery.  The jobs brought in roughly 20 RMB a month.  That covered her family's 
daily expenses as well as something extra for the new year, like a hen and new socks for her four 
younger brothers.
67
66 As a point of reference, Zhong Yinlan was born in 1932 and Shanghai's junior high schools typically accepted 
students between 12 and 15 years of age.  Interview with Zhong Yinlan, June 16
th, 2009.
67 Interview with Zhong Yinlan, June 16
th, 2009.45
When the Shanghai Museum made an open call for junior job applicants in 1951, Zhong 
Yinlan jumped at the chance.  Civil service job opportunities were a boon for young, ambitious 
Chinese.
68  Private industry job opportunities shrank when the PRC instigated anti-capitalistic 
campaigns in the early 1950s.
69  This had an especially dire impact on industries in Shanghai. 
Many found themselves unemployed or simply stuck in difficult financial situations.  When I 
interviewed Shen Minren (Figure 1.1), another 1951 junior job applicant at the Shanghai 
Museum, she explained that “our livelihoods were fairly strained...when the museum made its 
call I went.”
70
Zhing Yinlan needed to distinguish herself from other job candidates.  She had worked 
for six months as a chicken incubation specialist at the Native Products Fair in downtown 
Shanghai.  It wasn't good pay, but she won a speaker's award for talking herself hoarse about the 
benefits of mechanized hatcheries.
71  The fair organizers supported her ambitions and gave her a 
68 Louis Putterman and Xiao-Yuan Dong, “China's State-Owned Enterprises: Their Role, Job Creation, and 
Efficiency in Long-Term Perspective,” Modern China, 26, no. 4 (2000): 403-447; Hung-Yok Ip, “Fashioning 
Appearances: Feminine Beauty in Chinese Communist Revolutionary Culture,” Modern China, 29, no. 3 
(2003): 329-361; Eddy U, “The Making Of Zhishifenzi The Critical Impact Of The Registration Of The 
Unemployed Intellectuals In The Early PRC,” The China Quarterly, 173 (2003): 100-121.
69 Deborah S. Davis, “Social Class Transformation in Urban China: Training, Hiring, and Promoting Urban 
Professionals and Managers after 1949,” Modern China, 26, no. 3 (2000): 251-275; James Gao, The Communist 
Takeover Of Hangzhou: The Transformation Of City And Cadre 1949-1954.  (Honolulu, 2004); Toby Ho, 
“Managing Risk: The Suppression of Private Entrepreneurs in China in the 1950s,” Risk Management, 2, no. 2 
(2000): 29-38; Kenneth Lieberthal, Revolution And Tradition In Tientsin 1949-1952 (Stanford, 1980); Hua-yu 
Li, Mao And The Economic Stalinization Of China, 1948-1953, (New York, 2006); Wai-yip So, “The Policy-
Making and Political Economy of The Abolition Of Private Ownership In The Early 1950s: Findings From 
New Material,” The China Quarterly no.171 (2002): 682-703; Andrew G. Walder and Songhua Hu, 
“Revolution, Reform, and Status Inheritance: Urban China, 1949–1996,” American Journal of Sociology, 114, no. 
5 (2009): 1395-1427; 
70 Interview with Shen minren, September 24
th, 2009.
71 For more on state spectacles of this kind see Chang-Tai Hung, “Mao's Parades: State Spectacles In China In 
The 1950s,” The China Quarterly, 190 (2007): 411-431; 46
recommendation.  Everybody knew that compared to chicken incubation, museum “pay was 
good...about sixty units per work unit, so about thirty RMB per month.”
72  
Few paid attention to the Shanghai Museum's minimum education requirements.
73 
Applicants were required to have finished high school, yet even “people who just had elementary 
school” tried their luck.
74  Zhong Yinlan barely finished junior high but went anyway: “If I passed 
the test, we can figure things out”.
75   
The preliminary exam took two days to complete.  Applicants had to explain why they 
wanted to work for the municipality, demonstrate basic knowledge on dynasties Qin through 
Qing, and identify all the major directives that the PRC had promulgated since 1949.
76  An 
interview awaited those who passed.  Zhong Yinlan had to calm her nerves before interviewing. 
Her father had Guomindang (GMD) associations and everyone knew that “with these 
Communists.  They remember what your family history was, and when the time comes, they 
settle their accounts with you.”
77   Despite the warnings of this received knowledge, Zhong got a 
72 Interview with Zhong Yinlan, June 16
th, 2009.  A retrospective statistical record account for labor in Shanghai's 
cultural industries noted that average salary for employees at the Shanghai Museum in 1952 was 58 RMB per 
month.  55 – 60 RMB per month is a typical salary for the average employee in Shanghai's cultural industries 
during the early 1950s.  Shanghai shi wenhua ju 1949nian – 1956 nian shanghai wenhua yishu shiye tongji ziliao 
huibian [Edited Statistical Records for the Shanghai Cultural Affairs Administration, 1949 – 1956] September 
1956 – May 1957, B172-1-182, SMA, Shanghai. 
73 Interview with Zhong Yinlan, June 16
th, 2009; Chen Peifen, June 22
nd, 2009; and Huang Xuanpei January 12
th, 
2010; For similar trends in other job sectors see Eddy U., “The Hiring of Rejects: Teacher Recruitment and 
Crises of Socialism in the Early PRC Years,” Modern China, 30, no. 1 (2004): 46-80.
74 Interview with Chen Peifen, June 22
nd, 2009.
75 Interview with Zhong Yinlan, June 16
th, 2009. 
76 Interview with Zhong Yinlan, June 16
th, 2009. 
77 Interview with Lu Songlin, September 24
th, 2009.  Lu Songlin and Zhong Yinlan were right to be weary about 
their personal history's impact on hiring decisions at the Shanghai Museum.  For municipal and party 
documents specifically ordering the Shanghai Cultural Bureau to terminate all personnel with political or 47
letter of acceptance about a month and a half after her interview.
78  She was one of 126 young 
people that the Museum chose for its Class of 1952.
79  Over the next four decades, the teenage 
chicken incubator would transform from alley kid to museum professional.  
This chapter examines the profound transformation of professional identity amongst 
Shanghai's cultural industry workers between 1949 and 1956.  I argue that a nationwide 
campaign to acquire top tier antiquities marked museum employees as professionals with a 
special concern for canonization, philanthropy, and heritage preservation.  This same campaign 
portrayed museum employees' commercial equivalents – art dealers – as law breakers and 
profiteers – smugglers whose industry needed social reform.  These identifiers distinguished 
Zhong Yinlan's job functions from that of art dealers like Ye Shuzhong, even though both, 
fundamentally, spent their days evaluating and acquiring antiquities from the private sector.  
The above-mentioned redefinition of professional identity went hand in hand with the 
nationwide transformation of antiquities ownership: From private to public property.  Cultural 
historical (familial) conflicts with state and party interests, see Wenhua bu, huadong wenhua ju guanyu wenbo, 
tushu gongzuo de zhishi, guiding ji woju youguan de qingshi baogao, [Ministry Of Culture And China Eastern 
Cultural Bureau's Directives And Regulations Regarding Museum And Library Work And Our Bureau's Related 
Petitions And Reports] 1954 – 1955, B172-4-301, SMA, Shanghai; Wenhua bu, gongan bu guanyu jiaqiang 
wenwu anquan baowei gongzuo de tongzhi ji Shanghai shi wenhua ju suo shu she wen dui wai wenwu baoguan 
gongzuo de duokou jiancha baogao, [Ministry of Culture And Office Of Security's Notifications Regarding 
Strengthening Cultural Relics Security Work And Shanghai Municipal Cultural Bureau's Personnel Inspections 
On Local Outfacing Cultural Relics Preservation Work] May 4
th, 1960 – November 2
nd, 1960, B172-5-249, 
SMA, Shanghai. 
78     Nevertheless, in all my interviews with Zhong Yinlan, as well as with other former Shanghai Museum 
employees whose families had GMD associations, the fact that a “bad family background” loomed in the 
background was consistently alluded to as a risk factor for job seekers in the Maoist era. 
79 Shanghai shi wenhua ju 1949nian – 1956 nian shanghai wenhua yishu shiye tongji ziliao huibian, [Edited Statistical 
Records for the Shanghai Cultural Affairs Administration, 1949 – 1956] September 1956 – May 1957, B172-1-
182, SMA, Shanghai. 48
Relics Laws, which declared ancient Chinese art the common inheritance of all Chinese, stood 
at the center of this transformation.  In the name of heritage preservation, the Class of 1952 
offered top dollar for antiquities at the same time as they expropriated antiquities from 
individuals and other cultural institutions.  As the nationalization of industries (1956) converted 
private art dealerships into State Owned Enterprises, the Shanghai Museum staff leveraged 
Cultural Relics Laws to get first pick of private sector merchandise.  I argue that these events 
inaugurated the museological fiction of donations.  I further argue that museum employees 
erected a series of tropes, such as ceremonies and merit awards, to substantiate the affection of 
donation.  These tropes cast specific individuals and antiquities as proof of the museum's 
legitimate custodianship of Chinese cultural heritage.  Examining the first years of the Class of 
1952's careers in detail, I explore how the above changes impacted the Chinese art market, and 
evaluate the Shanghai Museum's role in enforcing the nationwide appropriation of art.   
Redefining Chinese Art
The PRC announced new antiquities export regulations in 1950.  The edicts, also 
known as Cultural Relics laws, were distributed across all art market channels: at Customs, 
through antiquities publications, as well as in the Chinese Curio Markets, the downtown hub for 
art dealerships in Shanghai.  Cultural Relics laws dictated that “inspector-approved cultural 
relics and books can only be exported from designated locations at Tianjin, Shanghai, and 
Guangdong Customs” and that those cities “will recruit experts” for inspection purposes.
80  The 
80 Zhongyang renmin zhengfu zhenwu Yuan, “Fenfa 'jinzhi zhenggui wenwu tushu chukou zanxing banfa' ling,” 49
experts in question were almost uniformly recruited from museum institutions in Tianjin, 
Shanghai, and Guangdong.  Thus, Shanghai’s art dealers had to send all antiquities intended for 
sale overseas to Customs, for inspection by Shanghai Museum employees.  This radically 
changed the rhythm of business in the Shanghai art market, which was one of the world’s richest 
suppliers of Chinese antiquities for the international art market.
81  The regulations forced 
Shanghai's antiquities guild, a conglomeration of over one hundred and thirty dealers known 
internationally as the  Shanghai Curios Trader's Association, to conform to new legal and 
administrative procedures that changed both the scale, and scope of their trade.
82 
Cultural Relics laws essentially redefined Chinese art.  The regulations put all of China's 
antiquities into one of two camps: wenwu or guwan (henceforth cultural relics and arts and 
crafts, respectively).
83  They also made the year 1795, Qing emperor Qianlong's sixtieth and final 
year in power, the border between heritage and commodity.  Antiquities made before 1795 were 
heritage and could not leave the country.  Antiquities dated post-1795 were commodities 
[Announcement 'Provisional Plans For Preventing the Export of Precious Cultural Relics and Books] Wenwu 
cankao zhiliao 1, no. 1- 6, (1950): 5.
81 For an assessment of Shanghai’s role in the international art market see Shanghai guwan shangye tongye gonghui 
gongzuo zongjie, [Conclusion of Shanghai antiquities industry guild's work], 1951 – 1954, S186-4-3, SMA, 
Shanghai.
82 This is the English language name with which the antiquities guild referred to itself in its correspondences.  For 
an example see Shanghaishi guwan shangye tongye gonghui huiyuan yinyee nasuie he yinli suode suie qingce, 
[Shanghai antiquities industry guild's operational taxes and received taxes], August 1946 – January 1947, S186-
1-12, SMA, Shanghai.
83 Historic artifacts specifically refer to objects related to events the CCP considered revolutions, such as the 
Opium War, the Taiping Rebellion, the May Fourth Movement, and the Communist Revolution.  Zhongyang 
renmin zhengfu zhenwu Yuan, “Fenfa 'jinzhi zhenggui wenwu tushu chukou zanxing banfa' ling” 
[Announcement 'Provisional Plans For Preventing the Export of Precious Cultural Relics and Books], Wenwu 
cankao zhiliao 1, no. 1- 6, (1950):6-7.50
eligible for sale across the globe.
84  Private individuals had the right to own both categories of 
antiquities, but should consider the former public property – the cultural inheritance of all 
Chinese.
85
Demarcating Chinese cultural heritage at 1795 reinforced the received knowledge, held 
by cultural arbiters in China and overseas, that the end of Qianlong's reign also marked the end 
of quality art production in China.  Qianlong's antiquities acquisitions, commissions, and 
collection had already formed the foundation of the Palace Museum in Beijing, as well as its 
competing monument to Chinese art in Taiwan – both landmark repositories of the imperial 
collecting legacy.
86  Cultural Relics Laws integrated this legacy into the narrative of cultural 
heritage.
87  From 1950 onwards, both PRC cultural institutions and art markets used 1795 as 
their official benchmark for heritage identification.  
Cultural Relics Laws made it difficult for Shanghai art dealers, such as Ye Shuzhong, to 
84 Shanghaishi remin zhengfu guanyu Shanghai haiguan jihuo zousi guwu, zhongxinju riben guihuan gudong, deren 
yiliu wenwu de jieshouchuli deng, [Shanghai Municipal Government Regarding Smuggled Antiquities Retrieved 
by Shanghai Customs, Arrangements Made For Antiquities the Japanese Returned at the Central Trust Bureau 
and Cultural Relics Left Behind By Germans, etc] July 21
st, 1949, B1-1-2214, SMA, Shanghai. 
85 Zhongyang renmin zhengfu zhenwu Yuan, “Fenfa 'jinzhi zhenggui wenwu tushu chukou zanxing banfa' ling” 
[Announcement 'Provisional Plans For Preventing the Export of Precious Cultural Relics and Books], Wenwu 
cankao zhiliao 1, no. 1- 6, (1950):11-13.
86 Jeannette E. Shambaugh with David Shambaugh, The Odyssey of China's Imperial Art Treasures (Seattle, 2005).
87 My interpretation of Cultural Relics Laws' follows a growing discourse in the investigation of Chinese law and 
society.  For a select bibliography of this approach see William P. Alford, “Law, Law, What Law?: Why Western 
Scholars of Chinese History and Society Have Not Had More to Say about Its Law” Modern China, 23, no. 4 
(1997): 398-419; Philip C. C. Huang, “Whither Chinese Law?” Modern China, 33, no. 2 (2007): 163-194; 
William Kirby, “China Unincorporated: Company Law and Business Enterprise In Twentieth-Century China,” 
Journal of Asian Studies, 54, no. 1, (1995): 43 – 63; Xiaoqun Xu, “The Rule of Law without Due Process: 
Punishing Robbers and Bandits in Early-Twentieth- Century China,” Modern China, 33, no. 2 (2007): 230-257; 
Jonathan Spence, The Death of Woman Wang (New York: 1978).51
export antiquities at pre-1949 volumes.  Obtaining Customs approval necessitated tedious form-
filling.  Every antiquity that dealers sent overseas had to have seven copies of Customs 
declaration material, including the object's photo, description, weight, price, specific 
measurements, plus proof of ownership.
88  Shipments awaiting inspection clogged storehouses. 
As a result, dealers complained that “We have not been able to export any goods and business 
has stopped...it is affecting our employees' livelihood.”
89  According to K. Chuck Wong Co. on 
Myburgh Road, “our overseas customers wrote that we must send them their goods soon...we 
have more than five shipments waiting at customs and although our employees have asked 
around many times, we have seen no progress.”
90  
The above complaints came from both small-time entrepreneurs as well as those who 
worked at the top of their field.  Ye and his cohorts, a group of four art dealers who were so 
successful that they were known as the Four Vajrapani, resorted to desperate measures.  Dai 
Fubao, one of the Vajrapani, fled the country.  He changed his name to J. T. Tai, left his wife, and 
tried to move his business to every Chinese enclave from Taiwan to New York City.
91  His 
88 Shanghashi renmin zhengfu guanyu guwenhua yizhi ji gumu zang zhi diaocha faqu zanxing banfa, jinzhi zhenggui 
wenwu tushu chukou zanxing banfa, [Shanghai Municipal Goverment's Temporary Solution Regarding Ancient 
Cultural Sites and Tomb Burials' Discovery and Excavation Plans, and the Ban on the Export of Cultural Relics 
and Books], June 1950, B1-2-773, SMA, Shanghai. 
89 Shanghai dui waimaoyi guanli ju guanyu wenwu, guwan, zhucui deng chukou wenti de gonghan, dianbao, [Shanghai 
Commisson of Export Commerce's Public Directives and Telegrams Regarding the Export of Cultural Relics, 
Curios, and Jewelry] March 1952 – August 1952, B83-2-1295, SMA, Shanghai. 
90 Shanghai dui waimaoyi guanli ju guanyu wenwu, guwan, zhucui deng chukou wenti de gonghan, dianbao, [Shanghai 
Commisson of Export Commerce's Public Directives and Telegrams Regarding the Export of Cultural Relics, 
Curios, and Jewelry] March 1952 – August 1952, B83-2-1295, SMA, Shanghai. 
91 Shanghai's municipal authorities and the antiquities industry knew J. T. Tai as Dai Fubao.  He referred to 
himself as Jun Tsei Tai amongst Hong Kong and overseas compatriots.  This practice reflected common 
practice in the early twentieth century, when Chinese men converted their sinophone names into initials for the 52
compatriots joked that Tai “swam across the Taiwan Strait with one Song dynasty vase clutched 
under each arm”.
92  The anecdote is clearly a joke.  The image that it conjures, however, paints a 
difficult reality.  During the early PRC years, art dealers literally had to cross oceans to keep their 
businesses afloat.  Even the municipal Commission of Commerce complained that “Shanghai's 
antiquities industry is at full stop”
93 because the lengthy, inefficient process made “most of the 
stock in the Shanghai Antiquities Industry's possession stagnant.”
94
The enforcement of Cultural Relics laws, in turn, made the Shanghai Museum staff the 
gatekeepers of Shanghai’s art market.  The municipality gave those museum employees who had 
experience authenticating works of art full rights to evaluate any and all antiquities awaiting 
export, as well as to recommend police investigations into dealerships under suspicion of 
breaking Cultural Relics laws.  Museum staff also gained considerable leeway in the execution of 
evaluations.  For example, they could recommend that confiscated antiquities be released for 
sale if the items were deemed “curios without historical or artistic value”.
95  This was true of 
Shanghai’s considerable repository of Japanese-owned antiquities, which were abandoned in 
benefit of anglophone ears.  A famous example is Song Ziwen, who simplified his name as T. V. Soong.  Tai and 
his wife eventually reunited in New York City, after he reestablished his business.
92 Interview with Jim Lally, October 28
th, 2009.
93 Shanghai duiwai maoyi guanli ju guanyu xiuding jingzhi zhenggui wenwu, tushu, guwan chukou zanxing banfa de 
han, zuotan hui jilu, [Shanghai Commission of Export Commerce's Records Regarding its Meeting on 
Amendments to the Temporary Directive Banning the Export of Precious Cultural Relics, Books, Curios] 
March 16
th, 1951 – September 11
th, 1951, B172-4-87, SMA, Shanghai. 
94 Shanghai shi wenhua ju guanyu 1952 nian shanghai wenhua yishu shiye jiben qingkuang tongji biaobao, [Shanghai 
Municipal Cultural Affairs Administration's Statistics Regarding Shanghai's Cultural and Artistic Industries 
1952], March, 1952, B172-1-167, SMA, Shanghai. 
95 Shanghai dui waimaoyi guanli ju guanyu wenwu, guwan, zhucui deng chukou wenti de gonghan, dianbao, [Shanghai 
Commisson of Export Commerce's Public Directives and Telegrams Regarding the Export of Cultural Relics, 
Curios, and Jewelry] March 1952 – August 1952, B83-2-1295, SMA, Shanghai. 53
vacated estates after the Japanese retreated from Shanghai in 1945.  The Shanghai Museum’s 
staff evaluated these to be commodities of “no cultural value” that “the Japanese already picked 
through and did not want”.
96  The objects were subsequently allocated to cultural institutions, as 
well as for sale in China and overseas.    
Making Antiquarians Red
The majority of Shanghai Museum employees with the ability to authenticate antiquities 
were senior staff.  The city mayor, Chen Yi, inaugurated a nation-wide recruitment campaign for 
capable senior staff in 1949.
97  The recruits included Xu Senyu, a seasoned bureaucrat who only 
corresponded by calligraphy brush, who catalogued antiquities for the Palace Museum and 
directed acquisitions at the National Beiping Library.
98  Xie Zhiliu, a well-known artist whose 
command of connoisseurship made him one of the most sought-after appraisers of the twentieth 
century, was also heavily recruited.
99  Others, such as collector/connoisseur Xu Bangda and 
96 Shanghai shi renmin zhengfu guanyu shanghai shi wenwu guanli weiyuan hui suo baoguan de riben guihuan wenwu 
de chuli baogao he zhengfu yuan de pifu, [Shanghai People's Government's Disposal Report on the Cultural Relics 
Management Bureau's Cultural Relics that the Japanese Returned, with Rescripts from the State Department] 
April 23
rd, 1954 – August 5
th, 1954, B1-1-1372, SMA, Shanghai. 
97 For the full list of Cultural Relics Management Board members, see Shanghai shi renwei wenyi bangong shi ge 
wenhua shiye danwei jingsuo gaizao modi jihua ji fangan, [Shanghai Municipal People's Representative Board, 
Arts And Culture Office's Merger Plan And Investigative Report On All Cultural Danweis] May 1955 – July 
1955, B9-2-11, SMA, Shanghai. 
98 For a selection of Xu Senyu's work on ancient Chinese civilization, see Xu Senyu, Jitan Hanwei Shijing canzi, [Xu 
Senyu collection of rubbings from the Han and Wei dynasties] (China: 1912-1949); Shanghai Committee for 
the Preservation and Administration of Art Objects, Gems of Chinese Painting, (Shanghai, 1955); Xu Senyu, Han 
shi jing zhai wencun [Records of Han Stele Rubbings], (Beijing, 2010); For a recent biography of Xu Senyu 
using oral historical and archival sources, see Zheng Zhong, Xu Senyu (Beijing, 2007).
99 For a selection of Xie Zhiliu's work on Chinese art connoisseurship, see Xie Zhiliu, Jian yu za gao 
[Miscellaneous Drafts Drawn from Connoisseurship] (Shanghai, 1979); Xie Zhiliu, Zhongguo gudai shuhua 
yanjiu shilun [Ten Thesis on Ancient Chinese Calligraphy and Painting] (Shanghai, 2004); For a recent 
biography of Xu Senyu using oral historical and archival sources, see Zheng Zhong, Xie Zhiliu (Beijing, 2004). 54
calligrapher Shen Yinmo, lived and breathed the kind of connoisseurship and social interactions 
that Jiangnan's “old society” elites practiced in everyday life.   Fifty-four such luminaries were 
appointed to Shanghai’s Cultural Relics Management Board, the political and administrative arm 
of the Shanghai Museum, by 1952.
100  
The senior staff spent the majority of their first years of appointment training the new 
hires – the Class of 1952.  Members of the Cultural Relics Management Board took turns working 
at Customs but complained vociferously about conducting inspections, because Customs kept 
“random, chaotic, and messy” warehouses that mixed antiquities with broken type writers, leather 
goods, and dank books. 
101  The senior staff’s dissatisfaction with Customs gave the Class of 
1952’s training real urgency.  After all, the senior staff had something to gain from creating the 
PRC’s first generation of Red antiquarians.  Once trained, the Class of 1952 could relieve the 
senior staff from working at the Shanghai docks.  
100 By “old society” I refer to how the PRC described pre-1949 society – a phrase still in use by most of my 
interviewees.  Interview with Zhong Yinlan July 10
th, 2009. 
101 Quote obtained from Shanghai shi renmin zhengfu guanyu shi wenwu guanli wenyuanhui chengli fangan, renyuan 
pinyong, niandu yewu jihua deng wenti de qingshi ji pifu, [Shanghai Municipal Government's Requests and 
Rescripts on the Establishment of a Municipal Cultural Relics Management Board including Administrative 
Outline, Hiring, and Yearly Budget], September 1949, B1-2-765, SMA, Shanghai.  Description of warehouse 
conditions obtained from Shanghai shi renmin zhengfu guanyu shanghai shi wenwu guanli weiyuan hui suo 
baoguan de riben guihuan wenwu de chuli baogao he zhengfu yuan de pifu, [Shanghai People's Government's 
Disposal Report on the Cultural Relics Management Bureau's Cultural Relics that the Japanese Returned, with 
Rescripts from the State Department] April 23
rd, 1954 – August 5
th, 1954, B1-1-1372, SMA, Shanghai. 55
Figure 1.2. Archaeologist Jiang Dayi teaching a survey of ancient Chinese art to the Shanghai 
Museum's the Class of 1952 (1952).  Photo obtained from Zheng Zhong
The Class of 1952 uniformly called the senior staff laoxiansheng (venerable sir).
102  Xie 
Zhiliu, for example, was Xie lao (venerable sir Xie).  Nearly sixty years later, my interviewees 
pronounce these honorifics with bodily expressions of respect.  They call their first months of 
work “going to school” or “taking lessons.”
103  When describing her lessons Zhong Yinlan actually 
gets up, hunches over her shoulders, folds her hands in the form of a notepad and nods her head 
up and down.  Li Junjie never fails to straighten his frame when he says “venerable sir”.  He points 
his glance upwards, cups his hands and says “every week the venerable sirs held their lessons.”
104 
Li then gestures writing and utters “we wrote things down”.
105  These vocal and bodily habits 
102     This term literally translates into “old mister”.  The phrase, however, does not capture the valences of respect 
inherent in the term xiansheng, or the honorific lao when it is attached to xiansheng.  I thank Benjamin 
Andersen and Dana Byrd for their suggestion of the term “venerable sir”. 
103 Interview with Zhong Yinlan, June 16
th, 2009; Interview with Chen Peifen, June 22
nd, 2009.
104 Interview with Li Junjie, June 29
th, 2009.
105 Interview with Li Junjie, June 29
th, 2009.56
reflect the extent to which new-hire training marked the Class of 1952.
106  They learned how to 
interact with donors, party officials, as well as quotidian museum visitors.  The museum’s senior 
staff taught the Class of 1952 how to give the impression of being cognoscenti while maintaining 
a humility that bespoke respect for potential benefactors.
Training the new hires took months.  Senior staff such as paleographer Yang Kuan (also 
the Shanghai Museum's Director), archaeologist Jiang Dayi, and painter Shen Jianzhi designed 
the sessions from scratch.
107  The teaching team literally wrote its own survey of Chinese art. 
Select members of the Class of 1952 copied out the senior staff's drafts by hand and assembled a 
textbook using the museum's own mimeograph press.  Those who still have their mimeos today 
dub them the “pen edition” because their cohorts hand-cranked the originals with pen and ink.
108  
The training sessions underlined Chinese antiquities' “Chineseness” and used this quality 
to glorify the achievements of Chinese civilization.  Ma Defu, the ceramics lecturer, described 
106 For additional findings that confirm the relationship between physical bearing and historical experience, see 
Arthur Kleinman and Joan Kleinman, “How Bodies Remember: Social Memory and Bodily Experience of 
Criticism, Resistance, and Delegitimation following China's Cultural Revolution,” New Literary History, 25, no. 
3, (1994): 707-723.
107 These individuals were also well supported by Chinese Communist Party members within and overseeing 
Shanghai Museum administration.  For Yang Kuan's own account of his experiences in the party see Yang Kuan, 
Lishi jiliu zhong de dongdang he quzhe: Yang Kuan zi zuan, [The Vicissitudes of Historical Drama: Yang Kuan, an 
Autobiography] (Taibei, 1993), for examples of his work as it reflects Marxist ideologies see Yang Kuan, Shang 
Yang bian fa, [Shang Yang's Reforms and State Control in China] (Shanghai, 1973); Yang Kuan, Gushi xintan 
[New Discoveries about Ancient History] (Beijing, 1965); For Jiang Dayi's work as it reflects Jiang's support of 
the Chinese Communist Party, see Jiang Dayi, Tianbei minzhong kangzhan shilue [A Record of the People of 
Tianbei's Resistance Against the Japanese] (Zhexi, 1942); While Shen Jianzhi, published very little, evidence of 
his approved status may be found from his personnel records with Shanghai Museum administration, Shanghai 
shi renmin zhengfu guanyu shi wenwu guanli wenyuanhui chengli fangan, renyuan pinyong, niandu yewu jihua deng 
wenti de qingshi ji pifu, [Shanghai Municipal Government's Requests and Rescripts on the Establishment of a 
Municipal Cultural Relics Management Board including Administrative Outline, Hiring, and Yearly Budget], 
September 1949, B1-2-765.
108 Interview with Li Junjie, June 29
th, 2009.57
ceramics as “the Chinese working people's great invention.”
109  His genealogy of Chinese kilns 
argue that Yue kilns have a foundational role in the propagation of ceramic arts throughout 
mainland China(Figure 1.2).  They were used by Shanghai Museum exhibitions to justify 
Chinese civilization's mark on artistic creativity amongst ethnic minority peoples.
110  Jiang Dayi 
called Shang and Zhou dynasty bronzes “the zenith of excellence.”
111  “Whether from the 
perspective of form, patterning, or metal quality...they are the best of the entire world's bronze 
cultures”.
112  Chinese paintings also stood “first in the world” in its poetry, form, and intellectual 
merit.
113  “All of New China's people should perceive paintings from a nationalistic perspective, 
and consider ancient paintings as part of our mother country's great artistic heritage.”
114  These 
statements created a master narrative for the Shanghai Museum collection.  They also highlighted 
the PRC's investment in those “cultural relics and ancient remains that are part of our nation's 
cultural inheritance.”
115   
109 Introductory lessons for Shanghai Museum Junior Staff, Private collection of Xia Shunkui.   
110 Zhonggong shanghai shi wei xuanchuan bu, shi wenhua ju guanyu shanghai bowu guan, shijian bowuguan chenlie 
jihua ji qi gaijing fangan de qingshi, pifu, [People's Republic Shanghai Municipality Representative Board's 
Propaganda Ministry and Municipal Cultural  Administration's Rescripts Regarding Exhibition Plans and 
Improvement Requests for the Shanghai Museum and the Shanghai History Museum] January 24
th, 1956 – 
August 27
th, 1956, B172-4-532, SMA, Shanghai.  
111 Introductory lessons for Shanghai Museum Junior Staff, Private collection of Xia Shunkui.   
112 Introductory lessons for Shanghai Museum Junior Staff, Private collection of Xia Shunkui.   
113 Introductory lessons for Shanghai Museum Junior Staff, Private collection of Xia Shunkui.   
114 Introductory lessons for Shanghai Museum Junior Staff, Private collection of Xia Shunkui.   
115 Zhongyang renmin zhengfu zhenwu Yuan, “Zhongshi wenwu guji jiaqiang baohu guanli” [Taking Cultural 
Relics and Ancient Remains Seriously, Increasing Preservation and Management] Wenwu cankao zhiliao 1, no. 
1- 6, (1950): 11.58
Figure 1.3.  Ceramics Kiln map in the Shanghai Museum's Survey of Chinese Art, also known as 
the Pen Edition (1953), Private Collection of Xia Shunkui, Shanghai, photographed with 
permission.
 
The lessons and exhibitions that drew from the Shanghai Museum's Survey of Chinese art 
equated “Chineseness” with creativity.  According to the textbook, Chinese creativity not only 
benefited the Chinese themselves, but also all the peoples with whom the Chinese came into 
contact.  Museum exhibits, which both drew from the textbook and advertised the textbook for 
sale to all visitors, expanded this argument.  They integrated all categories of art into one 
consistent, historical narrative that underscored Chinese creativity's ability to absorb and sinicize 
foreign influence.  The Wei/Jin/Northern and Southern Dynasties gallery, for example, used 
Buddhist art to “explain that Chinese people not only have great inventive abilities, but also the 59
first-rate tradition of absorbing and integrating foreign countries' outstanding culture.”
116  When 
leading guided tours, the Class of 1952 assured visitors that Chinese civilization's sinicizing effect 
on creativity is how “art reaches the next step in development”.
117  
The senior staff privileged Maoist ideology in the classroom.  Lessons used class-
oppression as a framework to interpret objects as well as events, and encouraged the Class of 1952 
to integrate Marxist terminology into their articulation of Chinese cultural heritage.  For example, 
Jiang Dayi, author of the pen edition's bronzes chapter and the Shanghai Museum's senior 
archaeologist, contextualized the museum's collection of ancient bronze relics as follows: “Only 
the extorting classes could use bronze crockery...the repressed and extorted masses used pottery, 
bamboo, or bone utensils”.
118  Student scribbles in the margins of one pen edition repeated, 
“Shang dynasty had slave mentality, slavery still existed.”
119   
The pen edition's chapter on ceramics best illustrates how the senior staff integrated 
proletariat revolutions into aesthetic education.
120  Its introduction to imperial red porcelain 
116 Zhonggong shanghai shi wei xuanchuan bu, shi wenhua ju guanyu shanghai bowu guan, shijian bowuguan chenlie 
jihua ji qi gaijing fangan de qingshi, pifu, [People's Republic Shanghai Municipality Representative Board's 
Propaganda Ministry and Municipal Cultural  Administration's Rescripts Regarding Exhibition Plans and 
Improvement Requests for the Shanghai Museum and the Shanghai History Museum] January 24
th, 1956 – 
August 27
th, 1956, B172-4-532, SMA, Shanghai. 
117 Zhonggong shanghai shi wei xuanchuan bu, shi wenhua ju guanyu shanghai bowu guan, shijian bowuguan chenlie 
jihua ji qi gaijing fangan de qingshi, pifu, [People's Republic Shanghai Municipality Representative Board's 
Propaganda Ministry and Municipal Cultural  Administration's Rescripts Regarding Exhibition Plans and 
Improvement Requests for the Shanghai Museum and the Shanghai History Museum] January 24
th, 1956 – 
August 27
th, 1956, B172-4-532, SMA, Shanghai. 
118 Introductory lessons for Shanghai Museum Junior Staff, Private collection of Xia Shunkui.  
119 Introductory lessons for Shanghai Museum Junior Staff, Private collection of Xia Shunkui.  
120 This is consistent with recent scholarship on CCP and social education Liyan Liu, “The Man Who Molded 
Mao: Yang Changji and the First Generation of Chinese Communists,” Modern China, 32, no. 4 (2006): 483-
512.60
portrayed a regional administrator, Pan Xiang, as a eunuch-tyrant who “harassed the people” with 
heavy taxes.
121  Pan Xiang's “oppressive management” incensed a ceramist named Tong Bin, who 
protested by “walking into fire and burning to death”.
122  Tong Bin's desperate act both galvanized 
“great peasant rebellions” against Pan Xiang and left a lasting aesthetic legacy.  Mixed with 
porcelains in his kiln, Tong Bin's blood produced a bright, scarlet glaze, now known as imperial 
red.
123  
Tong Bin's life story bears clear parallels to Socialist martyr narratives, which use similarly 
gruesome anecdotes to heroize proletariat sacrifices in the Chinese Civil War (1945 – 1949).
124 
In the Class of 1952's Survey of Chinese Art, however, Tong Bin's story does far more than 
replicate Communist propaganda.  The narrative transformed rhetoric about the revolution into 
an origins myth about aesthetic innovation.  At the same time, it rewrote the imperial history of 
Jingdezhen, an imperial ceramics production center and Tong Bin's home, from the perspective 
of “ordinary people”.  This was an alternative to traditional art historical narratives, which had 
focused on Jingdezhen's imperial patronage.  
The Marxist turn transformed Chinese Ceramics into artifacts of ideological harmony 
between antiquarianism and Marxism.  The research themes, such as labor, trade demands, and 
121 Introductory lessons for Shanghai Museum Junior Staff, Private collection of Xia Shunkui.  
122 Introductory lessons for Shanghai Museum Junior Staff, Private collection of Xia Shunkui. 
123 Introductory lessons for Shanghai Museum Junior Staff, Private collection of Xia Shunkui.  
124 In fact, these narratives continue to the present.  For examples see Rana Mitter, “Behind The Scenes At The 
Museum: Nationalism, History And Memory In The Beijing War of Resistance Museum, 1987 – 1997,” The 
China Quarterly, 161 (2000): 279 – 293; Chang-tai Hung, “The Red Line: Creating A Museum Of The Chinese 
Revolution,”  The China Quarterly, 184, (2005): 914 – 933.61
taxation, remain how the history of Chinese ceramics is studied today – especially as new 
archaeological finds have expanded the available data on everyday life in Jingdezhen.
125  As the 
Class of 1952 learned, antiquarianism rescued Tong Bin's innovations from obscurity.  By 
articulating ordinary people's mastery of clay and fire, ceramics connoisseurship became a vehicle 
to facilitate artisan wisdom and personal sacrifice.  
Training young antiquarians to be Red also meant political socialization.  The Class of 
1952 regularly participated in recreational activities with other municipal employees, including 
police officers, postmen, and bankers.
126  Zhu Shuyi, who visited Zhongshan Park with her 
cohorts every Sunday, fondly boasted that “I still have the awards that I won from these athletic 
125 Before the turn towards Marxism, the study of Chinese Ceramics focused on identifying the ceramics' reign 
dates, colors, decorative features.  Michael Dillon, “Fang Zhimin, Jingdezhen and the Northeast Jiangxi Soviet: 
Tradition, Revolution and Civil War in a Pottery Town,” Modern Asian Studies, 26, no. 3 (1992): 569-589; 
Robert Finlay, “The Pilgrim Art: The Culture of Porcelain in World History,” Journal of World History, 9, no. 2 
(1998): 141-187; Wen-Chin Hsu, “Social and Economic Factors in the Chinese Porcelain Industry in 
Jingdezhen during the Late Ming and Early Qing Period, ca. 1620-1683,” Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of 
Great Britain and Ireland, no. 1 (1988): 135-159; Clare Le Corbeiller and Alice Cooney Frelinghuysen, 
“Chinese Export Porcelain,” The Metropolitan Museum of Art Bulletin, 60, no. 3, (2003): 1,5-60; Stephen Little, 
“Economic Change in Seventeenth-Century China and Innovations at the Jingdezhen Kilns,” Ars Orientalis, 26 
(1996): 47-54; Anne P. Underhill, “Investigating Variation in Organization of Ceramic Production: An 
Ethnoarchaeological Studyin Guizhou, China,” Journal of Archaeological Method and Theory, 10, no. 3 (2003): 
203-275.
126 The now seminal study on political socialization is Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture, 
(Princeton, 1963); while few studies exist on how these activities affected young people in the PRC, studies on 
East Earman socialization efforts reveal that the state used a variety of “transmission belts”, including organized 
leisure activities, to shape political culture in everyday life.  See Sterling Fishman and Lothar Martin, Estranged 
Twins: Education and Society in the Two Germanys, (New York, 1986); Alan McDougall, Youth Politics in East 
Germany: The Free German Youth Movement, 1946 – 1968, (Oxford, 2004); Ester Von Richthofen, Bringing 
Culture to the Masses: Control, Compromise and Participation in the GDR, (New York, 2009).
       For applications in PRC history, see Chang-tai Hung, “Mao’s Parades: State Spectacles in China in the 
1950s,” The China Quarterly 190 (June 2007): 411-431; Chang-tai Hung, "The Politics of National 
Celebrations in China," In The People’s Republic of China at 60: An International Assessment, ed. by William C. 
Kirby, (Cambridge, 2011): pp. 357-372.  62
contests.”
127  Li Junjie learned to sing and play soccer while others took dance lessons.
128  Many 
found the activities so engrossing that they “didn't go home in the evenings”.
129  The Ministry of 
Culture even distributed entertainment passes for Soviet and Czechoslovakian dance 
performances, which the Class of 1952 attended with avid curiosity.
130  My interviewees point out 
that working at the museum enabled them to “horse around.  There were so many activities.  At 
night in the People's Square, the singing, dancing, and general carousing was all night long.”
131 
These activities both reinforced their confidence in PRC priorities and boosted their interest in 
the museum profession.  In fact, the camaraderie developed during classroom and leisure 
activities kept new hires from moving to other industries.  Chen Peifen asserted that she turned 
down other career opportunities because “I liked the environment and the people...the things that 
I was learning here were more interesting and I stayed.”
132
The Art Dealers' Trade
While socialization campaigns meant fun and games for the Class of 1952, they hounded 
Shanghai's art dealers.  State intervention in the antiquities trade quickly escalated from the 
enforcement of stricter export regulations to the institutionalized appropriation of profits and 
inventory.  The Five-Anti campaign, an anti-capitalist political movement that ran for the first 
ten months of 1952, exposed Shanghai's dealers to crippling municipal audits.  The auditors 
127 Interview with Zhu Shuyi, January 15
th, 2010.
128 Interview with Li Junjie, January 21
st, 2010.
129 Interview with Zhu Shuyi, January 15
th, 2010.
130 Interview with Zhu Shuyi, January 15
th, 2010.
131 Interview with Li Junjie, January 21
st, 2010.
132 Interview with Chen Peifen, June 22
nd, 2009.63
accused dealers of regularly flouting commercial regulations: Some haggled despite instructions 
to keep prices as marked, others evaded taxes, posed as collectors to avoid auditors, or simply 
kept incomplete accounts.
133  The most serious charge by far, however, was smuggling. 
According to municipal investigators, art dealers habitually “claimed that real antiquities are fake 
and ancient objects are reproductions.
134  Common ruses include using “glazes to cover imperial 
markings,” applying “flour and paint to camouflage antique surfaces,” and allowing “alcohol to 
change the texture of lacquer covers.”
135  The municipality accused dealers of tampering with 
inventory as well as forging receipts and declaration forms.
136  Investigators speculated that 
Shanghai's art dealers maintained extensive smuggling routes that stretched from Dalian to 
Guangzhou.  Municipal officials even warned that many “have family and friends in Hong Kong. 
Some even own stock in Hong Kong dealerships.”
137  Thus, dealers “knew very detailed 
133 Shanghai shi wenshang xingzheng guanliju guanyu shanghai shi guwan shichang, guwu shangchang qingkuan yi 
tanshang zuangkuan, [Shanghai Commission of Commerce Management Bureau Report Regarding Shanghai's 
Chinese Curio Markets and Itinerant Art Dealers], 1955, B182-1-848-115, SMA, Shanghai; Shanghai shi wenhua ju 
guanyu 1952 nian shanghai wenhua yishu shiye jiben qingkuang tongji biaobao, [Shanghai Municipal Cultural 
Affairs Administration's Statistics Regarding Shanghai's Cultural and Artistic Industries 1952], March, 1952, 
B172-1-167, SMA, Shanghai; Shanghai shi diyi shangye ju guanyu 1955 nian ge tongye gonghui siying shangye 
pucha gongzuo xiaojie, [Shanghai First Commercial Bureau's Conclusions Regarding Its Investigation on Private 
Industries and Guilds in 1955] 1955, B123-2-1452, SMA, Shanghai. 
134 Shanghai shi wenhua ju guanyu 1952 nian shanghai wenhua yishu shiye jiben qingkuang tongji biaobao, [Shanghai 
Municipal Cultural Affairs Administration's Statistics Regarding Shanghai's Cultural and Artistic Industries 
1952], March, 1952, B172-1-167, SMA, Shanghai. 
135 Shanghai shi wenhua ju guanyu 1952 nian shanghai wenhua yishu shiye jiben qingkuang tongji biaobao, [Shanghai 
Municipal Cultural Affairs Administration's Statistics Regarding Shanghai's Cultural and Artistic Industries 
1952], March, 1952, B172-1-167, SMA, Shanghai. 
136 Shanghai shi wenhua ju guanyu 1952 nian shanghai wenhua yishu shiye jiben qingkuang tongji biaobao, [Shanghai 
Municipal Cultural Affairs Administration's Statistics Regarding Shanghai's Cultural and Artistic Industries 
1952], March, 1952, B172-1-167, SMA, Shanghai. 
137 Shanghai shi wenhua ju guanyu 1952 nian shanghai wenhua yishu shiye jiben qingkuang tongji biaobao, [Shanghai 
Municipal Ministry of Culture's Statistics Regarding Shanghai's Cultural and Artistic Industries 1952], March, 
1952, B172-1-167, SMA, Shanghai. 64
information about the Hong Kong art market, once they know Hong Kong wants something, 
they buy it in large quantities then either export it themselves or sell to others” - an act often 
involved smuggling.
138  Pinpointing the exact details of Shanghai's smuggling operations, 
however, “was not easy to manage.”
139  Investigators agreed that art dealers had no incentive to 
turn their colleagues over to an administration that capped their business. 
Shanghai tried taxing dealers into submission.  In 1954, Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) agents pressured dealers to buy bonds for “national economic building”.
140  Senior 
dealers had to sell bonds to junior dealers at mandatory socialization classes.  During each 
session, agents indoctrinated guild members with new industry priorities.  Lessons included 
“follow state laws and regulations,” “turn in those who evade taxes,” “avoid purchasing illicit 
antiquities and help police apprehend transgressors,” and “protect the national essence, do not 
export precious cultural relics.”
141  CCP agents also encouraged dealers to look into each other's 
finances, supplies, and stocks.
142  Each class ended with self-criticism meetings where dealers 
138 Shanghai shi wenhua ju guanyu 1952 nian shanghai wenhua yishu shiye jiben qingkuang tongji biaobao, [Shanghai 
Municipal Ministry of Culture's Statistics Regarding Shanghai's Cultural and Artistic Industries 1952], March, 
1952, B172-1-167, SMA, Shanghai. 
139 Shanghai shi wenhua ju guanyu 1952 nian shanghai wenhua yishu shiye jiben qingkuang tongji biaobao, [Shanghai 
Municipal Cultural Affairs Administration's Statistics Regarding Shanghai's Cultural and Artistic Industries 
1952], March, 1952, B172-1-167, SMA, Shanghai. 
140 Shanghai shi guwan shangye tongye gonghui tuixiao 1950 nian ji 1954 nian gongzhai de rengou baogao biao ji 
gongjie, [Shanghai Antiquities Guild's Conclusions and Sale Sheets Regarding the Sale of State Bonds in 1950 
and 1954] March 16
th, 1950 – March 16
th, 1955, S186-4-15, SMA, Shanghai. 
141 Shanghaishi guwan shangye tongye gonghui qingkuan yuebao yi nianbao yi jiagong dinghuo guanxichang yu fei 
guanxichang zonghe biao, [Shanghai antiquities industry guild events, monthly reports, annual reports, 
restorations and orders, with a compiled list of related factories and unrelated factories] May 1955 – February 
29
th, 1956, S186-4-13, SMA, Shanghai.
142 Shanghai shi diyi shangye ju guanyu 1955 nian ge tongye gonghui siying shangye pucha gongzuo xiaojie, [Shanghai 
First Commercial Bureau's Conclusions Regarding Its Investigation on Private Industries and Guilds in 1955] 65
wrote confessions detailing how socialist education and bond purchasing enlightened their 
“understanding of the nation's industries.”
143  
The municipality took its bond campaign seriously.  Eighty-four percent of Shanghai's 
antiquities trade, or 147 out of 176 dealerships, bought bonds by the end of 1954.
144  The debts 
amounted to more than three billion RMB.
145  By way of comparison, in 1954 the industry paid 
its workers twenty million RMB.
146  According to these numbers, dealers owed the state the 
equivalent of staff salaries for the next fourteen years.  The municipality collected payments 
monthly, which amounted to payments of thirty-three million per month, industry-wide.
147 
Storefronts that lapsed on payments had to apply for reprieve.  Until the municipality approved 
the reprieve, dealers accrued penalty fees.
148  This meant that on average, each dealers paid 
229,856 yuan a month, or had to liquidate the equivalent 2.3 rosewood writing desks, in order to 
1955, B123-2-1452, SMA, Shanghai. 
143 Shanghai shi guwan shangye tongye gonghui tuixiao 1950 nian ji 1954 nian gongzhai de rengou baogao biao ji 
gongjie, [Shanghai Antiquities Guild's Conclusions and Sale Sheets Regarding the Sale of State Bonds in 1950 
and 1954] March 16
th, 1950 – March 16
th, 1955, S186-4-15, SMA, Shanghai. 
144 The exact sum is 304,100,000 yuan.  Shanghai shi guwan shangye tongye gonghui tuixiao 1950 nian ji 1954 nian 
gongzhai de rengou baogao biao ji gongjie, [Shanghai Antiquities Guild's Conclusions and Sale Sheets Regarding 
the Sale of State Bonds in 1950 and 1954] March 16
th, 1950 – March 16
th, 1955, S186-4-15, SMA, Shanghai. 
145 The exact sum is 304,100,000 yuan.  Shanghai shi guwan shangye tongye gonghui tuixiao 1950 nian ji 1954 nian 
gongzhai de rengou baogao biao ji gongjie, [Shanghai Antiquities Guild's Conclusions and Sale Sheets Regarding 
the Sale of State Bonds in 1950 and 1954] March 16
th, 1950 – March 16
th, 1955, S186-4-15, SMA, Shanghai. 
146 The exact sum is 20,493,600 yuan.  Shanghai shi guwan shangye tongye gonghui gongzuo renyuan mingdan, gongzi 
shouju he shouzhi yujuesuan ji guding zichan mingxi biao, [Shanghai Antiquities Guild Members' Census, Salary 
Receipts and Sales Predictions as well as Permanent Assets Audit] December 31
st, 1953 – February 20
th, 1956, 
S186-4-18, SMA, Shanghai. 
147 The municipality collected payments monthly.  The payments amounted to 33,788,889 per month. 
148 Shanghai shi guwan shangye tongye gonghui tuixiao 1950 nian ji 1954 nian gongzhai de rengou baogao biao ji 
gongjie, [Shanghai Antiquities Guild's Conclusions and Sale Sheets Regarding the Sale of State Bonds in 1950 
and 1954] March 16
th, 1950 – March 16
th, 1955, S186-4-15, SMA, Shanghai. 66
satisfy their commitment to the city.
149  Every art dealer in Shanghai felt the pressure.  To meet 
their payments, dealers had to divest fast, and cheap. 
In defense of their livelihood, dealers commissioned guild histories that framed their 
profession in Socialist terms.  One history argued that dealers rescued art appreciation from class 
oppression.  “In feudal, imperialist times...barely a handful of people could appreciate” Chinese 
art because “the art objects that people created with their wisdom only circulated amongst the 
ruling few.”
150  Art dealing, however, “uniformly enriched and raised people's material and 
cultural standards” by making antiquities accessible to “people interested in our ancient 
civilization”.
151  The Chinese Curio Markets, dealers argued, “made Chinese arts and crafts 
popular” and got “capitalist countries all over the world aware of our nation's unique culture and 
art”.
152  Guild histories also highlighted dealers' popularization of Chinese cultural heritage at the 
same time as they minimized the industry's commercial ties.  The accounts specifically touted 
dealers' role in “archaeological research”, where they provided museums with artifacts that 
garnered “high commendations, pride, and a bright future” for Chinese civilization.
153  These 
149 Shanghai shi guwan shangye tongye gonghui gongzuo renyuan mingdan, gongzi shouju he shouzhi yujuesuan ji guding 
zichan mingxi biao, [Shanghai Antiquities Guild Members' Census, Salary Receipts and Sales Predictions as well 
as Permanent Assets Audit] December 31
st, 1953 – February 20
th, 1956, S186-4-18, SMA, Shanghai. 
150 Shanghai guwan shangye lishi yange, [Shanghai Antiquities Industry's Historical Evolution], 1954, S186-3-1, 
SMA, Shanghai. 
151 Shanghai guwan shangye lishi yange, [Shanghai Antiquities Industry's Historical Evolution], 1954, S186-3-1, 
SMA, Shanghai. 
152 Shanghai guwan shangye lishi yange, [Shanghai Antiquities Industry's Historical Evolution], 1954, S186-3-1, 
SMA, Shanghai. 
153 Shanghai guwan shangye tongye gonghui gongzuo zongjie, [Conclusion of Shanghai Antiquities Industry Guild's 
Work's work], 1951 – 1954, S186-4-3, SMA, Shanghai.67
narratives simultaneously credited art dealers with popularizing ancient Chinese civilization and 
appealed to the PRC's investment in Chinese cultural heritage.    
Art dealers characterized their industry in the framework of class-struggle, portraying 
themselves as honest laborers who suffered at the hands of corrupt administrators.
154  In the face 
of autocratic foreign officials who “randomly searched houses, held people without reason, and 
demanded bribes,” their guild “fought for their rights” and won “just settlement that settled the 
hearts of our fellow workers.
155  These achievements putatively put art dealers in the same 
position as CCP exemplars, such as tenant farmers who suffered at the hands of profiteering 
landlords.
156  The histories also served as the antiquities industry's new compact with the PRC. 
Each concluded with lofty proclamations that asserted the dealers' commitment to “preserving 
the national essence...welcoming world peace, and the development of international 
commerce.”
157
The guild's panegyrics didn't assuage the municipality.  The municipality did, however, 
recognize that dealers ran “a profitable business” whose earning potential outshone its 
transgressions.
158  Even the Ministry of Culture noted that selling antiquities “helps the nation 
154 Dealers may have gotten the inspiration for this from historical conflicts between the Lower Yangzi chamber of 
commerce and their overseas trading partners.  Zhongping Chen, “The Origins of Chinese Chambers of 
Commerce in the Lower Yangzi Region,” Modern China, 27, no. 2 (2001): 155-201.
155 Shanghai guwan shangye tongye gonghui gongzuo zongjie, [Conclusion of Shanghai Antiquities Industry Guild's 
Work], 1951 – 1954, S186-4-3, SMA, Shanghai.
156 For similar narrative approaches see Chang-Tai Hung, “Reeducating a Blind Storyteller: Han Qixiang and the 
Chinese Communist Storytelling Campaign,” Modern China, 19, no. 4 (1993): 395-426.
157 Shanghai guwan shangye lishi yange, [Shanghai Antiquities Industry's Historical Evolution], 1954, S186-3-1, 
SMA, Shanghai. 
158 Shanghai shi wenhua ju guanyu 1952 nian shanghai wenhua yishu shiye jiben qingkuang tongji biaobao, [Shanghai 68
earn foreign currency”.
159  It all came down to hard cash.  In the interest of expanding China's 
international trade, Shanghai officials agreed to “encourage and support” the commercial 
antiquities sector, especially insofar as it “accelerates arts and crafts production.”
160   
Arts and crafts production encouraged dealers to invest in cheaper inventory.  Traders 
began to sell objects made with cheaper materials, such as newly mined jade and ivory from 
Northwest China.
161  Storefronts shied away from arts and crafts made with nephrite, coral, and 
amber, as they necessitated a level of craftsmanship that dealers could not afford.
162  Objects that 
guaranteed quick and easy turnovers, such as furniture, stamps, and reproduction antiquities, 
became industry staples.
163  The growing trade in arts and crafts, as Cultural Relics Laws defined 
the category, kept the art market in business.  The cultural relics-half of dealers' stock, however, 
remained in limbo.
164  
Municipal Cultural Affairs Administration's Statistics Regarding Shanghai's Cultural and Artistic Industries 
1952], March, 1952, B172-1-167, SMA, Shanghai. 
159 Shanghai shi wenhua ju guanyu 1952 nian shanghai wenhua yishu shiye jiben qingkuang tongji biaobao, [Shanghai 
Municipal Cultural Affairs Administration's Statistics Regarding Shanghai's Cultural and Artistic Industries 
1952], March, 1952, B172-1-167, SMA, Shanghai. 
160 Shanghai shi wenhua ju guanyu 1952 nian shanghai wenhua yishu shiye jiben qingkuang tongji biaobao, [Shanghai 
Municipal Cultural Affairs Administration's Statistics Regarding Shanghai's Cultural and Artistic Industries 
1952], March, 1952, B172-1-167, SMA, Shanghai. 
161 Shanghai shi dier shangye ju 29 ge hangye qingkuang diaocha ji gaozao anpai fangan yijian, [Shanghai Second 
Commercial Bureau's Industry Report Regarding 29 Industries Plus Plans for Industry Reform], January 1952 – 
November 1955, B98-1-57, SMA, Shanghai. 
162 Shanghai shi dier shangye ju 29 ge hangye qingkuang diaocha ji gaozao anpai fangan yijian, [Shanghai Second 
Commercial Bureau's Industry Report Regarding 29 Industries Plus Plans for Industry Reform], January 1952 – 
November 1955, B98-1-57, SMA, Shanghai.
163 Shanghai guwan shangye tongye gonghui gongzuo zongjie, [Conclusion of Shanghai antiquities industry guild's 
work], 1951 – 1954, S186-4-3, SMA, Shanghai.
164 Shanghai shi wenhua ju guanyu guwan ye guikou wenti de qingshi, [Shanghai Cultural Affairs Administration's 
Requests Regarding the Nationalization of the Curios Industry], March 29
th, 1956 – August 15
th, 1956, B172-4-
531, SMA, Shanghai. 69
 The Nationwide Divestment of Art
Art dealers weren't the only people who desperately needed cash.  The aforementioned 
socialization campaigns severed domestic exchanges with overseas partners, which reduced 
income amongst formerly elite households.
165  The Shanghai Museum staff affirmed that the Five-
Anti movement struck Shanghai's wealthy industrialists especially hard.   Li Junjie explained that 
“the Five-Anti campaign was about people who had tax evasion...Well some people, they owed the 
state money and they couldn't pay it back, so they had to sell their things, they had to sell cultural 
relics.”
166  Private collectors' divestment needs formed the basis of Shanghai's antiquities bonanza 
in early 1950s.  The museum “unfailingly accumulated books and cultural relics from private 
collections because at present most collectors are in dire straits”.
167  Museum administrators 
couched these acquisitions in subtle terms, claiming that once collectors learned that “their 
ancestors' books and cultural relics were in danger of dispersal, they willingly contributed to the 
state”.
168  Amongst themselves, however, museum staff agreed that empty coffers motivated the 
sales.  “In the end it all comes down to money.  At that time if the state became interested in your 
165 Julia Strauss, “Paternalist Terror: The Campaign To Suppress Counter-Revolutionary And Regime 
Consolidation In The People's Republic Of China, 1950-1953,” Comparative Studies In Society And History, 44, 
no. 1 (2002): 80-105.
166 Interview with Li Junjie, January 21
st, 2010.
167 Shanghai shi renmin zhengfu guanyu shi wenwu guanli wenyuanhui chengli fangan, renyuan pinyong, niandu yewu 
jihua deng wenti de qingshi ji pifu, [Shanghai Municipal Government's Requests and Rescripts on the 
Establishment of a Municipal Cultural Relics Management Board including Administrative Outline, Hiring, and 
Yearly Budget], September 1949, B1-2-765, SMA, Shanghai. 
168 Shanghai shi renmin zhengfu guanyu shi wenwu guanli wenyuanhui chengli fangan, renyuan pinyong, niandu yewu 
jihua deng wenti de qingshi ji pifu, [Shanghai Municipal Government's Requests and Rescripts on the 
Establishment of a Municipal Cultural Relics Management Board including Administrative Outline, Hiring, and 
Yearly Budget], September 1949, B1-2-765, SMA, Shanghai. 70
collection, they would send someone over and give you a price.”
169  
Museum employees also pressured collectors to divest.   Both the senior staff and the 
Class of 1952 visited collectors regularly – a gesture that some perceived as rude and 
threatening.
170  For example, when museum staff approached Yan Huiyu (1895 – 1968) for 
antiquities the collector threw his guests out.
171  Yan literally pulled out his drawers and said “you 
look, I've got plenty of money, I don't sell things, I have money, why would I sell things?”
172  The 
museum staff, however, paid Yan so many visits that “they almost wore out his front steps”.
173 
Zhu Junbo, an employee at Duoyun Xian Art House, explained that, 
“The Cultural Relics Management Board comes to your house and says oh you have some nice 
things in your house.  Our Museum is lacking the same kinds of nice things.  The first time you 
don't want to, the second time...the third time, you're scared.  Some people gave things willingly, 
and some people were just scared.  If I don't give it to them this time, the next time there's some 
kind of political movement, then maybe they'll arrest me.”
174  
As Zhu pointed out, while some collectors divested antiquities willingly, others had reservations 
that repeated visits and concurrent political circumstances made moot.  Li Junjie confirmed the 
museum's position: “We were a political organization, we had a political department and could 
help the collectors.  If the collectors had problems.”
175  This combination of persistence and 
169 Interview with Li Junjie January 21
st, 2010.
170 For more on Yan Huiyu's art collecting, see Jiangsu Sheng Zhengxie Wenshi Ziliao Weiyuan hui and Zhenjiang 
shi Zhengxie Wenshi Ziliao Weiyuan hui, Yan Huiyu Jinian Wenji.  [Yang Huiyu Memorial Literature] (Nanjing: 
1994). 
171 Zhong Zheng, Bowu guan yu shoucang jia, [Museums and Collectors] (Shanghai, 2000): 177.
172 Zhong Zheng, Bowu guan yu shoucang jia, [Museums and Collectors] (Shanghai, 2000): 177.
173 Zhong Zheng, Bowu guan yu shoucang jia, [Museums and Collectors] (Shanghai, 2000): 177.
174 Interview with Zhu Junbo, December 17
th, 2009.
175 Interview with Li Junjie, June 29
th, 2009.71
pressure worked.  “If we go and visit them, even if they don't donate they'll sell to you.  Shanghai 
was good at doing this kind of work.”
176   Eventually, even the obstinate Yan Huiyu sold 
antiquities to Shanghai.  He did so, however, with regret: “these things have accompanied me my 
whole life.”
177
Between 1950 and 1954, mayor Chen Yi gave the museum unprecedented financial 
support, partly in recognition that in comparison to the rest of the PRC, Shanghai's 
preponderance of local wealth offered “more cultural relics and rank a special category...in cultural 
relics acquisition and promulgation.”
178  Chen Peifen boasted that “Chen Yi our mayor really 
cared...he had some culture in him.  He gave lots of funding.”
179  This level of support continued 
even after 1956, when Chen Yi stepped down as mayor and “went to the central bureau.”
180 
Whenever Shanghai requested supplementary funds for new acquisitions, “old ancestor Chen he 
was fine with it.  He just nods.”
181  This enabled Shanghai to make bail out-level offers.  In fact, 
municipal budget officer Liu Shiji revealed to the museum staff that up until 1962, the 
municipality's museum and library got “one third of the city's culture and education budget” so 
their acquisitions teams could “buy a lot of cultural relics”.
182   
176 Interview with Li Junjie, April 27
th, 2010.
177 Zhong Zheng, Bowu guan yu shoucang jia, [Museums and Collectors] (Shanghai, 2000): 178.
178 Shanghai bowuguan, shanghai shi wenguan hui, shanghai tushuguan fu jing gongzuo zu gongzuo baogao, [Work 
Report from the Shanghai Museum, Shanghai Cultural Relics Management Bureau and Shanghai Library's Trip 
to Beijing], June 20
th, 1953, B172-4-230, SMA, Shanghai. 
179 Chen Yi had the city mayor's post from 1949 – 1954.  Interview with Chen Peifen, June 22
nd, 2009. 
180 Interview with Li Junjie, April 27
th, 2010.
181 Interview with Li Junjie, April 27
th, 2010.
182 Interview with Li Junjie, April 27
th, 2010.72
By 1953, the National Summit of PRC Museums had appointed Shanghai as the lead in 
converting antiquities from private to public property.  The Shanghai Museum staff attributed 
this decision to the density of private collectors and antiquities in their region.  “South East China 
has the highest concentration of antiquities and most of it is in Shanghai...we need to prevent 
[these objects] from going overseas...use multiple methods to sooth collectors and build their 
confidence [in the PRC].”
183  The summit identified museum professionals as special emissaries 
in an imminent transformation wherein “the top cultural relics that are spread amongst private 
hands will inevitably be nationalized,” and placed in museum custody.
184  
The summit also identified art dealers as primary obstacles to its acquisition project. 
Zhang Congyu (1915 – 1963), a Shanghai antiquarian who moved to Beijing to take up dual 
positions at the Palace Museum and the State Administration of Cultural Heritage, warned that 
“the important thing is not to let dealers take advantage in the interim, and take charge of 
standardizing acquisition prices.”
185  This assessment enabled the Shanghai Museum to 
manipulate art market prices to its own advantage.  Strong political and financial backing soon 
made Shanghai the nation's highest bidder for antiquities.  Meanwhile, heavy taxes and 
183 Shanghai shi renmin zhengfu guanyu shi wenwu guanli wenyuanhui chengli fangan, renyuan pinyong, niandu yewu 
jihua deng wenti de qingshi ji pifu, [Shanghai Municipal Government's Requests and Rescripts on the 
Establishment of a Municipal Cultural Relics Management Board including Administrative Outline, Hiring, and 
Yearly Budget], September 1949, B1-2-765, SMA, Shanghai.  
184 Shanghai bowuguan, shanghai shi wenguan hui, shanghai tushuguan fu jing gongzuo zu gongzuo baogao, [Work 
Report from the Shanghai Museum, Shanghai Cultural Relics Management Bureau and Shanghai Library's Trip 
to Beijing], June 20
th, 1953, B172-4-230, SMA, Shanghai. 
185 Shanghai bowuguan, shanghai shi wenguan hui, shanghai tushuguan fu jing gongzuo zu gongzuo baogao, [Work 
Report from the Shanghai Museum, Shanghai Cultural Relics Management Bureau and Shanghai Library's Trip 
to Beijing], June 20
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socialization campaigns kept art dealers from taking advantage of Shanghai's antiquities 
divestment bonanza.  In other words,  the Shanghai Museum manipulated the market so that it, 
and only it, could profited from nationwide divestment of art.   
The Class of 1952 confirmed that the museum's acquisitions offers topped the nation. 
Elsewhere on the mainland, prices went down because “if everybody wants to sell, then of course 
the prices would be lower...if this object was originally 2000rmb, if everyone's selling, then I’ll buy 
it at 1800.  If you don't sell I’ll buy it from someone else.”
186  The best antiquities got stuck in the 
domestic market because Cultural Relics laws made it “illegal to sell overseas”.
187  Thus, when it 
became clear that dealers “could make the train money back and still make a profit off their sales,” 
collectors and dealers across the nation chose to liquidate their collections in Shanghai.
188  All 
worked on the received knowledge that “people paid more for things in Shanghai.”
189  The exact 
price differences between cities remain unclear.  The Class of 1952, however, stressed that “at that 
time, having five RMB more was a really big deal, so of course they came and sold things to 
Shanghai...that's how a lot of things came to Shanghai ”
190  The museum's ledgers confirm that 
throughout the 1950s, new acquisitions came from faraway cities such as Beijing, Tianjin, and 
Hefei, as well as Shanghai and its nearby provinces.  
It should be noted that in addition to the 1795 demarcation, Cultural Relics laws 
186 Interview with Li Junjie, January 21
st, 2010.
187 Interview with Li Junjie, June 29
th, 2009.
188 Interview with Li Junjie, June 29
th, 2009.
189 Interview with Li Junjie, June 29
th, 2009.
190 Interview with Zhu Junbo, December 17
th, 2009.74
encouraged museum institutions to evaluate Chinese antiquities according to a Three-Tier 
system.  The tiers correspond to a nationwide standard for antiquities that PRC cultural 
institutions used to evaluate art as early as 1949.  First-Tier refers to “important cultural relics 
worthy of preservation.”
191  These objects usually took center place at exhibitions and in museum 
catalogs.  Second-Tier antiquities “are average cultural relics which, unless part of a larger set of 
objects which the Department of Cultural Affairs will preserve, may, after inspection, be 
distributed to various film companies, theater groups, cultural centers, libraries, etc. as props and 
exhibition material.”
192  Third-Tier antiquities “are not cultural relics and have no preservation 
value”.
193   This category of objects comprise the bottom rank of all museum collections, if they 
make it to museums at all.  Some individual variations exist in tier rankings across the country. 
For sake of quality control, however, all PRC museums uniformly refrained from identifying more 
than one percent of their collections as First-Tier.  
The figure entitled “Shanghai Museum First-Tier Acquisitions 1949 - 1959” (Figure 1.4) 
charts purchases against cost-free transactions, such as donations, internal transfers, 
191 Huadong wenhua bu, Shanghai shi wenhua ju guanyu wenwu zhengli cangku ku cun tongqi waili wenti de baogao, 
pifu, [The China Eastern Cultural Affairs Administration and the Shanghai Cultural Affairs Administration's 
Report and Responses To The Disposal Of Bronze Objects Stored In the Cultural Relics Rescue Warehouse] 
September 1
st, 1953 – November 4
th, 1955, B172-4-422, SMA, Shanghai. 
192 Huadong wenhua bu, Shanghai shi wenhua ju guanyu wenwu zhengli cangku ku cun tongqi waili wenti de baogao, 
pifu, [The China Eastern Cultural Affairs Administration and the Shanghai Cultural Affairs Administration's 
Report and Responses To The Disposal Of Bronze Objects Stored In the Cultural Relics Rescue Warehouse] 
September 1
st, 1953 – November 4
th, 1955, B172-4-422, SMA, Shanghai. 
193 Huadong wenhua bu, Shanghai shi wenhua ju guanyu wenwu zhengli cangku ku cun tongqi waili wenti de baogao, 
pifu, [The China Eastern Cultural Affairs Administration and the Shanghai Cultural Affairs Administration's 
Report and Responses To The Disposal Of Bronze Objects Stored In the Cultural Relics Rescue Warehouse] 
September 1
st, 1953 – November 4
th, 1955, B172-4-422, SMA, Shanghai. 75
expropriations, and requisitions, for First-Tier acquisitions at the Shanghai Museum.
194   
Figure 1.4. Shanghai Museum's First-Tier Antiquities Acquisitions, 1949 – 1959. 
Seventy-two percent of the museum's 288 First-Tiers came from purchases.  By way of 
comparison, the Shanghai Museum owned 149,000 antiquities in 1959, suggesting that the First-
194 Data extracted from Wenhua bu, shanghai shi wenhua ju guanyu bianzhi, chuban shanghai bowuguan yiji cangping 
jianmu, huace, tupu de tongzhi, baogao, zongjie, [Cultural Division and Shanghai Ministry of Culture's Reports 
and Rescripts Regarding Publishing the Shanghai Museum's First Tier Collections' Index, Illustrated Album, 
and Graphics Archive], February 1963 – November 1963, B172-1-443, SMA, Shanghai; Shanghai shi wenhua ju 
guanyu shangbao shanghai gemin lishi jinian guan, shanghai bowuguan, shanghai luxun jinian guan yiji cangping de 
baogao, mulu, [Shanghai Cultural Affairs Administration's Report and Table of Contents Regarding First Tier 
Collections at the Shanghai Revolutionary History Museum, Shanghai Museum, and Shanghai Luxun Memorial 
Museum], August 1960 – October 1965, B172-1-498, SMA, Shanghai. 76
Tier rank is indeed rare – about .002% of the entire collection.  The fact that the majority of these 
came to Shanghai through purchases suggests that money and pressure opened doors.  Museum 
ledgers note that the majority of First-Tier acquisitions came from private sales, by collectors who 
divested as a result of active door-knocking and above-market prices.  Some acquisitions also 
came from dealers living outside of Shanghai, confirming that Shanghai's offers topped the nation. 
As Li Junjie explained, the Shanghai Museum spent more than one million RMB on acquisitions 
between 1949 and 1959.  Yearly salaries for museum employees, in contrast, added up to 135,320 
RMB.
195  In other words, the acquisitions budget could pay for the next eight years' worth of 
employee salaries.   
The Four Vajrapani
Art dealers heard dark news in June of 1955.  The Shanghai Police arrested Zhang 
Xuegeng, a seasoned dealer whose assets held the antiquities industry in awe, for smuggling.
196 
Zhang Xuegeng was one of the Four Vajrapani.  He and fellow Vajrapanis Ye Shuzhong, Hong 
Yulin, and the expatriate J. T. Tai made profits that put them at the top four-percent of their 
industry.
197  They acquired antiquities from throughout mainland China and catering extensively 
to foreign clientele.
198  The Shanghai Museum's senior staff considered the dealers' appraisal 
195 Shanghai shi wenhua ju 1956 nian guomin jingji jihua he jiuxing qingkuang de zongjie, [Conclusion of Shanghai 
Cultural Affairs Administration's 1956 Citizen's Financial Plans and Implementation Report] September 1955 
– February 1957, B172-1-179, SMA, Shanghai. 
196 Luxia Song, Bainian shoucang: 20 shiji zhongguo minjian shoucang fengyun Lu, [A Century of Collection: 20
th 
Century Chinese Private Collecting Tales] (Shanghai shi, 1999): 381.
197 For more information on J. T. Tai, see Christie's, “Property of the Ping Y. Tai Foundation” Fine Chinese 
Ceramics and Works of art September 17
th, 2008.
198 Nicknames reminiscent of the Buddhist pantheon are commonly used to underline the greatness of the 77
skills on a par with their own – two of the Vajrapani even advised museum acquisitions.  The 
ramifications of this crackdown are still whispered about today.  
   The Shanghai Police had linked Zhang Xuegeng to an illegal shipping container.  Police 
records allege that the container, which belonged to both Zhang and J. T. Tai, contained more 
than ten thousand contraband antiquities, including bronze relics from the Three Dynasties era, 
Tang dynasty pottery, and gold and silver implements from the Qin and Han dynasties.
199  The 
No. 2. Intermediate People's Court immediately froze the dealers' assets and detained their 
employees for questioning.  The Shanghai Police then opened investigations on Ye Shuzhong 
and Hong Yulin, effectively putting the antiquities industry's top brass out of business.   
Police investigators interrogated the entire Shanghai antiquities guild.  Guild members 
were divided into small groups and required to confess all extant transgressions against the 
state.
200  As with many such interrogations, the interrogators told dealers “if that person had 
completely confessed, then it was fine...once you tell us everything then you are not a counter-
individuals to whom the nicknames refer.  Although the above four dealers were frequently referred to as the 
Four Vajrapani during the 1950s, the earliest written reference I found is in 1964, in Shanghai shi renwei, wenhua 
ju guanyu wenwu baohu danwei de xioushan, caichu ji daji wenwu shuhua touji fanmai huodong de jihua baogao he 
pifu, [The Shanghai People's Representative Board and the Cultural Affairs Administration's Replies and 
Reports Regarding the Reform, Break-up, and Destruction of Opportunistic Profiteering From the Sale of 
Cultural Relics, Painting, and Calligraphy] April 7
th, 1964 – December 19
th, 1964, B3-2-139, SMA, Shanghai. 
199 “Wenwu Shangye,” [Cultural Relics Industries] in Ma Chengyuan, Huang Xuanpei, and Li Junjie, eds., 
Shanghai wenwu bowuguan zhi, [Gazetteer of Shanghai's Cultural Relics Museums] (Shanghai, 1997): 430 – 
431. 
200 Shanghai shi guwan shangye tongye gonghui qingkuan yuebao yi nianbao yi jiagong dinghuo guanxichang yu fei 
guanxichang zonghe biao, [Shanghai antiquities industry guild events, monthly reports, annual reports, 
restorations and orders, with a compiled list of related factories and unrelated factories] May 1955 – February 
29
th, 1956, S186-4-13, SMA, Shanghai.78
revolutionary.”
201  Those who didn't cooperate, however, risked getting into trouble because 
“then we had to go and investigate and make sure they tell us everything.”
202
Guild members soon confessed to all manners of smuggling, condemned Tai as “a 
traitorous merchant”, and confirmed that the “court's decision is definitely correct and 
important”.
203  Under interrogation, some admitted to minor crimes such as “not trusting the 
state and hoarding American dollars”.
204  Others wrote “I am willing to confess my wrongs in 
front of all my industry cohorts and our financial management comrades.”
205  These 
interrogations began as an inquiry into the Four Vajrapani's smuggling ring.  The resultant 
confessions, however, constituted a full investigation into Shanghai's antiquities industry.  
The investigation destroyed the Four Vajrapani.  Zhang Xuegeng got fifteen years in 
prison.  He was fifty-three years old in 1955 and would have been sixty-eight upon his release; 
too old to start over in any industry.
206  That didn't matter though – he died in prison.  Hong 
201 Interview with Xia Shunkui, April 26
th, 2010.
202 Interview with Xia Shunkui, April 26
th, 2010.
203 Shanghaishi guwan shangye tongye gonghui qingkuan yuebao yi nianbao yi jiagong dinghuo guanxichang yu fei 
guanxichang zonghe biao, [Shanghai antiquities industry guild events, monthly reports, annual reports, 
restorations and orders, with a compiled list of related factories and unrelated factories] May 1955 – February 
29
th, 1956, S186-4-13, SMA, Shanghai.
204 Shanghaishi guwan shangye tongye gonghui qingkuan yuebao yi nianbao yi jiagong dinghuo guanxichang yu fei 
guanxichang zonghe biao, [Shanghai antiquities industry guild events, monthly reports, annual reports, 
restorations and orders, with a compiled list of related factories and unrelated factories] May 1955 – February 
29
th, 1956, S186-4-13, SMA, Shanghai.
205 Shanghaishi guwan shangye tongye gonghui qingkuan yuebao yi nianbao yi jiagong dinghuo guanxichang yu fei 
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Yulin, who was forty-six at the time of his arrest, tried to defect to Hong Kong but soon got 
mixed up in forgery claims.
207  One particularly gray day, the penniless dealer jumped off a 
building.  The Shanghai Museum had confiscated all of his stock.  
Ye Shuzhong fought his fifteen-year sentence all the way to the Shanghai Higher 
People's Court.  The dealer argued that charges against him should be reduced because the 
municipality was trying him for sales that occurred between 1927 and 1942, before Cultural 
Relics laws existed.
208  Ye added that he was never the main perpetrator on any of his overseas 
deals.  He was a middleman for overseas dealers like C. T. Loo, who orchestrated the 
transactions and took most of the profits.
209  The Higher Court acknowledged Ye's appeal, but 
did not exonerate him.  The fifty-one year old got transferred to hard labor in Qinghai, a bitterly 
cold province on the Tibetan plateau, and never came back.
210  The only time his family saw him 
again was when they went to Qinghai to collect his body, which had already been cremated.
211
None of the Vajrapani's families ever recovered from the taint of having produced a 
smuggler.  Chen Peifen, who tracked the Vajrapanis' children through Shanghai Museum 
connections, explained that the municipality confiscated the dealers' homes and the stigma of 
207 Song, Bainian shoucang: 20 shiji zhongguo minjian shoucang fengyun lu, 382.
208 Song, Bainian shoucang: 20 shiji zhongguo minjian shoucang fengyun lu, 380.
209 For more information on C. T. Loo and his work as a dealer in China, America, and Paris, see Yiyou Wang, The 
Loouvre from China: A Critical Study of C. T. loo and the Framing of Chinese Art in the United States, 1915 – 1950. 
Unpublished PhD, Ohio University, 2007.  An image of C. T. Loo can be found at the National Portrait 
Gallery's exhibition entitled Portraits of the Art World, Available 
<http://www.npg.si.edu/cexh/artnews/loo.htm> [3, December 2010]
210 For a thorough discussion of labor conditions in Qinghai during this era see Greg Rohlf, “Dreams of Oil and 
Fertile Fields: The Rush to Qinghai in the 1950s,” Modern China, 29, no. 4 (2003): 455-489.
211 Oral interview with Chen Peifen, February 1
st, 2010.80
guilt kept their children from getting decent jobs.  Even in the 1980s, when she visited one of Ye 
Shuzhong's daughters, the family regarded her with fear and suspicion.  As she parked her 
bicycle in their housing complex “the whole complex was saying someone's coming, someone's 
coming...they were afraid because if one person was no good, then the whole family gets 
affected.”
212  To underscore the impact that such an arrest had on one's family, Chen Peifen 
added that “until this day, Ye Shuzhong's two remaining kids, one is 60, one is 55 or so, neither 
of them are married...even if you're a woman, you have to have something to be able to get 
married.  It's like they were garbage sweepers.”
213  In short, the Vajranapis' arrest stamped their 
children as people without social status – the lowest of the low.  
J. T. Tai, the only Vajrapani to escape the raids, stayed in America.  According to those 
who worked with him in New York, Tai talked about Shanghai to no one.
214 
Figure 1.5. J. T. Tai and Ping Y. Tai at Mrs. Tai's sixtieth birthday celebration (1975) in New 
York.  Photograph courtesy of Christie's.
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The Shanghai Museum became the major beneficiary of the Four Vajrapani's downfall. 
The No. 2 Peoples Court officially condemned the dealers as criminals.  Therefore, all their 
stock got appropriated for the museum collection.
215 
Nationalization
The nationalization of industries began just as the dust settled on the Four Vajrapani. 
The four men's disappearance signaled the end of an era.  Private art dealing shut down.  The 
state made all privately businesses into State Owned Enterprises, transferring all proprietors and 
their employees to work in state-appointed danwei (work units).
216  The work unit administered 
everything: Housing, child care, training, health care, stores, post offices, as well as permission 
for marriage, child -bearing, and travel.  Dealers soon understood that regardless of their guild 
histories or earning potential, “private parties could not deal in works of art anymore.  They 
don't let you do business.”
217  Shops in the Chinese Curio Markets “still look the same, here 
there's some ceramics, there's furniture, but it's not separate stores.”
218  They now belonged to a 
municipal work unit where all inventory and profits belonged to the state. 
Nationalization enabled the Shanghai Museum to acquire the pick of antiquities 
215 Wenhua bu, shanghai shi wei xuanchuan bu, shanghai shi wenhua ju guanyu jiachang wenwu chukou jianding 
gongzuo he guwan ye guanli de yijian, baogao, pifu ji jianding biaozhun, [The Cultural Affairs Administration, The 
Shanghai Representatives Board's Propaganda Board, and Shanghai Municipal Ministry of Culture’s Reports, 
Objections, Approvals and Appraisal Standards for Improving the Management Of Export Appraisals and the 
Antiquities Industry] February 1960 – November 1960, B172-1-364, SMA, Shanghai. 
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industry stock.  This meant the museum could appropriate art market inventory just as it did 
court-confiscated personal property.
219  All the antiquities that belonged to the Four Vajrapani, 
for example, became museum property upon their arrest.
220  Museum employees picked out the 
best of the lot and sent the rest, largely antiquities post-dating 1795, to commercial work units 
like the newly nationalized Chinese Curio Markets.
221  The Class of 1952 called this process 
inventory clearance.
Inventory clearance caused widespread panic amongst already apprehensive dealers. 
Some kept “a large amount of antiquities in storage for many years” and didn't want to lose it all 
to the state.
222  Others wondered whether the municipality suspected that dealers who had 
already fled for Hong Kong kept their Shanghai storefronts as a smuggling depot.  No one knew 
what the future portended. 
The Shanghai Museum cleared T. Y. King's store on March 6th, 1956.  The Kings had 
already fled the mainland in 1949.  One employee, the elderly Li Chaozhen, stayed behind.  
219 Shanghai shi renmin weiyuan hui wenyi bangong shi guanyu shanghai shi siyin guwan shang anpai gaizao ji wenwu 
zhengli gongzuo de youguan wenjian, [Shanghai Municipal People's Board, Arts and Cultural Office's Documents 
Regarding Reformation Plans for Shanghai's Art Dealers and the Organized Allocation of Cultural Relics] 
March 1955 – November 1955, B9-2-25,  SMA, Shanghai.
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gongzuo he guwan ye guanli de yijian, baogao, pifu ji jianding biaozhun, [The Cultural Affairs Administration, The 
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Shanghai. 
222 Shanghai shangye yiju guanyu shi bowuguan tiqu jincaiji guwu jinguo qingkuan baogao, [Shanghai First 
Commercial Bureau Report Regarding the Municipal Museum Appropriating T. Y. King's Antiquities], 1956, 
B123-3-571, SMA, Shanghai. 83
Rumors about museum staff tagging and commandeering inventory swept the Chinese 
Curio Markets within the day.  Dealers who peeked in T. Y. King's saw commandeered items 
displayed in the windows, marked with tags that read “already selected for the Shanghai 
Museum”.
223  More than 150 objects, including a pair of woven shoes from the Warring States 
era, Shang dynasty oracle bones, Han lacquer, Tang jewelry, and Yuan ceramics, bore the 
museum's seal.
224  
Dealers panicked.  They wanted to know whether the King family received any 
compensation from the museum (no), if the museum had permission to commandeer any and 
all inventory (yes), and whether private buyers had the opportunity to give counter offers to the 
museum (no).  The rumors caused so much agitation that by the end of the week, district 
administrators refused to allow museum staff daylight access to T. Y. King's.
225  City officials 
warned that “it is no longer beneficial to expropriate at will...the antiquities guild is abuzz with 
rumors and it looks bad politically.”  Officials expressed particular concern over the Hong Kong 
connection – “the Cultural Bureau needs to devise a different approach, otherwise this will have 
a negative impact overseas”.
226  In response, district administrators called Li Chaozhen and T. Y. 
223 Shanghai shangye yiju guanyu shi bowuguan tiqu jincaiji guwu jinguo qingkuan baogao, [Shanghai First 
Commercial Bureau Report Regarding the Municipal Museum Appropriating T. Y. King's Antiquities], 1956, 
B123-3-571, SMA, Shanghai. 
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B123-3-571, SMA, Shanghai. 
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King's daughter in for a talk.  Both were told not to discuss inventory clearance with anyone.
227 
The Shanghai Museum, however, retained its ability to appropriate stock.  Its employees just 
had to exercise more discretion in the future.  
Art dealers soon found out that the Shanghai Museum got the pick of T. Y. King's stock 
for a pittance.  The museum paid five thousand RMB for 151 objects, all of which were 
antiquities that predated the Yuan dynasty.  Li Chaozhen wanted to negotiate for ten thousand 
RMB, but got rebuked.
228  By way of comparison, in 1958 J. T. Tai sold a Song dynasty jar 
(Longquan kiln) in London for ₤620, or 4,237 RMB.
229  The Shanghai Museum's confiscations 
list for T. Y. King included three Song dynasty ceramics from the same Kiln.  The set included a 
matched pair, which alone was worth more than 4,237 RMB.
230  Nevertheless, the Shanghai 
Museum got all three ceramics, plus 148 other top-tier antiquities, for only five thousand.  The 
museum used nationalization to justify this price.  As Zhu Junbo explained, after 1956 “all the 
stores changed, it all belonged to the state [gestures]...this belongs to the state, that belongs to 
the state...if you bought it for 3 rmb then you sell it to me for 4rmb.  It wasn't doing business, it 
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B123-3-571, SMA, Shanghai. 
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B123-3-571, SMA, Shanghai. 
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was just an internal transfer.”
231  
It would be a mistake, however, to claim that the nationalization of industries expanded 
the Shanghai Museum's reach.  The requisitions made during inventory clearance were 
consistent with those that the Class of 1952 had performed since they started work.  The chart 
entitled “Shanghai Museum General Acquisitions 1949 – 1959” (figure 1.6) visualizes the 
history of appropriations at the Shanghai Museum by comparing purchases to cash-less 
transactions from its first decade in existence.
232  
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232 Data extracted from Wenhua bu, shanghai shi wenhua ju guanyu bianzhi, chuban shanghai bowuguan yiji cangping 
jianmu, huace, tupu de tongzhi, baogao, zongjie, [Cultural Division and Shanghai Ministry of Culture's Reports 
and Rescripts Regarding Publishing the Shanghai Museum's First Tier Collections' Index, Illustrated Album, 
and Graphics Archive], February 1963 – November 1963, B172-1-443, SMA, Shanghai; Shanghai shi wenhua ju 
guanyu shangbao shanghai gemin lishi jinian guan, shanghai bowuguan, shanghai luxun jinian guan yiji cangping de 
baogao, mulu, [Shanghai Cultural Affairs Administration's Report and Table of Contents Regarding First Tier 
Collections at the Shanghai Revolutionary History Museum, Shanghai Museum, and Shanghai Luxun Memorial 
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Figure 1.6. Shanghai Museum's General Antiquities Acquisitions, 1949 – 1959. 
The top sections of each acquisition column show that the majority of the Shanghai Museum's 
permanent collection came from cash-free transactions.  If anything, the Shanghai Museum's 
cash-free acquisitions from 1956 were less than those that it got, on average, over the previous 
seven years.  In 1956 the Class of 1952 brought back 12,634 antiquities without having to pay 
for them.  Between 1949 and 1955, the Class of 1952 appropriated, on average per year, 13,540 
antiquities – a difference of 6,342 objects in total.  In its first decade of existence, the museum 
got 132,000 of its 149,000-object collection cash-free.  This means Shanghai only had to paid for 87
eleven percent of its entire collection.  This is in stark contrast to the First-Tier acquisitions 
chart (Figure 1.4), which shows the museum paying for seventy-two percent of its collection.  
The remarkable requisitions-to-purchases ratio in the Shanghai Museum's general 
acquisition ledgers has everything to do with the creation of a museum professionals' identity. 
Enforcing Cultural Relics laws allowed museum employees to present themselves as custodians 
of Chinese cultural heritage.  Appropriations legitimated this identification.  The museum 
argued that its participation in PRC ideological movements “raised the people's political 
awareness...increased their demand to learn culture and elevated their need for museums.”
233 
Appropriations expanded the museum collection, which, when exhibited, “enriches laborers and 
students' understanding of the motherland's history, allow the people to critically absorb our 
ancient cultural essence, raise ethnic pride, and develop new ethnic cultures.”
234  In sum, the 
museum's role in cultural heritage promotion justified the appropriation of art. 
The institutional infrastructure for appropriations was immense.  The museum operated 
a Cultural Relics Warehouse that shifted through factories and recycling centers for antiquities 
that it acquired by internal transfer.
235  It also maintained a trade-and-transfer partnership with 
Shanghai's Bureau of Higher Education: Universities and colleges relinquished their collections 
233 Shanghai Museum, Chenlieshi shuomingshu, [An Interpretative Guide to the Exhibitions] (Shanghai, 1952): 4. 
The book is out of print.  I found my copy in the private collection of Xia Shunkui.   
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235 Huadong wenhua bu guanyu jiang gaibu suoshu de luxun jinian guan, wenwu cangku yijiao shanghai shi wenhua ju 
lingdao de tongzhi ji shanghai shi wenhua ju de jiejiao jihua, baogao, [China Eastern Region Ministry of Culture's 
Notification Regarding Transferring the Luxun Memorial Museum and Cultural Relics Warehouse to the 
Shanghai Cultural Affairs Administration's Authority, with the Shanghai Cultural Affairs Administration's Plans 
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of ancient bronzes and mirrors to the Shanghai Museum in exchange for fossils.
236  Defunct 
cultural institutions such as the Shanghai History Museum and the Shanghai Confucius 
Research Institute also relinquished their possessions to the Department of Cultural Affairs, 
which automatically transferred the artifacts to the Shanghai Museum.
237  Museum employees 
could also, as previously mentioned, appropriate antiquities from abandoned estates and 
persons under trial.  Whenever a court trial resulted in the confiscation of personal property, for 
example, the Shanghai Museum could request that its employees takeover the appropriation 
process.  The museum staff called the subjects of appropriation hanjian or “traitors of the Han 
people, at that time they still used that term.”
238  Employees who participated in appropriations 
found many of the homes unoccupied because “they were all gone, gone off to Taiwan, or some 
people were captured and jailed already.”
239  Nevertheless, “they had lots of objects in their 
home.  You would go over there and take a look, then fill out forms for anything you wanted to 
take back.”
240  In interviews, members of the Shanghai Museum confirmed that “once the house 
was searched all cultural relics got confiscated and sent to the museum.”
241   
The museum's position in municipal infrastructure made appropriating easy.  Ostensibly, 
236 Shanghai shi wenhua ju guanyu shinian lai wenwu gongzuo, qiangjiu gongzuo de zongjie, tongji shuzi, [Shanghai 
Cultural Affairs Administration's Conclusion and Statistics Regarding the Past Ten Year's Work on Cultural 
Relics Preservation and Rescue] October 1959 – March 1960, B172-1-341, SMA, Shanghai.  
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appropriations paperwork took time because Shanghai maintained distinct offices for all its 
cultural institutions.  By municipal appointment, however, the same administrators who served 
the city's myriad cultural boards and institutions also ran the Shanghai Museum.  Thus, in 
practice Shanghai Museum employees simply went to their supervisors if they wanted “a letter of 
introduction.”
242   By authority of that letter, museum staff could enter defunct institutions, frozen 
estates, or recycling centers.  Once inside, they “appraised the items and took them back to the 
museum.”
243   
By the end of 1956, Shanghai had successfully branded art dealing as a delinquent 
profession that promoted national economy with one hand but squandered cultural relics with 
the other.
244  Dealers' authentication skills remained valuable, but the taint of smuggling cut off 
any potential for upward mobility.  The municipality forbade museums from hiring art dealers 
outright.  The Ministry of Culture branded art dealers “individuals with serious historical and 
political problems” and placed them on the same scale as “tomb raiders and other bad 
elements.”
245  Those with “close relationships with overseas art dealers” were either immediately 
terminated from cultural institutions or kept under close surveillance and consistently placed in 
242 Interview with Chen Peifen, June 22
nd, 2009.
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244 Shanghai maoyi xintuo gongsi guanyu shanghai shi guwan xingye qingkuang de muodi baogao, [Shanghai 
Commercial Trust Company's Comprehensive Report on the Shanghai Antiquities Industry] March 12
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B123-3-578-19, SMA, Shanghai.
245 Wenhua bu, huadong wenhua ju guanyu wenbo, tushu gongzuo de zhishi, guiding ji woju youguan de qingshi baogao, 
[Ministry Of Culture And China Eastern Cultural Bureau's Directives And Regulations Regarding Museum 
And Library Work And Our Bureau's Related Petitions And Reports] 1954 – 1955, B172-4-301, SMA, 
Shanghai.90
reeducation programs.  These procedures dramatically changed art dealers' identities.  They 
transformed from entrepreneurs to suspicious elements who not only needed “reeducation in 
political understanding”, but also “intimate attention to their personal rehabilitation.”
246
This transformation of identity enabled the Shanghai Museum to achieve what Zhang 
Congyu had proposed at the National Summit of PRC Museums in 1953.  They took over 
distribution in the Shanghai art market.  “The Cultural Relics Store and the Arts and Crafts 
Stores can sell” antiquities if and only if the Shanghai Museum processed them first.
247  Art 
dealerships had to keep “any kind of cultural relic” for the museum.
248  Employees referred to 
these transactions as “the agreement” between museum and market.
249  Sun Jiecong, an 
employee at Duoyun Xian Art House, explained that “if our work unit, us retail, commercial 
work units, if we got anything good...the first thing we have to do is to tell the museum, ask them 
if they want it.”
250  If the museum replied yes, then the object automatically became museum 
property.  If “the Shanghai museum thought well we already have this” then the item was offered 
to “a museum outside the area.”
251  Only when no museums expressed interest did Duoyun Xian 
make the item available on the open market. 
246 Wenhua bu, gongan bu guanyu jiaqiang wenwu anquan baowei gongzuo de tongzhi ji Shanghai shi wenhua ju suo shu 
she wen dui wai wenwu baoguan gongzuo de duokou jiancha baogao, [Ministry of Culture And Office Of Security's 
Notifications Regarding Strengthening Cultural Relics Security Work And Shanghai Municipal Cultural 
Bureau's Personnel Inspections On Local Outfacing Cultural Relics Preservation Work] May 4
th, 1960 – 
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Xia Shunkui, a member of the Class of 1952, asserts that antiquities' transformation from 
private to public asset would not have been possible without the nationalization of industries. 
Nevertheless, he privileges the promotion of Chinese cultural heritage over the erasure of art 
dealers' upward mobility.  “In terms of protecting cultural relics, we had some achievements. 
Whether they were supposed to confiscate those objects, what can we say about that?  That's just 
the politics of the time.”
252  Period reports confirm Xia's convictions.  Nationalization reports 
stress that State Owned Enterprises provided a minimum standard of living for dealers.  Jobs at 
the antiquities danwei “weren't well paid or anything”, but the salaries ensured that dealers “can at 
least pass the days.”
253  The danwei even tried to pay wives and older relatives, whom typically 
worked without pay in family-owned businesses.
254  In other words, nationalization took away art 
dealers' businesses, but not their livelihood.    
Smugglers On Exhibit
Museum exhibitions reinforced the distinction between museum professionals and art 
dealers.  Throughout nationalization, Shanghai Museum exhibitions such as “Ancient Relics 
That Antiquities Dealers Who Transgressed the Law Tried To Smuggle” cast art dealing in a 
negative light.
255  The Shanghai Police provided “photographs, antiquities and account books” 
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from at-large dealers like C. T. Loo, while Customs contributed frequent-offenders lists.
256 
Exhibitions featured “expropriated artifacts from Zhang Xuegeng's case”, as well as “court 
records, confessions, photos of secret rooms where dealers hid their antiquities, and photos of 
antiquities smuggled overseas after 1949.”
257  Labeling on the displays encouraged museum 
visitors to denounce antiquities smuggling and “isolate law-breakers”.
258  The galleries even 
showcased exemplary letters, purportedly sent in by individuals who wanted to shame art 
dealers for participating in an industry that peddled Chinese cultural heritage.
259  
The 1956 Vajrapani show opened alongside a courtroom-style exhibition entitled 
“America's Conspiracy and Cultural Relics Orphaned in Taiwan”.
260  This exhibition literally put 
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the antiquities industry's association with overseas collections on trial.  Shanghai Museum staff 
mounted photographs of “our nation's cultural relics in Taiwan” as evidence of an “American 
imperialist plot.”
261  Signboards posted throughout the museum praised nationalization for “its 
enforcement of policies that properly protect cultural relics” and highlighted “the Chinese 
Communist Party and the state's steady privileging of cultural relics.”
262  In order to appeal to 
general audiences, the museum even simplified the names of specific antiquities.  Archaic 
Chinese words and specialized terminology like “mid-mountain style” got edited out because 
“ordinary audiences find them...too complicated and not easy to understand.”
263  Instead, 
displays featured new names that described the objects' period and categorical designation. 
“Mid-mountain style colored pottery container” became “colored pottery container from the 
new stone age.”
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The exhibitions worked.  Art dealers who didn't hear the death knell when the Vajrapani 
got arrested saw the end when they visited the Shanghai Museum.  Their nationalization 
applications stressed that “the state and the party's guidance and teachings have elevated our 
guild members' ideas and enlightenment”, inspiring dealers to “link our future with that of the 
state.”
265  Dealers even offered to do exhibitions of their own.  Attendants at the Chinese Curio 
Markets could showcase select curios because “delegations to Shanghai often enjoy visiting the 
Shanghai Art Market, either as a part of a tour or to purchase.”
266  These exhibits could act as a 
diplomatic lubricant: “All the nations of the world are enamored with the handicrafts that our 
nation's workers have invented, including ceramics, bronzes, jades, and stone carvings.”
267 
These proposals came to naught.  In the years following nationalization, museum employees 
increasingly cast art dealers into commercial roles, even as museums exercised more power in 
the art market.  
Collector Psychology
Their first four years at the Shanghai Museum taught the Class of 1952 that amassing a 
Crafts, The Sale Of Reproduction Cultural Relics And Print Material Overseas, Etc] September 18
th, 1954 – 
February 24
th, 1956, B172-4-419, SMA, Shanghai. 
265 Shanghai diyi shangye ju guanggao, guwan, qideng, bingxiang geyin shengqing shu, [Nationalization Application 
Letters from Shanghai's Advertising, antiquities, Automotive, Electric, and Refrigeration Companies] 1956, 
B123-3-530, SMA, Shanghai. 
266 Shanghai diyi shangye ju guanggao, guwan, qideng, bingxiang geyin shengqing shu, [Nationalization Application 
Letters from Shanghai's Advertising, antiquities, Automotive, Electric, and Refrigeration Companies] 1956, 
B123-3-530, SMA, Shanghai. 
267 Shanghai diyi shangye ju guanggao, guwan, qideng, bingxiang geyin shengqing shu, [Nationalization Application 
Letters from Shanghai's Advertising, antiquities, Automotive, Electric, and Refrigeration Companies] 1956, 
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collection took money and state collaboration.  But that's not all.  To get more than Shanghai's 
best, to get China's best, the Class of 1952 needed relationships, access, and sheer tenacity. 
Zheng Zhong, a Wenhui newspaper reporter who worked the Shanghai Museum beat throughout 
the latter half of the twentieth century, dubbed the museum's acquisition techniques its “collector 
psychology.”
268  
Between 1952 and 1956, junior employees' biggest responsibility was to track down 
antiquities.
269  The museum assembled its own acquisitions team.  Senior staff personally trained 
junior employees in how and where to locate top-quality artifacts, both in the classroom and on 
the field.  Senior archaeologist Jiang Dayi, for example, mentored junior archaeologist Sun 
Weichang when they paired up to excavate Shanghai's hinterland counties.  When the two first 
entered a small town, Jiang sent Sun to bed early and woke the younger man up at dawn the next 
morning.  They walked to the local tea-house for breakfast and approached regulars to ask 
whether anyone in town had found any archaeological material.
270  Jiang noted that tea-houses 
were excellent sources of local information.
271  “There are lots of elderly people and they would 
268 Interview with Zheng Zhong, June 11
th, 2009.
269 Shanghai's cultural institutions did not have much of a collection when Mayor Chen Yi inaugurated plans to 
establish them in 1950.  Although the CRMB inherited all the archaeological artifacts from the city's defunct 
history museum, the quality and quantity of those objects did not measure up to the city's ambitious acquisition 
plan.  Even the institutions' own employees opined that “in terms of quality our collection was a zero.” 
Interview with Li Junjie, June 29th, 2009.
270 Interview with Sun Weichang, April 30
th, 2010.
271 For more on tea-houses see Qin Shao, “Tempest over Teapots: The Vilification of Teahouse Culture in Early 
Republican China,” The Journal of Asian Studies, 57, no. 4 (1998): 1009-1041; Di Wang, The Teahouse: Small 
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gossip...some might tell you something.”
272  Sun confirmed that tea-house sources led the pair to 
ancient artifacts “in locals' houses.  They might have artifacts in their house that they just use as 
everyday tools, like pans that fed the chickens.”
273  The museum successfully acquired hinterland 
artifacts at below-market prices because “the farmers didn't care, they don't know how much it's 
worth in the city.”
274  Jiang's tea-house technique unearthed many artifacts and excavation sites in 
the Shanghai countryside and remains a part of archaeological training today.
275
Museum administrators also installed donor-relations programs to gain access to private 
collections.  Municipal officials collaborated as museum doyens taught the Class of 1952 proven 
techniques for soliciting Jiangnan's private collectors.  Some of these techniques gave symbolic 
capital.
276  City officials presented official commendations and merit awards for private 
contributions, demonstrating that the state held donors in high regard and awarded them 
accordingly.
277  Others, such as regular social visits and special invite lists, suggest a more personal 
touch.  
The acquisition of the Pan family art collection best illustrates the Shanghai Museum's 
use of collector psychology.  On July 6th of 1951, Pan Dayu wrote a letter to the Shanghai 
272 Interview with Sun Weichang, April 30
th, 2010.
273 Interview with Sun Weichang, April 30
th, 2010.
274 Interview with Chen Peifen, April 6
th, 2010.
275 Interview with Sun Weichang, April 30
th, 2010.
276 I borrow the phrase symbolic capital from Zhang Xiaojun, “Land Reform in Yang Village: Symbolic Capital and 
the Determination of Class Status,” Modern China, 30, no. 1 (2004): 3-45.
277 For examples of these certificates see Shanghaishi wenhua ju, shanghaishi renwei guanyu jieshou Gu Lujiang 
xiansheng juanxian wenwu de qingshi, pifu, jiangzhuang he qingce, [Shanghai Municipal Cultural Bureau, Shanghai 
Municipal People's Representative Board's Petitions, Rescripts, Merit Awards And Inventory List For Accepting 
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Cultural Ministry expressing her desire to donate “two great bronzes named Yu and Ke...to the 
municipal collection for permanent safe keeping.”
278  The Pan family collection commanded an 
international reputation, but few antiquarians had ever gained access to their Suzhou estate.
279 
The museum seized this opportunity.  Administrators immediately commandeered two trucks 
and filled the vehicles with custom-made storage containers, hay camouflage, cotton cushioning, 
as well as one bronze connoisseur, four art dealers, and fourteen movers.
280  Once the retrieval 
team brought Ke and Yu back to Shanghai, museum staff installed both in a special exhibit and 
dedicated a state ceremony to the Pans.  Tang Tao, the Ministry of Culture's regional bureau 
chief,  awarded Pan Dayu with two thousand RMB for “preserving our people's cultural 
inheritance and spreading nationalism.”
281  As news of the donation trickled from Shanghai to 
Beijing, the Pans saw laudatory coverage in both local and national news.  
278 Zheng, Haishang shoucangjia [Shanghai Collectors]: 12.
279 Interview with Li Junjie, June 29
th, 2009.
280 Zheng, Haishang shoucangjia [Shanghai Collectors]: 13.
281 Zheng, Haishang shoucangjia [Shanghai Collectors]: 14.98
Figure 1.7. Commemorative photo for Pan Dayu's donation of Yu and Ke to the Shanghai 
Museum, dated December 28th, 1952.  Pan Dayu is seated second to the right on the first row. 
Photo obtained from Zheng Zhong's private collection, Shanghai. 
Collector psychology like that described above opened doors.  Li Junjie explained that 
private owners may sell their antiquities for the right price but they “also loved owning it” and 
“would rather not part with it.”
282  Collectors wanted to see their treasures “become part of a 
permanent institution.”
283  Thus, collector psychology practices portrayed the Shanghai Museum 
as the permanent institution.  Employees “kept up relations with donors” and “did lots of services 
for them.”
284  Li confirmed that collector psychology, or the museum's willingness to invest both 
financially and personally in potential donors, helped it obtain not only the best antiquities in 
Shanghai, but also in China.  Like Pan Dayu, “a lot of donors in those early days were from 
Suzhou”, but they chose to “give [their collections] to Shanghai and not Suzhou. That's because 
282 Interview with Li Junjie, June 29
th, 2009.
283 Interview with Li Junjie, June 29
th, 2009.
284 Interview with Li Junjie, June 29
th, 2009.99
Shanghai had the infrastructure first.”
285  Indeed, Pan Dayu would donate and sell hundreds of 
antiquities to the Shanghai Museum over the next two decades, including bronzes relics, ancient 
mirrors, jade ornaments, paintings, and calligraphy.
286  Pan's enthusiasm even motivated the rest 
of her family.  For example, Ding Xierou, Pan Dayu's sister, also donated her art collection to the 
Shanghai Museum.
287
Collector psychology practices complicate the PRC's overarching narrative about art 
acquisition in the early 1950s, which claim that private collectors donated out of a newly-
discovered sense of nationalism.
288  From 1950 to 1956, PRC media promoted numerous stories 
about the myriad individuals who donated antiquities to state cultural institutions.
289  Wenwu, the 
PRC's premiere journal of art and archeology, even designated a Donations and Benefactors 
section in each of its issues.  These publications manufactured the fiction that many of the PRC's 
museum collections came from voluntary, jingoistic donations made in the 1950s.  This fiction of 
285 Interview with Li Junjie, June 29
th, 2009.
286 Wenhua bu, shanghai shi wenhua ju guanyu bianzhi, chuban shanghai bowuguan yiji cangping jianmu, huace, tupu 
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shangbao shanghai gemin lishi jinian guan, shanghai bowuguan, shanghai luxun jinian guan yiji cangping de baogao, 
mulu, [Shanghai Cultural Affairs Administration's Report and Table of Contents Regarding First Tier 
Collections at the Shanghai Revolutionary History Museum, Shanghai Museum, and Shanghai Luxun Memorial 
Museum], August 1960 – October 1965, B172-1-498, SMA, Shanghai. 
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[Ministry Of Culture, Shanghai Municipal People's Board, Shanghai Municipal Cultural Bureau's Petitions, 
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288 For more on the link between nationalism and culture see Tze-Ki Hon, “Cultural Identity and Local Self-
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donation perpetuates to the present.  The descendants of art dealers and collectors maintain that 
“elites in China are the most nationalist” because “look at everything the government did to them, 
and yet they still donate their collections to the state.”
290  
Shanghai's case contradicts the prevailing narrative.  Museum records demonstrate that 
institutions played a crucial role in rallying and recruiting donations.  Figure 1.6, entitled 
“Shanghai Museum Donors by Year of Donation, 1950 – 2007”, demonstrates active 
intervention's impact on antiquities acquisition.
291
Figure 1.8. Shanghai Museum Donors By Year Of Donation. 
290 Interview with Ma Zhongde, June 20
th, 2009.
291 Data retrieved from the Donors Plaque in the Shanghai Museum Lobby101
On average, the Shanghai Museum received donations from 18 individual donors each year, 
though the institution's median number of donors between 1950 and 2007 is ten per year.  This 
indicates that in some years, unusually large numbers of donors contributed to the Shanghai 
Museum, pulling the mean to the right of the median.  The peaks and valleys in Figure 1.8 
confirm these findings.  The number of donors-per-year ranges between two (years 1972 and 
1999) and 128 (year 1960).
Wenwu's claims regarding nationalistic giving predicts that years with the greatest number 
of donors would appear between 1949 and 1953 – the crucial years of PRC nation-building. 
Instead, the years in which so many donors gave that the numbers appear as outliers in the dataset 
are 1951, 1956, 1959, 1960, and 1961.  These dates have nothing to do with nation-building. 
1951, 1956, 1959, 1960, and 1961 correspond to years when museum employees actively 
engaged donors for institutional reasons.  In 1951, for example, 108 donors gave to the museum, 
six times the above-mentioned mean.  The staff won these donors by undertaking intense 
recruitment activity for the museum's grand opening on December of 1952.  As Li Junjie 
explained, the museum's collection was “equal to zero” and the staff had to organize a major 
acquisition effort to create a permanent collection.
292  The years 1959, 1960, and 1961, 
correspond to both the Great Leap Forward, during which agricultural campaigns inflicted 
tremendous social, political, and financial strain on both ordinary and elite Chinese, and a second 
292 Interview with Li Junjie, June 29
th, 2009.102
grand-opening for the Shanghai Museum.
293  In October of 1959 the museum moved to a larger, 
more prestigious location in downtown Shanghai.  Museum employees took this move so 
seriously that they dubbed its transportation logistics the “Forty-Day's Battle.”
294  Donation 
records collaborate this sentiment.  A total of 261 donors contributed antiquities to the 
permanent collection in those three years.  Minus the exception of 1951, that's more donors than 
the previous decade combined.  While the museum employees insist that donor recruitment 
drove successful acquisitions, one suspects that the overwhelming need to maintain basic 
sustenance for families undergoing Great Leap Forward movements also played a role in 
antiquities divestment.  The same sinister logic applies to 1956, the year of nationalization.  Given 
the level of panic that inventory clearance imposed on Shanghai’s art market, it is difficult to 
believe that individuals donating to the Shanghai Museum had only nationalism on their minds.  
The Shanghai Museum's donation patterns correspond with that of the Palace Museum 
in Beijing, whose peaks also do not correlate with the so-called jingoistic surge of the early 
1950s.
295  Nationalism may have motivated some private collectors.  The distribution in 
293 For Frank Dikötter's seminal study on the social and political ramifications of the Great Leap Forward see Frank 
Dikötter, Mao’s Great Famine: the History of China's Most Devastating Catastrophe, 1958 – 1962.  (London, 
2010).  For a detailed study on how socialization campaigns impacted art acquisition as well as political culture 
in the PRC, see Chang-tai Hung, Mao’s New World: Political Culture in the Early People's Republic.  (Ithaca, 
2011).
294 Wenhua bu guanyu zhaokao quanguo wenwu, bowuguan gongzuo huiyi de tongzhi ji shanghai shi wenhua ju de 
huibao cailiao, [The Ministry of Culture's Reports and Materials Regarding the Notification to Publicize the 
Nation's Cultural Relics, Museum Administrative Meeting Minutes, and the Shanghai Cultural Affairs 
Administration], February 1960 – June 1960, B172-1-362, SMA, Shanghai. 
295 Donation records for the Palace Museum (1949 – 1999) can be found in Gugong bowu yuan, Gugong bowu 
yuan wushi nian rucang wenwu jingping ji, [Selected Gems of Cultural Relics – Newly Collected in the Palace 
Museum in the Last Fifty Years] (Beijing, 1999): 358 – 360.103
Shanghai's donor ledgers, however, suggest that institutional motivations like “expanding our 
collection and exhibition space”, as well as larger shifts in the PRC's political socialization plans, 
have greater predictive power when it comes to determining the number of individual donors on 
a year-to-year basis.
296  “Nationalistic giving” only lent dramatic flair to the museum's collector 
psychology practices.  In Shanghai, as is true throughout mainland China, donors played just a 
small role in an elaborate drama.  In this drama, museums use donations as the operative fiction to 
create, and legitimize, their role as custodians of Chinese cultural heritage.  
The greatest irony, however, lies in comparing the figure entitled Shanghai Museum 
Donors By Year Of Donation to the figure entitled Shanghai Museum's General Antiquities 
Acquisitions, 1949 – 1959 (Figure 1.6).  While donations gave the museum a boost in 
acquisitions in the late 1950s, these numbers pale in comparison to the acquisitions bonanza that 
the Shanghai Museum achieved between 1949 and 1953, the years that museum employees and 
official sources highlight as the crowning era of nationalistic giving.  1949 – 1953 are also the years 
with the most dramatic non-purchase to purchase ratios.  In those four years, 95% of the 
museum's acquisitions came cash-free – out of 96,863 objects, 91,777 were acquired without 
payment.  In contrast, between 1954 and 1959,  the museum acquired 52,181 objects, and paid 
for 23% of them.  
296 Wenhua bu guanyu zhaokao quanguo wenwu, bowuguan gongzuo huiyi de tongzhi ji shanghai shi wenhua ju de 
huibao cailiao, [The Ministry of Culture's Reports and Materials Regarding the Notification to Publicize the 
Nation's Cultural Relics, Museum Administrative Meeting Minutes, and the Shanghai Cultural Affairs 
Administration], February 1960 – June 1960, B172-1-362, SMA, Shanghai. 104
The statistics above reveal the cracks in the Shanghai Museum's operative fiction.  Those 
who dealt with collectors on a daily basis saw a blurry line between donations, divestments, and 
appropriations.  Municipal administrators even portrayed private collectors as resources, 
“Shanghai has a lot of pools of water, every collector is like a pool of water.”
297  The ideological 
campaigns created opportunity.  “Those big rich families, after 1949 they didn't have income 
anymore” and “if you want to pass the days, to eat, then you can sell your family collections.”
298 
Thus, “once the Shanghai cultural bureau knows who has nice things in their house, they can go 
to work on those individuals.  They can tell you to donate it, or sell it to the museum.”
299  In sum, 
while the Shanghai Museum touts its wealth of philanthropic bequests, the subtext of the 
bequests had little to do with voluntary giving.  
Interviews with the Class of 1952 indicate that the Shanghai Museum's collector 
psychology practices carried a long life span.  The Pan clan, for example, received regular visits 
from the museum staff for five decades.  On each visit, the Pans received token gifts.  Museum 
employees brought moon cakes during the Mid-Autumn festival and sweet glutinous rice cakes 
for the Lunar New Year, a courtesy that the institution extended to all its major donors.  The 
curatorial department offered appraisal services and “didn't take appraisal fees from our 
collectors.”
300  When visiting or receiving visits from private collectors, the museum staff never 
297 Interview with Zhu Junbo, December 17
th, 2009.
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“sat facing south,” meaning they deferred master's honors as a sign of deference.
301  The 
conservation department offered repair services for collectors with broken ceramics and fragile 
paintings.
302  Additionally, the museum regularly sent collectors special invitations for antiquities 
discussion-groups, closed exhibitions, and special viewings with the education department.
303 
The institution inaugurated these practices in 1950, before the museum's grand opening, and 
continues to employ them today.  When museum staff introduced reporter Zheng Zhong to the 
Pan Clan in the 1990s, the reporter immediately noticed the institution's mark on the family.  Pan 
Dayu and her daughter greeted the museum staff “like family, and immediately fell into chatting 
about mutual acquaintances' comings and goings.”
304  Collector psychology practices encouraged 
relationship building, which enabled Shanghai to buy from Suzhou and Hangzhou families even 
though the families' regional allegiances had nothing to do with Shanghai.  
The Class of 1952 employed collector psychology practices far and wide.  The techniques 
gave Shanghai an edge, especially as employees found themselves in competition with acquisition 
teams from other wealthy municipalities.  The Shanghai staff interpreted their interaction with 
other museum employees as part of a nationwide trend.  As Huang Xuanpei observed, “Shanghai 
could to go other provinces and other provinces also came to us.”
305  These acquisition visits 
aroused turf wars between museums.  Institutions guarded local collections jealously and refused 
301 Interview with Zhong Yinlan, June 16
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to relinquish choice antiquities to out-of-towners.
306  Shanghai, for example, competed with 
neighboring provinces like Zhejiang and Jiangsu for access to wealthy collecting families in 
Suzhou and Hangzhou.
307  Beijing and Liaoning teams frequently traveled to the Jiangnan region, 
all the while jostling for artifacts in the Chinese southwest and northeast.
308  Collector psychology, 
however, gave Shanghai's acquisitions team advantages that other museums didn't have.  Local 
collectors felt encouraged to sell to the Shanghai Museum because collector psychology practices 
indicated that its staff might grant special favors.  
The Shanghai Museum's nationwide acquisition program depleted private collections in 
poorer cities such as Suzhou and Hangzhou.  This led some to complain that in the PRC's 
hierarchy of cities, administrators in lower-level cities “can't sit on your position securely unless 
306 Wenhua bu, shanghai shi wenhua ju guanyu zuzhi shanghai bowuguan jindai meishu gongyiping shougou weiyuan 
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you give the people in Shanghai what they want.”
309  Similarly, commercial work units protested 
that “it's not selling to them, it's called letting them have it.”
310  
The Shanghai Museum's acquisition drives also occasionally backfired.   In the winter of 
1955, Huang Xuanpei and his acquisitions partner, Chen Desheng, took a bus to a train to a boat 
that finally deposited them on Dongting Shan, the biggest island on Lake Tai.  They went from 
house to house, giving out their hotel address and telling residents that Shanghai had a keen 
interest in acquiring any ancient bronzes, ceramics, bamboo carvings, or embroideries – the 
senior staff assured the two that Suzhou's Lake Tai region had “lots of private collections.”
311 
Then the lake froze.  The two only had funds to last them ten days but could not find a boat to 
take them off the island for nearly a month.  Huang commented that in retrospect, it was amazing 
he and Chen had managed to acquire anything at all from Suzhou.  Their ordeal made them 
looked like paupers who “collected garbage.”
312    
Conclusion
By the conclusion of nationalization in 1956, the Shanghai Museum had already 
established itself as the critical link between high culture and ordinary people.  Making headway 
amongst China's private collectors allowed the museum to transition from a serendipitously well-
located, regional collection to a cultural institution with resources that commanded national 
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renown.  Gaining distribution authority over Shanghai's art market, the biggest in China, allowed 
museum employees to distinguish their professional identities from that of art dealers.  All the 
while, training the Class of 1952 transformed Shanghai's chicken hatchers and alley kids into the 
PRC's first generation of Red antiquarians, a key step in maintaining winning over Jiangnan's 
older elites.  
Key differences, nevertheless, remained between the present Shanghai Museum of 
international stature and its regionally-based self in 1956.  The Class of 1952 were still green. 
They could give gallery talks and carry out everyday museum operations, but didn't know the 
difference between a Chao Menfu and a Bada Xianren painting.  The nationalized economy gave 
the museum more reach in the art market.  Collectors who had no incentive to sell, however, 
could still shut their doors when museums came calling.  What private collectors, art dealers, and 
the Class of 1952 had yet to experience is the Shanghai Museum's transformation into one of the 
world's biggest collections of Chinese art.  Throughout this transformation, the museum staff 
maintained relationships with private collectors and the art market, but gradually erased their 
collection's provenance in favor of a fiction of donation that the museum itself authored.  Dealers 
like Ye Shuzhong had only lived through the transformation of antiquities from private to public 
property.  The fully elaborated integration of antiquities into Chinese cultural heritage is yet to 
come.    109
Chapter Two: from Trash to Treasure, 1956 – 1966110
Figure 2.1. Gu Youchu (fourth from right, top row) standing with fellow craftsmen at the China 
Crafts Commune in Shanghai, 1956.  Private collection of Gu Youchu, Shanghai. 
Country Boy
Twelve-year-old Gu Youchu was small for his age.  When the “short and plump” country 
kid came to Shanghai in 1946, he wondered how mom would manage the farm without him.
313 
He came for a three-year apprenticeship with Li Yuyi, the owner of a plaster molds 
manufacturing factory.  Boss Li nearly sent Gu back.  “He didn't like that I was small and 
short”.
314  Boss Li's wife convinced her husband otherwise.  She “said I want him, he's from 
Pudong, she liked that we were from the same town”.
315  That was the last time Gu got to talk 
with his “mouth full of country language.”
316
The apprenticeship was hard.  If Gu forgot to sweep the floor Boss Li would “pull at my 
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ears”.
317  The technical training, however, came easily to the Pudong native.  Gu quickly became 
an expert draftsman.  By 1956, he could sketch free-hand, model, as well as make artisan replicas 
from plaster.  
Nationalization broke up Boss Li's business.  Gu got transferred to the China Crafts 
Commune, where he designed sculptures for Sino-Soviet friendship ventures.  He excelled once 
again, winning awards for making molds that reproduced fine-grained details.  As a result, the 
commune administrators soon pulled Gu aside and “said there's some people that want you”.
318 
He was being transferred to the Shanghai Museum.  Gu had no choice in the matter.  “The upper 
bureaucracy had letters of introduction”, and in Shanghai “if you have a letter of introduction 
there's nothing you can say, those politicos have more power than you do.”
319  
  As I have argued in Chapter One, the transformation of professional identities amongst 
Shanghai's cultural industry workers went hand in hand with the transformation of antiquities in 
China: From private to public property.
320  In this chapter, I examine the absorption of 
previously marginalized artisans into the Shanghai Museum's existing coterie of professionals.  I 
explore the continuities of identity formation as introduced in Chapter One, and show how 
craftsmen such as Gu Youchu became indispensable to the museum's monopolization of art 
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restoration – a major link in the art market supply chain.  I argue that monopolizing art 
restoration enabled the Shanghai Museum to maximize profits manipulating prices on the art 
market, which expanded the scale of private art collecting both in China and overseas. 
While I focus on museum professionals' impact on the art market, I also interrogate the 
Shanghai Museum's collecting interests in so-called arts and crafts – antiquities that the PRC's 
Cultural Relics laws designate as exportable commodities.  Institutional growth in both the 
financial and bureaucratic realms enabled the museum to promote some art and crafts, such as 
ethnic minority artifacts, to canonical status.
321  While local initiatives, such as the salvaging of 
ancient bronzes and paper from Shanghai's industrial manufacturers, motivated some of these 
designations, others came from the museum's desire to compete with international collecting 
trends.  This process suggests that the making of an art historical canon is not a one-sided, or 
even top-down process.  The creation of art historical categories is instead, I argue, a dynamic 
phenomenon co-produced by different constituents, all of whom operate simultaneously in the 
regional, national, and international arena.  
Red Restoration
When Gu Youchu got to the Shanghai Museum, he met fellow transfers like Xie Hua, 
barely seventeen-years-old and the youngest in a family of book repairers.  They all worked in 
the Conservation Workshop, a new department that restored paintings, calligraphy, bronzes, 
321 For collaborative findings in the field of music, see Frederick Lau, “Forever Red: The Invention of Solo dizi 
Music in Post-1949 China,” British Journal of Ethnomusicology, 5 (1996): 113-131.113
ceramics, as well as “minor decorative arts”.
322  Museum administrators made all the younger 
transfers apprentices to more senior transfers, whom the museum staff called laoshifu (master 
artisan).  Almost all the master artisans had done contract work for local collectors as well as 
dealers in the Chinese Curio Markets.  As the restoration of paintings, ceramics, and bronzes 
was a limited profession, they also worked more mundane jobs, such as making poker cards, 
glue, and shoe heels.
323  
Ostensibly, the museum opened a Conservation Workshop because “without immediate 
rescue, we'll be in danger of losing our skill repository” of master restorers.
324  The senior staff 
argued that Shanghai's existing pool of restorers have “serious gaps...thus, we need to invest 
heavily in new talent and increase the number of senior professionals and new apprentices, in 
order to nurture successors for these difficult-to-fill positions.”
325  Thus, assembling the 
322 “Minor decorative arts” refers to miscellany such as lacquers, jades, wooden figures, etc.  This is consistent with 
Chinese art category terminology across the PRC, as well as overseas.  For specific reference to the formation of 
this workshop see Shanghai shi wenhua ju shehui wenhua xitong de bianzhi wenti, [Shanghai Cultural Affairs 
Bureau's Decisions Regarding the Organization of Municipal Cultural Institutions] April 1956 – December 
1956, B9-2-56, SMA, Shanghai.  
323 Personnel information gathered from Interview with Jin Jiapin, January 13
th, 2010 and Interview with Xie Hua, 
January 22
nd, 2010.  For official records regarding the allocation of art restorers to Shanghai's newly nationalized 
pipe, sewing machine, and umbrella manufacturers, as well as their subsequent re-allocation to the Shanghai 
Museum's Conservation Workshop, see Shanghai shi wenhua ju shehui wenhua xitong de bianzhi wenti, [Shanghai 
Cultural Affairs Bureau's Decisions Regarding the Organization of Municipal Cultural Institutions] April 1956 
– December 1956, B9-2-56, SMA, Shanghai. 
324 Zhonggong shanghai shi wenhu ju dangzu guanyu quanshi tushu guan yu wenwu, bowuguan shiye xu peiyang 
xinsheng liliang de baogao, [People's Republic of China Shanghai Municipal Cultural Affairs Bureau's Political 
Division's Report Regarding the City's Library, Cultural, Museum Industries' Need to Nurture New Strength] 
May 23
rd, 1959, B172-5-138, SMA, Shanghai. 
325 Shanghai shi wenhua ju guanyu ju shu xiju, she wen danwei zuzhi jigou, renyuan bianzhi, ganbu diaopei deng de 
qingshi, baogao, [The Shanghai Ministry of Culture's Report Regarding Work Unit Organization, Human 
Resource Structuring and Cadre Allocation in The Ministry's Drama, Culture, and Social Divisions] January 
26
th, 1959 – December 31
st, 1959, B172-5-132.  SMA, Shanghai. 114
workshop was itself an act of conservation.  The museum recognized a rare skill set amongst 
previously marginalized artisans and presented them with an opportunity to rise above lower-
level careers.
326 
In practice, getting in-house restorers altered the art market.  It enabled the museum to 
regulate art restoration, or, as the municipality called it, enforce the “Reform, Break-up, and 
Destruction of Opportunistic Profiteering From the Sale of Cultural Relics, Painting, and 
Calligraphy .”
327  Museum administrators suspected that restorers fueled the black market by 
“making fakes, participating in profiteering, and selfishly opening their own underground 
painting repair shops.”
328  Specifically, “if an art dealer got an object that was missing everything, 
a ceramic that was broken everywhere,” a restorer “would could fix it for them so that it looked 
unblemished” and help the dealer with “his underground deals”.
329  Creating the Conservation 
Workshop, however, rendered restoration services unavailable to the private sector.  It allowed 
326 Eddy U offers a thorough examination of the costs and benefits of similar bureaucratic decisions in Eddy U, 
Disorganizing China, Counter-Bureaucracy And The Decline of Socialism, (Stanford, 2007).  
327 Shanghai shi renwei, wenhua ju guanyu wenwu baohu danwei de xioushan, caichu ji daji wenwu shuhua touji fanmai 
huodong de jihua baogao he pifu, [The Shanghai People's Representative Board and the Cultural Affairs 
Administration's Replies and Reports Regarding the Reform, Break-up, and Destruction of Opportunistic 
Profiteering From the Sale of Cultural Relics, Painting, and Calligraphy] April 7
th, 1964 – December 19
th, 1964, 
B3-2-139, SMA, Shanghai. 
328 Shanghai shi renwei, wenhua ju guanyu wenwu baohu danwei de xioushan, caichu ji daji wenwu shuhua touji fanmai 
huodong de jihua baogao he pifu, [The Shanghai People's Representative Board and the Cultural Affairs 
Administration's Replies and Reports Regarding the Reform, Break-up, and Destruction of Opportunistic 
Profiteering From the Sale of Cultural Relics, Painting, and Calligraphy] April 7
th, 1964 – December 19
th, 1964, 
B3-2-139, SMA, Shanghai. 
329 Shanghai shi renwei, wenhua ju guanyu wenwu baohu danwei de xioushan, caichu ji daji wenwu shuhua touji fanmai 
huodong de jihua baogao he pifu, [The Shanghai People's Representative Board and the Cultural Affairs 
Administration's Replies and Reports Regarding the Reform, Break-up, and Destruction of Opportunistic 
Profiteering From the Sale of Cultural Relics, Painting, and Calligraphy] April 7
th, 1964 – December 19
th, 1964, 
B3-2-139, SMA, Shanghai. 115
the museum to take over a major link to the art market supply chain.  Indeed, museum 
administrators boasted that its workshop would “repair a gap in the socialist education of town 
and country.”
330
Municipal officials tracked down restorers through industry contacts, personnel files, 
and sent candidates to the museum in droves.
331  By 1960, the Conservation Workshop 
employed so many master artisans that private citizens had a hard time contracting independent 
art restoration.  Collectors in Shanghai and its surrounding provinces complained vociferously, 
stating that they felt they “had to have some kind of guanxi [relations] with the Shanghai 
Museum” in order to get any restoration done.
332  Even the Department of Cultural Affairs 
objected.  “Collectors have no way to meet restorers and directly discuss the specifics of what 
should be done on a commission...there are hardly any painting repair shops on the street 
anymore, nor are there restoration masters.”
333  The Conservation Workshop monopolized 
330 Shanghai shi renwei, wenhua ju guanyu wenwu baohu danwei de xioushan, caichu ji daji wenwu shuhua touji fanmai 
huodong de jihua baogao he pifu, [The Shanghai People's Representative Board and the Cultural Affairs 
Administration's Replies and Reports Regarding the Reform, Break-up, and Destruction of Opportunistic 
Profiteering From the Sale of Cultural Relics, Painting, and Calligraphy] April 7
th, 1964 – December 19
th, 1964, 
B3-2-139, SMA, Shanghai. 
331 For more on the history of art restoration recruitment in the PRC see Wenchao Ji,a “Tan gudai qingtongqi de 
chuantong xiufu jishu,” [Regarding The Traditional Restoration Technique For Ancient Bronzes] Jiangxi 
Wenwu [Relics From Jiangxi] no. 3 (1991): 103 – 106; Li Wan, “Qingtongqi xiufu jishu duiwu de lishi ji qi 
fazhan chuyi,” [My Observations On The History of Bronze Restoration And Its Development] Zhongguo 
bowuguan [Chinese Museums] no. 4 (1991): 64-68; Guodong Xiao, “Lüetan wenxian fuzhi gongzuo,” [A Brief 
Discussion On Art Reproduction Work] Zhongguo bowuguan [Chinese Museums] no. 1 (1985): 84 – 86; 
332 Shanghai shi wenhua ju, wenguan hui wenwu, ziran bowuguan lingdao guanxi deng baogao, [Shanghai Cultural 
Affairs Administration and Cultural Relics Management Bureau's Reports Regarding Leadership and 
Relationship Relevant to Cultural Relics Museums and Natural History Museums] January 22
nd, 1963 – 
December 16
th, 1963, B3-2-165, SMA, Shanghai. 
333 Shanghai shi wenhua ju, wenguan hui wenwu, ziran bowuguan lingdao guanxi deng baogao, [Shanghai Cultural 
Affairs Administration and Cultural Relics Management Bureau's Reports Regarding Leadership and 
Relationship Relevant to Cultural Relics Museums and Natural History Museums] January 22
nd, 1963 – 116
Shanghai's restoration services.  Any member of the general public who wanted antiquities 
repaired had to visit the museum and pay “prices calibrated according to services rendered”.
334  
Figure 2.2. Shanghai Museum's Retail Charges For Painting And Calligraphy Repairs.  SMA, 
Shanghai.
December 16
th, 1963, B3-2-165, SMA, Shanghai. 
334 Shanghai shi renwei, shanghai shi wenhua ju guanyu tongyi shanghai bowuguan sheli zhuangbiao mengbu de baogao, 
pifu, [Shanghai People's Representative Board and Shanghai Municipal Cultural Affairs Administration's 
Reports and Edits on Approving the Setup of A Conservation Department at the Shanghai Museum] August 
1962 – March 1963, B172-1-442, SMA, Shanghai.  117
The Conservation Workshop presented a lucrative business opportunity.  The museum 
charged a basic service fee to set wooden rollers on scrolls, reinforce painting and calligraphy 
scrolls, mount scrolls, and collate albums.  Prices varied according to the size: big albums, for 
example, cost more than small albums.  Additional services, such as saturating colors, painting 
over faded surfaces, smoking paper to create an antiquated look, and using silk and satin, cost an 
additional five to fifty percent.  As the price chart further indicated (Figure 2.2), its estimates use 
contemporary art objects as the baseline.
335  Older calligraphy and painting were subject to a 
5.80RMB per hour professional's fee, as well as additional charges.  The restoration of antiquities 
that already belonged to the museum, however, cost nothing.  The museum kept its 
conservators on permanent retainer, with strict rules against taking private orders. 
Private sector commissions were so lucrative that the workshop's earnings paid for itself. 
Table 2.1 illustrates restoration earnings between 1960 and 1962.
336 
335 Shanghai shi renwei, shanghai shi wenhua ju guanyu tongyi shanghai bowuguan sheli zhuangbiao mengbu de baogao, 
pifu, [Shanghai People's Representative Board and Shanghai Municipal Cultural Affairs Administration's 
Reports and Edits on Approving the Setup of A Conservation Department at the Shanghai Museum] August 
1962 – March 1963, B172-1-442, SMA, Shanghai.  
336 In its first decades the Shanghai Museum's exhibition space could not offer a de-humidified environment for 
ancient artifacts, so the Conservation Workshop made reproductions for display.  Run-offs from the 
reproduction process got sold for profit at the museum store.  Data for Table 1 extracted from Shanghai shi 
renwei, shanghai shi wenhua ju guanyu tongyi shanghai bowuguan sheli zhuangbiao mengbu de baogao, pifu, 
[Shanghai People's Representative Board and Shanghai Municipal Cultural Affairs Administration's Reports 
and Edits on Approving the Setup of A Conservation Department at the Shanghai Museum] August 1962 – 
March 1963, B172-1-442, SMA, Shanghai.  118
Table 2.1. Painting Restorations at the Shanghai Museum's Conservation Workshop, July 1960 
– June 1962
Commission Type Number of Commissions Number of Work Hours Charges 
(RMB)
Ancient paintings  747 3,824 0  
Reproduction paintings 691 1,025 0  
Outside commissions 774 3,904 14,441
Sum 2249 8,664 14,441
In two years, the workshop repaired 747 ancient paintings, reproduced 691 paintings (for 
exhibition and sale), and repaired 774 paintings for outside collectors and donors.  While 
outside commissions only comprised one third of the workshop's total number of commissions, 
they occupied more than 45% of its total working hours.  Private commissions alone earned 
14,441 RMB.  By way of comparison, salary for a 25-person team cost 15,662 RMB.
337  This 
suggests that the workshop's total output could both sustain itself and earn additional income for 
the museum.  Additionally, the workshop took commissions from local work units at cost, which 
gave the museum social and political leverage.  Between 1958 and 1962, in-house restorers 
“reproduced 19,854 pieces of cultural relics and repaired 2,249 pieces of calligraphy and 
painting” for both the museum and other municipal work units.
338  Museum administrators 
337 Wenhua bu, shanghai shi wenhua ju guanyu zuohao wenwu baohu gongzuo de tongzhi, baogao ji shanghai shi 
wenhua ju baohu yu yuan, longhua is de cu bu fangan, [The Cultural Affairs Administration, Shanghai Ministry of 
Culture's Notifications and Reports Regarding Optimizing Cultural Relics Preservation Performance, And the 
Shanghai Cultural Affairs Administration's Preliminary Plans for Protecting the Yu Gardens and the Longhua 
Temple] February 1956 – January 1957, B172-1-221, SMA, Shanghai. 
338 Wenhua bu guanyu shanghai bowuguan fangmei yanjiu shiyan de pifu ge jianguan shizhounian qingzhu huodong de 
baogao, 1963 – 1972 nian keyan guihua, [The Cultural Affairs Administration's Responses to the Shanghai 
Museum's Mold-Prevention Experiments and Report on the Celebration Plans For The State's Ten Year 119
boasted that on the basis of these services, its conservators “provided important research 
resources and attended to the needs of international cultural exchange.”
339  In fact, the 
Conservation Workshop garnered so much recognition that the Ministry of Culture in Beijing 
asked the Shanghai Museum to teach conservation methods around the country, as an example 
to other cultural institutions.
340 
Monopolizing art restoration also gave the museum unprecedented insight into private 
antiquities ownership.  Without leaving their office, museum staff saw, and interacted with, 
private collectors throughout Shanghai and its neighboring provinces.  Between 1958 and 1962, 
the workshop “repaired 1,204 cultural relics for 36 collectors”.
341  These opportunities allowed 
the staff to encourage a wider demographic of collectors to donate, leveraging the fact that the 
workshop took care of their antiquities and thereby made the collectors “a part of the 
museum.”
342  
Anniversary,  Science and Research Plans For 1963 – 1972] December 20
th, 1961 – January 14
th, 1963, B172-5-
564, SMA, Shanghai. 
339 Wenhua bu guanyu shanghai bowuguan fangmei yanjiu shiyan de pifu ge jianguan shizhounian qingzhu huodong de 
baogao, 1963 – 1972 nian keyan guihua, [The Cultural Affairs Administration's Responses to the Shanghai 
Museum's Mold-Prevention Experiments and Report on the Celebration Plans For The State's Ten Year 
Anniversary,  Science and Research Plans For 1963 – 1972] December 20
th, 1961 – January 14
th, 1963, B172-5-
564, SMA, Shanghai. 
340 Wenhua bu guanyu zhaokai wenwu baohu gongzuo zuotanhui de tongzhi ji shanghai shi wenhua ju de huibao cailiao, 
[The Ministry of Culture's Notification for Initiating A Conference on the Protection of Cultural Relics and the 
Shanghai Municipal Cultural Affairs Administration's Press Release Materials] February, 1963 – July, 1963, 
B172-1-440, SMA, Shanghai. 
341 Wenhua bu guanyu shanghai bowuguan fangmei yanjiu shiyan de pifu ge jianguan shizhounian qingzhu huodong de 
baogao, 1963 – 1972 nian keyan guihua, [The Cultural Affairs Administration's Responses to the Shanghai 
Museum's Mold-Prevention Experiments and Report on the Celebration Plans For The State's Ten Year 
Anniversary,  Science and Research Plans For 1963 – 1972] December 20
th, 1961 – January 14
th, 1963, B172-5-
564, SMA, Shanghai. 
342 Interview with Xie Hua, January 22
nd, 2010. 120
Furthermore, the workshop enabled the museum to erase accidents.  In 1963, for 
example, the Shanghai Museum was courting a private collector for his Song dynasty blue and 
white ceramic.  The acquisitions team offered the collector 700 RMB, but he refused to sell.
343 
“The museum really wanted this thing, so we said to him could we keep it for a while, so we 
could study it.”
344  The collector agreed and left.  During a study session, senior archaeologist 
Jiang Dayi dropped the ceramic on the floor.  It shattered.  According to the museum staff, “one 
student came by...and patted him somehow”, which surprised Jiang into loosening his grip.
345 
Jiang immediately called the workshop.  Ceramics restorer Yao Hongfa “came and he looked at 
it, he got a white piece of paper, licked his fingers and took the pieces all up with his finger 
tips.”
346  The museum put Yao in a small hotel where no one could see and sent a bunch of 
cigarettes to speed him along.  Much to the museum's relief, “after a week he really did fix it.”
347  
The museum even used the above-mentioned events to negotiate with the ceramic's 
owner.  When the collector came for his antiquity, museum staff said “I'll tell you the truth, we 
were careless, when we held it in our hands it fell on the floor, and now it's completely 
shattered.”
348  Instead of compensating the collector for damages, however, the museum 
reasserted its interest to acquire the piece for 700 RMB.  The staff showed the collector his blue 
343 Interview with Jin Jiaping, January 13
th, 2010.
344 Interview with Jin Jiaping, January 13
th, 2010.
345 Interview with Jin Jiaping, January 13
th, 2010.
346 Interview with Jin Jiaping, January 13
th, 2010.
347 Interview with Jin Jiaping, January 13
th, 2010.
348 Interview with Jin Jiaping, January 13
th, 2010.121
and white and said “We've fixed it, but if you take it back there's no point.”
349  Yao had repaired 
the artifact so well that the collector could hardly tell any accident occurred at all.  He “looked at 
the thing under the sun, rang his fingers on it and said, no it hasn't been broken, you're lying to 
me.”
350  
The Second Grand Opening
In the midst of the Great Leap Forward (1958 - 1962), the Shanghai Museum moved 
from its original location on #325 West Nanjing Road to the Chinese Remittance Bank building 
at #16 South Henan Road, in the heart of Shanghai's financial district.  By definition, museums 
contributed little to the Great Leap Forward's focus on industrial and agricultural growth.  The 
Shanghai Museum's association with bronzes, however, allowed it to work with steel 
manufacturing, a key item on the Great Leap Forward's agenda.
351  Furthermore, the new 
museum site gave the Class of 1952 space to sort through metal castoffs from Shanghai’s 
municipal and backyard steel furnaces.  Thus began the museum's collaboration with local metal 
refineries.
The Department of Cultural Affairs merged the Shanghai Museum with the Cultural 
349 Interview with Jin Jiaping, January 13
th, 2010.
350 Interview with Jin Jiaping, January 13
th, 2010.
351 For a select biography on work distribution assessments during the Great Leap Forward see Frank Dikötter, 
Mao's Great Famine: The History of China's Most Devastating Catastrophe, 1958-1962, (New York, 2010); 
William A. Joseph, “A Tragedy of Good Intentions: Post-Mao Views of the Great Leap Forward” Modern China, 
12, no. 4 (1986): 419-457; Choh-Ming Li, “China's Industrial Development, 1958-63”, The China Quarterly, 
no. 17 (1964): 3-38; Kimberley Ens Manning, “The Gendered Politics of Woman-Work: Rethinking 
Radicalism in the Great Leap Forward” Modern China, 32, no. 3 (2006): 349-384; Xizhe Peng, “Demographic 
Consequences of the Great Leap Forward in China's Provinces”, Population and Development Review, 13, no. 4 
(1987): 639-670.122
Relics Rescue Warehouse (henceforth Warehouse), a municipal department for salvage 
archeology that had been in place since 1949.
352  This facility trolled smelting pits and retrieved 
artifacts of value from local steel and paper refineries.
353  In order to sift through the thousands of 
tons of metal that came to Shanghai for processing, the museum created a special department for 
“the rescue of ancient objects from all regions of Shanghai”, which was made up of Warehouse 
employees as well as members of the Class of 1952.
354  These individuals regularly inspected 
more than 290 metal recycling stations in Shanghai and its surrounding hinterlands.
355  
Some employees got the difficult assignment of working in remote stations.  For 
352 Shanghai shi renwei, shanghai shi wei xuanchuan bu, shanghai shi wenhua ju guanyu chexiao shanghai shi wenwu 
zhengli cangku jianzhi bin fenbie binru Shanghai tushu guan, shanghai wenguan hui de qingshi, pifu, [The Shanghai 
People's Representative Board and the Shanghai People's Representative Board's Public Affairs Bureau's Replies 
on the Decision to Dismantle the Shanghai Cultural Relics Rescue Warehouse and Merge Its Parts With the 
Shanghai Library and the Cultural Relics Management Board] January 1958 – January 1959, B172-1-299, SMA, 
Shanghai.  
353 Wenhua bu, shanghai shi wenhua ju guanyu zizhu shanghai shi wenwu zhengli cangku qiangjiu wenwu de han, 
baogao ji gai cangku de gongzuo zongjie, [The Ministry of Culture and Shanghai Cultural Affairs Administration's 
Report Regarding Funding the Shanghai Cultural Relics Sorting and Rescue Warehouse's Rescue of Culturel 
Relics Plus The Conclusive Report on the Rescue Operations] April 1957 – June 1957, B172-1-268, SMA, 
Shanghai. 
354 The Warehouse's paper division became a part of the Shanghai Library, which took charge of retrieving steele 
rubbings, ancient texts, and other artifacts of possible value to the book industry. Shanghai shi renwei, shanghai 
shi wei xuanchuan bu, shanghai shi wenhua ju guanyu chexiao shanghai shi wenwu zhengli cangku jianzhi bin fenbie 
binru Shanghai tushu guan, shanghai wenguan hui de qingshi, pifu, [The Shanghai People's Representative Board 
and the Shanghai People's Representative Board's Public Affairs Bureau's Replies on the Decision to Dismantle 
the Shanghai Cultural Relics Rescue Warehouse and Merge Its Parts With the Shanghai Library and the 
Cultural Relics Management Board] January 1958 – January 1959, B172-1-299, SMA, Shanghai.  For 
information about the Shanghai Library's paper sorting work, see Wenhua bu, Shanghai shi wenhua ju, shi 
wenguan hui guanyu jieshou juanxian wenwu bin yu yi biaozhang de qingshi baobao, pifu, [Ministry of Culture, 
Shanghai Municipal Department of Cultural Affairs, Municipal Cultural Relics Management Bureau's Report 
And Rescripts Regarding The Acceptance Of Donated Cultural Relics And The Granting Of Merit Awards] 
November 1959 – December 17
th, 1959, B172-5-97 SMA, Shanghai. 
355 Shanghai shi disan jie renmin daibiao dahui disanci huiyi guanyu wenjiao jie daibiao fayan gao, [Third Shanghai 
Municipal People's Representative Conference's Third Meeting Regarding Cultural And Educational Field 
Representatives' Speech Draft] May 12
th, 1960 – May 17
th, 1960, B1-1-791, SMA, Shanghai. 123
example, inspections at outer Jiading district, an area more than sixty miles (97KM) away from 
the museum, required employees to “leave their house at 4AM in order to report to the factories 
by 6AM”.
356  Many worked without face masks and “the bronze gases steamed and overwhelmed 
us, to the point where we could taste sweetness in our mouths.”
357  Steel mills kept scrap ores 
uncovered, so inspectors worked outdoors in all seasons.  Chen Peifen recalled that in the 
summer, “as you climb up the planks on the metal heap your shoes make this zhi-zhi sound 
because the soles are melting.”
358  During the winter inspectors wore thick gloves to keep their 
fingers from freezing to metal.  Lu Songlin, who worked inspections from 1956 to 1993, joked 
that the job made his team look so shabby that they called themselves jianpolan (trash-pickers), 
a term that described beggars who salvaged garbage.
359  
356 Shanghai shi wenhua ju guanyu shinian lai wenwu gongzuo, qianjiu gongzuo de zongjie, tongji shuzi, [Shanghai 
Ministry of Culture's Conclusions and Statistics Regarding the Past Ten Year's Work In Cultural Relics And 
Cultural Relics Rescue] October 1959 – March 1960, B172-1-341, SMA, Shanghai. 
357 Shanghai shi wenhua ju guanyu shinian lai wenwu gongzuo, qianjiu gongzuo de zongjie, tongji shuzi, [Shanghai 
Ministry of Culture's Conclusions and Statistics Regarding the Past Ten Year's Work In Cultural Relics And 
Cultural Relics Rescue] October 1959 – March 1960, B172-1-341, SMA, Shanghai. 
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rd, 2009.
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Figure 2.3.  Premiere Zhou Enlai admiring a retrieved Han dynasty bronze mirror with Shanghai 
Museum employee Ma Chengyuan. (Circa early 1960s) Courtesy of Zheng Zhong. 
The Shanghai Museum's salvage archeology program was astonishingly effective.  In 
their first year of operation (1959 - 1960), Lu and his cohorts retrieved more than ten thousand 
bronze relics from local smelting pits.  The artifacts were so numerous that the museum 
cataloged them by the ton.
360
As dictated by the Department of Cultural Affairs, bronze specialists such as Jiang Dayi 
and Ma Chenyuan categorized salvaged bronzes according to the three-tier system.  First-Tier 
retrievals either stayed at the museum or got distributed amongst museums outside Shanghai.
361 
Second-Tier retrievals didn't interest the museum.  The museum had to recompense refineries 
360 Shanghai shi disan jie renmin daibiao dahui disanci huiyi guanyu wenjiao jie daibiao fayan gao, [Third Shanghai 
Municipal People's Representative Conference's Third Meeting Regarding Cultural And Educational Field 
Representatives' Speech Draft] May 12
th, 1960 – May 17
th, 1960, B1-1-791, SMA, Shanghai. 
361 Huadong wenhua bu, Shanghai shi wenhua ju guanyu wenwu zhengli cangku ku cun tongqi waili wenti de baogao, 
pifu, [The China Eastern Cultural Affairs Administration and the Shanghai Cultural Affairs Administration's 
Report and Responses To The Disposal Of Bronze Objects Stored In the Cultural Relics Rescue Warehouse] 
September 1
st, 1953 – November 4
th, 1955, B172-4-422, SMA, Shanghai. 125
for all salvaged artifacts by weight, so instead of allotting money for unwanted bronzes the 
museum transferred them to theaters and film companies, which used the artifacts as props.
362 
Some Second-Tier retrievals also became decoration at hotels and restaurants.
363  Third-Tier 
retrievals interested neither the museum nor the art market, so their whereabouts depended on 
“the needs of the state”.
364  Some returned to the smelting pits, while sellable trinkets went to the 
export art market.
The national and municipal government even incorporated salvage archeology into 
projects such as the creation of roads and communal farms.  Throughout the Great Leap 
Forward, the Shanghai museum was responsible for antiquities unearthed during road 
construction and tilling.  Thus, museum employees sometimes found themselves traveling to 
construction sites and agricultural communes.
365  First-tier finds went to the museum.  Second 
and third tier objects, however, got distributed “according to the needs of road building or 
362 Huadong wenhua bu, Shanghai shi wenhua ju guanyu wenwu zhengli cangku ku cun tongqi waili wenti de baogao, 
pifu, [The China Eastern Cultural Affairs Administration and the Shanghai Cultural Affairs Administration's 
Report and Responses To The Disposal Of Bronze Objects Stored In the Cultural Relics Rescue Warehouse] 
September 1
st, 1953 – November 4
th, 1955, B172-4-422, SMA, Shanghai. 
363 Shanghai shi renmin zhengfu, shi wenhuaju guanyu wenwu huiji, guanli yu zhuzhi jigou lindao fenggong de zhishi ji 
longhua ta xiushan wenti, [Shanghai Municipal People's Government, Municipal Department Of Cultural 
Affairs' Directives Regarding The Collection, Management And Organization of Leadership And Division Of 
Labor For Cultural Relics, Plus Problems Regarding The Restoration Of Longhua Pagoda] 1954,  B34-2-211, 
SMA, Shanghai. 
364 Huadong wenhua bu, Shanghai shi wenhua ju guanyu wenwu zhengli cangku ku cun tongqi waili wenti de baogao, 
pifu, [The China Eastern Cultural Affairs Administration and the Shanghai Cultural Affairs Administration's 
Report and Responses To The Disposal Of Bronze Objects Stored In the Cultural Relics Rescue Warehouse] 
September 1
st, 1953 – November 4
th, 1955, B172-4-422, SMA, Shanghai. 
365 Shanghai shi renmin weiyuan hui fabu Shanghai shi lishi he gemin yiji baohu banfa yu youguan wenwu baohu guanli 
zhenji deng wenti de tongzhi, tonggao, diyipi wenwu baohu mindan, [Shanghai Municipal People's Representative 
Board Promulgates Shanghai Municipal Historical And Revolutionary Site Preservation Methods And Related 
Cultural Relics Preservation Management And Acquisition Regulations, Plus First List Of Objects For Cultural 
Relics Preservation] January 2
nd, 1959 – December 21
st, 1959, B1-1-1468, SMA, Shanghai. 126
industrial and agricultural industry growth”, pending permission from the appropriate “district 
and county officials.”
366  
The three-tier system served two important functions.  First, it inaugurated new 
evaluation standards for  Chinese art.  The logic of evaluating by tiers runs counter to the idea of 
a pre-existing greatest hits list of Chinese art, filled with objects whose value are independent of 
market and political needs.  According to tier-based evaluations, all salvaged artifacts are subject 
to “the needs of the state”, such as gaps in museum collections around the country, art market 
trends, and the Great Leap Forward's drive for steel.  
Secondly, the tier-based system allowed the Shanghai Museum to expand the visibility of 
bronzes relics in Chinese art.  The salvage archeology team sent Anhui's new provincial museum 
163 bronzes, a substantial sum that remains the core of Anhui's bronze collection.
367  Similarly, 
Shanghai sent the National Palace Museum in Beijing 175 salvaged bronzes and helped the 
Northwestern History Museum in Shaanxi province expand its collection by thirty-two 
bronzes.
368  By way of comparison, the Shanghai Museum's permanent collection only contained 
366 Shanghai shi renmin weiyuan hui fabu Shanghai shi lishi he gemin yiji baohu banfa yu youguan wenwu baohu guanli 
zhenji deng wenti de tongzhi, tonggao, diyipi wenwu baohu mindan, [Shanghai Municipal People's Representative 
Board Promulgates Shanghai Municipal Historical And Revolutionary Site Preservation Methods And Related 
Cultural Relics Preservation Management And Acquisition Regulations, Plus First List Of Objects For Cultural 
Relics Preservation] January 2
nd, 1959 – December 21
st, 1959, B1-1-1468, SMA, Shanghai. 
367 Shanghai shi renmin weiyuan hui wenyi bangong shi guanyu shanghai shi siyin guwan shang anpai gaizao ji wenwu 
zhengli gongzuo de youguan wenjian, [Shanghai Municipal People's Board, Arts and Cultural Office's Documents 
Regarding Reformation Plans for Shanghai's Art Dealers and the Organized Allocation of Cultural Relics] 
March 1955 – November 1955, B9-2-25,  SMA, Shanghai.
368 Shanghai shi renmin weiyuan hui wenyi bangong shi guanyu shanghai shi siyin guwan shang anpai gaizao ji wenwu 
zhengli gongzuo de youguan wenjian, [Shanghai Municipal People's Board, Arts and Cultural Office's Documents 
Regarding Reformation Plans for Shanghai's Art Dealers and the Organized Allocation of Cultural Relics] 
March 1955 – November 1955, B9-2-25,  SMA, Shanghai.127
105 First-Tier bronze objects as of 1964.
369  This injection of artifacts fundamentally altered the 
role of bronzes in Chinese museums.  Ancient bronzes gained a denser, more identifiable 
presence in PRC collections, while the Shanghai Museum gained a reputation as the institution 
that put bronzes on the Chinese art historical map.
In order to alleviate the strenuous schedule that pit inspectors had to maintain on a daily 
basis, the Shanghai Museum produced posters that encouraged “comrades at each factory, 
warehouse, recycle station to be on constant alert for the protection of cultural relics.”
370  These 
posters often appeared at the entrances of steel refineries and paper mills.  Members of the Class 
of 1952 also distributed them to other municipal work units, with the request that they be 
posted in the cafeterias.
369 Data gathered from Wenhua bu, shanghai shi wenhua ju guanyu bianzhi, chuban shanghai bowuguan yiji cangping 
jianmu, huace, tupu de tongzhi, baogao, zongjie, [Cultural Division and Shanghai Ministry of Culture's Reports 
and Rescripts Regarding Publishing the Shanghai Museum's First Tier Collections' Index, Illustrated Album, 
and Graphics Archive], February 1963 – November 1963, B172-1-443, SMA, Shanghai; Shanghai shi wenhua ju 
guanyu shangbao shanghai gemin lishi jinian guan, shanghai bowuguan, shanghai luxun jinian guan yiji cangping de 
baogao, mulu, [Shanghai Cultural Affairs Administration's Report and Table of Contents Regarding First Tier 
Collections at the Shanghai Revolutionary History Museum, Shanghai Museum, and Shanghai Luxun Memorial 
Museum], August 1960 – October 1965, B172-1-498, SMA, Shanghai. 
370 Shanghai shi wenhua ju guanyu shinian lai wenwu gongzuo, qianjiu gongzuo de zongjie, tongji shuzi, [Shanghai 
Ministry of Culture's Conclusions and Statistics Regarding the Past Ten Year's Work In Cultural Relics And 
Cultural Relics Rescue] October 1959 – March 1960, B172-1-341, SMA, Shanghai. 128
Figure 2.4.  A Shanghai Museum-designed poster that promulgates antiquities retrieval during 
the Great Leap Forward.  SMA, Shanghai. 129
The bold, and black pictographs that frame the poster in Figure 2.4 declare “PROTECT 
CULTURAL HERITAGE, EVERYONE IS RESPONSIBLE!”
371  Fine print in the lower left 
hand corner summarize the major aspects of Cultural Relics law enforcement, and point out the 
categories of artifacts to which the public should pay closer attention.  The images scattered 
throughout the length of the poster illustrate artifacts that have already been salvaged from 
industrial and agricultural movements, such as a Warring States era pot, a Tang dynasty mirror, 
and prehistoric stone tools.  The captions underneath each image identify the artifact by name 
and age, and when possible, the site from which the Shanghai Museum's salvage archeology 
team retrieved it.  
Pit inspectors would have found some of the artifacts pictured in Figure 2.4 surprising. 
Across the nation, salvage archeology programs prioritized the preservation of some categories 
of bronzes over others.  This system of prioritization imposed a hierarchy of preservation that is 
absent from this poster.  For example, cities and towns had no obligation to preserve religious 
artifacts if their districts already had several extant samples, even if the retrievals predated the 
Yuan dynasty.
372  This exemption included bronze Buddhas, human figures, lions, bells, incense 
burning vessels, all of which metal refineries could melt down.  Municipal refineries could also 
371 Image taken from Wenhua bu, shanghai renwei, shi wenhua ju guanyu jiaqiang wenwu baohu gongzuo de tongzhi, 
tongbao ji wanglai han, [The Ministry of Cultural, Shanghai People's Assembly, Municipal Cultural Affairs 
Administration's Notifications, Notices, and Correspondence Regarding Strengthening the Protection of 
Cultural Relics] January 7
th, 1959 – December 21
st, 1959, B172-5-83, SMA, Shanghai. 
372 Wenhua bu, Shanghai shi wenhua ju guanyu wenwu baohu, kaogu faju, guji xiushan, sanmu qingli deng de tongzhi, 
diaocha baogao, wang lai han, [the Cultural Affairs Bureau and the Shanghai Ministry of Culture's 
Correspondence Regarding Its Investigation and Reports on Cultural Relics Protection, Ancient Site 
Restoration, and Tomb Cleanup] January 11
th, 1958 – December 18
th, 1958, B172-4-948, SMA, Shanghai. 130
smelt Ming and Qing dynasty bronzes that bore no identifiable markings.  Bronzes that only had 
markings such as “reign dates, the commissioner's name, the artist's markings, or average 
designs” were transferred to art dealerships for sale, as the PRC preferred only to keep bronzes 
made by “historically important artists or [bearing] rare and beautiful patterning”.
373  According 
to these rules, neither the temple nor the Buddha statue in Figure 2.4 would have been salvaged 
– they were more likely to be treated as export stock or ore.  
Museum visitors, on the other hand, would find themselves equally surprised to see the 
cannons, arm bands, and the “bloody coat of transportation worker Zhong Quanzhou”, which 
feature prominently at top of Figure 2.4.
374  While the Shanghai Museum rarely exhibited these 
categories of art, Great Leap Forward policies mandated that inspectors collect, catalog, and 
preserve them for the museum industry at large.  The state planned to display “weapons used 
against our enemies before the Revolution” at national, municipal, and township history 
museums.
375  According to the Shanghai Museum's press office, these objects propagated 
373 Wenhua bu, Shanghai shi wenhua ju guanyu wenwu baohu, kaogu faju, guji xiushan, sanmu qingli deng de tongzhi, 
diaocha baogao, wang lai han, [the Cultural Affairs Bureau and the Shanghai Ministry of Culture's 
Correspondence Regarding Its Investigation and Reports on Cultural Relics Protection, Ancient Site 
Restoration, and Tomb Cleanup] January 11
th, 1958 – December 18
th, 1958, B172-4-948, SMA, Shanghai. 
374 Wenhua bu, shanghai renwei, shi wenhua ju guanyu jiaqiang wenwu baohu gongzuo de tongzhi, tongbao ji wanglai 
han, [The Ministry of Cultural, Shanghai People's Assembly, Municipal Cultural Affairs Administration's 
Notifications, Notices, and Correspondence Regarding Strengthening the Protection of Cultural Relics] 
January 7
th, 1959 – December 21
st, 1959, B172-5-83, SMA, Shanghai. 
375 Many of these objects were later allocated to the collections of national and municipal history museums, which 
where they were used to articulate the history of the Chinese Communist Party.  Quote comes from Wenhua bu, 
Shanghai shi wenhua ju guanyu wenwu baohu, kaogu faju, guji xiushan, sanmu qingli deng de tongzhi, diaocha 
baogao, wang lai han, [the Cultural Affairs Bureau and the Shanghai Ministry of Culture's Correspondence 
Regarding Its Investigation and Reports on Cultural Relics Protection, Ancient Site Restoration, and Tomb 
Cleanup] January 11
th, 1958 – December 18
th, 1958, B172-4-948, SMA, Shanghai.  131
“workers' brave self-defense under Communist leadership” and deserved a place in Chinese 
cultural heritage.
376  
Bronze artifacts that pre-dated the Ming dynasty, such as dings (three or four-legged 
cooking vessels), wine vessels, war bells, farm implements, and work tools, were at the top of pit 
inspectors' retrieval lists.  Ancient weapons, such as arrow heads, spears, knives, and swords, also 
took priority.  Consequently, these categories of art frequently appeared on the Shanghai 
Museum's first-tier antiquities inventory under “internal transfer” (indicating that it came from 
smelting factories or similar sources).  In fact, these are the kinds of bronze relics that most 
museum-goers expect to see when they visit Chinese art museum today.  One wonders how our 
mental image of ancient Chinese bronzes might be different had Great Leap Forward programs 
calibrated their preservation priorities towards religious artifacts, or implements of the imperial 
courts.
Antiquarian Training Program 
The late 1950s and early 1960s saw Shanghai Museum administrators actively 
campaigning for professionalization.  Skill sets such as the ability to recognize, evaluate, and 
For recent scholarship on these museums, see Chang-tai Hung, “The Red Line: Creating a Museum of the 
Chinese Revolution,” The China Quarterly 184 (December 2005): 914-933; Rana Mitter, “Behind The Scenes 
At The Museum: Nationalism, History And Memory In The Beijing War of Resistance Museum, 1987 – 1997,” 
The China Quarterly, 161 (2000): 279 – 293;
376 Wenhua bu, shanghai renwei, shi wenhua ju guanyu jiaqiang wenwu baohu gongzuo de tongzhi, tongbao ji wanglai 
han, [The Ministry of Cultural, Shanghai People's Assembly, Municipal Cultural Affairs Administration's 
Notifications, Notices, and Correspondence Regarding Strengthening the Protection of Cultural Relics] 
January 7
th, 1959 – December 21
st, 1959, B172-5-83, SMA, Shanghai. 132
acquire top-end antiquities were “rare and difficult to acquire”.
377  The Class of 1952 needed 
programs that made them proficient in antiquities identification, authentication, transcription, 
and evaluation, because they were eventually expected to replace the senior staff.  After all, men 
like Xie Zhiliu, Shen Jianzhi, and Jiang Dayi were advanced in years when the museum hired them 
in 1949.  Most of them “have diabetes...are more than fifty years old...have chronic illnesses and 
can only work half days”.
378  Furthermore, the senior staff's elite backgrounds rendered them 
ineligible to become the “class-less...museum cadres” that a state-level museum needed to sustain 
its future.
379
Museum administrators proposed that the PRC invest in the Class of 1952.  These 
“young comrades” had the potential to “inherit the older generation's professional knowledge.”
380 
They also had the humble backgrounds necessary for upward mobility in PRC administration.  In 
377 The Shanghai Library also moved from the old Jockey Club building, which it shared with the Shanghai 
Museum, to a new location at 1634 Middle Huaihai Road.  Shanghai shi wenhua ju guanyu ju shu xiju, she wen 
danwei zuzhi jigou, renyuan bianzhi, ganbu diaopei deng de qingshi, baogao, [The Shanghai Ministry of Culture's 
Report Regarding Work Unit Organization, Human Resource Structuring and Cadre Allocation in The 
Ministry's Drama, Culture, and Social Divisions] January 26
th, 1959 – December 31
st, 1959, B172-5-132, SMA, 
Shanghai. 
378 Zhonggong shanghai shi wenhu ju dangzu guanyu quanshi tushu guan yu wenwu, bowuguan shiye xu peiyang 
xinsheng liliang de baogao, [People's Republic of China Shanghai Municipal Cultural Affairs Bureau's Political 
Division's Report Regarding the City's Library, Cultural, Museum Industries' Need to Nurture New Strength] 
May 23
rd, 1959, B172-5-138, SMA, Shanghai. 
379 Wenhua bu guanyu shanghai bowuguan fangmei yanjiu shiyan de pifu ge jianguan shizhounian qingzhu huodong de 
baogao, 1963 – 1972 nian keyan guihua, [The Cultural Affairs Administration's Responses to the Shanghai 
Museum's Mold-Prevention Experiments and Report on the Celebration Plans For The State's Ten Year 
Anniversary,  Science and Research Plans For 1963 – 1972] December 20
th, 1961 – January 14
th, 1963, B172-5-
564, SMA, Shanghai. 
380 Wenhua bu guanyu shanghai bowuguan fangmei yanjiu shiyan de pifu ge jianguan shizhounian qingzhu huodong de 
baogao, 1963 – 1972 nian keyan guihua, [The Cultural Affairs Administration's Responses to the Shanghai 
Museum's Mold-Prevention Experiments and Report on the Celebration Plans For The State's Ten Year 
Anniversary,  Science and Research Plans For 1963 – 1972] December 20
th, 1961 – January 14
th, 1963, B172-5-
564, SMA, Shanghai. 133
fact, the municipality referred to the Class of 1952 as “new-born strengths” and cadres – the 
period moniker for individuals with the potential to lead their organization.
381  These individuals 
had the potential to become the PRC's first generation of Red antiquarians.  
The Class of 1952's chicken-hatching roots, however, also held them back.  As museum 
administrators noted, “their education levels are on average not high.  Most are at the junior high 
school level, some have high school standards, few possess college or professional training.”
382  A 
1956 census noted that only forty-two of the museum's 114 cadres had high school diplomas.
383 
Some self-identified as “skilled worker from the trades.”
384  Others had primary or junior high 
school.  Less than nineteen percent of the Class of 1952 had any exposure to college educations. 
Therefore, the Cultural Heritage Management Board proposed that the museum establish a 
formal training program, which would take “immediate steps to ensure that our younger 
generation can inherit these professional skills and gain the necessary experience.”
385   
381 Wenhua bu guanyu shanghai bowuguan fangmei yanjiu shiyan de pifu ge jianguan shizhounian qingzhu huodong de 
baogao, 1963 – 1972 nian keyan guihua, [The Cultural Affairs Administration's Responses to the Shanghai 
Museum's Mold-Prevention Experiments and Report on the Celebration Plans For The State's Ten Year 
Anniversary,  Science and Research Plans For 1963 – 1972] December 20
th, 1961 – January 14
th, 1963, B172-5-
564, SMA, Shanghai. 
382 Wenhua bu guanyu shanghai bowuguan fangmei yanjiu shiyan de pifu ge jianguan shizhounian qingzhu huodong de 
baogao, 1963 – 1972 nian keyan guihua, [The Cultural Affairs Administration's Responses to the Shanghai 
Museum's Mold-Prevention Experiments and Report on the Celebration Plans For The State's Ten Year 
Anniversary,  Science and Research Plans For 1963 – 1972] December 20
th, 1961 – January 14
th, 1963, B172-5-
564, SMA, Shanghai. 
383 Shanghai shi wenhua ju 1955 nian youguan bowuguan, jinian guan gongzuo qingkuang de tongji zonghe biao, 
[Shanghai Municipal Department of Cultural Affairs' Statistical Reports For Museum And Memorial Institution 
Work Conditions In 1955] July 13
th, 1955 – February 7
th, 1956, B172-4-389, SMA, Shanghai. 
384 Interview with Gu Youchu, February 1
st, 2010.
385 The Shanghai Library also moved from the old Jockey Club building, which it shared with the Shanghai 
Museum, to a new location at 1634 Middle Huaihai Road.  Shanghai shi wenhua ju guanyu ju shu xiju, she wen 
danwei zuzhi jigou, renyuan bianzhi, ganbu diaopei deng de qingshi, baogao, [The Shanghai Ministry of Culture's 
Report Regarding Work Unit Organization, Human Resource Structuring and Cadre Allocation in The 134
By 1961, more than twenty junior employees  got promoted to apprentices in the 
museum's program for Red antiquarianism.
386  The administration kept this program small, 
partnering select senior staff with no more than three apprentices.  Wang Qingzheng, an 
apprentice who later became the Shanghai Museum's Vice President, learned how to read and 
identify stele rubbings with Xu Senyu, head of the Cultural Relics Management Board.
387  Other 
apprentices, like Zhong Yinlan and Zhu Henghui, learned painting and calligraphy appraisal from 
Senior Painting Researcher Sheng Jianzhi.
388  Some of these arrangements lasted for five or six 
years, others remained paired up for decades and now take apprentices of their own.
Red antiquarian coursework varied from apprenticeship to apprenticeship.  For example, 
Sheng Jianzhi, an elderly man with chronic arthritis and ulcers, had Zhong Yinlan and Zhu 
Henghui visit his house every Monday to take half-day lessons.
389  Chen Peifen studied bronzes 
Ministry's Drama, Culture, and Social Divisions] January 26
th, 1959 – December 31
st, 1959, B172-5-132.  SMA, 
Shanghai. 
386 For a complete list of which junior employees got apprenticeships with which senior employees, see Wenhua bu 
guanyu shanghai bowuguan fangmei yanjiu shiyan de pifu ge jianguan shizhounian qingzhu huodong de baogao, 
1963 – 1972 nian keyan guihua, [The Cultural Affairs Administration's Responses to the Shanghai Museum's 
Mold-Prevention Experiments and Report on the Celebration Plans For The State's Ten Year Anniversary, 
Science and Research Plans For 1963 – 1972] December 20
th, 1961 – January 14
th, 1963, B172-5-564, SMA, 
Shanghai. 
387 Wenhua bu guanyu shanghai bowuguan fangmei yanjiu shiyan de pifu ge jianguan shizhounian qingzhu huodong de 
baogao, 1963 – 1972 nian keyan guihua, [The Cultural Affairs Administration's Responses to the Shanghai 
Museum's Mold-Prevention Experiments and Report on the Celebration Plans For The State's Ten Year 
Anniversary,  Science and Research Plans For 1963 – 1972] December 20
th, 1961 – January 14
th, 1963, B172-5-
564, SMA, Shanghai. 
388 Wenhua bu guanyu shanghai bowuguan fangmei yanjiu shiyan de pifu ge jianguan shizhounian qingzhu huodong de 
baogao, 1963 – 1972 nian keyan guihua, [The Cultural Affairs Administration's Responses to the Shanghai 
Museum's Mold-Prevention Experiments and Report on the Celebration Plans For The State's Ten Year 
Anniversary,  Science and Research Plans For 1963 – 1972] December 20
th, 1961 – January 14
th, 1963, B172-5-
564, SMA, Shanghai. 
389 Interview with Zhong Yinlan, June 16
th, 2009. 135
with Jiang Dayi at his house every Sunday morning, where Jiang's wife showed her the week's 
assignments while Jiang took his morning walk in the park.
390  Others, like Feng Xiaogeng and 
Yang Jiangfa, trained on the job because their apprenticeships involved using large printing and 
photography equipment that the museum built on-site.
391
The lessons emphasized hands-on practice.  Zhong Yinlan explained that “the way my 
teacher trained me wasn't school based, he didn't talk to me about theory”.
392  In fact, Shen Jianzhi 
told her “books you can read at home” and had her practice painting for three years.  She literally 
learned “good and bad of ink and brush” hands-on.
393  Similarly, Chen Peifen learned to 
punctuate old Chinese and transcribe seal script before she learned to identify bronze relics.  Her 
mentor, Jiang Dayi, highlighted the ability to read ancient Chinese above all else and had her 
transcribe lengthy passages using the museum's own bronze and stele rubbings.  Every Sunday 
morning Chen brought her transcriptions to Jiang's house where “he would ask.  Well what about 
it?  Did you read them?  What do you think about it?  What are the perspectives?  Then I would 
have to reply.”
394  Chen “had to tell him what I knew...How do I say this, what is this, what does 
this passage say, where are you putting the punctuations, what do you think these words are, is it a 
390 Interview with Chen Peifen, June 22
nd, 2009.
391 Lesson details from interview with Feng Xiaogeng, April 2
nd, 2010.  Supplementary information regarding 
apprenticeship assignments from Wenhua bu guanyu shanghai bowuguan fangmei yanjiu shiyan de pifu ge jianguan 
shizhounian qingzhu huodong de baogao, 1963 – 1972 nian keyan guihua, [The Cultural Affairs Administration's 
Responses to the Shanghai Museum's Mold-Prevention Experiments and Report on the Celebration Plans For 
The State's Ten Year Anniversary,  Science and Research Plans For 1963 – 1972] December 20
th, 1961 – 
January 14
th, 1963, B172-5-564, SMA, Shanghai. 
392 Interview with Zhong Yinlan, January 5
th, 2010. 
393 Interview with Zhong Yinlan, January 5
th, 2010. 
394 Interview with Chen Peifen, June 22
nd, 2010. 136
person's name, a location, and when you interpret it, can you link it up with what it said before up 
here?”
395  After she defended her interpretations,  Jiang corrected her copy. 
The antiquarian training program fostered a unique culture of expertise at the Shanghai 
Museum.  Professionalization through hands-on learning, specifically the day-to-day work of 
looking at paintings, transcribing bronzes, and sketching and molding ceramics and lacquer casts, 
made experience a credible measure of expertise.
396  The museum even called employees who 
“knew what they were doing”zhuanjia (experts).
397  Zhuanjia distinguished the Class of 1952 from 
the more common antiquarian title of jianshang jia (connoisseurs).  It highlighted the trainees' 
hand skills, specifically that they “could tell reals from fakes” without social pretense.
398  This 
privileging of practical experience is consistent with PRC administrative practices going back to 
1949.  Even when mayor Chen Yi was recruiting senior staff for the Shanghai Museum's 
inauguration, personnel reports underlined the importance of hiring “experts and experienced 
individuals...to takeover management of books and ancient relics”.
399  The phrase jianshang jia 
never appear on these documents.  The title risked the taint of elite backgrounds, which went 
against the very idea of casting antiquities as the common cultural heritage of everyday Chinese. 
395  Interview with Zhong Yinlan, January 5
th, 2010. 
396 For collaborative findings see John Cleverley, “Deflowering the Cultural Revolution: Letter from China”, 
Change, 9, no. 5 (1977): 32-37.
397 Interview with Lu Songlin, September 24
th, 2009.
398 Interview with Lu Songlin, September 24
th, 2009.  
399 Shanghai shi renmin zhengfu guanyu shi wenwu guanli wenyuanhui chengli fangan, renyuan pinyong, niandu yewu 
jihua deng wenti de qingshi ji pifu, [Shanghai Municipal Government's Requests and Rescripts on the 
Establishment of a Municipal Cultural Heritage Management Board including Administrative Outline, Hiring, 
and Yearly Budget], September 1949, B1-2-765, SMA, Shanghai. 137
The important distinction between calling antiquarians experts, as opposed to 
connoisseurs, also shaped how the Class of 1952 envisioned their careers.  They looked up to the 
museum's President, Shen Zhiyu, not only because of his authority over the museum but also for 
his lack of pretension.
400  Museum employees admired the fact that Shen “was a simple guy, he 
just stood there in his blue cotton-padded jacket.”
401  The emphasis on hand skills became integral 
to the museum's definition of Chinese creativity, and the competitive advantage of its 
professionals.  When I asked members of the Class of 1952 to assess the difference between 
overseas museums and their own, for example, they unanimously pointed out the distinction 
between knowledge and skill.  Overseas museums “keep calling in these college graduates as if 
they know more, like they're valuing their knowledge.  But they really should be nursing 
their...skills.”
402  Indeed, Shanghai's antiquarian training programs fashioned a particular 
assessment of professionalization, one in which open access to active involvement and the ability 
to identify and evaluate artifacts mattered more than university credentials and high test scores. 
The privileging of hand skills also sowed tensions between those employees with higher 
education (senior staff) and those without.  Administrators like Xu Senyu and Li Yanong 
punctuated their careers with academic scholarship and erudite publications.  Xu Senyu took the 
Qing Imperial examinations and earned juren (recommended man) status, whereas Li Yanong 
400 For a more extended discussion on these preferences see Wang Annuo, “Zhuiyi dajiu Shen Zhiyu,” 
[Remembering Uncle Shen Zhiyu] Wenhua Jiaoliu [Cultural Dialogue] no. 7, (2010): 44 – 48. 
401 Interview with Lu Songlin, September 24
th, 2009. 
402 Interview with Shen Minren, September 24
th, 2009.138
studied at Kyoto University.
403  Similarly, Xie Zhiliu acquired his skill set through through the 
study of ancient Chinese poetry and painting, which made him a college professor before it made 
him the paintings “expert” that the Shanghai Museum hired in 1949.  In short, senior staff equated 
antiquarianism with higher education.  The privileging of hand skills was therefore as new to the 
the Class of 1952 as it was to the senior staff. 
The conflict between scholarly distinction and practical experience reveals itself in 
everyday language at the museum.  Educated employees often referred to unskilled workers as 
meiyou wenhua(without culture), a derogatory term that shamed the uneducated for their lack of 
learning.
404  Employees who privileged hand skills took offense at this term and used it to warn 
one another about the treacheries of dealing with those who privileged scholarly distinction. 
Zhong Yinlan and her fellow apprentices called senior staff like Xu Senyu and Xie Zhiliu “part of 
the old society”, casting the Class of 1952 as part of a new world order that “got trained to be 
experts in their turn.”
405  Senior conservators at the Conservation Workshop sometimes pulled 
young apprentices aside and warned “you have less wenhua, you have to be careful.”
406  Some 
employees even framed professional conduct in the context of wenhua.  Gu Youchu highlights 
403 Within the Chinese Imperial examination hierarchy, earning juren status makes one eligible for the national level 
exams for civil service.  It also gives the status-bearer higher social status due to his rare achievement in the rite 
of public and private life. 
404 For the application of the wenhua moniker in contemporary practice, see Nicholas Dynon, “'Four Civilizations' 
and the Evolution of Post-Mao Chinese Socialist Ideology,” The China Journal, no. 60 (2008): 83-109; Tamara 
Jacka, “Cultivating Citizens: Suzhi (Quality) Discourse in the PRC,” Positions: East Asia Cultural Critique, 17. no. 3 
(2009): 523-535.
405 Interview with Zhong Yinlan, July 10
th, 2009.
406 Interview with Gu Youchu, February 1
st, 2010139
the following example, “in general we were very casual in the workshop, if our nose was leaking 
we just patted it off and wiped off our hands.  No one cared.”  Visits from upper administration, 
however, changed the atmosphere.  When Xia Shunkui, the department's manager, “came it was 
different.  Especially if the director came, you had to stand up straight and look correct.  You had 
to know your face.”
407  The junior employees attributed these tensions to the administrators' 
privileging of wenhua.  They told each other that if they didn’t feign some wenhua “the leaders 
might turn against you, make you go and work in hard labor.”
408
Cultivating Private Collecting
Contemporary narratives presuppose a gap between art market performance in the 
Maoist years and the years following 1978, when Reform era economic prosperity encouraged 
record-breaking prices in the Chinese art trade.
409  The Shanghai Museum's records, however, 
indicate that nationalized art dealerships cultivated private collecting both in China and overseas, 
throughout the so-called Socialist era.  The Shanghai Museum's enforcement of Cultural Relics 
laws enabled state-run art dealerships to nurture the growth of the domestic art market as well as 
the export trade with the international art market.  These market manipulations not only fueled 
existing interests in collecting, but also paved the way for bigger, wetter appetites in the years to 
come.   
By 1958, the Shanghai art market's 215 private curio shops, stands, and migrant 
407 Interview with Gu Youchu, February 1
st, 2010
408 Interview with Gu Youchu, February 1
st, 2010
409 For more discussion about post-1978 art market trends see Chapter 5.140
dealerships had nothing of the brick-a-brak coziness that so charmed overseas collectors like Sir 
David Percival back in the 1930s and 40s.  The Shanghai First Municipal Trade Bureau merged 
the shops into six antiquities conglomerates: the Chinese Curio Markets in Huangpu district 
(downtown Shanghai), the Xinlong Store in Luwan district (former French concession), Gusong 
Ji in the South City District (City God's Temple), the Renli Store in Jinan district (Jinan temple), 
and Zunyi zhai in Hongkou district (former Japanese concession).
410  The Chinese Curio Markets 
remained the biggest antiquities bazaar in Shanghai, employing169 of 178 individuals in the 
industry.
411  The other five locations got transformed into specialized retail stores, which sold 
reproductions or export-only arts and crafts for low-end collectors.   
410 Shanghai shi wenhua ju guanyu benshi wenwu shangye zhuanyi wenhua bumen lingdao guanli de baogao ji shi 
shangye ju guwan jinyin guanli de guiding, [Shanghai Municipal Cultural Affairs Administration's Report 
Regarding the Transfer of the Municipality's Antiquities Industry to the Cultural Administration's 
Management, and the Municipal Commercial Bureau's Regulations on Antiquities Industry Management] 
February 25
th, 1963 – November 23
rd, 1963, B172-5-691, SMA, Shanghai. 
411 Antiquities industry census data comes from Shanghai shi wenhua ju guanyu benshi wenwu shangye zhuanyi 
wenhua bumen lingdao guanli de baogao ji shi shangye ju guwan jinyin guanli de guiding, [Shanghai Municipal 
Cultural Affairs Administration's Report Regarding the Transfer of the Municipality's Antiquities Industry to 
the Cultural Administration's Management, and the Municipal Commercial Bureau's Regulations on 
Antiquities Industry Management] February 25
th, 1963 – November 23
rd, 1963, B172-5-691, SMA, Shanghai. 
Chinese Curio Market census data comes from Gongsi heying Shanghai shi guwan shichang guanyu muqian guwan 
shichang cunzai jige zhuyao wenti de qingkuang baogao, [The Nationalized Chinese Curio Market's Report 
Regarding Questions About the Status of the Market] October 28
th, 1961, B123-1-1341-49, SMA, Shanghai. 141
Figure 2.5. The Shanghai Antique and Curios store in Hongkou district, a contemporary 
remnant of the consolidated antiquities conglomerates of the late 1950s and 60s.  Photograph 
taken by author in June, 2010. 
Consistent with the redefinition of art dealers' professional identities as outlined in 
Chapter One, smuggling remained a primary concern.  In 1958, the Ministry of Culture asserted 
that Shanghai art dealers “like Jin Yuanyong, Huang Kangxiang, and others traveled with large 
amounts of cash, without the Cultural Relics Management Board's permission, directly to 
[Zhenjiang provincial towns] like Xiaoxing, Yuyao,Shangyu,  Ningbo...Lanxi, Jinhua, Wukang and 
other localities to purchase cultural relics”.
412  Only the Shanghai Museum's vigilant enforcement 
of Cultural Relics laws curbed these illegal activities, and “cut off art dealers' illegal activities and 
tomb robbing in [Zhejiang and other nearby] provinces”.
413   
412 Wenhua bu, Shanghai shi wenhua ju guanyu wenwu baohu, kaogu faju, guji xiushan, sanmu qingli deng de tongzhi, 
diaocha baogao, wang lai han, [the Cultural Affairs Bureau and the Shanghai Ministry of Culture's 
Correspondence Regarding Its Investigation and Reports on Cultural Relics Protection, Ancient Site 
Restoration, and Tomb Cleanup] January 11
th, 1958 – December 18
th, 1958, B172-4-948, SMA, Shanghai. 
413 Wenhua bu, Shanghai shi wenhua ju guanyu wenwu baohu, kaogu faju, guji xiushan, sanmu qingli deng de tongzhi, 142
The museum staff's Customs inspection records suggest, however, that smuggling was a 
non-issue when considered in the context of the nationwide effort to profit from the export art 
trade.  The focus on maximizing profits from overseas sales is evident both in volume of 
antiquities inspected for export, as well as the consistent expansion in Customs inspection 
personnel.  Indeed, one of the primary purposes of the Shanghai Museum’s antiquarian training 
program was to increase the number of museum employees capable of working at Customs.
414 
By 1962, the Customs inspection team expanded from ten to twenty members, while the 
number of inspectors-on-retainer grew from five to sixteen.
415  Figure 2.6 illustrates how these 
changes impacted the antiquities export trade.
416 
diaocha baogao, wang lai han, [the Cultural Affairs Bureau and the Shanghai Ministry of Culture's 
Correspondence Regarding Its Investigation and Reports on Cultural Relics Protection, Ancient Site 
Restoration, and Tomb Cleanup] January 11
th, 1958 – December 18
th, 1958, B172-4-948, SMA, Shanghai. 
414 The members of the Class of 1952 remained museum employees.  They simply had the additional job 
requirement of working at Shanghai Customs. 
415 For 1950s Customs inspectors see Shanghai shi renmin weiyuan hui pifu youguan wenwu, gumu, baohu guanli, 
chukou jianding banfa deng wenjian, [Shanghai Municipal People's Representative Board's Decisions Regarding 
Cultural Relics, Ancient Tombs' Protection and Management, and Export Appraisal, Etc] January 1958 – 
December 1958, B1-2-1262, SMA, Shanghai; For 1960s Customs inspectors see Shanghai shi renwei, shanghai 
shi wen xuanchuan bu, shanghai shi wenhua ju guanyu xiuding, diaozhen shi wenwu tushu ji tezhong gongyi pin 
chukou jianding weiyuan hui zuzhi zhangchen, weiyuan mindan de baogao, pifu he gongzuo zongjie, [The Shanghai 
People's Representative Bureau, Shanghai People's Representative Bureau's Propaganda Division, Shanghai 
Municipal Cultural Affairs administration's Report, Correspondence and Conclusions Regarding Fixing and 
Restructuring the Municipal Cultural Relics, Books, and Specialized Arts and Crafts Export Appraisal Board's 
Proceedings and Board Members] March 1962 – September 1962, B172-1-417, SMA, Shanghai. 
416 Data for 1950 – 1958 gathered from Wenhua bu, shanghai shi wei xuanchuan bu, shanghai shi wenhua ju guanyu 
jiaqiang wenwu chukou jianding gongzuo he guwan ye guanli de yijian, baogao, pifu ji jianding biaozhun, [The 
Ministry of Culture, Shanghai People's Representative's Propaganda Department, Shanghai Municipal Cultural 
Affairs Administration's Objections, Correspondence, Decisions, and Appraisal Standards for Strengthening 
Cultural Relics Export Appraisal Work and the Management of the Antiquities Industry] February 1960 – 
November 1960, B172-1-364, SMA, Shanghai.  Data for 1959 – 1961 gathered from Shanghai shi renwei, 
shanghai shi wen xuanchuan bu, shanghai shi wenhua ju guanyu xiuding, diaozhen shi wenwu tushu ji tezhong gongyi 
pin chukou jianding weiyuan hui zuzhi zhangchen, weiyuan mindan de baogao, pifu he gongzuo zongjie, [The 
Shanghai People's Representative Bureau, Shanghai People's Representative Bureau's Propaganda Division, 
Shanghai Municipal Cultural Affairs administration's Report, Correspondence and Conclusions Regarding 143
Figure 2.6.  Number of antiquities that Shanghai Museum staff inspected for export between 
1950 and 1961.  SMA, Shanghai. 
The step-wise pattern in Figure 2.6 suggests that nationalization enabled the Shanghai 
Museum staff to appraise more antiquities in 1955, 1956, and 1957, than the staff did between 
1950 and 1954.  The number of inspected antiquities rose higher still after 1958, when the 
museum expanded its Customs inspection team from ten to twenty inspectors.  On average, 
Fixing and Restructuring the Municipal Cultural Relics, Books, and Specialized Arts and Crafts Export 
Appraisal Board's Proceedings and Board Members] March 1962 – September 1962, B172-1-417, SMA, 
Shanghai. 144
between 1950 and 1954 the number of inspected export antiquities per year was 25,718 objects. 
In the years leading up to and following nationalization (1955 - 1957), the number of inspected 
antiquities increased to an average of 52,761 per year.  Then, in the years starting with 1958, the 
appraisal team inspected an average of 72,494 export antiquities per year, increasing its 1955 – 
1957 numbers by thirty-seven percent.  In other words, the Shanghai Museum's inspectors 
enabled the municipal art trade to increase output by an average of 25,000 objects per year, once 
every three or four years.  
Figure 2.6 also suggest that the museum's vigilant smuggler's watch was just for show. 
The minuscule darker bands on the lower regions of each column indicate the number of 
contrabands discovered during Customs inspection.  The remarkable ratio of approvals to 
rejections demonstrate that inspectors did not discover more contraband as a result of 
inspecting more antiquities.  In their first decade on duty, inspectors only marked 3,804 out of 
437,230 artifacts as contraband, or less than 0.8% of all inspections.
417  In short, Customs 
inspectors’ primary role was to enable the export trade to sell more antiquities overseas, which 
increased store revenues, and earned profits for the state.  
In 1960, the municipal Cultural Affairs Administration announced that the Shanghai 
Museum's Customs inspection team “fought for and gained foreign currency, working in 
417 Wenhua bu, shanghai shi wei xuanchuan bu, shanghai shi wenhua ju guanyu jiaqiang wenwu chukou jianding 
gongzuo he guwan ye guanli de yijian, baogao, pifu ji jianding biaozhun, [The Ministry of Culture, Shanghai 
People's Representative's Propaganda Department, Shanghai Municipal Cultural Affairs Administration's 
Objections, Correspondence, Decisions, and Appraisal Standards for Strengthening Cultural Relics Export 
Appraisal Work and the Management of the Antiquities Industry] February 1960 – November 1960, B172-1-
364, SMA, Shanghai.  145
conjunction with the nation's socialist development plans to grow resources.”
418  As Chapter 1 
demonstrated, art dealerships often used their ability to earn foreign currency to underscore 
their value to the state.  By 1960, however, that recognition for earning foreign currency went to 
the Shanghai Museum.  Members of the Class of 1952 took credit for the antiquities trade's own 
profits. 
The Shanghai Museum also sought out specific art dealers, whose skills the museum 
wanted to utilize.  Museum administrators developed an active interest in Ye Shuzhong, the art 
dealer whom the municipality arrested and exiled to Qinghai during nationalization.  Despite Ye's 
tainted personnel record and his association with the condemned Four Vajrapani, museum 
administrators remembered him for the high-quality antiquities he identified and evaluated for 
the museum in the early 1950s.
419  Furthermore, the museum valued Ye's business network: “He 
knew lots of collectors and he made lots of introductions...say he saw something good, say a Qing 
dynasty thing, then he would come to the museum and sell it to you, he takes a cut like a 
commission.”
420  
418 Wenhua bu, shanghai shi wei xuanchuan bu, shanghai shi wenhua ju guanyu jiaqiang wenwu chukou jianding 
gongzuo he guwan ye guanli de yijian, baogao, pifu ji jianding biaozhun, [The Ministry of Culture, Shanghai 
People's Representative's Propaganda Department, Shanghai Municipal Cultural Affairs Administration's 
Objections, Correspondence, Decisions, and Appraisal Standards for Strengthening Cultural Relics Export 
Appraisal Work and the Management of the Antiquities Industry] February 1960 – November 1960, B172-1-
364, SMA, Shanghai. 
419 For more on the Shanghai Museum’s persistent effort to expand its reach into the art market as well as the 
entrepreneurial network of dealers with exceptional art authentication knowledge, see Shanghai shi wenhua ju 
shehui wenhua xitong de bianzhi wenti, [Shanghai Cultural Affairs Bureau's Decisions Regarding the 
Organization of Municipal Cultural Institutions] April 1956 – December 1956, B9-2-56, SMA, Shanghai.  
420 Interview with Xia Shunkui, April 28
th, 2010.146
Between 1960s and 1964, the museum's petitions to get Ye Shuzhong early release got 
approval from officials as powerful as “Fang Xing, the associate director of Administration of 
Cultural Heritage.”
421  In a meeting with the municipal court, 
“Fang Xing brought it up.  He said that Ye Shuzhong, back when he was an art dealer, was a 
major art dealer, and his appraisal skills were especially impressive...Now it had already been so 
many years since Ye Shuzhong had been sent away, and was it possible to get him an early 
release, and have him come back.”
422
This request was highly unusual, especially given Shanghai’s zero tolerance policy on art 
smuggling.  Even museum administrators admitted that “this was not something that normal 
people can do, it has to be a suggestion from high up in the bureaucracy.”
423  Nevertheless, Ye 
Shuzhong's record with the Shanghai Museum convinced municipal officials that the dealer, 
however disreputable, was a strong asset.  His reputation for spotting a good investment rivaled 
that of Xue Guisheng, one of the municipality's most trusted agents in the Chinese Curio 
Markets.  As Jin Jiapin explained, in comparison with Xue Guisheng, “we don't even need to talk 
about it.  Ye Shuzhong had a better eye, and higher status.”
424  
The petition for Ye's early release failed for political reasons.  According to Jin Jiapin, who 
participated in petitioning, “there were a lot of reports flying back and forth...but in the end it 
didn't go through.”
425  In fact, when I questioned other members of the Class of 1952 about the art 
421 Interview with Jin Jiapin, January 13
th, 2010.
422 Interview with Jin Jiapin, January 13
th, 2010.
423 Interview with Jin Jiapin, January 13
th, 2010.
424 Interview with Jin Jiapin, January 13
th, 2010.
425 Interview with Jin Jiapin, January 13
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dealer, they simply said “Oh don't mention the things that [they] did.  They were working on 
political movements at the time, we try not to talk too much about those things.  It was in the 
1960s.  How would we know if all those things are fairly meted out.”
426  The 1950s campaign to 
recast art dealers as profiteers and smugglers had worked too well.  However the museum staff 
wanted Ye Shuzhong, no amount of lobbying could erase the taint that the Class of 1952 
themselves had helped create. 
At face value, the above ministrations sound like bureaucratic wrinkle-smoothing.  Upon 
closer examination, they reflect larger shifts in the Shanghai Museum's role amongst PRC cultural 
industries.  Its regulation of the art market demonstrates the museum’s reach in PRC policy-
making.  By the 1960s, Shanghai Museum staff not only knew which dealers and collectors owned 
what antiquities, they also had the authority to object when individuals sold their antiquities 
privately.  The staff knew what collectors like Wu Hufan owned because it maintained an internal 
reporting system through public services, like hospitals and the Shanghai Police.
427  For example, 
when Wu checked into the hospital in 1963, the museum staff visited, sent condolences, and “sent 
people to ask those who knew Wu about whether he still keeps paintings in Hong Kong”.
428 
426 Interview with Zhu Shuyi, January 15
th, 2010.
427 Li Junjie, “Wu Hufan de shoucang yiwen,” [Anecdotes About Wu Hufan's Collecting] Shanghai Wenbo Luncong 
[Shanghai's Cultural Discussions] no. 2 (2002): 78-81. 
428 Wenhua bu guanyu dianding waibin xiedai wenwu chujing shouxu de yijian ji shanghai shi wen xuanchuan bu, 
shanghai shi wenhua ju guanyu diaozhen wenwu chukou jianding weiyuan mindan, xiuding zhangchen de qingshi, 
pifu, gongzuo zongjie, [The Ministry of Culture's Correspondence, Decisions, and Conclusions Regarding 
Objections to the Procedures for Allowing Foreign Guests to Take Cultural Relics Beyond Our Borders and the 
Shanghai Municipal People's Representative Board Propaganda Division and Shanghai Municipal Cultural 
Affairs Administration's Readjustment of the Cultural Relics Export Appraisal Board's Procedures and Members 
List] March 1962 – September 1962, B172-1-397, SMA, Shanghai.148
Museum staff even questioned Wu’s visitors to “find out from his visiting friends as well as others 
close to us whether Wu has a student named Wang Jiqian in America...he used to sell calligraphy 
and painting, sometimes to foreigners, and inquire whether Wu still maintains contact with 
Wang.”
429
Shanghai Museum staff also regulated the cost of art for both the domestic and export 
markets.  It raised prices on antiquities that sold well and depress prices on antiquities that did 
not.  The staff based these evaluations on their own acquisitions experience, which gave the 
Shanghai Museum a strong reputation for determining value as well as availability.  The 
Department of Cultural Affairs even warned against trusting museum evaluations to a fault. 
“When comrade Xie Zhiliu believes that this is a scroll that belongs to Wu Hufan, other comrades 
don't even think to double check him”.
430  This led to the dangerous assumption, the department 
warned, that “once objects arrive and either Venerable Sir Xu or comrade Xie Zhiliu express their 
opinions then everything is settled.”
431
429 Wenhua bu guanyu dianding waibin xiedai wenwu chujing shouxu de yijian ji shanghai shi wen xuanchuan bu, 
shanghai shi wenhua ju guanyu diaozhen wenwu chukou jianding weiyuan mindan, xiuding zhangchen de qingshi, 
pifu, gongzuo zongjie, [The Ministry of Culture's Correspondence, Decisions, and Conclusions Regarding 
Objections to the Procedures for Allowing Foreign Guests to Take Cultural Relics Beyond Our Borders and the 
Shanghai Municipal People's Representative Board Propaganda Division and Shanghai Municipal Cultural 
Affairs Administration's Readjustment of the Cultural Relics Export Appraisal Board's Procedures and Members 
List] March 1962 – September 1962, B172-1-397, SMA, Shanghai.
430 Shanghai shi wenhua ju, shi wenguan hui guanyu wenwu shougou, jianding gongzuo de qingshi baogao, [Municipal 
Cultural Affairs Administration, Municipal Cultural Relics Management Bureau's Permissions and Reports 
Regarding Antiquities Acquisition and Appraisal Work] January 15
th, 1960 – December 31
st,1960, B172-5-253, 
SMA, Shanghai. 
431 Shanghai shi wenhua ju, shi wenguan hui guanyu wenwu shougou, jianding gongzuo de qingshi baogao, [Municipal 
Cultural Affairs Administration, Municipal Cultural Relics Management Bureau's Permissions and Reports 
Regarding Antiquities Acquisition and Appraisal Work] January 15
th, 1960 – December 31
st,1960, B172-5-253, 
SMA, Shanghai. 149
 Museum-led price evaluations enabled the antiquities trade to enjoy good general health 
in the late 1950s and early 1960s.  Industry financial reports reveal that the danwei made 49% 
profits in the first six months of 1963 alone.
432  Between 1958 and 1962, storefronts not only sold 
60,000RMB worth of reproduction artifacts overseas, but also provided 2,190 exhibition-quality 
antiquities for museums throughout the PRC.
433  
Figure 2.7 illustrates the Shanghai Museum's role in increasing profitability in the 
commercial sector.
434  It shows the museum's adjustment of average prices for the sale of 
exportable, unexportable, and negotiable antiquities in 1962.  As noted in Chapter 1, exportable 
and unexportable are categories that designate whether inventory was sold in China or overseas. 
Negotiable antiquities, on the other hand, occupy a gray-zone in the 1795-demarcation.  Museum 
staff can arbitrate, depending on market needs, whether Customs can export antiquities in the 
negotiable category.  This category includes antiquities that bear no date of creation, or whose 
date of creation crosses the 1795 demarcation, such an undated painting made by an artist who 
432 Shangye bu, shanghai shi diyi shangye ju deng guanyu jiuhuo jishou zhengshui dingjia banfa shanghai shi guwan 
hangye jinyin guanli de baogao ji xiezhu waili muoshou wuzi de tongzhi, [The Ministry of Commerce, Shanghai 
First Municipal Trade Bureau and Others Regarding How to Set Prices for the Sale of used Goods by Delivery 
and the Shanghai Municipal Antiquities Industry's Operations Management's Report and Notification 
Regarding the Disposal of Confiscated Possessions] January 1963, B123-5-1444, SMA, Shanghai. 
433 Shangye bu, shanghai shi diyi shangye ju deng guanyu jiuhuo jishou zhengshui dingjia banfa shanghai shi guwan 
hangye jinyin guanli de baogao ji xiezhu waili muoshou wuzi de tongzhi, [The Ministry of Commerce, Shanghai 
First Municipal Trade Bureau and Others Regarding How to Set Prices for the Sale of used Goods by Delivery 
and the Shanghai Municipal Antiquities Industry's Operations Management's Report and Notification 
Regarding the Disposal of Confiscated Possessions] January 1963, B123-5-1444, SMA, Shanghai. 
434 Data retrieved from Shangye bu, shanghai shi diyi shanghye ju deng guanyu guwan, jiuhuo gouxiao jiage ji jiaqian, 
gaijin heng qingbaodao gongzuo de tongzhi, baogao, [The Ministry of Commerce, Shanghai First Trade Bureau, 
Etc's Report and Notifications Regarding Antiquities, Second Hand Goods' Sales Prices and Strengthening, 
Improving Industry Information Work] July 1962, B123-5-1102, SMA, Shanghai. 150
died in 1796.  
Figure 2.7.  The Shanghai Museum's price adjustments for on-site purchasing and retailing in 
the Shanghai art market.  SMA, Shanghai. 
The chart entitled Purchase Price Adjustments, 1962 examines how much Shanghai 
collectors received from selling to the nationalized antiquities industry.  1962 is not the only year 
in which the Shanghai Museum adjusted prices in the art market, but the data is representative 
of how market intervention worked throughout the late 1950s and early 1960s.  The chart shows 
that individuals received an average of forty-seven percent more RMB for selling exportable 
antiquities, twenty-eight percent for unexportable antiquities, and nine percent for selling 
negotiable antiquities than they did in the previous year.  The differences between categories 
suggest that the booming overseas trade raised offers on exportable goods.  Domestic sales were 
also robust, which explains why prices rose in the unexportable category as well.  Negotiable 151
antiquities, which required extended bureaucratic investment in order to clear inspections, bore 
the least change in price.  
The chart entitled Retail Price Adjustments, 1962 examines what the antiquities trade 
charged customers for buying antiquities.  Overall, buyers saw more dramatic changes than 
sellers.  Average retail prices for exportable antiquities rose 100% in comparison to the previous 
year.  Unexportable antiquities rose ninety-six percent, while negotiable antiquities rose twenty-
nine percent.  While the differences between categories vary dramatically, the hierarchy of 
change between exportable, unexportable, and negotiable antiquities remained the same.  
Overseas demand accounts for some of price increases.  Export opportunities were so 
lucrative that some dealerships set up a partitioned area where “local residents could not 
enter...catering to the special needs of foreign guests”.
435  The partition allowed dealers to “easily 
and quickly change” prices in order to “win more foreign currency”.
436  This policy irked many 
foreign buyers, who found price differences between stores, and sometimes between 
transactions.  Some “extremely unsatisfied foreign merchants” complained vociferously.
437  “I've 
435 Shanghai shi diyi shangye ju, shanghai shi zonghe maoyi gongsi, fengxian shangye ju guanyu zhubao peipin, guwan, 
jiuhuo jiage wenti baogao yijian, [The Shanghai First Municipal Commission of Commerce, Shanghai 
Comprehensive Trade Company, and Fengxian Commercial Bureau's Report and Discussions Regarding the 
Problem of Prices for Jewelry, Accessories, Antiquities, and Second-Hand Goods] 1965, B123-6-865, SMA, 
Shanghai. 
436 Shanghai shi diyi shangye ju, shanghai shi zonghe maoyi gongsi, fengxian shangye ju guanyu zhubao peipin, guwan, 
jiuhuo jiage wenti baogao yijian, [The Shanghai First Municipal Commission of Commerce, Shanghai 
Comprehensive Trade Company, and Fengxian Commercial Bureau's Report and Discussions Regarding the 
Problem of Prices for Jewelry, Accessories, Antiquities, and Second-Hand Goods] 1965, B123-6-865, SMA, 
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437 Shanghai shi diyi shangye ju, shanghai shi zonghe maoyi gongsi, fengxian shangye ju guanyu zhubao peipin, guwan, 
jiuhuo jiage wenti baogao yijian, [The Shanghai First Municipal Commission of Commerce, Shanghai 
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already paid the money I'm supposed to pay, why do I have to pay additional amounts, I don't 
know what kind of trade policy you're running.”
438  Nevertheless, the foreigner's section worked 
wonders.  Between 1964 and 1965, Shanghai's antiquities industry raised export prices by an 
additional fifty to 200 percent and “increased the price of some rare, extremely fine curios by 
more than a dozen times”.
439  In the first four months of 1965 alone, the danwei made 147,000 
RMB in foreign currency, an increase of sixty-nine percent from the previous year.
440 
Domestic collecting also kept the market strong.  The Shanghai Museum staff calibrated 
prices in specific categories of art according to regional interests.  The Ministry of Commerce 
noted that painting prices rose in 1962 because “within the country those who love it are many, 
and their purchase power is strong”.
441  The museum reduced prices for embroideries, coins, and 
Problem of Prices for Jewelry, Accessories, Antiquities, and Second-Hand Goods] 1965, B123-6-865, SMA, 
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440 Shanghai shi diyi shangye ju, shanghai shi zonghe maoyi gongsi, fengxian shangye ju guanyu zhubao peipin, guwan, 
jiuhuo jiage wenti baogao yijian, [The Shanghai First Municipal Commission of Commerce, Shanghai 
Comprehensive Trade Company, and Fengxian Commercial Bureau's Report and Discussions Regarding the 
Problem of Prices for Jewelry, Accessories, Antiquities, and Second-Hand Goods] 1965, B123-6-865, SMA, 
Shanghai. 
441 Shanghye bu, shanghai shi diyi shanghye ju deng guanyu guwan, jiuhuo gouxiao jiage ji jiaqian, gaijin heng 
qingbaodao gongzuo de tongzhi, baogao, [The Ministry of Commerce, Shanghai First Trade Bureau, Etc's Report 
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jade because “internal sales are not good” and “there are too many extant examples in folk 
collections already.”
442  Although profit margins were lower in the 1960s than they are after 
1978, the robust domestic sales figures show that domestic collectors remained active.  Both the 
Shanghai Museum and the municipality firmly believed that Chinese collectors had the 
spending power.  When I pressed Chen Peifen for how Shanghai maintained its domestic market 
throughout the Great Leap Forward she replied that in Shanghai “the water is deep, there's 
always people with money.”
443  After some thought, she added: “some people are like that, they 
just can't possibly spend all the money that they have.”
444
Ethnic Minority Art
The Shanghai Museum not only regulated prices amongst Chinese art collectors, it also 
regulated the categories of art that collectors would acquire.  This is best illustrated in the 
museum’s interest in ethnic minority artifacts, which the staff began to acquire in the late 1950s.
445 
This project coincided with the PRC's larger campaign to portray its fifty-five minority peoples as 
442 Shanghye bu, shanghai shi diyi shanghye ju deng guanyu guwan, jiuhuo gouxiao jiage ji jiaqian, gaijin heng 
qingbaodao gongzuo de tongzhi, baogao, [The Ministry of Commerce, Shanghai First Trade Bureau, Etc's Report 
and Notifications Regarding Antiquities, Second Hand Goods' Sales Prices and Strengthening, Improving 
Industry Information Work] July 1962, B123-5-1102, SMA, Shanghai. 
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444 Interview with Chen Peifen, April 6
th, 2010.
445 The history of this collection predates that which the existing literature has focused on, which place the PRC's 
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Chinese, a movement in which many cultural institutions participated.
446  In 1959, for example, 
the Shanghai Museum opened an exhibit using minority artifacts that it requisitioned from the 
Royal Asiatic Society and Aurora University Museums (former British and French institutions in 
Shanghai).  The exhibit, entitled Fraternal Peoples' Arts and Crafts, proclaimed that “the 
Northeast and Tibet are indivisible parts of our nation”.
447  Museum guides told visitors that non-
Chinese institutions, like the Royal Asiatic Society and Aurora University, were to blame for 
casting ethnic minority peoples as foreign.  They called the “American, British, and other 
imperialist powers...twisted and shameless” for “dividing the Northeast, Tibet, and other regions 
from our national map, and claiming that Northeasterners and Tibetans are not Chinese.”
448   
As the museum staff proceeded with the exhibition, they found that ethnic minority 
artifacts were becoming collectables on the international Chinese art market.  Chen Peifen 
explained that this growing trend prompted the museum to start an aggressive acquisitions 
campaign.  “At the time we knew that there were lots of foreigners who were coming to buy ethnic 
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2011); 
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minority relics, and if we didn't buy it up then, we would have nothing left to collect.”
449  
The museum started collecting close to home.  Fudan Univesrity had a collection of 
Gaoshan artifacts (a Taiwanese minority) which the Class of 1952 petitioned for requisition.  The 
petition asserted that the artifacts reinforced “existing museum exhibitions, they also illustrate the 
intimate relations between the Han and their fraternal peoples”.
450  The Conservation Workshop 
also played a role.  As the petition went on to argue, “Fudan University's preservation facilities are 
not ideal”, while the museum had resources to resolve “serious worm infestations” in the 
university's collection of bamboo and wood sculptures.
451  This requisition was successful.  By 
December of 1960, Fudan University agreed to transfer its Gaoshan artifacts, which included 
sculptures as well as clothing, to the Shanghai Museum’s custody.
452 
An international scandal soon prompted the museum to do far more than submit 
petitions.  In 1959, a Swedish dealer named Naseem Nelson had bought 28,200 USD worth of 
antiquities, including bronze and wooden Buddhas, bronze relics, and carpets, from the Beijing 
Special Arts and Crafts Company and exported them back to Sweden.
453  Soon, the PRC's 
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Ministry of Culture noticed that Swedish newspapers were advertising that “Sweden is the first 
foreign country to receive permission to buy and sell antiquities from China”.
454  The 
advertisements claimed that the relics “came from Tibet as well as newly excavated Ming dynasty 
tombs in the Beijing hinterlands.”
455  Furthermore, the newspapers published readers' response 
letters asserting that “the Swedish used relics that the Chinese state stole from Tibetan 
monasteries to help the PRC gain profit”.
456  The ministry reeled.  The scandal seemed to fly in 
the face of ongoing efforts to incorporate Tibet and other ethnic minority regions into greater 
China. 
The scandal prompted the Ministry of Culture to declare ethnic minority artifacts an 
integral aspect of the national essence.
457  Customs  inspectors decreed that all ethnic minority 
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artifacts that predate 1949 were no longer eligible for export – in other words, those artifacts now 
had their own category in the Chinese art historical canon.
458  At the same time, the Shanghai 
Museum staff inaugurated an ambitious plan to acquire artifacts from those Chinese provinces 
with rich concentrations of ethnic minorities.  
Museum administrators assigned Ma Chenyuan and Li Rongnie, two experienced staff 
members, to go to the North and Southwestern provinces and “acquire [previously 
undiscovered] minority peoples' artifacts as well as investigate kiln sites.”
459  The expedition 
proved extraordinarily trying.  Ma and Li “could not communicate with minority-peoples” 
because they did not speak the local dialects.
460  They traveled without public “transportation so 
we walked for days to reach our location”, often “crossing mountains and not eating for an entire 
day”.
461  The local grain, hulless barley, gave Ma excruciating indigestion.  Li soon  fell sick with “a 
fever of 41C and...was hospitalized”.
462  Nevertheless, the two men persisted.  Even with his fever, 
458 Wenhua bu, shanghai shi wei xuanchuan bu, shanghai shi wenhua ju guanyu jiaqiang wenwu chukou jianding 
gongzuo he guwan ye guanli de yijian, baogao, pifu ji jianding biaozhun, [The Ministry of Culture, Shanghai 
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Appraisal Work and the Management of the Antiquities Industry] February 1960 – November 1960, B172-1-
364, SMA, Shanghai.  
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Li insisted on crossing the “thousand-meter sands of the Great Mongolian Desert” to get yet more 
antiquities.
463  
The expedition finally made headway when Ma and Li linked up with “local divisions and 
party representatives”, who used their regional networks to help the two locate, identify, and 
acquire artifacts from ethnic minority enclaves with known repositories of objects.
464  With the 
help of these local cultural institutions and cadres, Ma and Li successfully purchased family 
heirlooms, including “jewelry, everyday utilitarian objects, musical instruments, and carpets”, as 
well as hand-made objects such as “embroideries, wax-dyed cloth, ornaments”, and ritualistic 
relics.
465  Within the year, the Shanghai Museum gained “1,108 artifacts from 35 of our fraternal 
minority peoples.”
466  In fact, the majority of objects in the museum's Minority Artifacts Gallery 
today come from acquisitions made during Ma and Li's expedition.
467  
By 1961 the Shanghai Museum had the mainland's biggest institutional collection of 
ethnic minority artifacts, but struggled to assess this collection’s value.  In fact, the staff were 
scared of the artifacts.  Chen Peifen, who unpacked the packages that Ma and Li sent back, said 
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“when I took those things out of the box, cringe!  Oh!  But you couldn't get rid of it.”
468  She 
recalled one instance when “there was something with hair on it, when I reached my hand into the 
box to get it, I just started screaming.”
469  These objects had little in common with the bronzes, 
ceramics, and paintings that the Class of 1952 had learned to appraise in antiquarian training.  
The Chinese art historical canon simply had no criteria for evaluating ethnic minority 
artifacts.  In fact, junior employees thought the objects were cast-offs.  Low acquisition prices 
seemed to support that stance – “it was easy to buy, those minorities didn't want to bother with all 
of their relics either.”
470  Thus, gallery scripts from the 1960s do not define ethnic minority 
artifacts as an example of Chinese creativity.  Neither did the artifacts appear in the main 
exhibition galleries, which ostensibly “focus on the excellent artistic creations that Chinese people 
produced.”
471  In fact, the museum did not put any artifacts on permanent display until 1996, 
when the generation of individuals who had acquired and cataloged the objects had already 
retired.  
The Class of 1952 feared that prolonged exposure to ethnic minority artifacts, as well as 
the borderlands that produced them, turned urbanized Han Chinese into savages.  After all, the 
minority peoples “had all these skull caps, they made a bowl out of skull caps...those people living 
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in Tibet were cruel.”
472  Ma and Li's return only confirmed the Class of 1952's fears.  The two 
“looked like wild men.”
473  They were unkempt.  “Their pants were all torn.”
474  Neither bothered 
to send their pants out for mending.  Instead, Ma and Li “said they would buy a handkerchief to 
mend it”, a recourse that urbanized Shanghainese believed only the very impoverished would 
choose.
475  Their colleagues thought these poor sartorial choices were the impact of Ma and Li's 
exposure to the uncivilized, rural provinces.  Indeed, museum administrators worried that their 
own staff were transforming into people as savage as the ethnic minorities that they created 
exhibits about.   
Despite the aesthetic difficulties, the state's interest in demonstrating that “our myriad 
peoples have long shared the same sensibilities” pushed the Shanghai Museum to integrate 
ethnic minority artifacts into their story of art.
476  The staff were told to double acquisition 
efforts because “at present our work is not complete, we cannot acquire every minority people's 
arts and crafts without gaps, we must keep replenishing our collection going forward.”
477 
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Museum administrators touted exemplary acquisition efforts.  During his hospital stay, Li asked 
about possible acquisition hotspots from “fellow patients who were minority-peoples”.
478  The 
Shanghai Museum praised Li as an example of employees who “think only of how to acquire a 
bit more artifacts”.
479  These gestures formed part of a growing trend, amongst museums across 
the PRC, to frame ethnic minority artifacts as categories of art that always belonged to the 
Chinese art historical tradition.
480  
The acquisition of ethnic minority artifacts demonstrates far more than canonical 
mutability.  It suggests that while the emphasis on Chinese national unity comes from state 
directives, the identification and evaluation of artifacts pertaining to Chinese cultural heritage is a 
more complicated phenomenon, co-produced by domestic as well as overseas influences.
481  The 
interest in cataloging, studying, and displaying ethnic minority artifacts, some of whose value have 
still yet to be determined by the art historical establishment, came from regional museums as well 
as traders in faraway countries like Sweden.
482  Therefore, like the Chinese art historical canon, 
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the establishment of Chinese cultural heritage, though often shaped by PRC directives, is also a 
co-produced phenomenon that derives meaning from on-going negotiations with regional, 
national, and international constituents. 
 A National Institution 
For the most part, PRC cultural institutions kowtowed to the demand of those in the 
state capital.  Shanghai's role in art canonization and art market regularization, however, soon 
enabled it to push back when Beijing's museums came elbowing into its territory.  The conflicts 
revealed themselves most explicitly during the nationwide project to requisition artifacts for two 
new cultural institutions in Beijing: the Museum of the Chinese Revolution and the Chinese 
History Museum.  The planning committees sent Shanghai an order for 358 objects, including 
signature bronzes such as the Dayu ding and Dake ding.
483  The requisition threatened to 
transfer some of the museum's finest antiquities to Beijing, including antiquities dating to the 
Shang, Zhou, and Tang dynasties.  
The Shanghai Museum staff refuse to cooperate.  They sent a letter to the Department 
of Cultural Affairs, not only rejecting Beijing's request but also reprimanding the capital for 
putting them in a difficult position.
484  The staff took offense at Beijing's attitude.  As Huang 
the Rise of Modern Chinese National Identity in the Early Twentieth Century,” Modern China, 32, no. 1 
(2006): 3-30.
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Xuanpei explained, “If you take everything nice from all over the country, then what's the point 
of having regional museums?  Why don't people just go to Beijing to see everything?”
485 
Shanghai refused to open its storerooms.  Chen Peifen recounted that “They said, we want to go 
into your storehouse and look by themselves...well what should we do, just close up the 
museum?  We said you can't just go in there and mess everything up.”
486  Museum 
administrators took a firm stand.  Beijing should “acquire and transfer antiquities from the 
National Palace Museum in Beijing, not transfer things from Shanghai”.
487    
The Shanghai Museum specifically objected to Beijing's interest in the Dayu and Dake 
dings.  The staff regularly used Pan Dayu's donation of both bronzes as an exemplar story in 
donor recruitment.  If Beijing removed the two relics, then Shanghai's donation rhetoric would 
suffer.  
We often conceive of donations as an exchange between the museum, potential donors, 
and the general public.  In its negotiations with the Ministry of Culture, however, the Shanghai 
Museum turned the language of donation against other museums.  Museum staff argued that 
their collection represented “part of a personal relations network”, a strong regional foundation 
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for philanthropy that might breakdown if state expropriation occurred.
488  In particular, Ma 
Chenyuan told Beijing that “this object, the old donor gave it to us, we have to go and ask her 
what she thinks about the requisition, otherwise she would think that we were just giving away 
her things.”
489  in other words, as the authors of its operative fiction, the Shanghai Museum 
retained unmitigated rights to designate the terms of any bequest.  Beijing could not simply 
transfer Shanghai's relics to museums where its donors had no personal affiliation. 
The Shanghai Museum's official donation documentation explicitly state that donors 
gave their antiquities to guojia, or the nation as a whole.  When I point out the documentation’s 
lack of regional distinctions, however, my interviewees point out that institutional competition 
still mattered.  Beijing had no right to expropriate Shanghai's property but “Beijing was greedy – 
they knew that they would not have many opportunities to take those items, so they just asked 
for a lot.”
490  Hardly an institution to suffer such affronts passively, the Shanghai Museum 
asserted that if Beijing wanted its antiquities, then it had to give explicit reasons why it couldn't 
find the same category of objects in the capital, and it had to pay the Shanghai Museum for all 
requisitions. 
After much back and forth, including face-to-face meetings between museum 
administrators as well as ministry officials, the two cities reached a compromise.  The Ministry of 
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Culture sent the Shanghai Museum an official letter of apology stating that “our ministry has 
criticized the History Museum” for “causing difficulties for Shanghai's Museum and Cultural 
Relics Management Bureau.”
491  Beijing museum administrators also hand wrote a letter of 
apology, stating that “so long as other provinces and cities can take care of our needs, we will not 
appropriate unnecessarily from Shanghai”.
492  The ministry reduced the size of Beijing's request 
from 358 objects to 142 objects, paid the Shanghai Museum 2,132.68RMB, and provided 
Shanghai with a replica of the Dayu ding for as long as Beijing held the original on display.
493  A 
compromise of this magnitude: Specifically, a sixty percent reduction in expropriation, payments, 
as well as a promise to replace and return requisitions, was unprecedented.  Even museums that 
shared the Palace Museum title, such as that in Shenyang, had to relinquish antiquities to Beijing 
upon request.  The special treatment that Shanghai received from the Ministry of Culture 
underscored its status amongst the nation's cultural institutions, as well as its power dynamic with 
central administration. 
Conclusion
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The Shanghai Museum's standing on the international museum circuit could only be 
“recognized” in the 1980s, when a more transparent cross-flow of artifacts, exhibitions, and 
personnel began to take place between Shanghai and museums in North America, Europe, and 
Japan.  Not until the 1990s would funding from these regions become fully visible in the 
Shanghai Museum budget.  Moreover, it took a more dramatic state transition – the rise of Deng 
Xiaoping and his associated economic policies in the years after 1978, to make the PRC's stake 
in Chinese cultural heritage more explicit.  In the 70s and 80s, the most significant indicators of 
international interest in China's “cultural inheritance” were the expansion of overseas Chinese 
art museums.  Institutions such as the Nelson-Atkins Museum in Kansas City, the Cleveland 
Museum of Art in Ohio, the Asian Art Museum of San Francisco, the Sir Percival David 
Foundation of Chinese Art in London, and the Tokyo National Museum in the Ueno Park 
complex in Japan became major cultural destinations for both domestic and international 
visitors.
494  The growing sophistication of Chinese art collections abroad made the PRC's 
privileging of Chinese cultural heritage visible, and ultimately indispensable.  
Even so, the museum's indispensability to Chinese cultural heritage required new 
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Ueno, Tokyo,” Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians, 63, no. 4 (2004): 472-497; Jennifer Barrett, 
Museums and the Public Sphere, (Malden, 2011); Hyung Il Pai, “Romancing the Ruins of Imperial Antiquity: 
Travel Myths, Memories, and the Marketing of Heritage Destinations in Korea,”  Imperial Exposure: Early 
Photography and Royal Portraits across Asia, Conference held December 5
th, - 6
th, 2011, Freer Gallery of Art.167
strategies for promulgation and evaluation.  By the 1960s, the concept of “cultural inheritance” 
had already transformed individual collecting whims, such as specific types of bronze relics and 
ethnic minority artifacts, to fully elaborated categories of art in the Chinese art historical canon. 
Furthermore, the Shanghai Museum's regulatory role in the art market marked the institution as 
a key player in both the commercial and non-profit aspects of cultural heritage creation.  But 
even these transitions demanded new professional capacities.  Would the Class of 1952 replace 
the senior staff to become fully elaborated Red antiquarians?  Or would their newly acquired 
skills and responsibilities taint these young people with elite preoccupations that flew in the face 
of the greater Socialist project?  Or perhaps, as some suggested, cultural institutions' apparent 
rise was simply a remnant of capitalist interests that lingered in the PRC, and an artifact of the 
Chinese art trade’s reaction to bright financial forecasts.  168
Chapter Three: Raid and Sort: the Shanghai Museum in 
the Cultural Revolution, 1966 – 1969169
Warning Shot
In the Spring of 1966 a delegation of officials walked up to the third floor of Duoyun 
Xian, a Shanghai work unit that sold Chinese antiquities.
495  Sun Jiecong, the store's Director, 
greeted them at reception.  She didn't know who the men were.  People who liked antiquities 
often came to look around and “if anyone came, then I received them, whatever they wanted to 
see I would show them.”
496  These men, however, asked for something unusual.  They wanted a 
list of the individuals who bought art at the store.
497  Looking back, Sun realized that the men 
“wanted that information to use against older officials.  People like Wang Yiping...because they 
would come and look at stuff...they bought things.”
498  She gave the men Duoyun Xian's guest-
book and they left.  Within a few months, Sun heard that Wang Yiping (1914 – 2007) got 
attacked during a Cultural Revolution rally in Beijing.  The former Shanghai Museum President 
spent the next five years in reeducation and hard labor.
499 
Li Junjie, a junior employee who joined the Shanghai Museum in 1952, remembers “it 
was in June and July of 1966 when [Cultural Revolution campaigns] started” in Shanghai.
500 
495 A danwei, sometimes translated as work unit, is both the name given to a place of employment and the principle 
instrument in implementing party policy in the PRC.   
496 Interview with Sun Jiecong, December 20
th, 2009.
497 Interview with Sun Jiecong, December 20
th, 2009.
498 Interview with Sun Jiecong, December 20
th, 2009.
499 For more on Wang Yiping's political career in Shanghai see Shanghai Gazetteer online, Zhuan ye zhi, Di Liujie 
weiyuan hui zhuren, [Section Six Heads Of Board], Available 
<http://www.shtong.gov.cn/node2/node2245/node72907/node72917/node72962/node72967/userobject1
ai86003.html> [11 June, 2011].
500 Interview with Li Junjie, June 29
th, 2009.170
Students who called themselves the Red Guards rallied throughout the city, gathering volunteers 
to break down the Four Olds: Old thoughts, Old culture, Old traditions, and Old habits.
501 
They called it the Four Olds campaign (1966 – 1968).  The students' destructive momentum 
escalated as more and more volunteers joined up, demonstrating in the streets and focusing the 
brunt of their violence on Huangpu district – downtown Shanghai.  All the shopkeepers on 
Nanjing Road watched as “Red Guards were going on the street, going into people's houses and 
threatening to burn things down.”
502  Many feared that Red Guards would “treat the museum as 
part of the Four Olds [as well], especially the religious objects.”
503  All cultural institutions in the 
municipality immediately put sentries at their doors.
504  Despite the precaution, Shanghai 
Museum employees who “saw them smashing up the signboards in stores” wondered what 
anyone could do if Red Guards “brought their hammers and knocked up the exhibitions” in the 
museum gallery.
505        
This chapter demonstrates that Chinese cultural institutions did far more than shut 
down and scatter in the first four years of the Cultural Revolution.
506  From behind closed doors, 
501 For a brief chronology of the Cultural Revolution see Alain Badiou, “The Cultural Revolution: The Last 
Revolution?” Positions: East Asia Cultures Critique 13, no. 3, (2005): 502 – 515.  For a summary of 
historiography since the 1970s see Jonathan Unger, “The Cultural Revolution at the Grass Roots,” The China 
Journal, no. 57 (2007): 109-137;  For a Shanghai-specific portrayals see Yomi Braester, “'A Big Dying Vat': The 
Vilifying of Shanghai during the Good Eighth Company Campaign,” Modern China, 31, no. 4 (2005): 411-447.
502 Interview with Li Junjie, April 27
th, 2010.
503 Interview with Li Junjie, June 29
th, 2009.
504 Shanghai gazetteers online, Shanghai wenwu gowuguan zhi,  Dashi ji [Annales] Available 
<http://www.shtong.gov.cn/node2/node2245/node4467/node20331/index.html> [February 2011]
505 Interview with Zhong Yinlan, July 10
th, 2009.
506 The generalization that all cultural institutions shut down during the Cultural Revolution arose from political 
and economic updates written by former China-hands during the 1960s and has perpetuated through 
subsequent studies focusing on the PRC's education and religious sectors.  For examples see Foreign Expert, 171
Shanghai's museums and libraries leveraged Cultural Revolution campaigns to the benefit of 
both institutional collecting and art market sales.  Museum employees actively participated in 
the nationwide seizure and confiscation of art.  They appropriated some objects based on 
museological concerns such as preservation and canonization, and seized others for the purpose 
of earning foreign currency on international art market.
507  I argue that these activities enabled 
the Shanghai Museum to profited enormously.
508  Participating in Cultural Revolution 
campaigns gave museum employees unprecedented access to both elite and ordinary art 
collections, as well as the ability to convert seized assets into sources of public wealth.  
I further argue that Cultural Revolution campaigns expanded antiquarians' social capital 
“Eyewitness of the Cultural Revolution”, The China Quarterly, no. 28 (1966): 1-7; Melvin Gurtov, “The Foreign 
Ministry and Foreign Affairs During the Cultural Revolution,” The China Quarterly, no. 40 (1969): 65-102; 
Sarah Strong and John Strong, “A Post-Cultural Revolution Look at Buddhism,” The China Quarterly, no. 54 
(1973): 321-330; Robert S. Wang, “Educational Reforms and the Cultural Revolution: The Chinese Evaluation 
Process,” Asian Survey, 15, no. 9 (1975): 758-774; Daniel S. P. Yang, “Theatre in Post Cultural Revolution 
China: A Report Based on Field Research in the Fall and Winter of 1981,” Asian Theatre Journal, 1, no. 1 
(1984): 90-103; Thomas B. Gold, “After Comradeship: Personal Relations in China Since the Cultural 
Revolution,” The China Quarterly, no. 104 (1985): 657-675.
For more recent interpretations that seek to revise the above views given recent access to archives, see Lu 
Xiuyuan, “A Step Toward Understanding Popular Violence in China's Cultural Revolution,” Pacific Affairs, 67, 
no. 4 (1994-1995): 533-563; Jonathan Unger, “Cultural Revolution Conflict in the Villages,” The China 
Quarterly, no. 153 (1998): 82-106; Dahpon Ho, “To Protect And Preserve: Resisting The 'Destroy The Four 
Olds' Campaign, 1966 – 1967,” in Joseph Esherick, Paul Pickowicz, and Andrew Walder, eds., The Chinese 
Cultural Revolution As History (Stanford, 2006): 64 – 95; Denise Ho, “The Ideology of Cultural Things: 
Shanghai in the Cultural Revolution,” The China Quarterly (forthcoming).
507 I address the commodification of confiscated property in the international art market in detail in Chapter 4.
508 My findings resonate with that of scholars who study how informal power structures benefited from the 
Cultural Revolution.  For examples see Nan Lin and Wen Xie, “Occupational Prestige in Urban China,” 
American Journal of Sociology, 93, no. 4 (1988): 793-832; Joel Andreas, “The Structure of Charismatic 
Mobilization: A Case Study of Rebellion During the Chinese Cultural Revolution,” American Sociological 
Review, 72, no. 3 (2007): 434-458. 172
and political reach.
509  Their ability to identify, evaluate, and authenticate antiquities made the 
museum's antiquarians pivotal to executing the Four Olds campaign as well as subsequent 
movements, such as raids and the creation of Shanghai's Cultural Relics Sorting Committee. 
While some argue that cultural institutions buffered the PRC's ancient relics from the worst of 
the Cultural Revolution, Shanghai Museum employees' work throughout the 1960s show that 
converting seized property into public assets was the institutions' true legacy.
Lockdown
Stores on Nanjing road went into immediate lockdown in the summer of 1966.
510  Sun 
Jiecong and her colleagues shut Duoyun Xian's reception.  “Our iron gates were closed so other 
people can't come in.”
511  Duoyun Xian stayed like that for months.  Employees could still enter 
509 Since the late 1960s, scholars working on the Red VS Expert paradigm have warned that the Cultural 
Revolution's ideological (Red) focus will erode the infrastructural and economic achievements that skilled 
individuals (Expert) have established in the PRC.  For the erosion thesis see Dennis Ray, “'Red and Expert' and 
China's Cultural Revolution,” Pacific Affairs, 43, no. 1 (1970): 22-33; Paul J. Hiniker, “The Cultural Revolution 
Revisited: Dissonance Reduction or Power Maximization,” The China Quarterly, no. 94 (1983): 282-303; 
Sharon Chien Lin, “Education for Librarianship in China After the Cultural Revolution,” Journal of Education 
for Librarianship, 24, no. 1 (1983):17-29; David Lewis Feldman, “Ideology and the Manipulation of Symbols: 
Leadership Perceptions of Science, Education, and Art in the People's Republic of China, 1961-1974,” Political 
Psychology, 6, no. 3 (1985): 441-460.
In recent years, opportunities to conduct oral historical interviews in the PRC have confirmed that the Cultural 
Revolution benefited professionalization amongst select sectors of expertise.  For examples see Ji Feng Yuan, 
Koenraad Kuiper, Shu Shaogu, “Language and Revolution: Formulae of the Cultural Revolution,” Language in 
Society, 19, no. 1 (1990): 61-79; Joel Andreas, “Battling over Political and Cultural Power During the Chinese 
Cultural Revolution,” Theory and Society, 31, no. 4 (2002): 463-519.
510 For more on systematic shutdowns in 1966 see Sharon Chien Lin, “Historical Development of Library 
Education in China,” The Journal of Library History, 20, no. 4 (1985): 368-386; Richard D. Ellis, “Trade Union 
Libraries in the People's Republic of China,” The Library Quarterly, 69, no. 4 (1999): 446-475; Alan P. L. Liu, 
“Rebirth and Secularization of the Central Party School in China,” The China Journal, no. 62 (2009): 105-125.
511 Interview with Sun Jiecong, December 20
th, 2009.173
from the backdoor and Sun reported to work every day, but there wasn't much to do.
512  Some 
stopped going to work altogether.  Left on her own, Sun sat in front of the store's in-house 
television set with some knitting.  The stations “broadcast all the struggles, the criticism 
sessions...I watched the stations and I knitted.”
513  Whenever strangers demanded entry Sun and 
her colleagues refused, stating “we're not letting strangers come in and sweep, we'll do our own 
sweeping of the Four Olds...we'll set up our own Red Guards.”
514  
Other antiquities dealerships coped by transferring their inventory elsewhere.  “The 
Cultural Revolution said the Chinese Curio Markets' stock is the Four Olds,” an accusation that 
no work unit could afford.
515    Once the word spread, “no one came to buy, and the whole 
business became one that had to be criticized and taken down.”
516  The storefronts transferred 
all existing stock to the China National Arts & Crafts Import & Export Corporation (henceforth 
Arts and Crafts Company), a new work unit that the state department set up in the same year. 
Personnel transfers occurred as well, largely as a matter of necessity.  “The people at the Chinese 
Curio Markets had no work to do, so they went over [to the Arts and Crafts Company] to see if 
512 Interview with Sun Jiecong, December 20
th, 2009.
513 Interview with Sun Jiecong, December 20
th, 2009.
514 Interview with Sun Jiecong, December 20
th, 2009.  For more general studies of Red Guards activities between 
1966 and 1969, see Tsang Chiu-Sam, “The Red Guards and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution,” 
Comparative Education, 3, no. 3 (1967): 195-205; Juliana Pennington Heaslet, “The Red Guards: Instruments 
of Destruction in the Cultural Revolution,” Asian Survey, 12, no. 12, (1972): 1032-1047; Anita Chan, Children 
of Mao: Personality Development and Political Activism in the Red Guard Generation, (Seattle, 1985);  Michael 
Schoenhals, “Review: Unofficial and Official Histories of the Cultural Revolution--A Review Article,” The 
Journal of Asian Studies, 48, no. 3 (1989): 563-572; Andrew G. Walder, Fractured Rebellion: The Beijing Red 
Guard Movement, (Cambridge, 2009); Joel Andreas, Rise of the Red Engineers: The Cultural Revolution and the 
Origin of China’s New Class, (Stanford, 2009); 
515 Interview with Xia Shunkui, April 28
th, 2010.
516 Interview with Xia Shunkui, April 28
th, 2010.174
they can make a living.”
517  By the end of 1966, everything that belonged to the Chinese Curio 
Markets became Arts and Crafts Company property.  The Arts and Crafts Company became an 
umbrella corporation with authority over all antiquities work units in the PRC.  “Even the 
[markets'] real estate belonged to them.”
518
The Shanghai Museum staff started getting nervous in July.  Red Guards clamored to 
inspect museum exhibitions and a rumor threatened that “there might be people who would 
rush the galleries”.
519  Some employees hoped that Red Guards would listen to reason.  Others, 
however, argued that “we couldn't open the doors by a hair, because if they came in then they 
would 'bam'!  Knock everything out.  That would be the worst.”
520  As conflicting anxieties 
played out inside the museum, the staff could hear Red Guards demonstrating out front.  The 
museum staff quickly agreed “we couldn't mess around with that...that was when the museum 
knew, we gotta close the doors, they're definitely coming.”
521  
The staff installed a two-pronged security plan.  First, administrators like Jin Jiapin and 
Zhang Ming sealed the entrance.   Jin Jiapin stood at the front gate and talked to all outsiders 
who requested entry.  He “told them this is the museum here, the museum's collection is not the 
Old Fours.”
522  Any time Red Guards objected Jin reminded “them about history they learned 
from school, that that history all came from the objects, we found out about history from 
517 Interview with Xia Shunkui, April 28
th, 2010.
518 Interview with Xia Shunkui, April 26
th, 2010.
519 Interview with Jin Jiapin, January 13
th, 2010.
520 Interview with Jin Jiapin, January 13
th, 2010.
521 Interview with Jin Jiapin, January 13
th, 2010.
522 Interview with Jin Jiapin, January 13
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objects.  If ancient times had no objects, then we would have no history.”
523   Jin leveraged the 
museum's role as custodian of Chinese cultural heritage.  He argued that the institution housed 
“things passed down from our predecessors to the nation, that the nation will use to teach its 
progeny.”
524  For every Red Guard that came knocking, “I would say it's not that I'm not opening 
the doors today and it's not that I don't trust you.  But just in case we have one object damaged, 
then I have to answer to history.  When you grow up you will know.”
525  Amazingly, no one 
argued with Jin.  They just left.  
Some Red Guards tried to enter from the back.  Zhang Ming met them there.  Zhang 
managed the storehouse – an in-house depository that held the majority of the museum's 
collection.  According to Li Junjie, Zhang “just didn’t give anything up.”
526  Whenever a Red 
Guard “told him to give them these objects” in a particularly threatening manner, Zhang simply 
referred them to Jin Jiapin, who stood his ground and told the young people to go away.
527 
Zhang kept the storehouse keys on hand at all times.  “He just didn't open the doors to anybody 
who wanted to take cultural relics away.”
528  
Fearful of a night attack, the museum assigned everyone to twenty-four hour shifts. 
Some packed up the exhibition displays.  Others, the more physically intimidating employees, 
took turns patrolling the streets.  If any patrolmen saw “a bunch of young people who gathered 
523 Interview with Jin Jiapin, January 13
th, 2010.
524 Interview with Jin Jiapin, January 13
th, 2010.
525 Interview with Jin Jiapin, January 13
th, 2010.
526 Interview with Li Junjie, June 29
th, 2009.
527 Interview with Li Junjie, June 29
th, 2009.
528 Interview with Li Junjie, June 29
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outside the museum”, they got Jin or Zhang to “reason with them, tell them that they couldn't 
just come and slash up what was in the museum.”
529  These measures worked effectively.  “Our 
walls were tight.”
530  In fact, “after a while [Red Guards] stopped coming.”
531  
The second prong of the security plan was to set up the museum's own team of Red 
Guards.  From the perspective of outsiders requesting entry, an existing Red Guard unit 
indicated that the Four Olds campaign was already underway.  Museum administrators believed 
that “people who work at the museum there's no way they would smash up cultural relics.”
532  An 
in-house unit would also keep strangers out - if any outsiders wanted to enter “we just said that 
we were participating with Red Guards” internally.
533  
Museum administrators selected their Red Guards carefully.  Only employees that had 
already obtained Chinese Communist Party membership were nominated.  This methodology 
differed from the selection of Red Guards outside the museum, which left membership up to 
self-determination.
534  Roughly thirty candidates were selected based on their record of Party 
participation.
535  The appointment process even included a background check.  “They said who 
are you and what did your parents do.  You had to have three generations of straight and clean 
workers in your family.”
536  
529 Interview with Zhong Yinlan, July 10
th, 2009.
530 Interview with Chen Peifen, April 6
th, 2010.
531 Interview with Jin Jiapin, January 13
th, 2010.
532 Interview with Jin Jiapin, January 13
th, 2010.
533 Interview with Zhong Yinlan, July 10
th, 2009.
534 Interview with Huang Xuanpei, January 12
th, 2010.
535 Interview with Huang Xuanpei, January 12
th, 2010.
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Huang Xuanpei, another junior employee who joined the museum in 1952, led the 
museum’s Red Guards.  Huang credited his appointment to a clean background check: “My 
grandfather was a farmer, my dad was a worker, and I myself was in the party, so they trusted 
me.”
537  This group of “people of good birth” held the fort.
538  Huang's duties “stopped once the 
Red Guards stopped [demonstrating], so about the end of 1966”.
539  He joked that the rest of 
the staff called them “the fake Red Guards” because they left museum property alone.
540
The Shanghai Museum officially closed its doors on August 24th, 1966.
541  Curtains and 
tape covered the windows.  The “exhibition halls were sealed, it was empty, we had no 
visitors.”
542 
Nights At The Museum
 Looking back, Zhong Yinlan remembers thinking that shutting down might mean the 
beginning of a long-deserved break.  Most of the museum's junior employees (the Class of 
1952) had spent the year in cadre-training: “Went to factories and farms to get reformed...to 
erase our old-world views.”
543  The program mandated constant movement.  “We carried our 
clothes and bedrolls with us” and promoted Chinese cultural heritage at every farm and factory 
537 Interview with Huang Xuanpei, January 12
th, 2010.
538 Interview with Huang Xuanpei, January 12
th, 2010.
539 Interview with Huang Xuanpei, January 12
th, 2010.
540 Interview with Huang Xuanpei, January 12
th, 2010.
541 Shanghai gazetteers online, Shanghai wenwu gowuguan zhi,  Dashi ji [Annales] Available at 
<http://www.shtong.gov.cn/node2/node2245/node4467/node20331/index.html> [February 2011].
542 Interview with Xia Shunkui, April 26
th, 2010.
543 Interview with Zhong Yinlan, July 10
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on the training agenda.
544  They spent most nights camped out on bare ground.  If the trainees 
spent more than one night at any location, they looked forward to “putting up some bamboos 
for a screen” because it kept rodents at bay.
545  Screens didn't always work though.  “There were 
all these bats living there.  Once the night comes all the bats come out and start flying around”.
546 
Figure 3.1. Members of the Class of 1952 at the Wuqi Cadre training school (Cultural 
Revolution era).  Photo obtained from Zheng Zhong.
Sleeping in humidity and rodent droppings covered everything in fungus.  The Class of 
1952 spent all their free time boiling water because “you open up your bedroll and it was all 
moldy.  Mold everywhere.”
547  There wasn't “money to change our bedrolls every month” so “we 
wiped it down with hot water, hung it up to dry and slept on it again.”
548  Upon their return from 
544 Interview with Zhong Yinlan, July 10
th, 2009.
545 Interview with Zhong Yinlan, July 10
th, 2009.
546 Interview with Zhong Yinlan, July 10
th, 2009.
547 Interview with Zhong Yinlan, July 10
th, 2009.
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cadre-training, the Class of 1952 had hoped to spend time with family, or even pursue their 
antiquarian training programs further.
549  
That was when the raids started.  
Raids had already swept Beijing so Shanghai's denizens, however apprehensive, knew 
exactly what to expect.  Residents knew that Red Guards could enter private homes, ransack the 
occupants' possessions and seize anything that resembled the Four Olds.  They also knew that 
raids could happen at all hours, and that participating Red Guards did not hesitate to use 
violence.  All valuables, including antiquities, were game.  Red Guards “would throw ceramics 
from the roof, if they saw paintings they would just rip it up.  It was at that level!”
550
As soon as news about raids hit Shanghai, the Shanghai Museum petitioned Mayor Cao 
Diqiu for unmitigated entry rights to any and all proceedings.  Museum administrators were 
determined to appropriate the city's seized antiquities.  Cao signed off, mandating that city 
officials give the museum jurisdiction over art objects.
551  The mandate went to all major work 
units as well as “different departments and bureaus in Shanghai”, enabling museum employees 
to participate in any and all raids.
552  
Zhong Yinlan explained raid procedures as follows: “The city knew.  For example, if 
someone in the textile industry was going to be raided, they would call us and let us know.  Then 
549 For more on apprenticeships for museum professionals, see Chapter 2. 
550 Interview with Chen Peifen, January 25
th, 2010.
551 Interview with Zhong Yinlan, July 10
th, 2009.
552 Interview with Zhong Yinlan, July 10
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we would say, oh okay.  If we knew that person we would go to their house.”
553  Huang Xuanpei 
pointed out that museum cooperation was crucial to successful raids.  “So long as we knew that 
someone's house was going to be searched, we would send someone there to make contact” with 
on-site Red Guards and arrange the appropriate division of work.
554  These procedures gave 
museum employees time to find out what the residents had in terms of antiquities, as well as 
arrange for specific appraisers (for example, experts in ceramics, painting, bronzes, etc).  
The Class of 1952's regular work schedules quickly fell apart.  Raid notifications came in 
at all hours.  “Red Guards can start going into houses at any time, midnight, one in the 
morning.”
555  Employees with appraisal expertise started living in the museum.  Zhong Yinlan 
and other antiquarians-in-training “slept in our offices” because “when they were confiscating we 
had to work.”
556  They brought “a bedroll from home, dragged it out on the floor at night, 
covered yourself with a blanket.”
557  During the week “we didn't go home...it was a work related 
necessity.”
558  In fact, museum employees recalled sleeping through the night on weekends only, 
because that's when Red Guards stopped raiding “to go tour around” Shanghai.
559  
The Class of 1952 distributed the museum's raid hotline everywhere.  280160 answered 
calls twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week.  Private collectors on the museum's donor-
553 Interview with Zhong Yinlan, July 10
th, 2009.
554 Interview with Huang Xuanpei, January 12
th, 2010.
555 Interview with Zhong Yinlan, July 10
th, 2009.
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relations program got targeted attention.  The staff contacted them individually because “we had 
their number, their address, we kept up relations with them.”
560  Some even visited collectors at 
home “to say that if you have anything nice bring it to the museum.”
561  Collectors were told to 
relinquish their antiquities or risk run-ins with Red Guards.  Indeed, the museum stressed that 
the municipality had no way of predicting raids.  Residents who didn't have telephones of their 
own were told to find the closest public phone, so they could notify the museum to come and 
appropriate antiquities the moment they sensed trouble.  
With regard to raid-participation, it was the Class of 1952's absorption of the ordinary 
into the extraordinary that is so striking.  When living in the museum, sleeping arrangements 
maintained social norms.
562  “Men slept on one side, the women on the other, we had to stay 
separate.”
563  Overnighters brought their own bedrolls because “the museum didn't have dorm 
rooms or extra mats for you to use.”
564  Schedules were made for bath and toilet time, especially 
for staff with children.  This insistence on the mundane – morning rituals, cafeteria haunting, 
and toilet complaints – reduced the shock of raiding, if not exactly to the level of everyday 
annoyances, then at least to measurable difficulties.  
It would be a mistake, though, to assume that the Class of 1952's response to PRC 
560 Interview with Zhong Yinlan, July 10
th, 2009.
561 Interview with Huang Xuanpei, January 12
th, 2010.
562 This is in sharp contrast to studies that show the breakdown of social norms amongst young Cultural 
Revolution participants.  See Emily Honig, “Socialist Sex: The Cultural Revolution Revisited,” Modern China, 
29, no. 2 (2003): 143-175; Wendy Larson, “Never This Wild: Sexing the Cultural Revolution,” Modern China, 
25, no. 4 (1999): 423-450.
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campaigns of this magnitude were limited to lack of sleep and poor bathroom access.  Raiding 
gave the Shanghai Museum opportunity to acquire antiquities that it had no ability to access 
prior to 1966.  The museum staff even anticipated raids at specific households because of the 
vastness of the inhabitants' wealth or the notoriety of their collections.  The collectors' “circle 
was small, we didn't say much, but we knew what people had in their houses.”
565  The Class of 
1952 saw anticipation as the most efficient approach.  “We couldn't go to everybody, we could 
only go to the people who volunteered, the people who collected a lot, the people who collected 
very fine things.”
566  Red Guards knew the same.  Municipal raid-procedures maintained that “if 
you get cultural relics it goes to the museum, if you get gold, silver, and other hard cash you give 
it to the bank.  Everyone who worked on raids knew that.”
567
Members of the Class of 1952 portray raiding, then as now, as an act of preservation. 
Their colleagues “voluntarily contacted collectors” at a time when all other cultural institutions 
closed their doors.
568  Private collectors, however, saw things differently.  They owned 
antiquities that the museum wanted but couldn't get by donation or purchase – family 
heirlooms.  Indeed, the majority of homes that the Class of 1952 visited during raids were those 
that had consistently refused to make their antiquities part of the museum's collection.   
565 Interview with Lu Songlin, September 24
th, 2009.
566 Interview with Zhong Yinlan, July 10
th, 2009.
567 Interview with Chen Peifen, January 25
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th, 2011 at 
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568 Interview with Huang Xuanpei, January 12
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Staying In Business
The antiquities industry had a hard time generating income in 1966.  Art didn't sell 
amongst nationals because no one wanted to be accused of owning Four Olds.  Buyers who 
linked the Shanghai art market to Hong Kong also disappeared.  Even under normal conditions, 
traveling from Hong Kong to the mainland was tough.  Dealers left “at six in the morning by 
train” to get to the Luohu station in Shenzhen.
569  After spending the afternoon towing through 
Customs, they caught a train to Guangzhou that reached the city “just around six in the 
evening.”
570  From Guangzhou, dealers waited in overseas Chinese hotels like the Huaqiao dasha 
(Overseas Chinese Mansion) for train tickets to Beijing or Shanghai.
571  When dealers heard 
they had to endure both the journey and the Cultural Revolution, they refused to go.
572  Buyers 
didn't trust their mainland contacts' guarantee of protection.  Even those who had long-term 
partnerships with mainland vendors worried that “midway there might be some Red Guards 
who'd stop you and mess with you.”
573  Duoyun Xian's employees summarized the situation as 
follows: “it's not that China didn't let people from Hong Kong come back to the PRC, it's that 
they're too afraid to come back...they didn't want to come back.”
574  
In order to stay in business, antiquities work units in Shanghai sold Maoist trinkets. 
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572 For more on the impact of the Cultural Revolution on Hong Kong, see Ray Yep, “The 1967 Riots In Hong 
Kong: The Diplomatic And Domestic Fronts Of The Colonial Governor,” The China Quarterly, no. 193, 
(2008): 122-139. 
573 Interview with Andy Hei, June 14
th, 2010.
574 Interview with Zhu Junbo, December 17
th, 2009.184
Duoyun Xian, for example, stocked “Mao statues, calligraphy, and poems.”
575  Sun Jiecong and 
her colleagues also partnered with local artisans to sell “everything about Mao that they 
made.”
576  People lined up for Red paraphernalia, which did so well that “we even sold it outside 
of Shanghai.”
577  During major holidays Duoyun Xian also sold Red greeting cards.  All the 
antiquities, however, disappeared from inventory.  The Arts and Crafts Company kept those in 
hinterland warehouses, accessible only to employees and Customs agents.
578  
The Arts and Crafts Company abandoned the domestic market and focused sales efforts 
overseas.  This strategy worked for two reasons.  Firstly, “they want that stuff overseas...Taiwan, 
Hong Kong, America, France, they wanted it.”
579  Secondly, selling abroad helped the industry 
claim that it had a special diplomatic mission.  It contributed to “the elevation of our country's 
international reputation and the world's unlimited passion for Chairman Mao.”
580  These 
strategies kept the export trade going despite antiquities' classification as part of the Four Olds. 
Dealers in Hong Kong, America, and Britain remember that the Arts and Crafts 
Company started out as a mail-order business.  Alvin Lo joked that the company's mantra was 
“send the list out and say please buy from the list.”
581  The list referred to the company's 
575 Interview with Xia Shunkui, April 28
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580 Shanghaishi diyi shangye ju guanyu guwan shichang chukou menshi bu gaiwei zhuan gong waibin canguan goumai de 
qingshi baogao, [Shanghai First Municipal Commission of Commerce's Request and Report Regarding The 
Chinese Curio Market's Export Division Converting To Exclusive Sales And Browsing For Foreign Visitors] 
August 17
th, 1966, B123-6-1518-40, SMA, Shanghai. 
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onionskin sales catalog.   The catalog was comprised of “super thin paper, from China, very thin, 
thin it can fly in the air and it'll keep floating in the air” – hence the nickname onionskin.
582  Each 
page included a list of objects, presented with each object's name, age, price, and condition, 
wherein the condition ranged between “chipped, broken, [and] perfect”.
583  Dealers simply 
“check off the list and send it back and then they would send a shipment.”
584  
The onionskin catalogs had very few images.  The Arts and Crafts Company described 
its stock in industry jargon.  For example, “in Chinese, in the jargon, they named different-sized 
porcelains (in terms of vases, fish bowls) yibai jian, liangbai jian, sanbai jian, yiqian jian, one 
hundred items, two hundred items, three hundred items, one thousand items.”
585  The numbers 
indicated size: “They say the largest fish bowl is called yiqian jian, one thousand items...wubai 
jian, five hundred items, is half the size of that.”
586  The description for a piece of porcelain might 
read “indigo, flowers and willows, one thousand items, condition column (right), que – maybe a 
chip or a big crack, or nianfeng, year date, then on the corner, price.  Then there would be a long 
list of different things, fengcai [famille rose], qingyou [indigo glaze].”
587  
Due to their relative scarcity, images became the Arts and Crafts Company's primary 
marker of value.  “If the export company believed what they were trying to offer you was very 
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very important they would send a black-and-white thumbnail photograph.”
588  Hugh Moss, a 
British dealer of Chinese art who bought snuff bottles from the PRC throughout the Cultural 
Revolution, owns a collection of Arts and Crafts Company photographs.  Figure 3.2 depicts 
photographs that Hugh Moss obtained himself.  Figure 3.3 showcases those that the Arts and 
Crafts Company sent to Hong Kong art dealer Robert Chang, who in turn sent the pictures to 
Moss in 1966.  The pictures fit on a child's palm and have a tell-tale scalloped edge, which 
mainland photo shops used when cutting family portraits and other important records.
588 Interview with Alvin Lo, June 14
th, 2010.187
Figure 3.2. Snuff bottles photographs taken from The Arts and Crafts Company Catalog for the 
Hugh Moss snuff bottle archive, Courtesy of Hugh Moss, Old Surrey Hall.
Figure 3.3. Additional Snuff bottles, originally taken from the Arts and Crafts Company Catalog 
for the Hugh Moss snuff bottle archive, Courtesy of Hugh Moss, Old Surrey Hall. 
Moss bought lots of snuff bottles from the Arts and Crafts Company during the Cultural 
Revolution.  Cultural Relics laws didn't itemize snuff bottles as art, which made it easy to export 188
them.
589  Moss' PRC contact, a New Zealander who did economic research for the PRC, helped 
him obtain access to the Arts and Crafts Company warehouses in Beijing.  “I would get 
hundreds of pictures of stuff sent to me in London.  I would send them the money and they 
would send them to me in the post.”
590  Using his PRC contacts, Moss built up, over the 
following ten years, a substantial Chinese snuff bottle collection as well as a successful Chinese 
antiquities dealership.  In return, dealers like Moss helped the Arts and Crafts Company obtain 
valuable foreign currency at a time when the PRC had few overseas trading partners. 
Raider's Rules
While Shanghai's art market transitioned into a mail order business, Shanghai's museum 
employees were busy becoming raid administrators.  The Class of 1952 accompanied Red 
Guards on raids, took calls on its raid hotline, directed in-house appraisers to residences 
undergoing raids, and took in any confiscations that its appraisers deemed art.  When I 
interviewed them, members of the Class of 1952 described this period as one of the busiest in 
their careers.  
Not everyone was fit for the job.  Chen Peifen, a newly married member of the Class of 
1952, worked throughout the Cultural Revolution.
591  She started out accompanying Red 
Guards on raids but being pregnant soon made her miserable.  She had to tie a kilogram of 
kaiyang (dried baby shrimp) around her belly.  “I had no flavor in my mouth” and nibbling kept 
589 For more on Cultural Relics Laws in the PRC, see Chapter 1. 
590 Interview with Hugh Moss, September 27
th, 2010. 
591 Zheng Zhong, Bowuguan yu shoucang jia (Shanghai: 2000), 215.189
nausea under control.
592  Chen looked for toilets at every raid.  “Whenever I went to someone's 
house the first thing I did was to find the bathroom...I was still throwing up.”
593  Sometimes, the 
raids went on all night long and Chen had to use public outhouses in convenient alleyways.   
The museum transferred Chen to hotline duty.  She answered 280160 on both day and 
night shifts.  Whenever a call came in, she asked specific questions to determine which 
appraisers to send where.  For example, “I would ask, what kind of Four Olds do you have.  They 
would say oh drawings, so I would know it was for painting and calligraphy.  If they said really 
heavy metal I would know it was for the bronze department.”
594  Often, Chen got jumbled 
messages because callers couldn't articulate under duress.  “People call and they had no idea 
what they were calling about.”
595  Chen would send appraisers to a specific address but 
appraisers wouldn't recognize anything upon arrival.  Information either got mislaid or 
appraisers simply couldn't get there fast enough – Red Guards had came and gone already. 
Sometimes, Chen also “made mistakes and sent the wrong people because the communication 
was so hurried.”
596  Nevertheless, 280160 tried its best to match raids with specific appraisers. 
Object-specific knowledge made the difference between new museum acquisition and 
smashed/unaccounted valuable.
597  After all, museum employees had to share precious time and 
space with Red Guards with whom they had no prior acquaintance, and the guards had little 
592 Interview with Chen Peifen, January 25
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patience for jurisdiction.  
Appraisers Zhong Yinlan, Shang Yehuang, and Li Hongye still remember raiding Liu 
Jingji's house.  Liu ran the Anda textile company and owned a vast collection of painting and 
calligraphy.
598  Museum employees had tried to court Liu into donating art since the 1950s, but 
he rebuffed all advances.
599  
The Red Guards had a strong head-start.  By the time appraisers arrived, Liu was already 
sequestered in his courtyard.  Zhong remembered that everyone “wore Capri pants and round-
necked tee-shirts because they were at home.”
600  The family watched as raiders went through 
everything.  Some Red Guards gathered around Liu to “put that big, tall, white hat on him with 
the label that he was a ox-demon snake-spirit.”
601  Others wanted to publicly humiliate the family 
by marching them in chains.   
The museum staff inventoried Liu's antiquities through the night and well into the next 
day.  Zhong remembered that throughout their search, Liu “kept looking into the room where 
we were going though his paintings.”
602  He recognized Shang Yehuang as a Shanghai Museum 
employee and whispered “some Zhang Daqian paintings got torn.”
603  Shang found the pieces 
598 A detailed account of Liu Jingji's collecting interests can be found in Zheng Zhong, “Shuhua xiangban du 
zhongsheng” [Liu Jingji – A Shanghai Collector of Paintings And Calligraphy Works,” Shanghai Wenbo Luncong 
[Shanghai's Cultural Discussions] no.1, (2003): 10 – 17; Some of the Shanghai Museum's own records on the 
event can be found at Shanghai Gazetteer Online, Dashi ji [Annals] Available 
<http://www.shtong.gov.cn/node2/node2245/node4467/node20331/index.html> [13 June, 2011]
599 Zheng, Bowuguan yu shoucang jia, 262.
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and put them in the Shanghai Museum's pile.
604  Liu also approached Zhong Yinlan.  “He stood 
behind me and said, Miss, where are you from?  I can tell from the way you go through paintings 
that you know what you are doing.”
605  Zhong told Liu that she worked for the Shanghai 
Museum, which prompted the industrialist to reveal more information.  He helped the staff find 
four paintings by the early Qing dynasty painter Shitao (1642 – 1707), which he kept “at the top 
of a closet.”
606  Liu also showed Zhong where he kept “other important calligraphy and 
paintings” – a room that had remained untouched by Red Guards because Liu claimed it 
contained “letters from Chairman Mao.”
607  
The next morning, Zhong Yinlan and her colleagues gave Liu an itemized list of all the 
antiquities that they had seized.  The list named more than one thousand pieces of painting and 
calligraphy.  
According to the Shanghai Museum's raid procedures, all appropriations had to have an 
itemized list.  The staff made lists in sets of five: “One went to the collector, one went to the 
municipal cultural relics administration, one went to the neighborhood association, and two 
went to the museum.”
608  The Class of 1952 assured collectors that antiquities would be safe in 
museum custody.  The museum intended to keep seized antiquities out of the Red Guards' 
reach and in good preservation.  As Zhong Yinlan repeated to me on multiple interviews, “it was 
604 Zheng, Bowuguan yu shoucang jia, 262.
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like we adopted those works of art, we were their custodians.”
609   
Theater of Donations
Raiders and raided alike employed the language of donation when referring to 
confiscated antiquities.  When Red Guards sacked Sun Yufeng's house, the collector “said you 
can't move this stuff, this all belongs to the Shanghai Museum.  I donated it all.”
610  Sun had no 
such agreement with the Shanghai Museum.  He simply wanted to save his collection from 
getting smashed.  Sun dialed 280160 as soon as he saw Red Guards coming.  He “sealed up all 
his own materials with red tape” labeled property of the Shanghai Museum.
611  Appraisers 
arrived within hours.  “We went to his house, opened up the red tape, took the pieces one by one 
and cataloged them.”
612  Sun Yufeng's case was also not unique.  Throughout the summer of 
1966, museum employees found that “people put the Shanghai Museum's tags and seals on their 
things, we went to their houses and saw they had done it already.”
613  In other words, private 
collectors used the language of donation in a last-ditch effort to protect their belongings from 
destruction. 
Raiding allowed Shanghai Museum employees to author, elaborate, and promulgate its 
fiction of donation to previously unprecedented levels.  The Class of 1952 referred to all 
appropriations as donations.  Raid reports itemized seized antiquities as jieshou (acceptances), 
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an administrative term that distinguished cash-free transactions from purchases.
614  The museum 
had used this term since its establishment.  In 1959, for example, the Shanghai Museum 
reported that “since our institution opened we've jieshou-ed donations from 63 groups and 275 
individuals, totaling 27,415 objects.”
615  In the jargon, jieshou refers to antiquities that the 
museum received at no cost and had no obligation to return.  All seized antiquities at the 
Shanghai Museum contained documentation that “said it was a price-less jieshou”, which 
encouraged the staff to treat appropriations as new acquisitions.
616   
On the surface, the fiction of donation provides a platform for the Shanghai Museum to 
present its mastery over destruction during a tumultuous moment in PRC history.  Those 
working the night shift, for example, noted that they often woke up to “find that someone’s 
thrown some works of art at the museum.”
617  Suspecting that owners dumped them hoping for 
the best, “we would just file it away and worry about it later.”
618  Li Junjie asserts that this 
condition framed “what the society was like at the time”.
619  
614 Zhonggong Shanghai shi wei xuanchuan bu, shi wenhua ju guanyu wenwu tushu ziliao waili gongzuo baogao ji 
jieshou beichao wenwu de yijian, [The People's Republic of China Shanghai Representative's Board Promulgation 
Department, Municipal Cultural Affairs Administration's Report Regarding the Allocation of Cultural Relics, 
Books and Similar Resources, and Rescripts Regarding the Appropriation of Confiscated Cultural Relics] 
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No one, however, equated confiscations with voluntary donations.  As Zhong Yinlan 
pointed out, “under that kind of environment, you can't tell if people actually wanted to donate 
or if it was a situational thing.”
620  Donating one's property to the state even aroused suspicion. 
In raid reports, the museum noted that “some are using the framework of donation to make 
themselves look good, others know that their collections...have problems and are afraid that they 
will be found during the Four Olds campaign.”
621  These statements suggest that both raiders 
and raided alike were fully aware that the fictive quality of donation put individuals at risk for 
more raids, as well as physical violence. 
Conflating donations with seized property, however, did far more than reflect difficult 
realities.  It established administrative continuity between small-scale antiquities appropriations 
in the 1950s and large scale seizures during the Cultural Revolution.  It also equated raids and 
seizures with donor-relations, which the museum held up as pillars of legitimacy throughout its 
history.  In other words, conflating seizures with bequests expanded the fiction of donation. 
Cultural Revolution appropriations did not belong to the museum in the way that a voluntary 
bequest did, but the owners could not get those objects back either.  The staff “thought we 
would get it all for free from the state because once things are confiscated it belonged to the 
620 Interview with Zhong Yinlan, July 10
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state, and if the state thought it was good they gave it to the museum.”
622  By applying the term 
jieshou to one-off as well as systematically seized antiquities, the Shanghai Museum extended 
appropriations' range of acceptability, from specific individuals and industries to all PRC 
denizens.  In other words, expanding the fiction of donation transformed museum staff from 
raiders to custodians with indefinite holding power.  
Moreover, the language of donation erected a false distinction between popular 
movements, in which Red Guards took center stage, and institutional work, wherein the 
museum took charge.  The Class of 1952 regarded Red Guards as irresponsible students who 
“didn't know anything” and only thought of “bringing down the Four Olds”.
623  It is worth 
remembering, however, that both Red Guards and museum employees followed the same set of 
state policies regarding the search and seizure of private property, and even worked together to 
maximize the efficiency of specific raids.  The language of donation suggested that the museum 
would hold confiscations in custody until the Cultural Revolution blew over.  As the campaigns 
proceeded, however, no one knew when the movement would end, if ever.  At the same time as 
museum employees told private collectors “we are taking care of it for you, we're not 
confiscating”, they inventoried appropriations as museum property.
624  Therefore, just as the 
fiction of donation reverberates the museum's image as a preservationist institution, it also 
reveals the museum's active role in inverting the definition of donation. 
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By the end of summer, 1966, the Shanghai Museum had participated in so many raids 
that the municipality requested a report itemizing how much it took and from whom.
625    Figure 
3.4 visualizes this list.  
625 Data for antiquities appropriated in the latter half of 1966 retrieved from Zhonggong shanghaishi wei xuanchuan 
bu, shi wenhua ju guanyu wenwu tushu ziliao waili gongzuo baogao ji jieshou beichao wenwu de yijian, [The People's 
Republic of China Shanghai Representative's Board Promulgation Department, Municipal Cultural Affairs 
Administration's Report Regarding the Allocation of Cultural Relics, Books and Similar Resources, and 
Rescripts Regarding the Appropriation of Confiscated Cultural Relics] February 8
th, 1965 – November 21
st, 
1966, B172-5-1105, SMA, Shanghai.  197
Figure 3.4.  Number of Antiquities Appropriated By the Shanghai Museum in 1966, Organized 
By Name of Owner.  SMA, Shanghai. 198
Shanghai Museum employees intercepted thirty-six raids between August 28th and September 
12th, 1966.  These fifteen days yielded 6,184 objects, which the staff cataloged and tagged 
according to the Three-Tier system.
626  According to the inventory, “a considerable amount of 
precious antiquities” fell into the First- and Second-tiers.
627  Traditional categories of art, such as 
“bronzes, calligraphy, and painting make up the majority” of this cache.
628  Notable confiscations 
included bronzes from the Shang and Western Zhou dynasties, paintings and calligraphy from 
the Song and Yuan dynasties, and Ceramics from Song and Qing imperial kilns.
629  Some of the 
antiquities were objects that the museum had known about for decades but could not access. 
Others were unexpected gains from individuals who had collected in secret for decades.  
I showed this report to members of the Class of 1952 in order to ask them about the 
categories of art that the Chinese art historical canon marked as minor, such as seals, imperial 
clothing, jade, as well as newly incorporated categories such as ethnic minority artifacts.  Zhong 
626 For more on the Three Tier appraisal system for antiquities in the PRC, see Chapters 1 and 2.
627 Zhonggong shanghaishi wei xuanchuan bu, shi wenhua ju guanyu wenwu tushu ziliao waili gongzuo baogao ji jieshou 
beichao wenwu de yijian, [The People's Republic of China Shanghai Representative's Board Promulgation 
Department, Municipal Cultural Affairs Administration's Report Regarding the Allocation of Cultural Relics, 
Books and Similar Resources, and Rescripts Regarding the Appropriation of Confiscated Cultural Relics] 
February 8
th, 1965 – November 21
st, 1966, B172-5-1105, SMA, Shanghai. 
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Yinlan remarked that while “there were also people...who called us” regarding the preservation 
of those categories of art “there isn't much documentation about them.”
630  When I pressed her 
about why the documentation didn't exist, she cited the privileging of some categories of art over 
others.  Relics like seals and imperial clothing are“just not a major collecting category.”
631  The 
museum considered them non-essential to Chinese cultural heritage and made no special effort 
to intercept those raids.  Much like the Shanghai Museum's salvage archeology program, one 
wonders what our imaginary distribution of the canon might look like had museum staff made 
the effort to retrieve ethnic minority artifacts, snuff bottles, studio implements, or lacquer wares 
throughout the Four Olds campaign – just to name a few.
632  
In its appropriations report, the Shanghai Museum noted that thirty-eight of the 6,184 
antiquities that it seized in 1966 were First-Tier.  To put this number in context, between 1949 
and 1964 the Shanghai Museum acquired, on average, thirty-four First-Tier antiquities per 
year.
633  To acquire thirty-eight in fifteen days means that Cultural Revolution raids enriched the 
Shanghai Museum's collection more quickly, cheaply, and significantly than any previous 
630 Interview with Zhong Yinlan, July 10
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632 For more on the metal salvaging project, see Chapter 2. 
633 Data extracted from Wenhua bu, shanghai shi wenhua ju guanyu bianzhi, chuban shanghai bowuguan yiji cangping 
jianmu, huace, tupu de tongzhi, baogao, zongjie, [Cultural Division and Shanghai Ministry of Culture's Reports 
and Rescripts Regarding Publishing the Shanghai Museum's First Tier Collections' Index, Illustrated Album, 
and Graphics Archive], February 1963 – November 1963, B172-1-443, SMA, Shanghai; Shanghai shi wenhua ju 
guanyu shangbao shanghai gemin lishi jinian guan, shanghai bowuguan, shanghai luxun jinian guan yiji cangping de 
baogao, mulu, [Shanghai Cultural Affairs Administration's Report and Table of Contents Regarding First Tier 
Collections at the Shanghai Revolutionary History Museum, Shanghai Museum, and Shanghai Luxun Memorial 
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acquisition effort in the museum's history.  Subsequent raid evaluations confirm that “those 
cultural relics that entered the museum in the early stages of the movement are better” in terms 
of quality.
634  In other words, raiding the homes of collectors that the Shanghai Museum knew 
and warned beforehand yielded better antiquities than random raids did.  The appropriations' 
value, plus the brutal nature in which collectors lost them, also explains why many remember 
their antiquities' loss to this day.  
A descriptive analysis of the data in Figure 3.4 indicates that the mean number of objects 
appropriated per household is 172, while the median is twenty-seven.  The median suggests that 
most individuals who called 280160 kept a modest number of antiquities – the average raid 
yielded several dozens objects.  This confirms anecdotal observations about collecting in 
general: “In one year you might get one or two good things...it's not easy to be a collector, you 
need to save things for years.”
635  Indeed, the museum staff considered anyone who owned more 
than one hundred antiquities a da shoucangjia (Big Collector).  As Zhong Yinlan explained, even 
amongst the legendary collectors and connoisseurs, “no one ever donates several 
thousand”objects.
636  Very few managed to accumulate more than one hundred objects because 
“collectors have to have stamina and money and the eye, if you don't have all of the above, you 
634 Shanghai wenhua xitong ge weihui (chou) guanyu tushu, wenwu zhanbei ji Lu Xun mu zhenxiu deng qingshi, baogao, 
pifu, [Shanghai's Cultural Organization' Revolutionary Board's (Preparatory) Requests, Reports, and Directives 
Regarding the Wartime Preparation of Books, Cultural Relics, and the Restoration of Lu Xun's Tomb], March, 
1969 – December 1969, B172-3-28, SMA, Shanghai. 
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can't be a big collector.”
637  Furthermore, “if you don't have [any of] these qualities, you can't be 
a collector” at all.
638  Thus, insofar as the staff knew, the distribution in Figure 3.4 represents a 
believable cross-section of antiquities ownership amongst elite Shanghai residents in the 1960s, 
from small-timers to the rare da shoucangjia. 
The mean, 172, is more than six-times greater than the median.  This suggests that 
Cultural Revolution raids ransacked private homes at the highest level – amongst collectors who 
never had to give museum staff the time of day.  The six-fold difference between the mean and 
median also explains why Shanghai Museum employees can clearly recall raiding Liu Jingji and 
Sun Yuefeng's homes today.  Liu and Sun owned 1,209 and 461 antiquities, respectively.  Those 
quantities made them some of the biggest collectors in Shanghai.  Their estates contained more 
antiquities than the museum staff had ever seen in a single home, probably in their working 
careers.  The quantity and quality of these two collections gave Zhong Yinlan, Li Junjie, and 
other members of the Class of 1952 more distinct impressions of Liu and Sun than the thirty-
four other individuals in the report.  These memories remained vivid in spite of Liu and Sun's 
deaths, and despite the decades of time between the raids and my interviewing the museum staff. 
Incidentally, Zhong and Li also retain sharp recollections of Li Yinxuan, whose collection also 
passed the thousand-objects mark.
My interviewees raised two issues regarding missing data in the appropriations report. 
637 Interview with Zhong Yinlan, July 10
th, 2009.
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First, the Class of 1952 didn't maintain a consistent counter for coins until 1969.
639  Some tagged 
a bag of gold coins as one unit, others counted each coin as one unit.  Therefore, we do not know 
if “coins, one unit” refers to many coins or only one piece of coin.  This implies that for some 
categories of art, the quantity of seized objects may well be higher than indicated in the 
itemization.  Second, at the time that the museum submitted this report its staff had actually 
participated in fifty-four raids, not thirty-six.
640  The staff, however, only had time to make 
inventories for thirty-six of the fifty-four households.  Therefore, the scale of raids between 
August 28th and September 12th, 1966 is actually greater than that which is indicated in the 
chart.  The extant quantity of antiquities in Figure 3.4 suggests, however, that even given missing 
data, the Shanghai Museum collection profited significantly from appropriations made in the 
summer of 1966. 
The Shanghai Museum's fiction of donation obscures its Cultural Revolution profits. 
Seized antiquities enlarged the museum's collection both in quantity and quality.  As its staff 
confirmed, “things that were confiscated during the Cultural Revolution were never intended to 
be returned.”
641  The appraisers' five-copy inventories recorded how much the institution gained 
639 Shanghai wenhua xitong ge weihui (chou) guanyu tushu, wenwu zhanbei ji Lu Xun mu zhenxiu deng qingshi, baogao, 
pifu, [Shanghai's Cultural Organization' Revolutionary Board's (Preparatory) Requests, Reports, and Directives 
Regarding the Wartime Preparation of Books, Cultural Relics, and the Restoration of Lu Xun's Tomb], March, 
1969 – December 1969, B172-3-28, SMA, Shanghai. 
640 Zhonggong shanghaishi wei xuanchuan bu, shi wenhua ju guanyu wenwu tushu ziliao waili gongzuo baogao ji jieshou 
beichao wenwu de yijian, [The People's Republic of China Shanghai Representative's Board Promulgation 
Department, Municipal Cultural Affairs Administration's Report Regarding the Allocation of Cultural Relics, 
Books and Similar Resources, and Rescripts Regarding the Appropriation of Confiscated Cultural Relics] 
February 8
th, 1965 – November 21
st, 1966, B172-5-1105, SMA, Shanghai. 
641 Interview with Xu Yongxiang, July 8
th, 2009.203
from the Cultural Revolution, not how much preservation it achieved.  Raiding gave the 
museum access to homes that could previously afford to close their doors to all other methods of 
entry.  Red Guards may not have known the difference between valuable antiquities and prosaic 
Four Olds, but the museum staff did.  This explains why the museum kept distributing salaries 
despite shutting down between 1966 and 1972.  Continuous payroll suggests that the museum 
staff served a useful purpose – they had the antiquarian skill sets to determine what the 
municipality could gain from raids, and by how much.
642  
Revolutionary Rebels
While some members of the Class of 1952 participated in raids, others initiated 
revolutions within the museum itself.  Shortly after July of 1966, denizens all over Shanghai 
began to self-identify as Zaofan pai, or Revolutionary Rebels.
643  These individuals formally 
incorporated Cultural Revolution movements, such as the Four Olds campaign, into everyday 
operations at work units and local government institutions.  At the Shanghai Museum, the 
number of Revolutionary Rebels rose just after the museum disbanded its Red Guards.
644  By 
autumn of 1966, Revolutionary Rebels at the Shanghai Library started rallying for cross-
642 This is in stark contrast to those individuals detailed in jails and interrogations, who had their salaries held 
indefinitely during their detainment.  In fact, during the late 1970s and 80s, those who received rehabilitation 
from Cultural Revolution charges found that they got their detainment-period salaries returned to them, but 
charges were deducted for the cost of room and board during detainment.  
643 For more on the rise of the Revolutionary Rebels see Alessandro Russo, “The Conclusive Scene: Mao and the 
Red Guards in July 1968,” Positions: East Asia Cultural Critique 13, no. 3, (2005):535 – 575; Michael 
Schoenhals, “'Why Don't We Arm the Left?' Mao's Culpability for the Cultural Revolution's "Great Chaos" of 
1967,” The China Quarterly, no. 182 (2005): 277-300; Jonathan Unger, “Whither China?: Yang Xiguang, Red 
Capitalists, and the Social Turmoil of the Cultural Revolution,” Modern China, 17, no. 1 (1991): 3-37.
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institutional solidarity, which accelerated the rate of rebel self-identification at the museum. 
Many of the museum's newly instated Revolutionary Rebels went to Beijing on a state-funded 
pilgrimage to meet with Mao Zedong.  There, “they said that chairman Mao was in support of 
the Zhaofan pai, so then...they said okay, the museum is ready” for full-out rehabilitation.
645  
Revolutionary Rebels encouraged raids on fellow employees, focusing on the senior 
staff.  It remains unclear how many of the roughly 150 museum employees participated in 
raiding each other's homes.  Some estimate “95 percent of the the people at the museum joined 
– either they were Revolutionary Rebels or they were part of the group that became the Red 
Guards.”
646  Others insist that few self-identified as Revolutionary Rebels and the handful who 
did got transferred out of the organization in subsequent decades.  Willingness, however, was 
not an issue.  By the winter of 1966, those who did not declare revolutionary membership faced 
interrogation.  Whether or not they wanted to, they had to join up.  
The institutionalization of Cultural Revolution movements was punctuated by big letter 
poster campaigns and the creation of jails for geli shencha (segregated examination).
647  The 
poster-writing campaigns came first.  Employees wrote any and all gripes in letters so big that the 
645 Interview with Huang Xuanpei, January 12
th, 2010.
646 Interview with Chen Peifen, July 3
rd, 2009.
647 I borrow the phrase institutionalization of revolution from Joel Andreas, “Institutionalized Rebellion: 
Governing Tsinghua University during the Late Years of the Chinese Cultural Revolution,” The China Journal, 
no. 55, (2006): 1-28.  
For more on detainment and interrogation in segregated examination jails, see Wang Youqin, “The Second 
Wave of Violent Persecution Of Teachers: The Revolution Of 1968,” Paper Presented at the 35th International 
Congress of Asian and North African Studies, Budapest, July 7-12, 1997, Available 
<http://humanities.uchicago.edu/faculty/ywang/history/1968teacher.htm> [April, 2011].205
posters “stretched from ceiling to floor.”
648  The public nature of these posts ensured that any 
accusation was witnessed by one and all – everybody knew what was on everybody else' minds. 
Gu Youchu, for example, found a poster that read “why does Gu Youchu not want to criticize 
Shen Zhiyu, but instead tags along Shen's shirt sleeves?”
649  The post accused Gu, a bronze 
restorer, of maintaining a clandestine relationship with the Shanghai Museum's President from 
the time Gu was a child.
650  According to the poster, Gu had no commitment to the 
revolutionary cause “because the two of them have a history, it's because Shen Zhiyu was the 
person who got him to the museum from the factories.”
651  Gu felt “so shocked when I heard 
that.”
652  He had no idea that Shen even knew him as a kid.  He protested that he got transferred 
“to the museum because of work needs...when I was little, maybe he saw me, but I don't have 
much of an impression.”
653  Nevertheless, Gu got assigned to segregated examination and 
reeducation. 
The posters affected Hu Bo, head of the cataloging department, gravely.
654  Chen Peifen 
remembers her former boss as an artistic type.  “A very clever man, good at making seals.”
655 
One afternoon, she saw a poster that “said he had some kind of sales relationship with someone, 
648 Interview with Chen Peifen, January 25
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that he was dealing in works of art.”
656  In other words, the post accused Hu of violating museum 
procedure – making money by selling antiquities on the side. 
Both Chen and Hu saw the poster just before they were scheduled to attend reeducation 
study group, which their division held every afternoon.  Hu told Chen he would come late. 
Chen “couldn't just let him go because now the central administration was interested in him,” 
but she said “don't worry, just come a bit late.”
657  By four PM, Hu hadn't arrived so Chen called 
his house.  
Chen remembers that a woman picked up.  After Chen identified herself the woman 
“started crying right on the phone.  She said after he ate he said I'm not going to the museum, 
don't come and call for me.”
658  Chen understood that Hu committed suicide.  He “took a lot of 
sleeping pills.”
659
Chen froze.  “I didn't know what to do...I was the first to know.”
660   She quietly told the 
museum's President, Shen Zhiyu, who was detained in a segregated examination jail in the 
hallway outside Chen's office.  She had to be discreet because detainees had to stay silent.  Shen 
told her to “go over there to take a look, ask them if they need anything.”
661  Under the cover of 
darkness, Chen rode her bicycle to Hu's house.  She couldn't do anything.  The poster put 
everyone associated with Hu under scrutiny, including Chen herself.  The family held Hu's last 
656 Interview with Chen Peifen, July 3
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rites surreptitiously.  “You couldn't really hold a big funeral.”
662  
Segregated examination monopolized the staff's workday.  Everyone had to perform 
interrogations on themselves as well as each other.  “We all had to come to work still, but coming 
to work meant being criticized, writing self examinations.”
663  The interrogations used beatings, 
which instilled fear and, in some cases, serious personal injury.  
All of the museum administrators, “bigger people at the museum like Zhen Wei, Jiang 
Dayi, Ma Chengyuan, Shen Jianzhi,” underwent intense scrutiny.
664  Jiang Dayi, for example, 
used the phrase “careful work makes intricate projects” as his mantra.
665  Revolutionary Rebels 
accused Jiang Dayi of harboring “anti-Mao” proclivities because the phrase seemed to contradict 
Mao's stance on labor, which emphasized “working fast and saving energy.”
666  
Every museum employee above a specific pay grade got criticized for clinging to old, 
outdated ideas of institutional hierarchy.  “Everyone that did administrative and managerial 
work were being criticized as a group.”
667  Some got into trouble for having unclear family 
histories.  Others had to be rehabilitated for maintaining Capitalist ideas.
668  Employees who 
didn't make enough accusations became known as laobao (Old Conservatives), and got 
interrogated for their silence.  
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The staff had no duties outside of raids and segregated examination.  Feng Xiaogeng 
explained that  “everyday, you get together, you discuss, you criticize, every single day.  Every 
day you go to the criticism room.”
669  Once inside, “they sat on the floor, eight hours a day, being 
reeducated.”
670  The museum's archaeologists, for example, stopped excavating because they 
were “not allowed to work.”
671  Similarly, the “Conservation Workshop's day to day work 
basically stopped.  The museum became a black spot.”
672  Those detained in segregation had to 
participate in whatever activities their fellow employees assigned as part of reeducation.  Even 
those on sick leave had to participate.  
Some employees got sent to hard labor.  The Class of 1952 called this program zei 
gaowen, a Shanghainese phrase that means baking oneself in heat.
673  This term describes the 
work environment, which was long hours of manual labor in high-temperature rooms. 
Employees that “weren't developing” or needed “to learn from the farmers and laborers” worked 
these jobs in one or two year stints.
674  The specific duration of reeducation varied according to 
perceived faults.  “People who had bad family backgrounds went more often, people with farmer 
and laborer backgrounds went less”.
675  Often, employees that got sent to zei gaowen didn't come 
back.
676  
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Zhong Yinlan did her stint at a chemical factory in Xujia Hui district, about 4.3 miles 
(seven KM) away from the Shanghai Museum.  The factory made chemical fertilizer.  Zhong 
worked in the drying room, where “you take all the dried cakes of stuff out of the plates, then you 
put the next batch in.”
677  Every time she loaded a batch “hot air just hits you in the 
face...everything you're wearing is drenched.”
678  The drying room kept open fires, so she had to 
keep a face mask and gloves on at all times.
679  As soon as she dropped a batch off “you wave your 
fan around to dry the sweat...then you had to go in again, because time's up and you have to 
open that door again.”
680  When I asked her why she got sent to zei gaowen, Zhong explained that 
she volunteered.  Having zei gaowen experience on record indicated a willingness to rehabilitate, 
which some believed would protect them from the worst campaigns.
The Sorting Committee 
The museum staff got an alternative to zei gaowen in April of 1967.  In pursuit of a series 
of nation-wide initiatives to minimize unnecessary damage from the Four Olds Campaign, 
Shanghai set up its own Cultural Relics Sorting Committee (henceforth Sorting Committee). 
Sorting Committees administered confiscated property throughout the PRC – after 1967, all 
assets seized during the Cultural Revolution became committee property.  Shanghai modeled its 
Sorting Committee after that in Beijing, which “sorted and protected all antiquities and books 
677 Interview with Jin Jiapin, January 13
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confiscated in the Four Olds campaign” and already had a staff of “more than one hundred 
employees”.
681  Shanghai, however, expected greater workloads than Beijing.  After all, the city 
had more than five hundred work units, each with its own set of Red Guards and confiscated 
property, as well as a higher density of wealth.
682
The Shanghai Sorting Committee established multiple sorting stations throughout the 
city and its hinterland counties: Fengxian, Jinshan, Songming, Baoshan, Jiading, Chuansha, 
Nanhui, Songjiang, and Qingpu.  Fengxian county converted seventeen communes into sorting 
stations.  Songjiang county “routed books, calligraphy, and paintings to the care of the county 
museum” while others, like Baoshan, Songming, and Jiading counties, set up independent 
depositories.
683  Shanghai itself had sorting stations in all ten municipal districts.  “One site was 
at the Yufuo temple, one was at Xujia hui on Puxi road, and another was on Urumqi road, at the 
church.”
684  
The Sorting Committee recruited employees from all of Shanghai's cultural institutions, 
with an emphasis on individuals who could appraise art.
685  As the committee's first priority was 
681 Shanghai shi wenhua ju guanyu baohu wenwu, qingli tushu de baogao yu pifu ji benshi shukan zulin ye renyuan chuli 
yujian, [Shanghai Municipal Cultural Bureau's Report And Rescript Regarding Protecting Cultural Relics And 
Sorting Books Plus Comments on the Allocation of Our City's Books and Rental Industry Personnel] January 
1967 – November 1967, B172-3-5, SMA, Shanghai. 
682 For more on the particularities of the Shanghai case, see Lynn White III, “Local Autonomy in China During the 
Cultural Revolution: The Theoretical Uses of an Atypical Case,” The American Political Science Review, 70, no. 2 
(1976): 479-491.
683 Shanghai shi wenhua ju guanyu baohu wenwu, qingli tushu de baogao yu pifu ji benshi shukan zulin ye renyuan chuli 
yujian, [Shanghai Municipal Cultural Bureau's Report And Rescript Regarding Protecting Cultural Relics And 
Sorting Books Plus Comments on the Allocation of Our City's Books and Rental Industry Personnel] January 
1967 – November 1967, B172-3-5, SMA, Shanghai. 
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converting confiscations into public assets, it needed workers who knew how to evaluate objects 
accurately, reliably, and efficiently.  The municipality categorized Sorting Committee work as 
reeducation, which made hiring open to everyone except those who were already purged in 
Cultural Revolution campaigns.  Li Junjie explained that “the nice name for it was development 
through labor, the bad name for it was reeducation through labor.”
686  Li applied.  He couldn't 
stand staying in segregated examination: “Talking about how you were wrong...I wanted 
something else to do.”
687  Zhong Yinlan applied because it seemed like a better job than baking 
chemicals.  Museum employees who had salvaged bronze relics from steel refineries during the 
Great Leap Forward got placed automatically because they had prior experience in 
distinguishing valuables from trash.  Indeed, the Sorting Committee saw “rescuing cultural relics 
and books from waste metal and waste paper” as one of its primary responsibilities and even 
expanded the salvage team with recruits from other cultural institutions.
688
Li Junjie worked at #150 Puxi road, the biggest sorting station in the city.  Located in 
Xujia hui district, the station was considered well equipped because “the architecture is more 
solid, dry, and the storage space is bigger – it's good for precautions against humidity, fire, and 
Studies on Zhao Mengfu's Painting in China,” Artibus Asiae, 53, no. 1/2 (1993): 195-210; Alfreda Murck, 
“Golden Mangoes – The Life Cycle Of A Cultural Revolution Symbol,” Archives of Asian Art, 57 (2007): 1-21. 
686 Interview with Li Junjie, January 21
st, 2010.
687 Interview with Li Junjie, April 27
th, 2010.
688 Shanghai shi wenhua ju guanyu baohu wenwu, qingli tushu de baogao yu pifu ji benshi shukan zulin ye renyuan chuli 
yujian, [Shanghai Municipal Cultural Bureau's Report And Rescript Regarding Protecting Cultural Relics And 
Sorting Books Plus Comments on the Allocation of Our City's Books and Rental Industry Personnel] January 
1967 – November 1967, B172-3-5, SMA, Shanghai. 212
security.”
689  
Those who worked at Puxi road joked that they got put “in the Momo's house.”
690 
Shanghai residents called maids and cleaners momo tou and the Puxi road station looked like 
servant's barracks.  Some conjectured that the space was abandoned housing.
691  “Now we would 
call it houses awaiting reconstruction, for the cleaning staff, the momo tou.”
692  This guess was not 
far from the truth.  The municipality appropriated #150 Puxi Road from the China Umbrella 
Factory, which used the space to store spare parts.
693  
All sorting stations in Shanghai alternated between four tasks: receiving, cataloging, 
appraising, and waste metal and paper processing.
694  Li Junjie, who worked at Puxi road from 
1967 to 1972, specialized in receiving.  The sheer quantity of antiquities that came through the 
station stands out for him still: “Everyday we were there to receive, everyday there were things 
coming in.”
695   Receivers positioned themselves behind a desk where “people lined up, long 
689 Shanghai shi wenhua ju guanyu baohu wenwu, qingli tushu de baogao yu pifu ji benshi shukan zulin ye renyuan chuli 
yujian, [Shanghai Municipal Cultural Bureau's Report And Rescript Regarding Protecting Cultural Relics And 
Sorting Books Plus Comments on the Allocation of Our City's Books and Rental Industry Personnel] January 
1967 – November 1967, B172-3-5, SMA, Shanghai. 
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693 Shanghai shi wenhua ju guanyu baohu wenwu, qingli tushu de baogao yu pifu ji benshi shukan zulin ye renyuan chuli 
yujian, [Shanghai Municipal Cultural Bureau's Report And Rescript Regarding Protecting Cultural Relics And 
Sorting Books Plus Comments on the Allocation of Our City's Books and Rental Industry Personnel] January 
1967 – November 1967, B172-3-5, SMA, Shanghai. 
694 Shanghai shi wenhua ju guanyu baohu wenwu, qingli tushu de baogao yu pifu ji benshi shukan zulin ye renyuan chuli 
yujian, [Shanghai Municipal Cultural Bureau's Report And Rescript Regarding Protecting Cultural Relics And 
Sorting Books Plus Comments on the Allocation of Our City's Books and Rental Industry Personnel] January 
1967 – November 1967, B172-3-5, SMA, Shanghai. 
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lines...they came to the desk to relinquish items.”
696  Li and his colleagues had to register 
packages quickly because “these cars were waiting outside to give things in and be cataloged.”
697 
Confiscations always arrived dirty.  At the end of a work day Li “looked like an egg inked over” 
because registering confiscations covered him in soot, dust, and dirt.
698
Sorting Committee employees had a difficult time associating confiscations with specific 
individuals and organizations.  When I asked my interviewees where seized assets came from, 
they told me “some came from raids that the Revolutionary Rebels were doing.  Others were 
things that Red Guards were getting from outside”.
699  When I pressed for the exact location of 
“outside”, my interviewees admitted that they simply did not know.  “If you wore a red badge 
anyone could do a house search.”
700  Some of the confiscations came to the stations with “this 
and that capitalist's itemized list”, others simply said the contents came from “outside”, without 
further clarification.
701  The overwhelmed receivers rarely asked for more information because 
“there was just so much stuff..some tens of thousands of things.”
702  They didn't even have time 
to inventory all the confiscations already in custody, not to mention tracking down more.
703  
Catalogers collected confiscations from receivers.
704  Ostensibly, catalogers were 
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stenographers who took down all records regarding the objects' original danwei registration and 
owner.
705  In reality, catalogers moved confiscations from one end of the sorting station to 
another.  Their work got so overwhelming that the sorting stations had to call in the Shanghai 
Electricity Company.  The catalogers couldn't move fast enough so the electric company 
installed conveyor belts.  This allowed catalogers to “pull a lever and the calligraphy and 
paintings would 'hhwwwooooo' slide over, and once they slide it over we would catalog.”
706  
The final step was appraising.  There were two levels of appraisal.  The first is separating 
objects of value from everyday confiscations.  Appraiser set aside anything that might be art. 
“You had to look, you had to decide, good of bad, real or fake.”
707  Sorting stations kept two 
different kinds of appraisers: object and print.  The Sorting Committee recruited object 
appraisers from museums and art dealerships.  Print appraisers came from the Shanghai Library, 
Shanghai Book Store, and other used book outlets.  
The second level of appraisal involved enforcing Cultural Relics Laws.  At this level, 
antiquarian skill sets mattered.  Objects that predated 1795 went to museums.  Those that post-
dated 1795 became stock for the Arts and Crafts Company.  Zhong Yinlan, who cataloged 
objects at Puxi Road, explained that “if we found cultural relics then we would hold it for the 
state.”
708  Thus, appraising became a matter of profit.  If an appraiser could identify pre-1795 art 
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from a pile of confiscations then museums stood to expand their permanent collections. 
Similarly, if an appraiser could identify post-1795 art from everyday confiscations then the Arts 
and Crafts Company could sell it on the international art market for much-needed foreign 
currency.  Otherwise, confiscations simply remained in storage with the Sorting committee until 
further notice.  
Cultural industry employees who had the expertise and could obtain permission to work 
at sorting stations did.  For example, the head print appraiser at Puxi Road was Gu Dinglong, a 
paleographer and President of the Shanghai Library (Figure 3.5).
709  The Sorting Committee 
hired Gu because “there were all kinds of good printed books in Shanghai, first editions, second 
editions...ancient texts, well he knew them all.”
710  The committee transferred Gu out of 
segregated examination specifically for his appraisal skills. 
Figure 3.5. Paleographer Gu Dinglong (left) examining steele rubbings with Shanghai Museum 
employee Shang Yehuang (right) at the Shanghai Museum (circa 1960s).  Photo obtained from 
Zheng Zhong. 
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Gu Dinglong's case was a rare exception.  Sorting stations often had trouble finding 
proficient appraisers.  Segregated examinations kept senior staff, like Gu, from leaving their 
danweis.  Xie Zhiliu, the Shanghai Museum's chief painting specialist, never worked for any 
sorting station because his interrogators refused to let him go.  As a result, the Sorting 
Committee constantly petitioned for more appraisers.  “Some people, who knew what they were 
doing, might be able to call everything in the pile by name.  They might say, Zhang Daqian’s 
painting...Ming or Qing dynasty work”.
711  Those who had less experience “won't know how to 
label things...a pair of banners with calligraphy...people who don't know, well...they just label it as 
one unit: Two big strips of paper.”
712  Preliminary progress reports berated inexperienced 
appraisers for “piling ceramics randomly” and “keeping books, calligraphy, and painting on bare 
ground”, which damaged the objects.
713  The Sorting Committee was livid when the Shanghai 
Sixth Automation Instrument Factory “stored confiscated objects in an air-raid shelter and the 
calligraphy, painting and books got infested with mold.”
714  The Tianping Road neighborhood 
711 Interview with Li Junjie, January 21
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association left confiscated books near a water pipe, which spilled and made the books “rot to 
the state of glue, irreparable.”
715  In fact, due to the paucity of antiquarians, the Sorting 
Committee “estimate what we've already received is about ten percent of the total amount of 
cultural relics and books we are supposed to receive.”
716 
The Sorting Committees' complaints appear to confirm the Cultural Revolution's 
uniquely destructive impact on cultural heritage in the PRC.  To interpret these complaints as 
anything more than the daily vicissitudes of any large logistics operation, however, obscures 
broader continuities in the PRC's history of institutionalized antiquities appropriation since 
1949.
717  The Cultural Revolution did not erode the PRC's repository of antiquarians.  The 
systematic transfer of museum, library, and antiquities industry workers to new jobs both 
broadened and strengthened their value to the state.  This is evident, for example, in the 
proliferation of Cultural Relics Sorting Committees and employees across the nation, all of 
which cataloged confiscations for municipal and county sorting stations.  Furthermore, the 
sorting stations' petitions for more appraisers elevated antiquarians' value to both Cultural 
yujian, [Shanghai Municipal Cultural Bureau's Report And Rescript Regarding Protecting Cultural Relics And 
Sorting Books Plus Comments on the Allocation of Our City's Books and Rental Industry Personnel] January 
1967 – November 1967, B172-3-5, SMA, Shanghai. 
715 Shanghai shi wenhua ju guanyu baohu wenwu, qingli tushu de baogao yu pifu ji benshi shukan zulin ye renyuan chuli 
yujian, [Shanghai Municipal Cultural Bureau's Report And Rescript Regarding Protecting Cultural Relics And 
Sorting Books Plus Comments on the Allocation of Our City's Books and Rental Industry Personnel] January 
1967 – November 1967, B172-3-5, SMA, Shanghai. 
716 Shanghai shi wenhua ju guanyu baohu wenwu, qingli tushu de baogao yu pifu ji benshi shukan zulin ye renyuan chuli 
yujian, [Shanghai Municipal Cultural Bureau's Report And Rescript Regarding Protecting Cultural Relics And 
Sorting Books Plus Comments on the Allocation of Our City's Books and Rental Industry Personnel] January 
1967 – November 1967, B172-3-5, SMA, Shanghai. 
717 For the earlier history of appropriations see Chapters 1 and 2. 218
Revolution campaigns as well as municipal organizations.  As the above-cited reports made clear, 
without antiquarians the museums lost antiquities, and the Arts and Crafts Company lost 
profits.  Antiquarians could most efficiently, and effectively, evaluate the value of seized 
antiquities.  Thus, while Cultural Revolution campaigns are said to have robbed antiquarianism 
of its social and political purchase, participation in those campaigns have only strengthened 
antiquarians' impact and reach. 
Municipal Gains
Shanghai's sorting stations obtained unprecedented profits between 1966 and 1969. 
Figure 3.6 compares the Sorting Committee's inventory to the antiquities the Shanghai Museum 
seized in 1966.
718  
718 Data gathered from Shanghai wenhua xitong ge weihui (chou) guanyu tushu, wenwu zhanbei ji Lu Xun mu zhenxiu 
deng qingshi, baogao, pifu, [Shanghai's Cultural Organization' Revolutionary Board's (Preparatory) Requests, 
Reports, and Directives Regarding the Wartime Preparation of Books, Cultural Relics, and the Restoration of 
Lu Xun's Tomb], March, 1969 – December 1969, B172-3-28, SMA, Shanghai. 219
Figure 3.6.  Comparison of Antiquities Obtained From Shanghai Museum Confiscations VS 
The Cultural Relics Sorting Committee.  SMA, Shanghai. 
The multicolored blocks in both columns represent different categories of art as Shanghai's 
Sorting Committee named them.  These include Paintings and Calligraphy, Miscellaneous 
Categories, (a mishmash of jade, ivories, seals, lacquer, etc.), and Coins.  The dominant height 
of the Sorting Committee column shows that Shanghai's sorting stations got more antiquities in 
every category of art.  The museum expropriated 10,806 pieces of paintings and calligraphy 
while the sorting stations took in twenty-four thousand, a difference of eighty-two percent.  The 220
museum seized 16,877 miscellaneous antiquities while the sorting stations collected eighty-six 
thousand, a difference of 409 percent.  The comparison is even more astounding for Coins. 
While the museum collected seventy-six thousand pieces, the sorting stations reported fifty-one 
thousand pieces, plus an additional 2,669 kilograms' worth in bulk.  The stations didn't report 
how many coins the bulk category contained because “the quantities are too massive...at present 
we are lacking in appraisal personnel and have not begun to sort through” the numbers.
719  By 
way of comparison, most ancient Chinese coins weigh between five and fifteen grams.  To stay 
on the conservative side, let's assume that each coin weighs fifteen grams – 2,669,000 grams 
divided by fifteen gives 177,933 uncatalogued coins.  When added to the fifty-one thousand 
already inventoried pieces, the resultant sum (228,933) puts the sorting station's confiscations 
at 201 percent over the number of coins the Shanghai Museum seized in 1966.  
It is important to note, however, that both the committee and the museum 
organizations ultimately answered to Shanghai, the municipality.  In other words, however many 
more confiscations the Sorting Committee accumulated, it is the total confiscations both 
retrieved that distinguished their participation in the Cultural Revolution.  In four years, the two 
institutions obtained 34,806 pieces of paintings and calligraphy, 102,877 pieces of miscellaneous 
antiquities, and an estimated 304,933 coins.  These appropriations easily make up the contents 
719 Data gathered from Shanghai wenhua xitong ge weihui (chou) guanyu tushu, wenwu zhanbei ji Lu Xun mu zhenxiu 
deng qingshi, baogao, pifu, [Shanghai's Cultural Organization' Revolutionary Board's (Preparatory) Requests, 
Reports, and Directives Regarding the Wartime Preparation of Books, Cultural Relics, and the Restoration of 
Lu Xun's Tomb], March, 1969 – December 1969, B172-3-28, SMA, Shanghai. 221
of one museum.  In fact, the sum of assets at both institutions outnumber that in the Shanghai 
Museum's permanent collection as of 1966.
720  
The Sorting Committee transferred all antiquities that predated 1795 to the Shanghai 
Museum.  Figures 3.7 and 3.8 use the museum's Sorting Committee receipts to convey how 
much this expanded its collection.  Figure 3.7 looks at general acquisitions, comparing the 
Shanghai Museum's Cultural Revolution gains with historical acquisitions from 1949 – 1959.
721 
720 Data gathered from Shanghai wenhua xitong ge weihui (chou) guanyu tushu, wenwu zhanbei ji Lu Xun mu zhenxiu 
deng qingshi, baogao, pifu, [Shanghai's Cultural Organization' Revolutionary Board's (Preparatory) Requests, 
Reports, and Directives Regarding the Wartime Preparation of Books, Cultural Relics, and the Restoration of 
Lu Xun's Tomb], March, 1969 – December 1969, B172-3-28, SMA, Shanghai. 
721 Data for Cultural Revolution Confiscations comes from Shanghai wenhua xitong ge weihui (chou) guanyu tushu, 
wenwu zhanbei ji Lu Xun mu zhenxiu deng qingshi, baogao, pifu, [Shanghai's Cultural Organization' Revolutionary 
Board's (Preparatory) Requests, Reports, and Directives Regarding the Wartime Preparation of Books, Cultural 
Relics, and the Restoration of Lu Xun's Tomb], March, 1969 – December 1969, B172-3-28, SMA, Shanghai. 
Data for the Shanghai Museum's historical acquisitions comes from Wenhua bu, shanghai shi wenhua ju guanyu 
bianzhi, chuban shanghai bowuguan yiji cangping jianmu, huace, tupu de tongzhi, baogao, zongjie, [Cultural 
Division and Shanghai Ministry of Culture's Reports and Rescripts Regarding Publishing the Shanghai 
Museum's First Tier Collections' Index, Illustrated Album, and Graphics Archive], February 1963 – November 
1963, B172-1-443, SMA, Shanghai; Shanghai shi wenhua ju guanyu shangbao shanghai gemin lishi jinian guan, 
shanghai bowuguan, shanghai luxun jinian guan yiji cangping de baogao, mulu, [Shanghai Cultural Affairs 
Administration's Report and Table of Contents Regarding First Tier Collections at the Shanghai Revolutionary 
History Museum, Shanghai Museum, and Shanghai Luxun Memorial Museum], August 1960 – October 1965, 
B172-1-498, SMA, Shanghai. 222
Figure 3.7. Comparison of The Shanghai Museum's Historical Acquisitions (1949 – 1959) To 
Its Acquisitions From The Cultural Revolution (1966 - 1969).  SMA, Shanghai. 
The multicolored column on the left represents all the antiquities that the museum itself seized 
in raids, as well as that which the Sorting Committee transferred to the museum between 1967 
and 1969.  The unicolored column on the right represents the museum's acquisitions from its 
first decade in existence.  The multicolored column indicates that between 1966 and 1969, the 
Shanghai Museum gained 106,000 objects through a combination of raids and Sorting 
Committee transfers.  This amounts to seventy-one percent of all acquisitions that the museum 
accumulated between 1949 and 1959, thereby increasing the museum's permanent collection by 223
seventy-one percent.
722  
The obvious benefits of acquiring this many objects aside, the museum's acquisition of 
First-Tier objects indicates a much more profound level of gain.  Figure 3.8 refines the above 
statistics to look only at what the museum considered its best antiquities.  The comparison 
remains between acquisitions from the Cultural Revolution and the museum's historical 
acquisitions.  The greater availability of records for First Tier antiquities, however, allows me to 
extend the comparison to First Tier antiquities acquired between 1949 and 1964.
723 
722 There are no public records for the total number of antiquities the Shanghai Museum acquired between 1959 
and 1965. 
723 Data for Cultural Revolution Confiscations comes from Shanghai wenhua xitong ge weihui (chou) guanyu tushu, 
wenwu zhanbei ji Lu Xun mu zhenxiu deng qingshi, baogao, pifu, [Shanghai's Cultural Organization' Revolutionary 
Board's (Preparatory) Requests, Reports, and Directives Regarding the Wartime Preparation of Books, Cultural 
Relics, and the Restoration of Lu Xun's Tomb], March, 1969 – December 1969, B172-3-28, SMA, Shanghai. 
Data for the Shanghai Museum's historical acquisitions comes from Wenhua bu, shanghai shi wenhua ju guanyu 
bianzhi, chuban shanghai bowuguan yiji cangping jianmu, huace, tupu de tongzhi, baogao, zongjie, [Cultural 
Division and Shanghai Ministry of Culture's Reports and Rescripts Regarding Publishing the Shanghai 
Museum's First Tier Collections' Index, Illustrated Album, and Graphics Archive], February 1963 – November 
1963, B172-1-443, SMA, Shanghai; Shanghai shi wenhua ju guanyu shangbao shanghai gemin lishi jinian guan, 
shanghai bowuguan, shanghai luxun jinian guan yiji cangping de baogao, mulu, [Shanghai Cultural Affairs 
Administration's Report and Table of Contents Regarding First Tier Collections at the Shanghai Revolutionary 
History Museum, Shanghai Museum, and Shanghai Luxun Memorial Museum], August 1960 – October 1965, 
B172-1-498, SMA, Shanghai. 224
Figure 3.8. Comparison of The Shanghai Museum's First Tier Historical Acquisitions (1949 – 
1964) To Its First Tier Acquisitions From The Cultural Revolution (1966 - 1969).  SMA, 
Shanghai. 
The multicolored column on the left represents all First-Tier antiquities that the Shanghai 
Museum seized in raids, as well as that which the Sorting Committee transferred into its 
possession between 1967 and 1969.   The unicolored column on the right represents the 
museum's First Tier acquisitions from its first fifteen years of existence.  As the chart shows, 
between 1949 and 1964, the museum got 539 First-Tier objects from acquisitions, internal 225
transfers, appropriations, and donations.  Cultural Revolution appropriations, on the other 
hand, brought in 6,650 First Tier objects.  In other words, the Cultural Revolution boosted the 
museum's finest collections by 1,234%.  In fact, just the Sorting Committee's cache of First-Tier 
antiquities amounted to six hundred objects, which is more than the Shanghai Museum acquired 
in a fifteen year period.  What's more, the museum received all these valuables at no cost, and 
expected keep them for the foreseeable future.  
The distinction between museum-appropriations and Sorting Committee transfers in 
both Figures 3.7 and 3.8 illustrates the most haunting aspect of museum profiteering during the 
Cultural Revolution.  While transfers from the Sorting Committee benefited the institution, the 
museum's own participation in raids trumped transfers by leaps and bounds.  In both figures, the 
bottom chunks of the columns labeled Cultural Revolution Seizures represent antiquities that 
museum staff seized themselves.  While Sorting Committee transfers gave the museum an 
additional twelve-thousand antiquities, the museum's own work brought in ninety-four 
thousand objects, expanding its permanent collection by sixty-six percent.
724  This means even if 
the museum had no acquisitions program for its first seven years, its staff still would have seized 
enough antiquities to make a world-class institution by the winter of 1966.  
One might say that the Shanghai Museum emptied the city's antiquities reserves during 
the Cultural Revolution.
724 As compared to museum acquisition ledger totals as of 1959.226
Conclusion 
From the perspective of “China Watchers” at the time, the Cultural Revolution's 
phenomenal sweep through all levels of society between 1966 and 1969 represented the 
machinations of an increasingly militarized state.  The ambitions of its charismatic, albeit 
autocratic party chairman (Mao Zedong) seemed nothing less than the eradication of all 
Capitalism from China's Socialist soil.
725  Following this narrative scheme, in which ownership of 
elite artifacts leads unquestionably to capitalistic decline, the Shanghai Museum's wealth of 
antiquities and antiquarian knowledge must make it the most debased institution of all, and 
therefore first in line for purges.  Yet in both oral historical and statistical accounts of the 
Cultural Revolution, the museum only profited, and its antiquarians only expanded their reach. 
How is it that an institution so set for purges can achieve such enduring growth?  There is 
something lacking, then, in the explanatory power of the monolithic PRC and autocratic 
Socialism paradigms.  From the Shanghai Museum to the Arts and Crafts company, the same 
individuals, skill sets, and trade networks were used to appropriate antiquities as they were to 
“preserve” cultural relics – for the same audience, in the same market.   
725 For examples of such “China Watching” see Philip Bridgham, “Mao's Cultural Revolution: The Struggle to 
Consolidate Power”, The China Quarterly, no. 41 (1970): 1-25; Harvey W. Nelsen, “Military Bureaucracy in the 
Cultural Revolution,” Asian Survey, 14, no. 4 (1974): 372-395; Joan Robinson, “The Cultural Revolution in 
China,” International Affairs, 44, no. 2(1968): 214-227; Anne F. Thurston, “Victims of China's Cultural 
Revolution: The Invisible Wounds: Part II,” Pacific Affairs, 58, no. 1 (1985): 5-27; Jiping Zuo, “Political 
Religion: The Case of the Cultural Revolution in China,” Sociological Analysis, 52, no. 1 (1991): 99-110.227
What I have presented is not the history of the Shanghai Museum between 1966 and 
1969, but rather a historical account.  This account serves two purposes.  First, to show that a 
cultural institution's constituents, however marginalized for their “Capitalistic” elitism, can 
nevertheless be dynamic and active participants in creating the illusion of a coherent, free-
standing entity known as the PRC state.
726  As part of the abstracted force that directed local 
denizens' social, economic, cultural, and political life, the museum's different constituents not 
only produced the machinations of a coherent state apparatus, they also bore its impact. 
Second, to understand how different constituents' joint efforts reified the Cultural Revolution, it 
is necessary to observe both their failures and achievements.  Neither raids nor sorting stations 
were well organized.  Even given the unprecedented gains these campaigns achieved, their 
participants made mistakes, often failing to achieve their goal of acquiring as much seized 
property as possible, or even recognize objects of value.  Indeed, one of the most persistent 
critiques of this period is the prevalence of petty theft.  As Li Junjie described, “if you wore a red 
badge anyone could do a house search” and walk away with whatever they desired.
727
It is in this broader configuration of an imperfect, yet putatively coherent actor that the 
Shanghai Museum, precisely because of its suspect status in the Socialist schema, pioneered the 
techniques of cultural heritage monopolization in the PRC.  In both the historical record and 
contemporary interviews, museum employees portray themselves as working outside the state. 
726 Timothy Mitchell, “The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and Their Critics,” The American 
Political Science Review, 85, no. 1, (1991), 91. 
727 Interview with Li Junjie, January 21
st, 2010.228
They present their participation in raids and appropriations as acts of preservation wherein they 
protected antiquities from state-sanctioned destruction.
728  They transformed organized seizures 
into elegant fictions of donation.  Museum employees downplay the ways in which raids and 
appropriations expanded both The Shanghai Museum collection and the value of its staff, as well 
as the fact that their paychecks came from the PRC state.  While some have argued that the PRC 
maintains a low level of cultural governance, My findings show that state cultural institutions 
have worked in collaboration with those who self-identify as non-state actors since the 
institutions' inception.
729  In sum, the Shanghai Museum's history contextualizes how cultural 
governance was experienced through time, from the perspective of constituents who were both 
the makers, and subjects of the entity we call the PRC state.
728 These portrayals have even filtered into the international media.  For an example, see The Associated Press, “Ma 
Chengyuan, 77, President of Shanghai Museum, Dies,” New York Times, October 15
th, 2004.
729 Selina Ching Chan, “Cultural Governance And Place Making In Taiwan And China,” The China Quarterly, 206, 
(2011): 372-390.229
Chapter Four: Unaccounted Gains, 1969 – 1972230
To Hong Kong
5PM meant a lot to Alvin Lo, a junior high-schooler in late 1960s Hong Kong.  The 
island had two television channels and cartoons started at 5PM, sharp.  Cargo from the docks, 
however, also unloaded in Lo's living room at 5PM.  Trucks with a soft canopy top “just loaded 
off these crates and then you had to open up these crates and they were all wrapped in 
straw...they were just incredible.”
730  Unpacking got straw everywhere.  Every unloading day, Lo 
had to remind “these coolies, clear me a path so I can reach my TV.”
731
From the perspective of Hong Kong art dealers like Alvin Lo and his father, P. C. Liu, 
the trade “was controlled by only one company, this Arts and Crafts Company.”
732  The 
company had branches in Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Guangdong.  During the Cultural 
Revolution, however, dealers only saw catalogs, cargo, and straw.  That's all they wanted to see. 
P. C. Liu refused to go up to the mainland for the first seven years after 1966.
733  Hei Honglu, 
another dealer, assessed the situation as follows: “If you knew it wasn’t safe then you shouldn’t 
go, because maybe midway there might be some red guards who might stop you and mess with 
you.”
734  
730 Interview with Alvin Lo, June 14
th, 2010.
731 Interview with Alvin Lo, June 14
th, 2010.
732 Interview with Alvin Lo, June 14
th, 2010.
733 For more on the mainland's delicate relationship with huaqiao across the Luohu border, see Agnes S. Ku, 
“Immigration Policies, Discourses, and the Politics of Local Belonging in Hong Kong (1950-1980),” Modern 
China, 30, no. 3 (2004): 326-360; Glen D. Peterson, “Socialist China and the Huaqiao: The Transition to 
Socialism in the Overseas Chinese Areas of Rural Guangdong, 1949-1956,” Modern China, 14, no. 3 (1988): 
309-335.
734 Interview with Hei Honglu, June 14
th, 2010.231
Hong Kong's bonded warehouses made receiving shipments easy.  Dealers could 
redeem Arts and Craft Company cargo in parcels.  Whenever they had cash, “you just go to the 
bank and say I have three thousand Hong Kong and then they just mark off three thousand 
Hong Kong worth of merchandise...and you go to the warehouse to collect.”
735  The warehouses 
kept inventory lists.  Once the bank released the cash, the warehouse cleared the equivalent in 
inventory.  Dealers took their cargo, sold it, generated more cash, and went back to the 
warehouse to redeem more inventory.  
The Kadoories started buying from P. C. Liu in the early 1970s.  This was big time. 
Hong Kong had few local collectors and the Kadoories were the wealthy family.  They owned 
The Peninsula Hotels, whose flagship property in Tsim Sha Tsui also consented to renting shop 
space to P. C. Liu.  That event, plus the fact that by the early 1970s the “Cultural Revolution 
kind of calmed down a little”, prompted Liu go up to the mainland again.
736
Hong Kong dealers knew exactly what they crossed the Luohu border to get. 
“Confiscated materials...sent to the Arts and Crafts company.”
737  They suspected that 
merchandise came out in tiers.  “The really good things they didn't let out of the country.  Those 
all went to the museums.”
738  The dealers were spot on.  Shanghai Museum staff confirmed that 
“good things went to the museum, the not so good, average things went to the Arts and Crafts 
735 Interview with Alvin Lo, June 14
th, 2010.
736 Interview with Alvin Lo, June 14
th, 2010.
737 Interview with Hei Honglu, June 14
th, 2010.
738 Interview with Hei Honglu, June 14
th, 2010.232
company.  The Arts and Crafts company then sold it overseas, to Hong Kong or Japan.”
739  I 
pressed my interviewees about whether they could tell which antiquities came from 
confiscations and which came from art dealerships.  Lo replied “it's impossible to keep an 
account of all the things that came out during the Cultural Revolution, they had so much 
stuff.”
740
As I have argued in Chapter three, Cultural institutions profited enormously from 
participating in  Cultural Revolution campaigns.  In Shanghai's case, the establishment of sorting 
stations transformed museums into major links in the export art supply chain.  This chapter 
explores the day-to-day operations of that supply chain across Shanghai, Hong Kong, and 
abroad, examining how distribution, profit, and sales volumes are constructed against 
museological concerns such as preservation, canonization, and heritage creation.  My findings 
reveal the global aspect of Cultural Revolution profiteering.  I argue that international buyers 
drove the commercial disposal of confiscated property, at the same time as the widespread 
availability of commodified confiscations inflated prices in the international art market.  
This chapter also investigates the Cultural Revolution's unaccounted gains, which I 
define as the professional experiences that younger museum staff obtained as a by-product of the 
senior museum staff's incapacitation.
741  I show that the Class of 1952 not only took on new 
739 Interview with Wang Qianbi, June 28
th, 2010.  For accounts of similar policies in other industrial sectors, see 
Audrey Donnithorne, “China's Cellular Economy: Some Economic Trends since the Cultural Revolution,” The 
China Quarterly, no. 52 (1972): 605-619; Colina MacDougall, “Chinese Trade since the Cultural Revolution,” 
The World Today, 28, no. 1 (1972): 23-29.
740 Interview with Alvin Lo, June 14
th, 2010.
741 While some scholars have argued that the 1970s generation have quickly dismantled any Cultural Revolution 233
responsibilities as a result of gaps in the administrative hierarchy, they also acquired the right to 
choose their successors.  In this context, I introduce the Class of 1972, a new batch of recruits 
that the museum selected from Sent-down youths.  The experiences of both classes show that 
the existing rhetoric of rehabilitation do not account for the unprecedented career advances that 
young professionals won throughout the Cultural Revolution years.  I argue that participation in 
the Cultural Revolution, in the absence of former supervisors, allowed young museum 
employees to reap unaccounted gains.
Selling Out
Anxieties ran high at the Puxi road sorting station in 1969.  The Cultural Revolution 
severed Sino-Soviet relations.  That March, armed raids along the Ussuri River escalated to tense 
anti-Soviet war preparations throughout the mainland.  Beijing built an entire underground city 
for civilian protection and Shanghai started to do the same.  Sorting station employees had to 
figure out what to do with the confiscated antiquities in their custody.  “Everyone was freaked 
out, we were digging air trenches, it would have been perfect if the whole warehouse could have 
reforms upon coming to power, my findings show that in the Shanghai Museum's case, the 1970s generation 
built upon the previous generation's experience, seizing new opportunities using skills learned from museum 
doyens (senior administrators) as well as the Class of 1952.  David Bonavia, “The Fate of the 'New Born Things' 
of China's Cultural Revolution,” Pacific Affairs, 51, no. 2 (1978): 177-194; For collaborating findings in other 
professions see  Keith Forster, “Repudiation of the Cultural Revolution in China: The Case of Zhejiang,” Pacific 
Affairs, 59, no. 1 (1986): 5-27; George P. Jan, “The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in China since the Cultural 
Revolution,” Asian Survey, 17, no. 6 (1977): 513-529; Robin Munro, “Settling Accounts with the Cultural 
Revolution at Beijing University 1977-78,” The China Quarterly, no. 82 (1980): 308-333; Dwight H. Perkins, 
“Economic Growth in China and the Cultural Revolution (1960--April 1967),” The China Quarterly, no. 30 
(1967): 33-48; Lucian W. Pye, “Reassessing the Cultural Revolution,” The China Quarterly, no. 108 (1986): 
597-612; Sigrid Schmalzer, “On the Appropriate Use of Rose‐Colored Glasses: Reflections on Science in 
Socialist China,” Isis, 98, no. 3 (2007): 571-583.234
moved out of the country.”
742  
In order to get through work as fast as possible, the station installed a new inventory 
system and hired more workers.  Employees from the Arts and Crafts Company “got transferred 
in to help out”, expanding Puxi road's headcount for catalogers and appraisers to “ forty or fifty 
people”.
743  Inventory categories stayed the same: tong ci yu za (Bronzes, Ceramics, Jades, 
Miscellaneous).  Record keeping, however, privileged museum-quality antiquities.  Catalogers 
wrote out complete names and titles for museum-level antiquities, but the “other stuff...the 
inventory was just bronzes, X units, ceramics, X units, jade, X units.  There were no names.”
744 
The unit-based procedure anonymized all the antiquities that the Shanghai Museum didn't want 
to acquire, making it easy to consider them as all part of one great cache of stock.  
The PRC was in dire financial straits.
745  The Cultural Revolution froze production and 
education.  Shen Minren, who did the packing at Puxi road, explained that “economically [the 
state] was pretty anxious, so they thought we can sell” confiscated property.
746  What got sold 
742 Interview with Lu Songlin, June 16
th, 2011.
743 Interview with Lu Songlin, June 16
th, 2011.
744 Interview with Lu Songlin, June 16
th, 2011.
745 While sinologists agree that the PRC was struggling to improve its economic conditions throughout the 1960s 
and 70s, they disagree on the impact that earlier campaigns, such as the Great Leap Forward, Soviet 
collaboration, and even selective fertility control, had on subsequent social and economic campaigns such as the 
Cultural Revolution.  The seminal study on these issues is Roderick MacFarquhar, The Origins of the Cultural 
Revolution, Vol. 1-3 (London, 1974-1997); For a selection of subsequent studies see Prasenjit Duara, “The 
Great Leap Forward in China: An Analysis of the Nature of Socialist Transformation,” Economic and Political 
Weekly, 9, no. 32/34, (1974): 1365-1390; Carl Riskin, “Judging Economic Development: The Case of China,” 
Economic and Political Weekly, 12, no. 41 (1977): 1741-1754; Gregory C. Chow, “Economic Analysis of the 
People's Republic of China,” The Journal of Economic Education, 19, no. 1 (1988): 53-64;  Tih-Fen Ting, 
“Resources, Fertility, and Parental Investment in Mao’s China,” Population and Environment, 25, no. 4 (2004): 
281 – 297.
746 Interview Shen Minren, June 16
th, 2011.235
depended on appraisers and Cultural Relics laws.
747  Objects that predated 1795 stayed on the 
mainland, while “objects made after 1795, because according to national policy it could be 
exported, we gave it a number that indicated that it was arts and crafts.”
748  This arts and crafts 
designation gave the Arts and Crafts company the right to place the object in its onionskin 
catalog for sale overseas.  
From the perspective of art evaluation, the new emphasis on commodification meant 
that sorting stations disregarded the pre-existing Three-Tier system, which designated 
antiquities into the categories of museum acquisition, commodity, and trash.  Anonymized 
objects didn't merit that level of attention.  The sorting station workers' primary goal was to 
make use of available resources and get as much of its confiscated holdings into the art market as 
possible.   
As of 1969, the Shanghai Sorting Committee estimated it had at least 98,000 pieces of 
stock that post-dated 1795.
749  This number only accounts for sorting stations in municipal 
Shanghai.  The nine hinterland counties had more.  Though the committee did not publicize its 
747 For more on the social underpinnings of art and law see Guo Xinghua, “Understanding the Logic Behind Rule 
of Law in China,” Chinese Sociology and Anthropology, 41, no. 2, (2008–9): 3–6; Samuel K. Parker, “The Matter 
of Value inside and out: Aesthetic Categories in Contemporary Hindu Temple Arts,” Ars Orientalis, 22 (1992): 
97-109.
748 Interview with Li Junjie, January 21
st, 2010.  For the contemporneous growth of the handicrafts industry, which 
exported the same categories of confiscated property, see Peter Schran, “Handicrafts in Communist China,” 
The China Quarterly, no. 17 (1964): 151-173. 
749 Data gathered from Shanghai wenhua xitong ge weihui (chou) guanyu tushu, wenwu zhanbei ji Lu Xun mu zhenxiu 
deng qingshi, baogao, pifu, [Shanghai's Cultural Organization' Revolutionary Board's (Preparatory) Requests, 
Reports, and Directives Regarding the Wartime Preparation of Books, Cultural Relics, and the Restoration of 
Lu Xun's Tomb], March, 1969 – December 1969, B172-3-28, SMA, Shanghai. 236
county-level records, fragments of data suggest that the majority of confiscation holdings in 
Shanghai's nine hinterland counties also post-dated 1795.  According to Li Junjie, whenever the 
committee referred to “arts and crafts”, they meant stock that the Arts and Crafts Company 
could sell.
750  Committee reports state that “most of the cultural relics in the...counties are arts 
and crafts.”
751  For example, Qingpu county “has comparatively good preservation conditions 
and plentiful numbers of arts and crafts” while the town of Zhu Jiajiao had “many arts and crafts 
amongst its bronze and ceramic objects”.
752  Therefore, the number of commodified holdings in 
the nine counties may have outnumbered that in municipal Shanghai.
The Arts and Crafts company prioritized speedy liquidation.  In the years that Zhong 
Yinlan worked at the Sorting Committee, she often heard her superiors recite “we didn't have 
any foreign currency in the country, if we could sell our arts and crafts then we could make some 
foreign currency.”
753  In fact, not selling meant wasting because “if we can’t sell it then it’s just 
going to take up space at the warehouse...I can’t keep things in the warehouse that I can’t sell, 
that’s a business loss.”
754  Therefore, the Arts and Crafts company insisted on selling in bulk: 
750 Interview with Li Junjie, January 21
st, 2010.
751 Shanghai shi wenhua ju guanyu baohu wenwu, qingli tushu de baogao yu pifu ji benshi shukan zulin ye renyuan chuli 
yujian, [Shanghai Municipal Cultural Bureau's Report And Rescript Regarding Protecting Cultural Relics And 
Sorting Books Plus Comments on the Allocation of Our City's Books and Rental Industry Personnel] January 
1967 – November 1967, B172-3-5, SMA, Shanghai. 
752 Shanghai shi wenhua ju guanyu baohu wenwu, qingli tushu de baogao yu pifu ji benshi shukan zulin ye renyuan chuli 
yujian, [Shanghai Municipal Cultural Bureau's Report And Rescript Regarding Protecting Cultural Relics And 
Sorting Books Plus Comments on the Allocation of Our City's Books and Rental Industry Personnel] January 
1967 – November 1967, B172-3-5, SMA, Shanghai. 
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wholesale instead of piecemeal. 
Arts and Crafts company associates asked sorting station employees to focus their work 
on exportable stock.  Lu Songlin remembers a strong emphasis on well-sculpted, low quality 
jades.  The Puxi road station, for example, had an unusually large jade bodhisattva that had no 
date markings, though its stylistic properties marked it as an expertly sculpted object made from 
lower-quality jade, most probably by craftsmen in Yangzhou.  The museum didn't want the 
bodhisattva because its jade was poor quality and, in comparison to the relics already in 
Shanghai's collection, the object's pedigree was relatively young.  The Arts and Crafts company, 
however, saw its potential in Southeast Asia.  One of the sales representatives later told Lu that 
“we sold that thing.  For twenty thousand.  I don't know in what currency, sold it to someone in 
the Philippines.  That company manager laughed all the way to the bank.”
755  
The export trade also got stock from regional purchasing stations.  Duoyun xian, for 
example, kept a station in the back.  The stations allowed everyday Chinese to sell antiquities for 
cash.  In fact, the Commission of Commerce decreed that purchasing stations “are responsible 
for collecting the privately-owned cultural relics and reproductions” nationwide.
756  Station 
agents were instructed to target objects with high export value, which meant antiquities that 
foreigners liked to buy.  These include “ceramics, bronzes, calligraphy and painting, stele, silk 
755 Interview with Lu Songlin, June 16
th, 2011.
756 Shanghai shi wenhua ju zhuanfa guojia wenwu guanli ju 'duo waiguo ren, huajiao, gangao tongbao xiedai, youji 
wenwu chukou zan xing guanli banfa' deng de tongzhi, [Shanghai Cultural Bureau Forwards State Cultural Relics 
Management Bureau's Notification On 'Temporary Regulations Regarding Foreigners, Overseas Chinese, 
Hong Kong and Macao Wombmates' Carrying and Mailing Cultural Relics Overseas', Etc] May 1973 – 
November 1973, B172-3-79, SMA, Shanghai. 238
tapestry with cut designs, embroidery, seals, ink and ink stone, coral, jade, jewelry, ivory, and 
snuff bottles”.
757  In short, the known canon of Chinese collectables for the international art 
market.  
On the Road
By 1970, the Arts and Crafts Company set up shop at the Canton fair, a semiannual 
trade fair that targeted the international market.  Twice a year, spring and fall, Hong Kong art 
dealers Hei Honglu and Y. F. Yang traveled from their home base to Guangdong to buy stock. 
These trips caused their families great anxiety.  Hei “went wearing these dark glasses...we were 
worried he might be stopped by the Red Guards for the glasses.”
758  During our interview, Hei 
Honglu perked up at the mention of his eye-ware and exclaimed “I still have those glasses!”
759 
They are his Cultural Revolution mementos.   
Once dealers registered at the fair, they piled into the exhibition space.  Sales 
representatives marketed everything from tea to silk robes, all produced in the PRC for overseas 
export.  Art dealers frequented the booths marked for arts and crafts and the regulars knew they 
took a gamble on whenever they bought.  “There was this unspoken rule at the time...they didn't 
separate the old and the new.”
760  In other words, an eighteenth century jade or snuff bottle 
757 Shanghai shi wenhua ju zhuanfa guojia wenwu guanli ju 'duo waiguo ren, huajiao, gangao tongbao xiedai, youji 
wenwu chukou zan xing guanli banfa' deng de tongzhi, [Shanghai Cultural Bureau Forwards State Cultural Relics 
Management Bureau's Notification On 'Temporary Regulations Regarding Foreigners, Overseas Chinese, 
Hong Kong and Macao Wombmates' Carrying and Mailing Cultural Relics Overseas', Etc] May 1973 – 
November 1973, B172-3-79, SMA, Shanghai. 
758 Interview with Andy Hei, June 14
th, 2010.
759 Interview with Hei Honglu, June 14
th, 2010.
760 Interview with Andy Hei, June 14
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could be sold alongside a modern-day version, or even reproduction, of the same thing.  Displays 
covered the whole range of collectable antiquities and “whatever you found and bought, it 
depended on your eyes.”
761  Furthermore, dealers “had to buy in bulk.  You couldn't say I want 
this one and that one you had to say I want five hundred here and five hundred there.  You buy 
them all and this is the price.”
762  The sales representatives, in accordance with Arts and Crafts 
company goals, didn't take singleton orders.  
The Canton Fair determined the rhythm of the international Chinese art market. 
Dealers who did not attend the fairs in Guangdong “wanted to be [in Hong Kong] when the 
dealers got back from the Canton Fair.”
763  Every spring and fall, British, American, and other 
overseas buyers flew into Hong Kong for the sole purpose of meeting fair attendees.  Even 
Sotheby's and Christie's auctioneers, who began to explore the Hong Kong market in the early 
1970s, arrived according to the Canton Fair's schedule.
764  Hugh Moss, who began buying from 
Hong Kong dealers in 1968, explained that fair attendees “would buy the stuff in bulk in China 
come and sell it semi-retail in Hong Kong.  But in fact they were selling to dealers like me and 
others who would then go and sell them all over the world.”
765  In other words, the Canton Fair 
acted as a major supply node that regular attendees used to collect merchandise for their 
respective networks of art dealers who sold Chinese art from dealerships located across Asia, the 
761 Interview with Andy Hei, June 14
th, 2010.
762 Interview with Hugh Moss, September 27
th, 2010.
763 Interview with Hugh Moss, September 27
th, 2010.
764 Interview with Julian Thompson, September 4
th, 2009; Interview with Jim Lally, October 28
th, 2009.
765 Interview with Hugh Moss, September 27
th, 2010.240
Middle East, Europe, and North America.  As far as the international market was concerned, 
“The whole of China came out through Hong Kong...and then out to the rest of the world.”  
The ready availability of Arts and Crafts company stock shaped Chinese art prices at the 
international level.  “Between 1968 and 1973 the market in Chinese art went bananas.”
766 
Cultural Revolution confiscations injected the market with previously unprecedented numbers 
of Chinese antiquities.   Japanese, European, and American collectors, as well as new wealth in 
Hong Kong met that availability by “suddenly becoming very active...driving the market up like 
crazy.”
767  
Even Canton Fair officials expressed shock at the profits that Arts and Crafts company 
stock turned overseas.  Despite raising prices “by three or four times...many customers continue 
to purchase like mad.”
768  In particular, “in the past snuff bottles sold for fifty Hong Kong Dollars 
(HKD), this time they sold for five hundred HKD.  Fujian's gold lacquer wooden figurines used 
766 Zhou xiannian fu zongli dui gongyi pin jiaoyi tuan dui wai shixing tongyi chenjiao jidian tihui de pishi ji shanghsi shi 
duowai maoyi ju taolun cailiao huibao, [Associate Chief Li Xiannian's Comments Regarding The Arts And Crafts 
Trading Group's Conclusions On Standardizing Trade Export Practices And Shanghai Municipality's Materials 
and Reports on Talks With The Foreign Trade Commission] May 1965 – July 1965, B170-2-1584, SMA, 
Shanghai. 
767 Zhou xiannian fu zongli dui gongyi pin jiaoyi tuan dui wai shixing tongyi chenjiao jidian tihui de pishi ji shanghsi shi 
duowai maoyi ju taolun cailiao huibao, [Associate Chief Li Xiannian's Comments Regarding The Arts And Crafts 
Trading Group's Conclusions On Standardizing Trade Export Practices And Shanghai Municipality's Materials 
and Reports on Talks With The Foreign Trade Commission] May 1965 – July 1965, B170-2-1584, SMA, 
Shanghai. 
768 Zhou xiannian fu zongli dui gongyi pin jiaoyi tuan dui wai shixing tongyi chenjiao jidian tihui de pishi ji shanghsi shi 
duowai maoyi ju taolun cailiao huibao, [Associate Chief Li Xiannian's Comments Regarding The Arts And Crafts 
Trading Group's Conclusions On Standardizing Trade Export Practices And Shanghai Municipality's Materials 
and Reports on Talks With The Foreign Trade Commission] May 1965 – July 1965, B170-2-1584, SMA, 
Shanghai. 241
to sell for ninety HKD, now more than six hundred HKD.”
769  The China Ocean Shipping 
company confirmed that foreign dignitaries “show particular interest in...older arts and crafts like 
reproduction cultural relics, ceramics, bronzes, jades, stone, calligraphy and painting, jewelry, 
etc.”
770  These are precisely the categories of Chinese art objects whose prices inflated during the 
latter half of the Cultural Revolution.  
The Arts and Craft Company raised prices at each successive Canton Fair.  It used the 
fair as a barometer by which to standardize the price of exportable antiquities in the PRC.  Price 
hikes often prompted buyers to protest and strike bargains under the table.  In response, Arts 
and Craft Company administrators mandated that its sales team must “cooperate closely, stand 
firm in out-facing situations so...the opposition...pays according to this higher price.”
771   At the 
same time, however, Canton Fair administrators wanted to deny that overseas demand drove 
price inflation.  In all the Arts and Crafts Company documents I've come across, price 
adjustments always conclude with the phrase, “take care to keep [this] secret, don't let foreign 
769 Zhou xiannian fu zongli dui gongyi pin jiaoyi tuan dui wai shixing tongyi chenjiao jidian tihui de pishi ji shanghsi shi 
duowai maoyi ju taolun cailiao huibao, [Associate Chief Li Xiannian's Comments Regarding The Arts And Crafts 
Trading Group's Conclusions On Standardizing Trade Export Practices And Shanghai Municipality's Materials 
and Reports on Talks With The Foreign Trade Commission] May 1965 – July 1965, B170-2-1584, SMA, 
Shanghai. 
770 Shanghai haiguan, wailun gongyin gongsi, yuanyang yunshu gongsi guanyu guowai shangren goumai wenyi pin, wupin 
chujin guanli wenti de qingshi baogao, [Shanghai Customs, China Ocean Shipping Supply Company, and China 
Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO)'s Requests and Reports Regarding Foreign Merchants' Purchasing of 
Arts and Crafts and Export Management Conditions] June 1973 – December 1973, B248-2-577, SMA, 
Shanghai. 
771 Zhou xiannian fu zongli dui gongyi pin jiaoyi tuan dui wai shixing tongyi chenjiao jidian tihui de pishi ji shanghsi shi 
duowai maoyi ju taolun cailiao huibao, [Associate Chief Li Xiannian's Comments Regarding The Arts And Crafts 
Trading Group's Conclusions On Standardizing Trade Export Practices And Shanghai Municipality's Materials 
and Reports on Talks With The Foreign Trade Commission] May 1965 – July 1965, B170-2-1584, SMA, 
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nationals know”.
772   This phrase has double underlines, written by hand.
It would be a mistake, however, to interpret anecdotal transgressions on the dealers' part 
to mean anything more than the fact that bargaining is an integral part of the culture of 
international trade fairs.  Dealers found the Canton Fair worthwhile despite price hikes.  In 
comparison to prices in Hong Kong and overseas, mainland “things were so inexpensive...buying 
wasn't a matter of selecting carefully.”
773  They also considered the fair a good networking 
opportunity.  Received knowledge told dealers that company representatives had the ability to 
“invite you to their companies directly, in Shanghai, Canton, or more inland.”
774  What dealers 
wanted most was to find the individuals with authority to invite them to the Arts and Craft 
Company warehouses on the mainland.  Such an invitation meant unfettered access to more 
antiquities and bypassing Canton Fair administration.
Warehouses invitations offered overseas dealers a further advantage.  They came with 
official Arts and Company protection because the dealers had to arrive with enough cash to “buy 
by the lot.”
775  When P. C. Liu went “he would go back to warehouse and say look, these these 
772 Shangye bu, shige hui, Shanghai shi diyi shangye ju, wailun gongsi deng guangyu youyi shangdian shangpin, gongyipin, 
jinkou tengzhi, waiguan renyuan xiedai jinkou wuzi shougou zuojia, diaojia de zanxing banfa, guiding de baobao, 
tongzhi he gaoxiu fu buzhang zai Beijing zhaokai bage diqu wailun gongyin, youyi shangdian shangpin jiage de 
zuotanhui de zongjie fayan, [The Commission of Commerce, Municipal Revolutionary Board, Shanghai First 
Municipal Commission of Commerce, China Ocean Shipping Supply Company and Others' Meeting 
Regarding Temporary Plans For Pricing, Price Changes, Regulation Reports, and Notifications For Friendship 
Store Merchandise, Arts and Crafts, Imported Bamboo, and Foreign Commission Personnel Carrying Import 
Items, And Conclusive Remarks At Associate Commission Head Gaoxiu's Beijing Conference On Ocean 
Shipping Supplies and Friendship Store Merchandise Pricing For Eight Regions] February 14
th, 1972, B123-8-
708, SMA, Shanghai. 
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these these here you leave here, the rest I want.”
776  Dealers who got warehouse access essentially 
“eyeball everything on the floor” and took cratefuls of merchandise home.
777  They bought at 
such impressive volumes because the Arts and Crafts Company demanded it, and because profit 
margins on the international market more than covered the cost of getting a few duds in a bulk 
order.
New Alliances 
On September 13th, 1971, a plane crash on the Öndörkhaan grasslands in eastern 
Mongolia changed the course of the Cultural Revolution.  The plane carried PRC Defense 
Minister Lin Biao, his wife and son, as well as several personal aids.  All were supposedly fleeing 
for the Soviet Union as a result of Lin's infamous break from Mao Zedong.  No survivors 
emerged from the wreckage.  To minimize panic throughout the country, the Chinese 
Communist Party did not disclose Lin Biao’s death for the next year. 
Lin Biao's disappearance galvanized sweeping political and administrative shifts 
throughout the PRC.  It marked a turn in the Sino-Soviet split and shifted Cold War allegiances. 
At the state level, central bureau officials began to seek a rapprochement with the United States.
778 
At the local and regional levels, select individuals got rehabilitation notifications from work units 
that had purged them and cultural institutions that had ceased operations saw signs of renewal.  
776 Interview with Andy Hei, June 14
th, 2010.
777 Interview with Andy Hei, June 14
th, 2010.
778 For contemporary accounts see G. P. Deshpande, “China's Foreign Policy in the Seventies,” Economic and 
Political Weekly, 5, no. 16 (1970): 677-680; Harry Harding, “Political Trends in China Since the Cultural 
Revolution,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 402, (1972): 67-82;244
In Shanghai, museums and libraries reopened their doors.  Younger staff got transferred 
back from their respective reeducation programs and began putting together exhibition plans. 
Senior staff who had spent the past four or five years in segregated interrogation came back to 
work as well.  Committees of scholarly communication made plans to bring American delegates 
to PRC museums, with focus on goals such as “advance scholarship, further international 
cooperation, and increase mutual understanding.”
779
Figure 4.1. Shanghai Museum employees showing Conservation Workshop facilities to 
members of an American Delegation to the PRC (1974).  Published photograph in the Bulletin 
of the American Institute for Conservation of Historic and Artistic Works.
The staff made sure that international visitors didn't see Cultural Revolution markers in 
the museum itself.  Gallery guides steered foreign visitors away from any “signs that read 
779 W. T. Chase, “Conservation In The People's Republic Of China,” Bulletin of the American Institute for 
Conservation of Historic and Artistic Works 14, no. 2, (Apr., 1974): 131.  245
'Revolutionary Board' or 'Industrial Propaganda Team'”, and even removed signs for specific 
visits.
780  The museum also expanded its Foreign Visitors' Reception Room.  The staff wanted 
internationals to be able to spread out comfortably.  
The Shanghai Museum changed its schedule to minimize contact between non-Chinese 
and “the great industrial, agricultural and military masses” in mainland China.
781  International 
visitors came in the morning, while PRC citizens were admitted afternoons and all day 
Sundays.
782  Admission prices, however, stayed the same.  Visitors bought “individual tickets at 
five cents per head, pre-arranged group at three cents per person.”
783  Those visiting the museum 
780 Shanghai shi wenhua xitong gewei hui (chou), shi wenguan hui deng guanyu juban chutu wenwu, zhongguo taoci, 
qintong qi zhanlan ji <Shanghai shi Qing shaonian meishu zhanlan> deng de baogao, pifu, [Shanghai Municipal 
Cultural Administration Revolutionary Board (Preparatory), Municipal Cultural Relics Administration, etc's 
Report and Rescripts Regarding Preparations for Exhibitions on Excavated Relics, Chinese Ceramics and 
<Shangahi Municipal Youth Arts Exhibition>] February 1972 – December 1972, B172-3-55, SMA, Shanghai; 
For an example of accounts by individuals who participated in these tours, see Eric H. Brown “Our Visit to 
China”, The Geographical Journal, 144, no. 2 (1978): 187-190; Stephen Fitzgerald “The Cultural Revolution: 
An Analysis of Some Trends in China following a Visit inJanuary/February, 1968”, The Australian Quarterly, 40, 
no. 3 (1968): 26-39; Frederick C. Teiwes, “Before and after the Cultural Revolution”, The China Quarterly, no. 
58 (1974): 332-348; 
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Cultural Administration Revolutionary Board (Preparatory), Municipal Cultural Relics Management 
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Ceramics and <Shangahi Municipal Youth Arts Exhibition>] February 1972 – December 1972, B172-3-55, 
SMA, Shanghai. 
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with a foreign delegation had their tickets purchased, or arranged, ahead of time and didn’t wait 
in line. 
The 152,977 individuals who visited the museum galleries in spring, 1972 saw the recent 
past on prominent display.
784  The Shanghai Excavated Cultural Relics Exhibition showed 
archaeological material that ordinary people, as well as salvage archeology programs, unearthed 
during the Cultural Revolution.  Gallery guides stressed that “during the Great Proletariat 
Cultural Revolution, active collaboration between the vast industrial and farming masses and 
cultural departments...protected important cultural relics”.
785  The displays featured tools from 
the new stone age, which were salvaged from Qingpu county, Liantang commune when a river 
dredging project exposed them, as well as Tang dynasty Buddha statues and Ming dynasty silver 
that farmers retrieved from a swamp draining-project in Songjiang county.
786  The exhibitions 
presented themselves as examples of Chinese cultural heritage preservation.  Gallery guides 
784 Exhibition visitor data retrieved from Shanghai shi wenhua xitong gewei hui (chou), shi wenguan hui deng guanyu 
juban chutu wenwu, zhongguo taoci, qintong qi zhanlan ji <Shanghai shi Qing shaonian meishu zhanlan> deng de 
baogao, pifu, [Shanghai Municipal Cultural Administration Revolutionary Board (Preparatory), Municipal 
Cultural Relics Administration, etc's Report and Rescripts Regarding Preparations for Exhibitions on Excavated 
Relics, Chinese Ceramics and <Shangahi Municipal Youth Arts Exhibition>] February 1972 – December 1972, 
B172-3-55, SMA, Shanghai. 
785 Shanghai shi wenhua xitong gewei hui (chou), shi wenguan hui deng guanyu juban chutu wenwu, zhongguo taoci, 
qintong qi zhanlan ji <Shanghai shi Qing shaonian meishu zhanlan> deng de baogao, pifu, [Shanghai Municipal 
Cultural Administration Revolutionary Board (Preparatory), Municipal Cultural Relics Administration, etc's 
Report and Rescripts Regarding Preparations for Exhibitions on Excavated Relics, Chinese Ceramics and 
<Shangahi Municipal Youth Arts Exhibition>] February 1972 – December 1972, B172-3-55, SMA, Shanghai. 
786 Shanghai shi wenhua xitong gewei hui (chou), shi wenguan hui deng guanyu juban chutu wenwu, zhongguo taoci, 
qintong qi zhanlan ji <Shanghai shi Qing shaonian meishu zhanlan> deng de baogao, pifu, [Shanghai Municipal 
Cultural Administration Revolutionary Board (Preparatory), Municipal Cultural Relics Administration, etc's 
Report and Rescripts Regarding Preparations for Exhibitions on Excavated Relics, Chinese Ceramics and 
<Shangahi Municipal Youth Arts Exhibition>] February 1972 – December 1972, B172-3-55, SMA, Shanghai. 247
bragged that “the party and the state prioritize the protection of excavated cultural relics...great 
achievements” in heritage protection.
787  
The Qin Standard
The Shanghai Museum put confiscated antiquities on display.  The Chinese Bronzes 
Exhibition, later reconfigured as the Qin Emperor's Standardization Of Coins, Measurements 
And Language Exhibition, featured confiscations from the 1966 raids as well as municipal 
sorting stations.  The exhibitions erased all indications of private collecting from the artifacts. 
Provenance was seen to undermine the “scientific nature” of the museum's work, so the staff 
emphasized the objects’ archaeological significance instead.
788  
The Shang an tong fang sheng (henceforth Qin Standard), a volumetric measuring 
standard, took center stage in this exhibition.
789  The relic represented a standardized unit of 
weight in the Qin campaign to standardize units and measures – a campaign that many regard as 
one of the great achievements in the history of Chinese civilization.  Signboards surrounding its 
display case ran ten lines long, outnumbering every other exhibition label except for the 
787 Shanghai shi wenhua xitong gewei hui (chou), shi wenguan hui deng guanyu juban chutu wenwu, zhongguo taoci, 
qintong qi zhanlan ji <Shanghai shi Qing shaonian meishu zhanlan> deng de baogao, pifu, [Shanghai Municipal 
Cultural Administration Revolutionary Board (Preparatory), Municipal Cultural Relics Administration, etc's 
Report and Rescripts Regarding Preparations for Exhibitions on Excavated Relics, Chinese Ceramics and 
<Shangahi Municipal Youth Arts Exhibition>] February 1972 – December 1972, B172-3-55, SMA, Shanghai. 
788 Shanghai shi wenguanhui, shi wenhua ju guanyu choubei <mao zhuxi zai hu gemin huodong shi ji zhanlan>, huifu 
zhanchu <shanghai gemin yizhi yiji zhanlai>, xiugai 'zhongguo taoci chenlie' deng de qingshi, pifu, [Shanghai 
Municipal Cultural Relics Management Administration And Municipal Cultural Bureau's Notices and Edits on 
the Preparation of <Chairman Mao’s Historical Revolutionary Activity in Shanghai>, Re-exhibition of 
<Shanghai Historic Revolutionary Locations> and Edits to “Chinese Ceramics Display, etc], March 1976 – 
December 1976, B172-3-214, SMA, Shanghai. 
789 For similarly symbolic uses of art, see Alfreda Murck, “Golden Mangoes: The Life Cycle of a Cultural 
Revolution Symbol,” Archives of Asian Art, 57 (2007): 1-21.248
introduction at the museum entrance.  
The exhibition used the standard to highlight Qin policies that paralleled existing PRC 
policies.  The standardization of prices and units, for example, featured prominently.  Black and 
white photographs showed the relic's base, which “bears the Qin emperor's edict unifying all 
China's weights and measures in his twenty-sixty year”.
790  Meanwhile, gallery guides asserted 
that the Qin emperor used this relic as the “measuring device to unify all of China's unitary 
weights.”
791  Visitors also learned that standardization allowed Chinese civilization to progress 
from slave ownership to a multi-ethnic, feudalistic country under centralized rule – a multi-
ethnic society that the PRC’s centralized rule would later release from feudalism.  Just as the 
standard enabled the Qin state to “rule heaven and earth”, integrating the standard into Chinese 
cultural heritage was part of an “inevitability in socio-economic development” that fostered the 
“further development of trade, government, and culture” in the PRC.
792  
790 Shanghai shi wenguan hui, shi wenhua ju guanyu faxian kangyin tiepao, suitang he songze yizhi, caixiao shi ji wenwu 
baohu danwei jing'an is ji juban guancang wenwu zhan de qingshi, pifu, [Shanghai Municipal Cultural Relics 
Management Bureau and Municipal Cultural Bureau's Proposals and Rescripts Regarding the Discovery of 
Anti-British Cannons, Sui, Tang, and Songze Remains, Eliminating Municipal Cultural Relics Protection 
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1975 – December 1975, B172-3-168, SMA, Shanghai. 
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Management Bureau and Municipal Cultural Bureau's Proposals and Rescripts Regarding the Discovery of 
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1975 – December 1975, B172-3-168, SMA, Shanghai. 
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Figure 4.2. The Shanghai Museum's Qin Standard.  Available 
from<http://www.jlbjb.com/gddlh/30/200805081286.html>.  [31, March, 2011]
The displays erased the standard’s provenance, in particular the crucial role that the 
Shanghai Museum played in raiding the Gong family, from whom the museum confiscating the 
standard in 1966.  Museum records confirm that different constituents across the mainland had 
been searching for the standard since the establishment of the People's Republic in 1949.
793  The 
Shanghai Museum identified the Gong clan as the relic's owners back in the 1950s.  The family 
patriarch, however, refused to grant any access to the museum: “this thing was sold to foreigners 
by my father.  We don't have it in our family, please don't come here again.”
794  
The Shanghai Museum was not easily deterred.  A member of the Gong family worked 
793 Zhonggong shanghaishi wei xuanchuan bu, shi wenhua ju guanyu wenwu tushu ziliao waili gongzuo baogao ji jieshou 
beichao wenwu de yijian, [The People's Republic of China Shanghai Representative's Board Promulgation 
Department, Municipal Cultural Affairs Administration's Report Regarding the Allocation of Cultural Relics, 
Books and Similar Resources, and Rescripts Regarding the Appropriation of Confiscated Cultural Relics] 
February 8
th, 1965 – November 21
st, 1966, B172-5-1105, SMA, Shanghai.
794 Zheng,  Haishang shoucangjia, 52250
at the Shanghai Flour Company.  During the Cultural Revolution, Red Guards raided her house 
and notified the Shanghai Museum for support.
795  The appropriations team found nothing, 
which prompted further searches at the homes of other clan members.  Huang Xuanpei 
confirmed that museum staff followed all raids involving the Gong clan closely.  Whenever they 
heard that a Gong family residence “was being raided we went to take a look.”
796  
By the time the staff finally raided the estate that kept the Qin standard, the Red Guards 
had started without them.  Gong family members “said this thing was already gone, it was 
thrown in the garbage.”
797  The Red Guards didn't recognize the Qin standard's value “because 
you know...it looked like a coal shovel, it wasn't very eye catching.”
798  Museum staff dug it out of 
the trash.  After filling out the requisite paperwork, the staff brought the standard, along with 
other appropriations, back to the Shanghai Museum.  The team revealed nothing about the 
value of their find to the Red Guards.  They simply “said you can leave this under the museum's 
watch.”
799   In a 1966 report to the Ministry of Culture, however, the Shanghai Museum rated its 
expropriation of the Qin Standard as one of the highlights of its history.  The report called the 
standard “the most distinguished” antiquity amongst the “cultural relics that we continue to 
appropriate.”
800  
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None of the above vicissitudes appear in the Shanghai Museum's exhibition.  The issues 
that raids and confiscations raised would have disrupted the exhibition narrative, which equated 
Qin dynasty bronzes with “the beginning of China as a unified, multi-ethnic country.”
801  The 
show attracted more than four thousand visitors a day, and proved so successful that the staff 
took it on the road.
802  Museum staff who participated nicknamed themselves “light calvary for 
cultural and museum propaganda work” because, they argued, the trip represented a pivotal 
marker on the road to socialism.
803  The roadies attracted 544,612 visitors from eleven factories, 
seven counties, forty-one communal production teams, and eight military units.
804  One 
Books and Similar Resources, and Rescripts Regarding the Appropriation of Confiscated Cultural Relics] 
February 8
th, 1965 – November 21
st, 1966, B172-5-1105, SMA, Shanghai.
801 Shanghai shi wenguan hui, shi wenhua ju guanyu faxian kangyin tiepao, suitang he songze yizhi, caixiao shi ji wenwu 
baohu danwei jing'an is ji juban guancang wenwu zhan de qingshi, pifu, [Shanghai Municipal Cultural Relics 
Management Bureau and Municipal Cultural Bureau's Proposals and Rescripts Regarding the Discovery of 
Anti-British Cannons, Sui, Tang, and Songze Remains, Eliminating Municipal Cultural Relics Protection 
Danwei Jing'an Temple and the Preparation for the Museum's Collected Cultural Relics Exhibition] February 
1975 – December 1975, B172-3-168, SMA, Shanghai. 
802 Shanghai shi wenguanhui, shi wenhua ju guanyu choubei <mao zhuxi zai hu gemin huodong shi ji zhanlan>, huifu 
zhanchu <shanghai gemin yizhi yiji zhanlai>, xiugai 'zhongguo taoci chenlie' deng de qingshi, pifu, [Shanghai 
Municipal Cultural Relics Management Administration And Municipal Cultural Bureau's Notices and Edits on 
the Preparation of <Chairman Mao’s Historical Revolutionary Activity in Shanghai>, Re-exhibition of 
<Shanghai Historic Revolutionary Locations> and Edits to “Chinese Ceramics Display, etc], March 1976 – 
December 1976, B172-3-214, SMA, Shanghai.  
803 Shanghai shi wenguanhui, shi wenhua ju guanyu choubei <mao zhuxi zai hu gemin huodong shi ji zhanlan>, huifu 
zhanchu <shanghai gemin yizhi yiji zhanlai>, xiugai 'zhongguo taoci chenlie' deng de qingshi, pifu, [Shanghai 
Municipal Cultural Relics Management Administration And Municipal Cultural Bureau's Notices and Edits on 
the Preparation of <Chairman Mao’s Historical Revolutionary Activity in Shanghai>, Re-exhibition of 
<Shanghai Historic Revolutionary Locations> and Edits to “Chinese Ceramics Display, etc], March 1976 – 
December 1976, B172-3-214, SMA, Shanghai.  
804 Shanghai shi wenguanhui, shi wenhua ju guanyu choubei <mao zhuxi zai hu gemin huodong shi ji zhanlan>, huifu 
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the Preparation of <Chairman Mao’s Historical Revolutionary Activity in Shanghai>, Re-exhibition of 
<Shanghai Historic Revolutionary Locations> and Edits to “Chinese Ceramics Display, etc], March 1976 – 
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particularly enthusiastic individual even gave the museum an account of how many man-hours 
the exhibition saved he and his fellow workers.  He worked at an electrical plant in Yangshu 
district with more than 1,400 other men.   According to his calculations, “seven rounds of 200 
workers will need four hours to make a round trip to the city center, using a total of 5,600 work-
hours.”
805  The traveling museum exhibition “only cost us about fifty work-minutes per 
person...that doesn't disrupt production, saves the country more than five-hundred workdays, 
and more than 350 RMB in transportation costs.”
806  By catering to ordinary people and 
delivering Chinese cultural heritage to their door, the museum showed its commitment to 
revolution.  As a farmer's representative in Qingpu county concluded, “the museums used to 
work behind closed doors.  Now they work in the open.  That's revolution.”
807
Professionalization
Cultural Revolution campaigns sharpened existing differences between the senior 
805 Shanghai shi wenguanhui, shi wenhua ju guanyu choubei <mao zhuxi zai hu gemin huodong shi ji zhanlan>, huifu 
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museum staff and the Class of 1952.
808  Junior employees underwent segregated interrogation as 
well as reeducation programs, but “we weren’t the main targets of the group criticisms.”
809  The 
first generation of museum employees, “like our old museum President, and Xu Senyu, Xie 
Zhiliu, those were the main targets.”
810  Senior staff got segregated interrogation straight 
through.  The class of 1952, on the other hand, could either transfer into reeducation work or 
supervise the senior staff's interrogations.  As Chen Peifen explained, the “older generation were 
all asked to stand aside” while the Class of 1952 “was in charge.”
811  Consequently, for the first 
time since they started their antiquarian training programs in 1960, the Class of 1952 acquired 
responsibilities that put them on a par with their superiors.    
  Chen Peifen found herself thrust into leadership when her former supervisor, Hu Bo, 
committed suicide.  She became an assistant division leader and keeper of the museum's 
storehouse for seized antiquities.
812  Between 1966 and 1974, Chen also supervised senior 
staff.
813  
Chen gave Xie Zhiliu, the senior painting specialist, menial tasks to occupy the hours 
between interrogations.  This responsibility gave Chen, a junior employee in her early thirties, 
complete authority over Xie, a senior administrator in his late fifties.  Museum President Shen 
808 Ji Feng Yuan, Koenraad Kuiper, and Shu Shaogu, “Language and Revolution: Formulae of the Cultural 
Revolution,” Language in Society, 19, no. 1 (1990): 61-79.
809 Interview with Li Junjie, January 21
st, 2010.
810 Interview with Li Junjie, January 21
st, 2010.
811 Interview with Chen Peifen, January 25
th, 2010.
812 Interview with Chen Peifen, January 25
th, 2010.
813 Interview with Chen Peifen, January 25
th, 2010.254
Zhiyu also worked for her.  “I asked him to help write Arabic numbers...copy catalog cards or 
something.”
814  In addition, Chen managed Zhang Gongwu and Li Hongye, two older 
employees who specialized in cataloging and appraising.  Zhang and Li “were so afraid...when 
they had to go to meetings, the minute they opened their mouths they were wrong.”
815  During 
their criticism sessions Zhang and Li “were always told off by the others, and if they didn't say 
anything then they were interrogated about why they didn't say anything.”
816  
Chen had all of her charges inventory confiscations.  Zhang and Li packed because “I 
knew that they were very good at putting things away.”
817  Xie just wanted to read and take naps. 
To keep him from sleeping, Chen assigned him “to write labels on the paintings”.
818  This 
assignment took advantage of Xie's appraisal skills.  The museum had already commissioned 
covers and boxes for all its seized antiquities but “no one wanted to write the labels.”
819  Chen 
explained that “the calligraphy became part of the art work, if you don't write well it looked bad. 
You have to look for someone who knew how to write.”
820  Xie also identified confiscated 
antiquities.   The task “wasn't easy...sometimes [the artists] signed their courtesy name, 
sometimes they wrote their nicknames, there were a lot of names.”
821  Chen recorded these 
projects' progress for the museum's Revolutionary Rebels. 
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rd, 2009.
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th, 2010.
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Managing senior employees gave Chen a sense of authority, both through how others 
reacted to her and how she interacted with her former superiors.  Zhang and Li “were very 
grateful for the job.”
822  They deferred to Chen on decisions like “how do you want things to be 
put away?”
823  As the revolution progressed “several people who came to work”.
824  In other 
words, Chen became the manager of a large cohort of older employees, all of whom saw her as 
both their professional and political superior.  Visitors who recognized Xie Zhiliu’s handwriting 
expressed surprise.  “Some people don't believe their eyes, why would Xie Zhiliu come to the 
museum and do this kind of work.”
825  Chen replied “well he did this work, he liked it, and he was 
supposed to do it.”
826  Before the Cultural Revolution, Chen reported to two immediate 
supervisors.  Between 1966 and 1974 she was her own supervisor, with only Revolutionary 
Rebels to report to.  In our interviews, Chen describes these responsibilities with pride.  She 
never had reeducation because “I already had a job...to manage that group well there was a lot to 
do.”
827  The experience even set her managerial style.  “I believe in people having something to 
do...being bored and doing nothing is not good.”
828  
Assigning senior staff to menial tasks worked to the museum's advantage.  Zhang and Li 
kept Revolutionary Rebels from rifling through the confiscations.  They “locked the door...then 
822 Interview with Chen Peifen, July 3
rd, 2009.
823 Interview with Chen Peifen, July 3
rd, 2009.
824 Interview with Chen Peifen, July 3
rd, 2009.
825 Interview with Chen Peifen, January 25
th, 2010.
826 Interview with Chen Peifen, January 25
th, 2010.
827 Interview with Chen Peifen, January 25
th, 2010.
828 Interview with Chen Peifen, July 3
rd, 2009.256
when they left they wrote down for me who locked up and when.”
829  Xie identified antiquities 
that few others could discern.  “Once in a while he could go back and correct the card catalogs 
too...he knew how to do it and he wrote just so fast.”
830  Xie's calligraphy even enhanced the 
confiscations' value.  “What can you say about Xie Zhiliu's calligraphy?  Usually his calligraphy 
costs thousands per word”.
831   
Young museum employees also advanced their careers through working at municipal 
sorting stations.  Both Li Junjie and Lu Songlin “joined [the station's] leadership team.”
832 
When Li Junjie resumed museum work in the early 1970s, his leadership role at the Puxi road 
boosted his standing in the Chinese Communist Party and helped him win upper administrative 
roles.
  Sorting confiscations gave antiquarians-in-training like Zhong Yinlan and Zhu Chenwei 
their first opportunity to evaluate art independently.  “At the time, real experts were made to 
stand aside, they couldn’t do anything.”
833  While Zhong and Zhu's “appraisal skills and whatnot 
were not up to the level of the older experts,” they literally were the only ones with the minimum 
qualifications required to carry out the job.
834  Zhong herself asserted that connoisseurship 
expertise correlates directly with the number of antiquities seen.  “You can't only look at the 
829 Interview with Chen Peifen, January 25
th, 2010.
830 Interview with Chen Peifen, January 25
th, 2010.
831 Interview with Chen Peifen, January 25
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good painters, it's important to recognize an entire period”.
835  The Sorting Committee's 
storehouses had enough stock to outline several periods.  Li Junjie assessed Zhong's expertise as 
follows: “her real knowledge of appraisals...she learned from working at the Sorting 
Committee...in the beginning we weren’t authorities, we couldn’t even be called authorities.  But 
afterwards, that process made you an authority.”
836  One might say that without the sorting 
station, Zhong Yinlan would not be a member of the National Committee of Cultural Relics 
today.
837
Even employees who worked in museum security got a leg-up from participating in 
Cultural Revolution campaigns.  Lin Biao's Number One Command, a countrywide vigilance 
against Soviet attack, mandated that cultural institution employees participate in wartime 
preparations against the USSR.
838  The Shanghai Museum participated by shipping their best 
antiquities to a set of caves in Anhui.  This required transporting more than 300 trunks of books, 
packing 11,783 antiquities, as well as recruiting security guards for patrol duty.
839  Museum 
835 Interview with Zhong Yinlan, January 5
th, 2010.
836 Interview with Li Junjie, January 21
st, 2010.
837 The Guojia wenwu jianding weiyuan hui (National Committee of Cultural Relics) was first established on 
January 26
th, 1983.  It comprises a fellowship of nominated antiquarians who perform appraisals on behalf of the 
state, perform commissioned research on cultural relics, and recommend cultural heritage policies.  The 
categories of expertise include (as of 2005): Calligraphy, painting, and stelle rubbings, Contemporary 
calligraphy and painting, Ancient texts,  Ceramics, Bronzes, Jades, Coins,  Miscellaneous, and Modern historical 
artifacts.  For more on the committee see the State Administration of Cultural Heritage website Available 
<http://www.sach.gov.cn> [May, 2011] 
838 Interview with Wang Qianbi, June 28
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839 Both the Shanghai Museum and the Shanghai Library participated in this program, and shared space in the 
Anhui mountain facility.  According to the Shanghai Library, transporting the books alone required “500m
2 of 
space, a dozen moving vans...and 100KG of plastic bags”.  Shanghai wenhua xitong ge weihui (chou) guanyu 
tushu, wenwu zhanbei ji Lu Xun mu zhenxiu deng qingshi, baogao, pifu, [Shanghai's Cultural Organization' 
Revolutionary Board's (Preparatory) Requests, Reports, and Directives Regarding the Wartime Preparation of 258
administrators regarded the Anhui project as “a secret mission.”
840  Participating individuals 
earned the administration's utmost trust.   
Some guards patrolled the caves “for a few months, others went for one or two years.”
841 
Only younger men met the survival criteria.  “Say it snows, then the roads get stuck and you can't 
go in, then your food and daily needs they all get affected.”
842  Feng Xiaogeng, who guarded the 
caves from 1969 – 1972, kept company with a group of two to five other colleagues.  The 
museum “rented some spaces for us to sleep... that factory had space for us to sleep...we couldn't 
always find things to eat.”
843  Those who went left their families behind.  Feng's wife, for example, 
raised their two kids alone.
Those who guarded the caves came back as heroes.  Feng got promoted to associate 
director of the Conservation Workshop.  He didn't have the same skill set as restorers who 
“knew how to do it all, draw, print, reproduce”.
844  On the other hand, he worked on a top-secret 
project and proved his worth as a Chinese Communist Party member.  As Feng boasted, other 
restorers “came from society” and just didn't have the level of trustworthiness that the 
administrators bestowed on the guards at Anhui.
845 
Books, Cultural Relics, and the Restoration of Lu Xun's Tomb], March, 1969 – December 1969, B172-3-28, 
SMA, Shanghai. 
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Take Charge
The Class of 1952 quickly found themselves working jobs that their former superiors 
vacated, or could no longer perform given Cultural Revolution politics.  When the Shanghai 
Museum resumed normal operations in 1972, its biggest concern was installing programs that 
matched the Gang of Four's criteria: “Promulgate the objects that workers and the people 
created.”
846  The museum's existing exhibitions faced vitriolic criticism from Gang of Four 
supporters.
847  The ancient antiquities galleries, for example, “were criticized for displaying 
religious objects because when people see Buddhas they prostrate and start kowtowing”, and 
had to be shut down.
848  The urgent need to reinvent the museum and its exhibitions made the 
Class of 1952 realized that they, more than ever, were the ones that determined the museum's 
future.
849
Under Gang of Four rule, all museum exhibitions “had to talk about how excellent 
laboring citizens created history”.
850  Both written content and gallery scripts went through an 
official approval process.  That meant meeting the expectations of Mao Zedong's wife Jiang 
846 Interview with Li Junjie, July 7
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848 Interview with Li Junjie, July 7
th, 2009.
849 Shanghai shi wenhua xitong gewei hui (chou), shi wenguan hui deng guanyu juban chutu wenwu, zhongguo taoci, 
qintong qi zhanlan ji <Shanghai shi Qing shaonian meishu zhanlan> deng de baogao, pifu, [Shanghai Municipal 
Cultural Administration Revolutionary Board (Preparatory), Municipal Cultural Relics Administration, etc's 
Report and Rescripts Regarding Preparations for Exhibitions on Excavated Relics, Chinese Ceramics and 
<Shangahi Municipal Youth Arts Exhibition>] February 1972 – December 1972, B172-3-55, SMA, Shanghai. 
850 Interview with Zhu Shuni, January 15
th, 2010.  For period coverage of these exhibitions in the international 
press see Robert J. Fornaro, “Ideology and Archaeology in China,” Economic and Political Weekly, 11, no. 20 
(1976): 743-745.260
Qing, leader of the Gang of Four and gatekeeper for public cultural displays in the PRC.  The 
Class of 1952 kept proposals conservative.  “Beijing did an archeology exhibition, so then 
Shanghai also did an archeology exhibit.”
851  Before the exhibitions premiered, inspectors 
listened to gallery guides recite narratives meant for local, national, as well as international 
guests.
852  The process even made seasoned guides nervous – many were seen repeating tour 
scripts to themselves before inspections.
853
Exhibitions that supported PRC drives for land rights and workers’ solidarity got 
approved easily.  The Ancient Chinese Ethnic Minorities' Bronzes And Arts And Crafts 
exhibition even got industry participation.  The museum invited workers from the Shanghai 
Metalworks Factory and the Shanghai Ceramics Factory for special “panel discussions and 
special viewings.”
854  The panels stressed the history of Chinese civilization in the Xisha or 
Paracel islands, an archipelago that China, Taiwan, and Vietnam all wanted sovereignty over. 
Every visitor, domestic or foreign, heard gallery guides recite that recent excavations 
“demonstrate that Chinese people have lived and worked in the south sea islands for hundreds 
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and thousands of years.”
855
The launch of Jiang Qing's 1973 Criticize Lin (Biao), Criticize Confucius Campaign, 
however, made things difficult for museum staff.  “She wanted to use the Legalists' things as an 
example, and wanted the calligraphy and painting exhibitions to reflect this historic struggle.”
856 
The municipality needed a show to galvanize “the great industrial, agricultural, and military 
masses...to use Marxist-Leninism and Maoist ideas to infiltrate the resource grounds for ancient 
Chinese painting.”
857  The Class of 1952 couldn't do it.  As Li Junjie pointed out, “calligraphy 
and painting are made by intellectuals!”
858  
The painting exhibition was a disaster.  The municipal inspection team panned 
everything.
859  The museum staff had to revise all plans.  When the show finally opened in 1975, 
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visitors walked away confused.  A  Jiangnan Ship Building Factory representative “couldn't tell 
how much education I got from today's exhibition, I don't know what it's all about, what am I 
supposed to do when I leave?”
860  Workers from the three upper harbor districts felt “Confucian 
paintings...took the dominant spot, it makes me feel like the right doesn't crush the wrong.”
861 
Furthermore, visitors clamored for more contemporary Chinese paintings.  “The Cultural 
Revolution had been going on for eight years, good paintings must be in abundance”.
862  The 
museum, however, had no interest in paintings postdating 1795 because it did not see those 
categories of art as integral to Chinese cultural heritage.  The Class of 1952 had to admit failure. 
The painting fiasco put the museum under intense scrutiny.  When city officials visited, 
they complained that conservation standards “did not reflect what the city wanted”.
863 
Inspectors complained that “even with sealed doors and windows, a de-humidifier can only take 
October 1974, B172-3-130, SMA, Shanghai. 
860 Shanghai shi wenhua ju gewei hui, shi wenguan hui deng guanyu ju ban <Qin zhan>, <pilin picong tupian zhan>, 
xiugai <zhongguo huihua chenlie>, <zhongguo qingtongqi chenlie> deng de qingshi, pifu [Shanghai Municipal 
Cultural Bureau's Revolutionary Director's Board and the Municipal Cultural Relics Administrative Board, Etc's 
Proposals and Rescripts on Preparing the <Qin Exhibition>, <Anti-Lin Biao, Anti-Confucius Images 
Exhibition>, Edits to <Chinese Paintings Exhibition>, <Chinese Bronzes Exhibition>, Etc] Feburary 1974 – 
October 1974, B172-3-130, SMA, Shanghai. 
861 Shanghai shi wenhua ju gewei hui, shi wenguan hui deng guanyu ju ban <Qin zhan>, <pilin picong tupian zhan>, 
xiugai <zhongguo huihua chenlie>, <zhongguo qingtongqi chenlie> deng de qingshi, pifu [Shanghai Municipal 
Cultural Bureau's Revolutionary Director's Board and the Municipal Cultural Relics Administrative Board, Etc's 
Proposals and Rescripts on Preparing the <Qin Exhibition>, <Anti-Lin Biao, Anti-Confucius Images 
Exhibition>, Edits to <Chinese Paintings Exhibition>, <Chinese Bronzes Exhibition>, Etc] Feburary 1974 – 
October 1974, B172-3-130, SMA, Shanghai. 
862 Shanghai shi wenhua ju gewei hui, shi wenguan hui deng guanyu ju ban <Qin zhan>, <pilin picong tupian zhan>, 
xiugai <zhongguo huihua chenlie>, <zhongguo qingtongqi chenlie> deng de qingshi, pifu [Shanghai Municipal 
Cultural Bureau's Revolutionary Director's Board and the Municipal Cultural Relics Administrative Board, Etc's 
Proposals and Rescripts on Preparing the <Qin Exhibition>, <Anti-Lin Biao, Anti-Confucius Images 
Exhibition>, Edits to <Chinese Paintings Exhibition>, <Chinese Bronzes Exhibition>, Etc] Feburary 1974 – 
October 1974, B172-3-130, SMA, Shanghai. 
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care of a space of 30 square meters, so it's only effective in our storerooms.”
864  They found out 
that every week, gallery guides helped haul “these huge rocks of lime that we put next to the 
exhibition rooms to suck out the humidity”, a method that inspectors found unscientific and 
backward.
865  Critiques quickly escalated to attacks.  The municipality soon asserted that the 
museum staff made no progress in socialist enlightenment despite participating in Cultural 
Revolution campaigns.
866  To the staff's horror, “they said that the Shanghai Museum has not 
reformed, our thoughts cannot keep up with the times.”
867  
The municipality proposed that the museum overhaul its infrastructure.  City officials 
wanted to “send peasants and soldiers into the pool of Shanghai Museum workers” and replace 
the Class of 1952.
868  This plan not only showed up in personal communications between 
museum and municipal employees, but also in official reports on institutional progress. 
Municipal surveys concluded “we should allow the industrial, agricultural and military masses to 
participate...add new blood into museum work.”
869  
The Class of 1952 perceived these demands as threats.  They had just experienced, and 
escaped, years of difficult campaigns.  They had also just established a foothold in the work unit 
864 Shanghai shi wenhua ju, shi wenguan hui guanyu henxiu jiading “qiuxia pu”, “zhenru si” ji xiugai huihua chenlie 
wenzi shuomin, qingtong qi chuxian fenzhuang xiu qingkuang de baogao [Shanghai Municipal Cultural Bureau, 
Municipal Cultural Relics Management Board's Report Regarding the Restoration of Jiading's Autumn Colors 
Orchard, Zhenru Temple, Editing the Painting Exhibition's Wording and explanations, and Condition Report 
on Bronzes Powderized with Rust] February 1975 – December 1975, B172-3-176, SMA, Shanghai. 
865 Interview with Zhong Yinlan, January 5
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866 Interview with Li Junjie, July 7
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in which they invested most of their careers.  Any administrative changes made from the outside 
loosened their footholds.  Their profession was under threat.
The Class of 1972
The Class of 1952 undertook a project to reinvent the Shanghai Museum.  Using the 
same language that municipal inspectors employed in their critiques, the Class of 1952 argued 
that they knew the best way to get “new blood in the museum”.
870  They alone had the skill sets 
to select and train new recruits, and prevent the PRC’s Red antiquarians from dying out.
871 
Zhu Shuyi and Yang Hui assembled detailed recruitment plans.  The Class of 1952 had 
specific goals in mind.  They considered existing candidates, Sent-down youths who left school 
to work in the municipal reeducation program known as chadui luohu (commune inserts), 
useless riffraff because their formal education stopped in 1966.
872  Instead, the museum staff 
wanted to recruit “a group of people who were sent down in '66...at least if they were the class of 
1966 they graduated from high school.”
873  
870 Interview with Zhu Shuyi, January 15
th, 2010.
871 This managerial tactic is consistent with that in other sectors.  For examples see James A. Wall, Jr., “Managers in 
the People's Republic of China”, The Executive, 4, no. 2 (1990): 19-32; 
872 Interview with Li Junjie, July 7
th, 2009.
873 Interview with Li Junjie, July 7
th, 2009.  This selective recruitment practice is the opposite of that reported by 
studies on education in the country at large Nirmal Kumar Chandra “Education in China: From the Cultural 
Revolution to Four Modernisations”, Economic and Political Weekly, 22, no. 19/21, (1987): AN121-
AN125+AN127-AN136; Zhong Deng and Donald J. Treiman, “The Impact of the Cultural Revolution on 
Trends in Educational Attainment in the People's Republic of China” American Journal of Sociology, 103, no. 2 
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Zhu and Yang had to search widely to find young high school graduates.  The pair had to 
obtain the Ministry of Labor's permission just to find out where these youths were.  “Some 
places...that we went to to look for these employees there was no transportation, Yang Hui and I 
had to walk for several hours to get down there.”
874  The recruits had to pass rigorous 
inspections.  The municipality only allowed work unit transfers for young people of innocuous 
family backgrounds, with industrial/agricultural work experience, and favorable 
recommendations from their local production unit.   
By autumn of 1972, the Shanghai Museum got thirty recruits from Nanhui county, 
located forty-seven miles (seventy-five KM) southeast of downtown Shanghai.
875  The Nanhui 
commune administrators gave the museum full access to its personnel files, which “talked about 
family background, their education, the labor society's conclusions on the workers 
themselves...whether they were activists”.
876  Zhu and Yang used these files to select “the top of 
the bunch...because we wanted some good people.”
877  
The municipality were satisfied with Zhu and Yang's selections.
878  Before admitting the 
Class of 1972, municipal inspectors “would say, oh the intellectuals have not found reform 
yet.”
879  Identifying the right recruits, however, showed that the museum understood the 
Cultural Revolution.  As Li Junjie explained, once the Class of 1952 integrated the Class of 1972 
874 Interview with Zhu Shuyi, January 15
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875 Interview with Xu Yongxiang, July 8
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into museum administration, “we were allowed to work with the public propaganda division”, a 
managerial transition that signaled true corroboration from the municipality.
880
The Class of 1972 included ten women and twenty men between the ages of twenty and 
twenty-five, all of whom roomed and boarded in the museum.  The museum staff had to create 
dormitories.  “These kids were from Nanhui.  They had no place to stay in Shanghai.”
881  The 
women shared one giant room, while the men had several smaller rooms.  “The girls lived on the 
7th floor and the boys lived on the 8th and 9th” floors” of the museum.
882  
The new recruits felt chosen.  Municipal officials visited and dubbed them the museum's 
Crimson Successors, going as far as to tell “them at an official conference that they were there to 
reform the intellectuals at the Shanghai museum”.
883  When I asked Qiu Jinxian, a member of the 
Class of 1972, whether it was difficult to adjust to Shanghai she replied no.  “We were the 
Crimson Successors, we were especially favored, the previous batches of recruits talked about us 
in a slightly jealous way.”
884   
For the first six months, the Class of 1972 took classes with the Class of 1952 and hunted 
for apprenticeships.  There were classes in “ancient Chinese language, history...bronze, 
calligraphy and painting, and ceramics.”
885  New hires were mentored around the clock.  When 
the junior employees “got up and had to have their exercises” early in the morning, the Class of 
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1952 were there.
886  The recruits had all seven days of the week planned.
887  Even recreational 
activities had an educational component.  Whenever the museum sponsored outdoor 
exhibitions Zhu Shuyi “went with [the new hires], waited in line...and then when we were done 
looking at the exhibition we walked all the way back, like we were going to school.”
888  These 
activities helped integrate the Crimson Successors into metropolitan life, which many had never 
experienced prior to joining the museum.   
The Class of 1952 designed apprenticeships for the new recruits.
889  Wang Youzhi, for 
example, wanted to do archeology.  Zhu Shuyi recalls asking Wang, “why do you like archeology, 
I said you guys don't know, archeology is a pretty tough job.”
890  Wang replied “since I was a little 
boy.  When other people were digging up coffins and things like that I would get all excited.”
891 
Zhu reported this to the archeology department, which agreed to train him.
892  
Some rotated through several departments in order to “find out what interested us.
893 
The Class of 1952 designed a part exam, part interview process to ensure that undecided 
members of the Class of 1972 “got the kinds of jobs they wanted, and that the jobs that they 
886 Interview with Zhu Shuyi, January 15
th, 2010.
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888 Interview with Zhu Shuyi, January 15
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889 For published apprenticeship accounts see Lao Jixiong, “Zhongguo gudai shuhua xunhui jianding zu de 
nanwang huiyi” [The Chinese Ancient Painting And Calligraphy Authentication Grand Tour's Unforgettable 
Moments] Jiancha Fengyun [Inspection Series] no. 3, (2011): 81-83; Si Wei, “Xiutao buci uitian you dao, ji 
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selected for themselves matched their capabilities.”
894  Qiu Jinxian settled on the Conservation 
Workshop.  She started her day brushing paper for the repair masters.  “After dinner in the 
canteen we went back to the repair room to practice, went to bed at 9 or 10PM, then got up the 
next morning to work again.”
895  Exam scores determined salaries.  “Some went from forty-two to 
forty-five RMB a month.  I remember starting at thirty-six, then we went to forty-two.”
896  The 
Class of 1972 did well.  When Qiu “left the Shanghai museum in 1987 I was at a salary of eighty-
six RMB a month.”
897  By way of comparison, high school teachers made between forty and fifty 
RMB a month.  
The Class of 1972 had better career prospects, on average, than their cohorts.  Between 
1968 to 1972, more than twenty million urbanites between the ages of sixteen and twenty were 
taken out of school and resettled in the countryside.  Their lack of formal education and training 
made the Sent-down youths some of the most socially and economically vulnerable individuals 
in China.  Many received no education in a time when the rest of the world, which would soon 
come to recruit and invest in the PRC, studied, trained, and worked in industries.
898  The Class 
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of 1972, however, received enough formal training to enable them to “become the people who 
took over major positions” at the Shanghai Museum.
899   
The new recruits' apprenticeships also marked the passing of their teachers' teachers – 
the Shanghai Museum’s senior staff.  Within the decade, the majority of individuals who taught 
Shanghai’s original antiquarian training program, such as ceramics specialist Ma Zefu (1894 – 
1976), stele specialist and former museum President Xu Senyu (1888 – 1971), bronze specialist 
Jiang Dayi (1904 – 1981), and painting specialist Shen Jianzhi (1901 – 1975),  succumbed to 
disease.
900  The Class of 1952 reach out to their teachers.  Throughout 1975, Zhong Yinlan 
visited Shen Jianzhi and helped him obtain end-of-life care.  When medical services refused to 
drive Shen to the hospital she and another colleague found a canvas sheet, put Shen in the 
middle, and carried him to a facility on Siping road.
901  Jiang Dayi asked Chen Peifen, his 
student, to help take care of his son, a mute who was in his late fifties.  Chen said “okay, I can do 
that, I'll take responsibility.”
902
The Class of 1952 got a sense of institutional continuity from taking care of their 
teachers and training the Class of 1972.
903  Xu Yonxiang “shared the same office” with Customs 
899 Interview with Li Junjie, July 7
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900 For more detailed information on which Class of 1952 apprentices paired up with which old misters, see 
Wenhua bu guanyu shanghai bowuguan fangmei yanjiu shiyan de pifu ge jianguan shizhounian qingzhu huodong de 
baogao, 1963 – 1972 nian keyan guihua [The Cultural Affairs Administration's Responses to the Shanghai 
Museum's Mold-Prevention Experiments and Report on the Celebration Plans For The State's Ten Year 
Anniversary,  Science and Research Plans For 1963 – 1972] December 20
th, 1961 – January 14
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inspector Shen Jinxin, who trained the former in antiquities appraisal.
904  After occupying the 
same office for fifteen years, Shen retired, at which point Xu took over at Customs.  Qiu Jinxian, 
who left the PRC in 1987 and now works in Chinese Painting Conservation at the British 
Museum, stays in contact with her Conservation Workshop mentors.
905  When she first left the 
PRC “my teacher gave me the set of all the repair materials that I brought to Britain.”
906  When 
she visits Shanghai “he still gives me stuff.”
907  In other words, the two classes maintained 
relationships that lasted well beyond the Class of 1952's retirement, and take pride in each 
other's accomplishments.  When I interviewed Zhu Shuyi, for example, she insisted on showing 
off group photos and boasted that even those members of the Class of 1972 who went overseas 
still “send me something every year.”
908   
Overseas Delivery
Zhong Yinlan started appraising Arts and Crafts Company stock a few months after she 
gave birth to her first child in 1972.  She had to work all over southeastern China and traveling 
put her out. “The living conditions were very bad” and she “had no milk”.
909  She could only 
come home four days a month so her mother took care of the newborn.  They made “thin 
porridge, put it in a milk bottle and fed him that way”.
910  
State, and Educational Inequality in China, 1949–1996”, Sociological Perspectives, 51, no. 1 (2008): 201-227
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The appraisers inspected stock in Shanghai, Suzhou, as well as Arts and Crafts Company 
“storage facilities...in Ningbo”, a seaport city in Zhejiang province.
911  The company kept “these 
little structures nearby, like small alleyways and shacks.”
912  The staff lived in these shacks for the 
duration of their audit.  There was no furniture, so they created makeshift beds by putting a 
board between two chairs.  Winters “were so cold...we would wash our towels at night, and in the 
morning the towels would have turned to ice!”
913
The auditors had to work outdoors because the storehouses had no electricity.  Zhong 
and her cohorts huddled under eaves or gathered in courtyards because the light there was good. 
They took turns bringing antiquities outside for inspections, then back inside for storage.    
Shanghai Museum employees also packed and inspected Arts and Craft Company stock 
at municipal sorting stations.  Shen Minren was one of a three-person team that the museum 
sent to pack up at Puxi road in the mid-1970s.  The three were told to put everything into boxes 
for the Arts and Crafts Company.  “They had all this stuff left over... big piles on the floors.”
914 
Once the boxes were ready the three waited for the company to “send someone over, we signed 
it, they took it, and they sold it” overseas.
915
Dealers who got invited to buy direct from Arts and Crafts Company warehouses 
confirm that the corporation kept their stock in similar conditions throughout the country. 
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st, 2010.
912 Interview with Zhong Yinlan, July 10
th, 2009.
913 Interview with Zhong Yinlan, July 10
th, 2009.
914 Interview with Shen Minren, June 16
th, 2011.
915 Interview with Shen Minren, June 16
th, 2011.272
Hugh Moss, one of the few British art dealers who got invited to the company's Beijing 
warehouses, describes his experience as follows.  He arrived in 1974.  An entourage of 
“minders...took me to a little warehouse on the western, northwestern, edge of Beijing, full of 
snuff bottles which were my main interest.”
916  There, Moss saw “literally, dozens and dozens of 
cardboard boxes, full of snuff bottles.  No wrapping no nothing.  It looked like they had just been 
shoved in there.”
917  Moss' Hong Kong contacts confirmed that “most of them would then go by 
the box to the Hong Kong dealers who would then shift through it, send it to their glass guy get 
all the little chips out and polish them and they would come out just fine at the end of the 
day.”
918  The quality of Arts and Crafts Company stock varied from spectacular to quotidian. 
Whether through the Canton Fair or direct sales, this was what sorting and purchasing stations 
all over the PRC supplied the Arts and Crafts Company, and in turn, the export antiquities trade. 
The demand for export antiquities soon changed the look of art dealerships in the PRC. 
By the time Zhu Junbo started working at Duoyun Xian in 1973, it bore no resemblance the 
store in which Sun Jiecong received her delegation of unidentified officials back in 1966.  In 
Sun's day the store had three operational floors and a purchasing station in the back.  The first 
floor sold scholar's studio implements.  “There were bronzes and stones, stele rubbings, pens.”
919 
The second floor stocked calligraphy and painting and the third floor was office space.  By the 
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time Zhu started, “we closed the upper and lower floors” and just had the purchasing station.
920 
The painting and calligraphy gallery got converted into a foreigners-only salon.  The staff put up 
some paintings and made it clear that “these things can only be sold to foreigners, not Chinese 
people.”
921  In fact, “only foreigners can go upstairs, if you were local you could not go 
upstairs.”
922  
The Arts and Crafts Company made the antiquities trade one of the few work units in 
Shanghai with the authority to receive foreign visitors.
923  Dealers had to pay special attention to 
the well being of non-Chinese customers.  Whenever the “big noses” walked up to Duoyun Xian, 
Zhu and his cohorts had to “deter local residents from gathering and watching”.
924  Employees 
got constant reminders to conduct themselves “without servility, but also without 
obnoxiousness”.
925   
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zuotanhui de zongjie fayan [The Commission of Commerce, Municipal Revolutionary Board, Shanghai First 
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Antiquities purchasing stations became Shanghai's de-facto pawn shops.  Cultural 
Revolution-era salaries were a pittance.  Zhu Junbo, for example, earned 17 RMB a month.
926 
He explained that,
“Your salary was calculated by how much grain you had to buy, how many liang of oil, how many 
liang of meat...There's grain purchasing coupons and grain purchasing cards, and you guard this 
with your life...So what happens if someone gets sick?  You have to get the money somehow, so if 
you have something in the family then you sell it.  And you can only sell to the state.”
927
Chinese who sold antiquities to purchasing stations went with all manners of personal 
documentation.  The municipality tracked people through these records, making note of those 
who sold unusually large quantities.
928  Private art dealing was forbidden and these records 
helped regulate the market.  The only way to exchange antiquities for cash was through 
purchasing stations.  “It was like a part of civic security...you have to sell to state-owned 
companies.”
929  The policy caused contention - sellers muttered that the PRC State kept earnings 
low and purchasing stations regulated for the same reason; to extract as much as possible from 
the private sector.
930  
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Appraisal Conflicts
Museum employees soon identified two issues in the export trade.  Firstly, they objected 
to selling in bulk.  The onionskin catalogs organized sales by price.  Buyers who ordered from 
the catalog “can say you give me one hundred objects from the ten RMB category, one hundred 
objects from the twenty RMB category, because for this order I want two hundred items.”
931 
The Class of 1952 asserted that bulk sales minimized profits.  Some also suggested that bulk 
sales encouraged mistakes.  “Everyone knew that during the Cultural Revolution they were 
raiding, even overseas, they knew that they were taking all the precious materials.”
932  Therefore, 
“Japanese and Hong Kong people...suspected that there were good things in there”, and “if they 
can take one good thing out of the hundred or thousands of things, then they're making bank.”
933
The museum raised bulk sales as an official complaint to the State Administration of 
Cultural Heritage.
934  The staff described bulk buyers as “the mice that fell into the rice pot, so 
thrilled!”
935  Wholesale prices made the PRC lose profits while “those Southeast Asians, those 
Hong Kong people, they made a bucket-load of money.”
936  The museum staff insisted that the 
Arts and Crafts Company sell antiquities piecemeal, in order to maximize profits over time. 
The State Administration of Cultural Heritage agreed.  The museum soon received 
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“notification saying that 'Arts and Crafts Company cannot export in bulk.'”
937  Canton Fair 
representatives had to “sell fewer at higher prices, keeping a thin stream [of product] that flows 
longterm.”
938  The museum also gained more authority over export transactions.
939  All Arts and 
Crafts Company stock in the eastern China came under the Shanghai Museum's watch and the 
staff could bar any of it from export.
940  Zhong Yinlan and her cohorts even started traveling to 
the Canton Fair, where they appraised stock before merchandise went on display.
941
The Shanghai Museum's second objection targeted the 1795 demarcation.  Appraisers 
felt the demarcation made too much available for sale overseas.  The museum staff warned that if 
this trend continued, “we would have nothing left, a big gap in collections of modern Chinese 
art.”
942  They argued that existing export practices allowed non-Chinese nations to become more 
advanced scholars of modern Chinese art than the Chinese themselves.  “In the future if we’re 
937 Interview with Li Junjie, January 21
st, 2010.
938 Guowu Yuan, Shangye bu, Shanghai haiguan, Shanghai shi diyi shangye ju, wailun gongsi guanyu pizhuan jiaqiang 
wenwu, shangye guanli he baohu zhence ji chukou gongyipin ticai, kucun chuli yijian, waixi chuanyuan, minhang jiwu 
Yuan gouwu xiedai chujin guanli wenti, waiyu shisheng lai youji shangdian shixu de yijian de tongzhi, baogao, pifu 
[State Department, Ministry of Commerce, Shanghai Customs, Shanghai First Municipal Commission of 
Commerce, China Ocean Shipping Supply Company's Notifications, Reports, and Comments Regarding 
Strengthening Management of Cultural Relics, Commercial Regulations and Protecting Plicies Regarding 
Export Arts and Crafts' Themes, Warehouse Processing, Foreign Ship Staff, and Domestic Staff's Taking 
Merchandise Beyond Borders, Comments On Foreign Language Students Interning At Friendship Stores] 
April 15
th, 1974, B123-8-1030, SMA, Shanghai. 
939 Interview with Li Junjie, January 21
st, 2010.
940 Interview with Li Junjie, April 27
th, 2010.
941 Shanghai shi wenhua ju zhuanfa guojia wenwu guanli ju 'duo waiguo ren, huajiao, gangao tongbao xiedai, youji 
wenwu chukou zan xing guanli banfa' deng de tongzhi [Shanghai Cultural Bureau Forwards State Cultural Relics 
Management Bureau's Notification On 'Temporary Regulations Regarding Foreigners, Overseas Chinese, 
Hong Kong and Macao Wombmates' Carrying and Mailing Cultural Relics Overseas', Etc] May 1973 – 
November 1973, B172-3-79, SMA, Shanghai. 
942 Interview with Zhong Yinlan, June 16
th, 2009.277
going to study Chinese art history, then you will have to go overseas, especially to Japan.”
943 
Thus, museum staff requested that paintings by twentieth-century artists, such as Wu Hufan, Qi 
Baishi, and Xu Beihong, as well as Qing painters whose careers spanned the 1795 demarcation, 
be selectively barred from export.  
Some fragments of data do seem to confirm the Shanghai Museum employees' warnings. 
Starting in 1960, Mary Shen, a British Chinese who worked for Collett's Bookstore, made bi-
annual trips to China to buy export antiquities for the British market.
944  Located across the 
street from the British Museum, Collett's “had connections with the British communist party” 
and sold “prints, silk painting, paper cuts, enameled cups...you name the arts and crafts they sold 
it.”
945  Shen “introduced the idea of sharing an interest in painting”, especially modern and 
contemporary Chinese painting, to the United Kingdom.
946  From the perspective of British 
dealers, Shen began “dealing in Chinese paintings, Qi Baishi, Xu Beihong, people like that long 
before anybody ever heard of the names.”
947  In fact, many British collectors developed an 
interest in modern Chinese paintings through Collett's.  Shen's clients included Mary Tregear, 
keeper of the Ashmolean Museum, who created Oxford University's collection of modern 
Chinese art.
The Shanghai Museum's objection to the 1795 demarcation caught the attention of the 
943 Interview with Li Junjie, January 21
st, 2010.
944 Interview with Helen Shepard (daughter of Mary Shen), September 7
th, 2009.
945 Interview with Helen Shepard, September 7
th, 2009.
946 Interview with Helen Shepard, September 7
th, 2009.
947 Interview with Hugh Moss, September 27
th, 2010.278
State Administration of Cultural Heritage.  The staff got permission to conduct detailed 
appraisal projects on specific painters.
948  Appraisers targeted “Ba-da's objects, or Wu Hufan's 
things...established a time line” for new export demarcations.  They also looked for iconic or 
representative works of art for all modern and contemporary Chinese artists, which the museum 
barred from export.  In effect, the appraisal projects established a new canon for Chinese art 
postdating 1795.  “Some if you see that name then it can’t be exported, some, the very fine 
objects can’t be exported, their run of the mill creations can be exported.”
949  
Takeover
   The Shanghai Museum's successful intervention in art exports convinced PRC officials 
to give the museum more authority over Shanghai’s art trade.  In 1974, PRC Premier Zhou Enlai 
“signed a document...which allowed the Chinese Curio Markets to reopen” under the museum's 
management.
950  The document mandated that “cultural relics stores currently under the 
leadership of foreign commerce departments be transferred to cultural institution leadership.”
951 
After working for the Arts and Crafts Company for years, art dealers in Shanghai could now 
return to their original work unit, albeit under different management.  The same edict also 
decreed that the work unit’s property, which the Arts and Crafts Company had acquired lump 
948 Interview with Li Junjie, January 21
st, 2010.
949 Interview with Li Junjie, January 21
st, 2010.
950 Interview with Jin Jiapin, January 13
th, 2010.
951 Shanghai gemin weiyuan hui caimao zu guanyu jiejue wenwu shangdian yongfang de qingshi baogao [Shanghai 
Municipal Revolutionary Board's Request and Report Regarding The Resolution of Cultural Relic Store 
Housing] July 1973 – June 1976, B248-2-966, SMA, Shanghai. 279
sum in 1966, should be restituted to the Shanghai Museum.
952  
The museum put Jin Jiapin and Xia Shunkui in charge of negotiations with the Arts and 
Crafts Company.  Jin and Xia “had to make sure that they would give us back the original real 
estate on Canton road and to give us back personnel so the store can reopen.  Also, the stock 
that we gave over.”
953  In short, everything that the Chinese Curio Markets owned before the 
merger, the museum wanted back.
954
Jin and Xia made four specific demands.  First, they wanted headcount.  The Chinese 
Curio Markets “originally had 274 people, of which 105 still work at the Arts and Craft 
Company and the Friendship Store.”
955  The museum wanted “at least thirty-five people to man 
the purchasing station, outside acquisitions, warehouse management, and administration.”
956 
Second, they wanted land.  Jin and Xia wanted the Arts and Crafts Company to allot 1,826 m2 of 
space, which the Chinese Curio Markets would use as sales rooms, shipping depots, storage, and 
952 Shanghai gemin weiyuan hui caimao zu guanyu jiejue wenwu shangdian yongfang de qingshi baogao [Shanghai 
Municipal Revolutionary Board's Request and Report Regarding The Resolution of Cultural Relic Store 
Housing] July 1973 – June 1976, B248-2-966, SMA, Shanghai. 
953 Interview with Xia Shunkui, April 28
th, 2010.
954 Shanghai gemin weiyuan hui caimao zu guanyu jiejue wenwu shangdian yongfang de qingshi baogao [Shanghai 
Municipal Revolutionary Board's Request and Report Regarding The Resolution of Cultural Relic Store 
Housing] July 1973 – June 1976, B248-2-966, SMA, Shanghai. 
955 Shanghai shi wenhua ju, shigewei hui dangan guan guanyu jieban Shanghai wenwu shangdian ji dui 'wenge' zhong 
xingchen de wenwu ziliao shouji baoguan yijian, baogao [Shanghai Cultural Bureau And Municipal Revolutionary 
Committee's Objections and Reports Regarding The Transfer Of Shanghai's Cultural Relics Stores And The 
Acquisition Of Cultural Revolution Related Cultural Relics] Feburary 1975 – December 1975, B172-3-176, 
SMA, Shanghai. 
956 Shanghai shi wenhua ju, shigewei hui dangan guan guanyu jieban Shanghai wenwu shangdian ji dui 'wenge' zhong 
xingchen de wenwu ziliao shouji baoguan yijian, baogao [Shanghai Cultural Bureau And Municipal Revolutionary 
Committee's Objections and Reports Regarding The Transfer Of Shanghai's Cultural Relics Stores And The 
Acquisition Of Cultural Revolution Related Cultural Relics] Feburary 1975 – December 1975, B172-3-176, 
SMA, Shanghai. 280
purchasing stations.
957  Third, facilities.  The work unit needed glass displays, counters, and 
storage containers so storefronts can “dress” merchandise.
958  Lastly, cash.   Inventory 
inspections revealed that the Arts and Crafts Company returned merchandise “in severe stages 
of damage...inspections show cultural relics have mold, rot, as well as wear and tare.”
959   Jin 
stated this fourth demand in plain terms.  “When I gave it to you it was good.  Now it's rotten 
and moldy.  You have to give us compensation.”
960
Opposition to the museum's demands came from the top of the municipal hierarchy.  Jin 
named Wang Hongwen, a member of the Gang of Four, as the main opponent to the Shanghai 
Museum’s takeover of the art trade.  When Jin confronted Wang, “I gave him that document 
from central administration and he started banging on the desk.”  Wang managed export 
commerce and simply refused to have the museum takeover one of the most lucrative parts of 
his business.  “He said I won't allow this, I only listen to Shanghai administration, I only pay 
attention to regional management.  So the talks failed.”
961  While the museum began negotiating 
957 Shanghai gemin weiyuan hui caimao zu guanyu jiejue wenwu shangdian yongfang de qingshi baogao [Shanghai 
Municipal Revolutionary Board's Request and Report Regarding The Resolution of Cultural Relic Store 
Housing] July 1973 – June 1976, B248-2-966, SMA, Shanghai. 
958 Shanghai shi wenhua ju, shigewei hui dangan guan guanyu jieban Shanghai wenwu shangdian ji dui 'wenge' zhong 
xingchen de wenwu ziliao shouji baoguan yijian, baogao [Shanghai Cultural Bureau And Municipal Revolutionary 
Committee's Objections and Reports Regarding The Transfer Of Shanghai's Cultural Relics Stores And The 
Acquisition Of Cultural Revolution Related Cultural Relics] Feburary 1975 – December 1975, B172-3-176, 
SMA, Shanghai. 
959 Shanghai gemin weiyuan hui caimao zu guanyu jiejue wenwu shangdian yongfang de qingshi baogao [Shanghai 
Municipal Revolutionary Board's Request and Report Regarding The Resolution of Cultural Relic Store 
Housing] July 1973 – June 1976, B248-2-966, SMA, Shanghai. 
960 Interview with Jin Jiapin, January 13
th, 2010.
961 Interview with Jin Jiapin, January 13
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in 1974, “by the time the negotiations were done it was 1976.”
962  The Arts and Crafts 
Company’s municipal allies simply didn't want to let the company’s people, stock, or capital go 
to another work unit.  Jin Jiapin literally had to wait until the Gang of Four fell before the 
Shanghai Museum complete negotiations. 
During our interview, I asked Jin why the negations took so long.  He turned towards me 
and squared his shoulders.  “That stuff was considered a piece of fat bacon!  It was very 
lucrative.”
963  Fulfilling the museum's terms meant the Arts and Crafts Company had to 
relinquish more than one-third of its headcount in Shanghai, plus land and cash.  The company 
also had to return more than four-hundred crates of antiquities, as well as more than twenty-
thousand pieces of calligraphy and painting.
964  Those concessions cut significantly into the 
company's profits.
On October, 1978, the Chinese Curio Markets officially resumed business under 
Shanghai Museum management. 
Conclusion
After the fall of the Gang of Four in 1976, the social and political assaults that once 
looked so devastating had been all but repelled.  Cultural industries survived by providing a 
962 Interview with Jin Jiapin, January 13
th, 2010.
963 Interview with Jin Jiapin, January 13
th, 2010.
964 Shanghai shi wenhua ju, shigewei hui dangan guan guanyu jieban Shanghai wenwu shangdian ji dui 'wenge' zhong 
xingchen de wenwu ziliao shouji baoguan yijian, baogao [Shanghai Cultural Bureau And Municipal Revolutionary 
Committee's Objections and Reports Regarding The Transfer Of Shanghai's Cultural Relics Stores And The 
Acquisition Of Cultural Revolution Related Cultural Relics] Feburary 1975 – December 1975, B172-3-176, 
SMA, Shanghai. 282
steady flow of state revenues, seizing private property, and selling the very objects it proposed to 
preserve.  At the dawn of the Reform era, however, those who visited China on Nixon's tails 
expressed shock at the shabby state of museums in the PRC.  Many feared that the Communist 
regime had robbed China of its cultural heritage.  Did the best collections of Chinese art now 
resided overseas?  
To the contrary.  The museum industry emerged on the other side of the Reform era 
decidedly intact.  It was ready to articulate Chinese cultural heritage, as an institutional and 
commercial force, both at home and abroad.  
There are, then four phases to the Cultural Revolution's extraordinary impact on the 
Shanghai Museum: the phase of expanding its collection through raids, the phase of employee 
professionalization, the mass-divestment of seized property overseas and, finally, the museum 
staff' regulation and eventual takeover of the art trade, which integrated new artists and 
categories of art into the Chinese art historical canon.  There is nothing mysterious about the 
Shanghai Museum's participation in Cultural Revolution campaigns.  It arose at a time when 
political conditions allowed cultural institutions to profit from local tensions, and state 
economic needs pushed the export trade to previously unprecedented heights.  What is 
remarkable, however, is the level of organization that institutions like the Shanghai Museum 
managed to obtain in the process of participation, as well as the extent to which participation 
profited the museum, the Arts and Crafts Company, and the international market for Chinese 283
art.  Hugh Moss, who bought on the cheap throughout the 1970s, confirmed that soon export 
art “weren't available at fifty quid.  It was expensive.”
965  By the time Alvin Lo started going to the 
Canton Fairs in 1979, sales representatives could block orders based on market trends.  “They 
say from what you choose we'll let you know what can be exported...they would take a whole 
month going through what you selected, maybe one percent could come out.”
966  In other words, 
from the perspective of the international market for Chinese art, the PRC quickly transformed 
from a wholesale supplier of Chinese art, to gatekeeper. 
965 Interview with Hugh Moss, September 27
th, 2010.
966 Interview with Alvin Lo, June 14
th, 1020.284
Chapter Five: Incomplete Restitution, 1976 – 1996285
Figure 5.1. Photograph of Gu Youchu's old work unit apartment.  Courtesy of Gu Youchu. 
Getting By
Those who marvel at the PRC's leap towards economic prosperity since 1978 have failed 
to register the marks of poverty that lingered throughout the 1980s and 90s.
967  Gu Youchu's 
967 For a detailed assessment of this issue see Andrew G. Walder “Social Change in Post-Revolution China” Annual 
Review of Sociology, 15 (1989): 405-424.
For a select set of scholarship seeking to deal with the simultaneity of economic growth and persistent poverty 
in the PRC, see Stephen L. Morgan, “Richer and Taller: Stature and Living Standards in China, 1979-1995” The 
China Journal, no. 44 (2000): 1-39; Sheying Chen “Economic Reform and Social Change in China: Past, 
Present, and Future of the Economic State”, International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society, 15, no. 4 
(2002): 569-589; Robert L. Moore, “Generation Ku: Individualism and China's Millennial Youth” Ethnology, 286
kitchen characterizes this persistent condition of need (Figure 5.1).  
Throughout the 1970s, 80s, and 90s, Gu lived in a one-room studio on the third floor of 
a public housing complex in Huangpu district.  His coal-stove sits in the lower right corner of 
Figure 5.1.  There is no kitchen sink.  Gu hauls water from the public faucet up three flights of 
stairs.  He cleaned  everyday, but a stubborn layer of dust covered everything – the unavoidable 
consequence of burning coal indoors.
968 
Poverty in the PRC looked different than poverty in Somalia or Haiti.  Famines are a 
distant memory, but the a career in the state's work units didn't provide full bellies either.  Meat, 
fish, vegetables, even cigarettes came from work unit-run stores, but the store shelves often had 
no stock for vouchers or money.  Underneath his photograph, Gu Youchu writes the following: 
“To live you have to have dignity, and not subject yourself to abuse.  Take charge of your own 
fate, look carefully and think right, go on, that's hope.  I got sick three times in my time at the 
Shanghai Museum, the above picture memorializes my living conditions as a bachelor.  The 
Shanghai Museum got four opportunities to allot housing, but not once to me?  If you have a 
house it's good on top of good, but homeless people stay homeless?  That's why I took long-term 
sick leave, retired, and after retirement, found another way of earning money, bought my own 
place.”
969
Gu's scribbles articulate his disappointment in a system that promised to provide a decent, 
minimal standard of living, but instead made poverty feel normal.
970
44, no. 4 (2005): 357-376; Stanley Rosen, “The Victory of Materialism: Aspirations to Join China's Urban 
Moneyed Classes and the Commercialization of Education” The China Journal, no. 51 (2004): 27-51; Zheng 
Bijian, “China's 'Peaceful Rise' to Great-Power Status”, Foreign Affairs, 84, no. 5 (2005): 18-24; Aimin Chen 
“Urbanization in China and the Case of Fujian Province” Modern China, 32, no. 1 (2006): 99-130.
968 Interview with Gu Youchu, February 1
st, 2010.
969 Work Portfolio of Gu Youchu, Private collection of Gu Youchu, photographed with permission.
970 For more on public displays of poverty and related sentiments of difficulty, see Weihua Wu and Xiying Wang 
“Cultural Performance and the Ethnography of Ku in China” Positions: East Asia Cultural Critique, 16, no. 2 
(2008): 409-433287
Women typically point to the fact that they had to nurse their children on thin rice 
porridge.  As a childless divorcée, Gu points to his fingernails.  They are dry and brittle with 
white, half moons spots – classic sign of calcium, iron, and protein deficiency.  I expressed shock 
at the fact that they also bear scorch marks, but he says those came from work.  He sometimes 
burns himself when reproducing bronze relics.  I ask Gu why he takes private commissions if the 
Shanghai Museum still contracts him for bronze restoration.  He replies he gets commissions 
because the museum keeps him on contract.  His institutional association brings better business. 
It even paid for a new apartment.  In other words, there is no separation between museum and 
art market for Gu Youchu.
971  He begrudges his work unit for taking him out of its housing 
lottery, but the museum's market contacts also allowed him to create his own housing lottery.
972
This permeable boundary between museum and market is neither Capitalist nor 
Communist.  Rather, the two have always developed in tandem in the PRC.  The co-evolution of 
museum and market is a condition inherent to the invention of cultural heritage, as discussed 
through the lens of nationalization in Chapter One, market intervention in Chapter Two, and 
the commodification of confiscated property in Chapters Three and Four.  Chapter Five 
investigates the internationalization of this permeable boundary by examining luoshi zhengce 
971 For similar findings see John Fitzgerald, “A New Cultural Revolution: The Commercialisation of Culture in 
China”, The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, no. 11 (1984): 105-120; Deborah Davis, “Urban Consumer 
Culture” The China Quarterly, no. 183, (2005): 692- 709.
972 For more on danwei allotment issues see Kam Wing Chan and Li Zhang “The Hukou System and Rural-Urban 
Migration in China: Processes and Changes” The China Quarterly, 160, (1999): 818-855; Jonathan Unger and 
Anita Chan, “The Internal Politics of an Urban Chinese Work Community: A Case Study of Employee 
Influence on Decision-Making at a State-Owned Factory” The China Journal, no. 52, (2004): 1-24; Fei-Ling 
Wang, Organizing Through Division And Exclusion: China Hukou System (Stanford, 2005); 288
(restitution), a PRC compensation policy that paid indemnities for property seized between 
1949 and 1976.  I focuses on the restitution of antiquities because, throughout the 1970s and 
80s, it became a site of negotiation for individuals in a persistent condition of need.  Money 
mattered in restitution, but exchanging seized antiquities for favors that only work units like the 
Shanghai Museum could bestow mattered more.  Different constituents leveraged antiquities to 
obtain housing lottery privileges, new jobs, even special permission to sell their “cultural 
inheritance” overseas.  Thus, the restitution of antiquities holds a prominent and particular place 
both in museological concerns such as preservation, canonization, and heritage, as well as 
commercial concerns such as profit, distribution, and availability.
  This chapter also examines shifts in the museological fiction of donation, as mediated 
by the Shanghai Museum's enforcement of restitution.  After 1976, the museum's intense focus 
on donor programming coincided with the implementation of restitution for Chinese living 
outside of mainland China.  In conjunction with national-, provincial- and municipal-level 
constituents, the museum produced an astonishing range of cultural propaganda to encourage 
these individuals to donate restituted antiquities, as well as cash, to the PRC.  Almost uniformly, 
these programs focused on consent.  At the same time, the programs anchored themselves to 
existing tropes of donation, such as merit ceremonies and awards.  These tropes, however, were 
retooled to highlight the overseas donors' willingness to consent to the Shanghai Museum's 
programs, investments, and presentation of cultural heritage.  The cult of consent underlined the 289
museum's establishment of institutional partnerships with other countries, drove overseas 
funding, and transformed the museum from a national institution to international icon of 
cultural heritage.
973  Consent made the Shanghai Museum's articulation of cultural heritage 
verifiable, and ultimately, indispensable. 
Slow Start
Restitution came as a surprise to Shanghai Museum staff.  Wang Qianbi found out as 
early as 1974, at a meeting with Shen Zhiyu and some other top administrators.  Wang was an 
underground CCP member who had joined the party in 1945 and enjoyed a position of trust 
amongst municipal officials.
974  Museum administrators tended to turn to him for sensitive 
matters like restitution.  They told Wang about a central administration document called 
number 7101, which contained new decisions about Chinese who were targeted by political 
campaigns.  The document decreed that “there was going to be restitution, and the targeted 
people were going to be given their things back”.
975  In other words, the PRC was making plans 
to compensate individuals whose personal belongings got confiscated during the Cultural 
973 For similar findings see Peter Hays Gries, China's New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, And Diplomacy, (Berkeley, 
2004); Jennifer Hubbert “(Re)collecting Mao: Memory and fetish in contemporary China”, American 
Ethnologist, 33, no. 2 (2006): 145-161; Edward X. Gu “Cultural Intellectuals and the Politics of the Cultural 
Public Space in Communist China (1979-1989): A Case Study of Three Intellectual Groups”, The Journal of 
Asian Studies, 58, no. 2 (1999): 389-431; Manoranjan Mohanty, “For Socialist Freedom: Students' Movement 
in China”, Economic and Political Weekly, 24, no. 24 (1989): 1329-1333; Helen Rees, “The age of consent: 
Traditional music, Intellectual Property and Changing Attitudes in the People's Republic of China”, British 
Journal of Ethnomusicology, 12, no. 1 (2003): 137-171;  Xin Zhao and Russell W. Belk, “Politicizing Consumer 
Culture: Advertising’s Appropriation of Political Ideology in China’s Social Transition”, Journal of Consumer 
Research, 5, no. 2 (2008): 231-244;
974 Interview with Wang Qianbi, June 29
th, 2010.
975 Interview with Wang Qianbi, June 29
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Revolution, as well as in campaigns going back to the 1950s.  Wang wasn't to spread the word – 
the information was too new. 
Also in 1974, municipal officials that Chen Peifen could only identify as “them” came to 
the Shanghai Museum.  The officials went to the fourth floor, where the museum kept all the 
confiscated antiquities in its custody.  Chen had all the confiscations organized according to the 
estates and individuals from which the antiquities were seized.  Except for a big desk in the 
middle, the fourth floor had boxes crammed up to the ceiling.  The desk was literally full of gold. 
“There were a lot of gold coins that got collected...I just put it under there.”
976  Only Chen and 
her clerks worked on the fourth floor.  “They” came as a surprise. 
976 Interview with Chen Peifen, July 3
rd, 2009.291
Figure 5.2. Chen Peifen (second from right) and Shanghai Museum constituents in the seized 
antiquities area on the fourth floor of the Shanghai Museum (circa Cultural Revolution). 
Courtesy of Zheng Zhong. 
“They” wanted Chen's ledger.  The ledger contained itemized records that accounted 
for every antiquity that the museum had expropriated, from the gold coins under the desk to a 
pair of “hand-held spectacles, not the kind that you wear behind your ears.”
977  Chen warned her 
visitors that the ledger didn't account for periodic loans.  “Sometimes the Gang of Four would 
come and look at things, borrow them...when they were borrowed or taken out, I had no control 
over that.”
978  Nevertheless, the officials who checked her numbers reported that “nothing was 
missing.”
979  In fact, “they counted some gold coins and came up with one extra”, so Chen 
amended her ledger.
980  Then she relinquished the ledger and the officials left as suddenly as they 
977 Interview with Chen Peifen, July 3
rd, 2009.
978 Interview with Chen Peifen, July 3
rd, 2009.
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rd, 2009.292
had come.
981 
Ma Chengyuan, director of the bronze department, took Chen Peifen aside and 
explained why the visitors took her records.  Ma had heard from Wang Qianbi, who revealed 
that Chen's visitors managed the Sorting Committee.
982  Wang told Ma about document 7101, 
the state directive that stated that the PRC planned to return the museum's appropriations to 
their original owners.
983  This meant that the museum could no longer claim ownership over 
antiquities confiscated during Cultural Revolution, and arguably the political campaigns that 
preceded it.  Ma made it clear that “we have to prepare for this policy”, or risk loosing out on a 
phenomenal cache of antiquities.
984
Although the municipality collected Chen Peifen's ledgers as early as 1974, the Sorting 
Committee waited until the Cultural Revolution ended before initiating restitution.  For both 
the museum and the individual seeking compensation, restitution “was a lot of work”.
985   In 
order to initiate the process, individuals had to have their work unit “contact the Sorting 
Committee.  They show the necessary documents.  Then the Sorting Committee would take the 
objects out of their warehouse.”
986  No individual could initiate the restitution process alone. 
Their work unit had to carry out the restitution process in the individual's stead.  Furthermore, 
the municipality maintained a “no conflict” requirement.  “You had to have no problems or 
981 Interview with Chen Peifen, Feburary 1
st, 2010.
982 Interview with Wang Qianbi, June 29
th, 2010
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th, 2010
984 Interview with Chen Peifen, Feburary 1
st, 2010.
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conflicts, like if you were a counter-revolutionary then we couldn't just give your things back to 
you.”
987  “No conflict” constituted the selective aspect of restitution – work units only applied for 
restitution on behalf of individuals who met this requirement.
In the immediate aftermath of the Gang of Four's collapse, very few individuals in 
obtaining restitution.
988  Wang and his six underlings at the Puxi Road sorting station spent most 
of their time cataloging unprocessed confiscations.  “It was mostly items that were confiscated 
but that were not organized or cataloged, and if they wanted those objects to be organized they 
had to give it to us.”
989  Sorting procedures stayed the same.  “All the things that the museum 
could have would be sent over to the museum, and the things that the museum didn't want 
could be sold through the Arts and Crafts Company.  The books would go to the library.”
990 
There was less work in comparison to the Cultural Revolution years, when work unit 
representatives brought in confiscations by cargo truck.  Deliveries of confiscated material from 
municipal work units, however, never stopped trickling into the sorting stations.  “Every week 
there would be one person who was in charge of taking in objects, and then we spent the rest of 
987 Interview with Wang Qianbi, June 29
th, 2010.
988 For a first hand account of the immediate aftermath of 1976 in Shanghai, see Ronald Suleski “Changing the 
Guard in Shanghai: October-November 1976”, Asian Survey, 17, no. 9 (1977): 886-897.
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the time organizing materials.”
991  Sorting stations remained an important link in the supply 
chain that brought commodified confiscations to market, and unless either restitution or 
overseas exports emptied the warehouses, the work of sorting, appraising, and cataloging 
continued.  
The Special Acquisitions Team
Wang Qianbi opined that PRC administration delayed restitution as long as it could.  It 
wasn't until 1979 that “we began giving everything back to their owners”.
992   This included the 
tedious task of going over inventories to figure out which confiscations had already been sold 
and which still sat in Arts and Crafts Company warehouses.  If “they have not been sold, then 
they sent it back” and Sorting Committee members “had to check...who those objects belonged 
to.”
993  The identification process also included checking museum records.  Though the 
Shanghai Museum never sold any of the confiscated antiquities it held in custody, municipal 
officials had, as Chen Peifen already noted, borrowed select items. 
The delay gave museum administrators time to establish a special acquisitions team. 
Initially, this team had only three members: Lu Songlin, who had just returned to the museum 
from Puxi Road, Li Hongye, who took part in the great Ethnic Minority Artifacts Acquisition 
Project back in 1960, and Shang Yehuang, who participated in the 1966 raids.  Lu still 
remembers when he got called into President Shen Zhiyu's office.  In very plain language, Shen 
991 Interview with Wang Qianbi, June 29
th, 2010.
992 Interview with Wang Qianbi, June 29
th, 2010.
993 Interview with Wang Qianbi, June 29
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explained that members of this team were going to do their best to intervene with restitution. 
“That set of things, the raided things was all really nice.  The museum wanted it...They wanted 
us to give the confiscations back to people, but also ask them to give it up.”
994  Shanghai wanted 
to permanently acquire the confiscated antiquities that it had considered part of its collection for 
the past decades.
The special acquisitions team reported to Ma Chengyuan, also a pre-1945 Communist 
Party member and one of the contenders for the museum's President-ship (a position he 
eventually shared with Class of 1952 member Wang Qingzheng).
995  Ma rallied everyone who 
participated in the raids to establish good relations with the individuals from whom antiquities 
were confiscated.  As an institution of professional appraisers for the international Chinese art 
market, the museum staff understood the monetary and symbolic value of confiscated 
antiquities, perhaps better than the original owners themselves.  The staff didn't want to give 
back anything of value, especially “because we knew how much was being given back.”
996  Thus, 
on Ma's prompt, the staff went into motion.  “We went around and asked: We would like you to 
donate or sell part of the collection to us.  In exchange, we can help you with whatever it is you 
need help with.”
997
994 Interview with Lu Songlin, June 16
th, 2011.
995 Li Chaoyuan “Ma Chengyuan xiansheng de Zhongguo qingtongqi yanjiu” [Mr. Ma Chengyuan's Study Of 
Ancient Chinese Bronzes] Shanghai wenbo luncong [Shanghai Wenbo ] no. 1, (2010): 17-25; Ma Zhefei “Ma 
Chengyuan Yu Shanghai Bowuguan” [Ma Chengyuan And The Shanghai Museum” Zhongguo Bowuguan 
[Chinese Museums] no. 4, (2004): 73-79.
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th, 2010.
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The museum staff followed the same evaluation procedures that Shanghai had used 
since the early 1950s.  Lu Songlin, Li Hongye, and Shang Yehuang attended roundtable 
discussions with specialists such as “Shen Jinxin, Xie Zhiliu, Chen Wei, these experts, these 
people with authority, including Ma Chengyuan.  They set the prices” for all restitution offers.
998 
Lu explained that all offers were, to some extent, negotiable.  “Some people haggled, say I don't 
think this is enough.  So we had a bit of wiggle room.  Say we opened with five hundred, well we 
had a bit, we can pay a bit more, six hundred it was okay.”
999  
Interestingly, the museum never made offers on entire collections.  The staff selected 
specific antiquities out of an entire restitution package, at times promising individuals awaiting 
restitution that the Shanghai Museum had the power to speed up the restitution process if the 
individuals would consent to surrendering specific works of art.  “Every time we're going to give 
things back, we pick out ahead of time what the museum already wanted.”
1000  The special 
acquisitions team paid especially close attention to these selections, for while the museum was 
willing to adjust acquisitions prices, it was not willing to negotiate which antiquities it acquired. 
According to Lu, the museum tended to choose antiquities made before 1795, particularly 
objects that did not already exist in the museum collection, or filled existing gaps in the 
museum's collection.  These selections seldom exceed ten percent of any restitution package. 
998 Interview with Li Songlin, June 16
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“It's not like we bought everything back, just the ones that the museum wanted.”
1001
The International Chinese Art Market
After the PRC installed new economic policies in 1978, the price of Chinese art saw 
phenomenal growth.  Zhu Junbo, who had just joined the Duoyun Xian management team, 
made thirty-six RMB a month that year.  Compared to 1973, Zhu's salary rose 112 percent.
1002 
High school teachers, young museum administrators and shoe store managers earned about the 
same salary.  It was enough to sustain he and his family, but not enough to buy anything on the 
Duoyun Xian sales floor.  
Zhu observed that “customers who came before the Cultural Revolution were 
completely different from those who came after.”
1003  Chinese with newly restituted antiquities 
sold their possessions as fast as collectors and dealers, both domestic and foreign, came to buy 
them.  For example, “parents whose children got into school overseas, but didn't have money to 
buy the plane ticket, didn't have money to pay for tuition, bring their things to sell to the 
Duoyun Xian.”
1004  Goals such as investing in one's own children took priority over 
reestablishing family art collections.  
Sun Jiecong, who supervised Duoyun Xian through the 1970s and 80s, describes price 
inflation's impact on the Chinese art market as follows.  In the 1960s she checked passports for 
1001 Interview with Li Songlin, June 16
th, 2011.
1002 Interview with Zhu Junbo, December 17
th, 2009.
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Duoyun Xian's foreigners-only salon.  Most customers were “teachers at the foreign school, 
Germans and French.”
1005  One German came in regularly for contemporary Chinese paintings. 
“He said that his mom likes Chinese paintings...told him to save his money to buy painting and 
calligraphy, just buy Qi Baishi and Xu Beihong.”
1006  Every month, the German man visited and 
“his salary for one month can buy one Qi Baishi or one Xu Beihong...in 1965 he could buy a Qi 
Baishi for fifty or sixty RMB.”
1007  The man left during the Cultural Revolution and didn't come 
back until after 1978.  Sun ran into him on the sales floor.  “He said he couldn't believe it, now 
he's rich.  He said he could never afford those paintings now.”
1008  Within a decade, Qi Baishi and 
Xu Beihong paintings had risen from fifty and sixty RMB to “tens of thousands.”
1009  He joked 
that museums in Germany offered to buy some of his paintings but his mother refused.
1010  In 
fact, his mother saucily suggested that “if the German Museums want them they can spend the 
money to borrow them from the family.”
1011
Dealers of Chinese art from China, Britain, and the United States attest that Chinese art 
prices saw phenomenal inflation throughout the 1970s and 80s.
1012  According to Jim Lally, who 
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th, 2009.
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1007 Interview with Sun Jiecong, December 20
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managed Chinese art sales for Sotheby's throughout this time, “you saw prices in London 
double, every year...in the early 1970s they were doubling every six months.”
1013  Some attribute 
the driving force to Japan's economic miracle, which gave Japanese collectors more spending 
power.  Philip Constantinidi, of the Eskenazi Gallery in London, called it the Japanese boom. 
The Eskenazi family have been sourcing Chinese art in Western Europe since the 1960s. 
Constantinidi attests that since Giuseppe Eskenazi took sole charge of the London gallery in 
1967, “trade with dealers from Japan were enormous.  We sold enormous things to Japan.”
1014  
Others attribute the rise in Chinese art prices to Sotheby's and Christie's new offices in 
Hong Kong, which opened in the 70s and 80s, respectively.
1015  Both houses undercut traditional 
collector-dealer relations by introducing auctions, as well as price estimates for in-house 
appraisers.  They openly marketed art collecting as an investment as well as an elite hobby, 
which brought a new set of individuals to the art market.
1016  
By the 1980s, however, it became clear that Chinese buyers were the primary force 
driving the rise of Chinese art prices across the globe.  This collecting frenzy started in Hong 
1013 Interview with Jim Lally, October 28
th, 2009.
1014 Interview with Philip Constantinidi, August 25
th, 2009.
1015 Former auctioneer Julian Thompson opened Sotheby's first Far East office with Lane Crawford.  The auction 
house kept its initial investment in Hong Kong conservative.  Lane Crawford supplied the auction house with 
secretarial staff, offices, warehousing, etc for a percentage of Sotheby's auction profits.  Christie's opened its 
offices in Hong Kong in 1986, teaming up with Swire and employing a shared-profits model similar to that 
between Sotheby's and Lane Crawford.  Interview with Julian Thompson, September 4
th, 2009; Interview with 
Jim Lally, October 28
th, 2009.
1016 For examples of this phenomena, in particular how investing in art is marketed by business studies specialists at 
auction houses, see Iain Robertson, A New Art from Emerging Markets (Surrey, 2011); for more general studies 
of art market investment, see Julian Stallabrass, Art Incorporated: The Story of Contemporary Art (Oxford, 2004); 
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Kong.  In comparison to the PRC, it was an island of plenty in an ocean of want.  Hong Kong's 
shops, even its unskilled workers, enjoyed higher incomes, better diets and safer livelihoods than 
anywhere else on the mainland.  Some of the Chinese who fled there after 1949 had already 
managed to build wealth.  Jim Lally opined that these individuals flaunted new money – “it 
wasn't the scholars of yesteryear who became filthy rich.  It was the bankers, the shippers, the 
property developers who knew nothing about art.”
1017  Dealers and auction houses alike noticed 
immediately.  “When they began buying in Hong Kong, the people who were selling in Hong 
Kong said Ooo, there's a man with a big fat wallet.  Let's go talk to him.”
1018  The Hong Kong 
collecting frenzy soon attracted young entrepreneurs from Europe and the United States, as well 
as seasoned dealers from the mainland, Japan, and South East Asia.   
Furthermore, by the late 1970s international jet travel gave formerly local art markets, 
such as Shanghai, Hong Kong, Tokyo, London, Paris, New York, and Beijing, immediate access 
to a fully elaborated international exchange.
1019  Every dealer of Chinese art I interviewed 
credited jet travel for transforming their business.  Lally literally watched as “the international 
travel boom” transformed regional enclaves.
1020  That's not to say that different regions sold the 
same kinds of collectables.  Hong Kong, for example, “sold to tourists and sold to local people”, 
as did Shanghai.
1021  English collectors tended to be retain an interest in “a lot of small things that 
1017 Interview with Hugh Moss, September 27
th, 2010.
1018 Interview with October 28
th, 2009.
1019 For a history of commercial jet travel see Jenifer Leigh Van Vleck. No Distant Places: Aviation and the Global 
American Century. Unpublished PhD, Yale University, 2009.
1020 Interview with Jim Lally, October 28
th, 2009.
1021 Interview with Jim Lally, October 28
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they could hold” in their hands, whereas new Japanese and Chinese wealth turned to 
“large...titular pieces.  Signature pieces.  Big things that make a statement.”
1022  
Frenzied buying linked these disparate markets of art together.  Every enclave displayed 
“a lot of activity, lots of knowledgeable activity which had previously not been understood.”
1023 
That is to say, collectors were engaging with not only dealers, but also museums, art catalogs, 
and craftsman in order to better discern the value of the works of art in which they were 
investing.  Dealers who bought their stock in Hong Kong and the mainland were looking for all 
of the above-mentioned antiquities, to sell in all of the above enclaves. 
The Chinese art boom meant more than dealers flying to Asia.  Booming prices also 
drove Chinese, Japanese, British, and American collectors to travel to the Far East and buy 
independently.  Jim Lally calls these individuals “serious collectors...these people coming for five 
years on these new jet planes, demonstrating their knowledge, demonstrating their passion for 
the art, and their willingness to pay for it.”
1024  From the perspective of thirty-six-RMB-a-month 
salesmen at Duoyun Xian, these people were walking bags of money.  
Restitution Negotiations
The individuals that got restitutions were nobody's fool.  They knew antiquities meant 
money.  Some haggled with the museum for higher offers.  The truly savvy ones, however, 
requested favors that only large work units like Shanghai's top cultural institutions could grant. 
1022 Interview with Philip Constantinidi, August 25
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“People wanted all kinds of different things” depending on their social, political, and economic 
needs.
1025  For example, some “wanted it noted in the newspapers that they were now cleared of 
all charges.  They wanted recognition.”
1026  Others “wanted help getting their things back 
faster.”
1027  In those cases, the museum staff “had them be at the top of the list for getting things 
back.”
1028  Chen Peifen confirmed that between 1976 and 1980, the Shanghai Museum “stamped 
a lot of documents for” individuals negotiating restitution packages and “that's how we also got 
some objects.”
1029
The Class of 1952 applied specific negotiating techniques to restitution.  When I asked 
my interviewees to share specific techniques, they revealed that they targeted widows.
1030  Zhong 
Yinlan explained that “wives outlived their husbands.”
1031  While husbands tended to be the ones 
who assembled collections, wives tended to be the ones still alive in the 1980s.  Furthermore, 
because the widows “minded the family, the children”, they tended to know less about the 
market potential of antiquities.
1032  The special acquisitions team, therefore, had an advantage 
when negotiating with widows: the team could expect less struggle with price, and gain more 
1025 Interview with Chen Peifen, July 3
rd, 2009.
1026 Interview with Chen Peifen, July 3
rd, 2009.  For collaborative findings in other professional sectors see Hong 
Yung Lee, “The Politics of Cadre Rehabilitation since the Cultural Revolution”, Asian Survey, 18, no. 9 (1978): 
934-955 
1027 Interview with Chen Peifen, July 3
rd, 2009.
1028 Interview with Chen Peifen, July 3
rd, 2009.
1029 Interview with Chen Peifen, Feburary 1
st, 2010.
1030 For examples of some successful donation cases that involved widows, see Zheng Zhong “Zan de yi ji kuai ran 
zizu cong Hu Huichun dao Fan Jirong wengxu jian shoucang jingshen de chuancheng” [Temporary 
Custodianship: Self Satisfaction From Hu Huichun To Fan Jirong, The Promise Of Collectors' Spirit, From 
Father-In-Law To Son-In-Law] Shanghai wenbo luncong [Shanghai Wenbo] no. 1, (2002): 8-15.
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leverage by offering to procure favors for the widows' family and children, which may ultimately 
cost the museum less.  
Li Junjie confirmed that the Class of 1952 visited the widows of private collectors 
repeatedly.  “When we visit them we hope that they will sell some things, and some people say 
well I'll donate these items.”
1033  Qiu Hui, the widow of Li Yinxuan (1911 - 1972), donated her 
husband's entire bronze collection.  The Shanghai Museum seized the lot during the Cultural 
Revolution.  Li called the museum himself when he saw Red Guards coming.
1034  Qiu Hui traded 
her restitutions for an expedited visa to join her son, Li Qing, in Canada.
1035  “She donated a 
selection of bronzes and other objects to the museum and we helped her leave the country.  We 
arranged for her planet ticket, for her to get to the airport, everything.”
1036  The museum staff 
even helped her navigate the embassy interview.  “We went to upper administration and said this 
person gave the state so many antiquities”, which sped up the state's decision to grant Qiu 
leave.
1037
The most difficult kind of request that the Shanghai Museum got was obtaining 
Shanghai hukou (household registration).  In the 1980s and 90s, municipal household 
registration meant a break from difficult rural conditions, especially for families that got 
downgraded from relative comfort during the Cultural Revolution.
1038  Collectors whose 
1033 Interview with Li Junjie, July 7
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1034 Zhong Zheng, Haishang shoucangjia [Shanghai Collectors] (Shanghai, 2003): 376-377.
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children lost the right to live in Shanghai “wanted their family to come back from faraway 
regions of China.”
1039  Some even phrased their requests in emotional terms.  “I want my son to 
come back to Shanghai...no matter what I want my child to be around me.”
1040  When the value 
of the antiquities made the work worth it, the museum got household registrations transferred. 
The museum “tells the municipality...say their children got sent to the farms.  We get them 
back.”
1041  In cases where the returnees also needed jobs as part of the transfer process, the 
museum “took the young people in for a while, then they can work for us for a while to establish 
their residences in Shanghai.”
1042  Temporary museum jobs, like receptionist or cleaner, offered 
returnees much-needed transition time.  Working at the museum also gave returnees networks 
from which they could look for other job opportunities, such as transferring to another work 
unit.
1043  Li Junjie observed that these services not only allowed the museum to gain select 
antiquities, it also ensured “good relations with donors over time, and collectors too.”
1044
Overseas Relations 
In 1983, the Shanghai Museum began negotiating restitutions with overseas Chinese.
1045 
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Chen Peifen and Ma Chengyuan met J. M. Hu that year.
1046  Hu ran the Min Chiu Society, an 
exclusive group of Chinese art collectors in Hong Kong.
1047  The museum knew the man not 
only from his days as a playboy in Shanghai, but also because it raided the Hu family collection 
during the Cultural Revolution.
1048  In particular, the museum “took all the porcelain”, the 
category of art in which Hu maintained a focused interest.
1049
When they met in Hong Kong, Hu pulled Chen Peifen aside and said, “I don't need to 
speak to your leader, I want to talk to you privately, is that possible.”
1050  Overseas contact was 
closely scrutinized in the early 1980s, but Chen “had no qualms about that kind of thing...I said 
sure.”
1051  Hu remained cautious.   “He asked me if I was CCP, I said I was not.”
1052  Satisfied, Hu 
invited Chen to his office. 
Once inside, “he said where are my things?”
1053  News about restitution had reached 
Hong Kong and  J. M. Hu wanted to find out how this worked for non-mainland residents. 
Chen replied “it's at the Shanghai museum...we can give it back to you but you would have to go 
Quarterly, no. 40 (1969): 103-126; For reform era findings see Michael R. Godley, “The Sojourners: Returned 
Overseas Chinese in the People's Republic of China”, Pacific Affairs, 62, no. 3 (1989): 330-352;
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Otto Wear, “The Sense Of Things: Chinese Art In The Lives Of Hong Kong Collectors And Connoisseurs”, in 
Gordon Mathews and Tai-Lok Liu, Eds., Consuming Hong Kong (Hong Kong, 2001): 173 – 204.
1048 Interview with Chen Peifen, June 22
nd, 2009; Interview with Jim Lally, October 28
th, 2009; Interview with James 
Watt, October 14
th, 2009.
1049 Interview with James Watt, October 14
th, 2009.
1050 Interview with Chen Peifen, February 1
st, 2010.
1051 Interview with Chen Peifen, February 1
st, 2010.
1052 Interview with Chen Peifen, February 1
st, 2010.
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to Shanghai, we can't give it back to you in Hong Kong.”
1054  The Shanghai Museum could, 
however, help arrange visa and travel accommodations such that non-residents can visit their 
antiquities “whenever you want”.
1055  
Hu was unsatisfied with Chen's visitation rights and made two counter offers.  He asked 
Chen to send him some photographs of his ceramics.  He also asked about Ye Shuzhong, the 
former Vajrapani whose last known whereabout were somewhere in Qinghai.  Hu told Chen 
that he simply “want to know if [Ye]'s doing okay, if his family is okay, where is he now, and can I 
exchange some correspondence with him.”
1056
Chen agreed to look for Ye Shuzhong on J. M. Hu's behalf – though she warned him it 
might take time.  Arrested art dealers were a sensitive issue.  In fact, when she submitted her 
report on J. M. Hu for municipal administration, Chen only noted that “I am giving him pictures 
and asking about his ceramics from the house searches...the Ye Shuzhong thing I didn't 
report.”
1057  She felt comfortable talking to Hu in private, but implicating herself in a 
conversation about a known smuggler was too much. 
It took Chen a long time to find Ye Shuzhong's descendants because she didn't want to 
risk search for them using official channels.  She made private inquiries through family and 
friends.  When she finally tracked the Ye family down she called first and biked right over.  The 
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family lived in a public housing complex and “when I got there...I tell you their attitudes were 
pretty frightening.”
1058  Shimei, Ye Shuzhong's daughter, came to the door looking “so nervous, 
like what are you doing here.”
1059  Chen waited for some time before they would let her inside, 
and the family expressed no interest in letting her linger.  “They didn't ask me to sit.”
1060  
Chen Peifen told the Ye family that she had met J. M. Hu, who expressed an interest in 
reestablishing contact.  The family accepted the piece of paper with J. M. Hu's contact 
information, but Chen suspects that they never attempted to write to him.  Chen also made it 
clear that the family “have no social status any more.  They all went to the factories to work, at 
the alleyway processing factory, that's about the worst industrial job you can get.”
1061  I asked 
Chen why the family didn't just take Hu's information and call for help.  Chen replied that 
having overseas contacts was as bad as having a smuggler in the family.  “If you were sent outside 
Shanghai to do hard labor what does your family have left at all?  They walked all over their 
alleyway every day asking for bit jobs to do.”
1062  If J. M. Hu had lived past Hong Kong's return to 
the mainland, the Ye family might have reconnected with him.  During the 1980s, however, “that 
wasn't how things were.”
1063  The past fifty-years' worth of purges had not become forgotten 
nightmares.  
Resolving J. M. Hu's restitution took years.  The collector wanted his antiquities in Hong 
1058 Interview with Chen Peifen, February 1
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Kong.  The Shanghai Museum refused.  “At the time Hong Kong had not been given back” to 
the PRC.
1064  
J. M. Hu's restitution remained unresolved until James Watt, the former Brooke Russell 
Astor Senior Curator at the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York, interceded.  “In 1986 or 
1987 we opened our ancient china gallery . We invited Ma Chengyuan to the opening and I 
invited Ma Chengyuan to a dinner on his own, not with the other delegates.”
1065  At the dinner, 
Watt “said look I have a proposal for you.”
1066  Watt suggested that the Hu family “give his 
collection but the Shanghai Museum has to acknowledge the gift in the same way as western 
museums do.  That is to say they could say this is donated by Hu Huichun Esquire.”
1067  Watt 
also proposed that the museum publish a catalog of Hu's collection as part of a grand donation 
ceremony.  Both Shanghai and the Hu family agreed.  On September 9th, 1989, the Shanghai 
Museum held a special exhibition honoring “one of the Shanghai Municipal Cultural Relics 
Management Board's first members and famous Hong Kong collector, Hu Huichun, for his 
donation of his Shanghai collection of Song dynasty Diao kiln moon-white glaze zun, Ming 
dynasty Xuande era blue-and-white figures vase, as well as seventy-six other precious cultural 
1064 Interview with Chen Peifen, February 1
st, 2010.
1065 James Watt held the Brooke Russel Astor Chairmanship of the Department of Asian Art and has worked at the 
Metropolitan Museum of Art since 1985.  Interview with James Watt, October 14
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relics to the Shanghai Museum.”
1068  The municipality not only gave the family high honors, they 
also made J. M. Hu a permanent member of the Shanghai Municipal Cultural Relics 
Management Board.  The museum installed a red, wall-length plaque extolling J. M. Hu in its 
ceramics gallery, where his collection remains on display today.  As of 2011, the J. M. Hu plaque 
remains the museum's only publicly visible gesture towards its enforcement of restitution in the 
decades following the end of the Cultural Revolution.  
Some see the J. M. Hu plaque as an empty gesture; a face-saving trifle that the autocratic 
party-state granted in order to both keep its seized spoils and win overseas Chinese approval. 
“This is a game they played in China, they grabbed his stuff...they said here, we'll give you 100 
Yuan for this dish, there, it's been paid.”
1069  From this perspective, J. M. Hu took the higher 
ground.  “He, being a proud man, chose to turn it into a donation.”
1070  While this perspective 
has its proponents, erecting J. M. Hu as yet another example of Chinese autocracy not only 
erases the different constituents who enabled the resolution, but also discounts significant shifts 
in the PRC's museological fiction of donation.  
I propose that restitution's shift from regional to international constituents transformed 
the fiction of donation from highlighting nationalism (as in the 1950s) to its current emphasis 
on consent.
1071  Consent took center stage precisely because it enabled different constituents, in 
1068 Shanghai Gazetteer Zhuanye zhi: Shanghai wenwu bowuguan zhi: Dashiji [Professional Gazetteers: Shanghai 
Cultural Relics Museum Gazetteer: Annals], Available 
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China and overseas, to act as joint participants in the making of Chinese cultural heritage.
1072  In 
this new language of cooperation, the Shanghai Museum argues that its preservation of seized 
property throughout the difficult Cultural Revolution years legitimizes its custodianship of 
Chinese cultural heritage.  Participating in raids allowed Shanghai to do “the best job in 
preserving cultural relics out of the whole country”, an achievement that even non-mainland 
residents consented to, as evidenced by their donations.
1073   
The cult of consent is all the more extraordinary for being anything but the idealized 
image of a preservationist institution.  It implicates the museum staff in the systematic, nation-
wide seizure of privately-owned antiquities at the same time as it encourages international 
audiences to acknowledge that the staff “were doing what we were supposed to do.  We were just 
care takers.”
1074  In contrast to all the violence and brutality that scar literature authors use to 
describe Cultural Revolution events, the cult of consent opens up a space in which participation 
Crowson and Huajian Cai “Patriotism, Nationalism and China's US Policy: Structures And Consequences Of 
Chinese National Identity” The China Quarterly, 205 (2011): 1-17; 
For the rising focus on consent see Helen Rees, “The Age of Consent: Traditional Music, Intellectual Property 
and Ahanging Attitudes in the People's Republic of China”, British Journal of Ethnomusicology, 12, no. 1 (2003): 
137-171;  
1072 Chen Xiejun “Bowuguan chengshi de wenhua zhidian” [The Museum, An Urban Cultural Fulcrum] Dongnan 
Wenhua [Southeast Culture] no. 6, (2010): 17-22; Liu Chang, “Qiantan bowuguan ruhe zuo hao youxiao de 
wenhua chuanbo” [A Discussion Of How Museums Can Best Disseminate Civilization] Bowuguan yanjiu 
[Museum Research] no. 2, (2010): 37-39; Wang Shuqing, “Gugong bowuyuan gaige kaifang de renshi jichu” 
[The Foundations Of The Palace Museum's Post-Reform Experience] Zhongguo bowuguan [Chinese 
Museums] no. 2, (1992): 28-32; Wang Xiuwen, “Guanyu bowoguan shehui xiaoyi yu jingji xiaoyi de tantao” 
[Regarding The Investigation Of Museological Cultural And Economic Effectiveness] Beifang wenwu 
[Northern Cultural Heritage] no. 3, (1988): 91-96; 
1073 Interview with Zhong Yinlan, July 10
th, 2009.
1074 Interview with Zhong Yinlan, July 10
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in Cultural Revolution campaigns represent, almost unmistakably, an image of conservation. 
Under consent, the museum's restitution negotiations, as well as the different constituents who 
brought the negotiations to fruition, all share credit in the making of Chinese cultural heritage. 
The raid participants saved heritage from destruction, the museum appraisers identified 
heritage's value, negotiators resident on the mainland and abroad made the museum's role in 
heritage creation tangible, while the subjects of restitution, in their act of donation, legitimized 
the museum's indispensability to Chinese cultural heritage.
What Money Can't Buy
The boom in Chinese art prices soon threatened to derail the museum's momentum.  In 
order to maintain the premise that the museum was the best candidate with whom to negotiate 
restitutions, the museum staff offered special services to past and potential affiliates.  Zhang 
Chengzong (1943 – 1996), a CCP agent and head of Shanghai’s Cultural Relics Management 
Board, guaranteed full municipal cooperation.  Zhang encouraged the Class of 1952 to “use 
cultural relics as a way to administer the organization.”
1075  Whenever they successfully 
convinced private collectors to donate or sell antiquities, Zhang “paid attention.  He asked the 
municipality and bureau to give awards.”
1076  Municipal cooperation helped the museum 
establish restitutions packages that money couldn't buy.
1075 Interview with Li Junjie, July 7
th, 2009.
1076 Interview with Li Junjie, July 7
th, 2009.312
In 1984, the museum inaugurated a program called wenwu zhiyou (Friends of Cultural 
Relics).
1077  This program enabled Shanghai to issue social capital in the guise of cultural 
relics.
1078  Its activities included outings with specific municipal officials and museum curators; 
“to look at cultural protection sites, museums, and archaeological sites.”
1079  The museum staff 
used this program as a way to recruit new donors, as well as to display the benefits of museum 
affiliation.  To celebrate J. M. Hu, for example, Friends of Cultural Relics took all the guests 
invited to the Hu Huichun donation ceremony on a curator-led trip to the Jingdezhen kilns in 
Jiangxi province.  The trip won tremendous accolades from the overseas guests.  James Watt 
reminisced that “they organized the only air conditioned train in all of south China reserved only 
for politburo members...the whole train full of people from all over the world.  It was a very 
grand affair.”
1080  
1077 You Zhenqun, “Bowuguan zhi you de xingzhi yu zhineng chutan” [An Exploration Of Friends Of Cultural 
Relics' Characteristics And Function] Zhongguo bowoguan [Chinese Museums] no. 3, (1990): 75-78. 
1078 Zhou Yongming, “Social Capital and Power: Entrepreneurial Elite and the State in Contemporary China” Policy 
Sciences, 33, no. 3/4, (2000): 323-340.
1079 Interview with Li Junjie, January 21
st, 2010.
1080 Interview with James Watt, October 14
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Figure 5.3. A group photo of some Friends of Cultural Relics members taken at the Shanghai 
Museum's inauguration ceremony.  Liu Jinji, whose painting and calligraphy collection were 
seized by the museum during the Cultural Revolution and the details of which are described in 
Chapter 3, sits third from the left. (1984) Courtesy of Zheng Zhong.  
Friends of Cultural Relics programming targeted both museological and commercial 
interests.  As Li Junjie explained, for collectors with means, “money wasn't the issue, it was the 
access.”
1081  When Friends organized a trip to see the Emperor Qin's Terracotta Army, their 
guests “went downstairs into the tombs themselves.”
1082  Given the PRC's strict excavation rules, 
to “see them at ground level that was like presidential treatment”.
1083  It set the potential donors 
apart from everyday visitors, who saw the tombs from a platform above the excavation site. 
Similarly, when Friends visited Dunhuang “we arranged things with the Dunhuang research 
center's director...they had someone who really knew what they were doing give them a talk.”
1084 
1081 Interview with Li Junjie, January 21
st, 2010.
1082 Interview with Li Junjie, June 29
th, 2009.
1083 Interview with Li Junjie, January 21
st, 2010.
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The guests saw murals in uncrowded settings and gained access to many more grottoes than 
otherwise allowed.
Friends of Cultural Relics also made visiting the mainland easy.  “You have to think, 
right after 1978, how difficult was it to get a hotel or train to Shanghai.”
1085  Friends affiliates, 
however, might “call on a Friday, say they are coming for the weekend.”
1086  Upon receiving the 
call, the Shanghai Museum staff “did so much back room work, renting a care, a hotel, plane 
tickets.  We organized the restaurant to eat.  The money we paid for it.”
1087  Staff “go to the 
airport to pick them up, take them to dinner.  We open up the warehouse and show them the 
objects.  Then we send them off.”
1088  From the perspective of potential donors, “they spent a 
great weekend in Shanghai, looking at cultural relics, and they didn't have to think.”
1089  The 
museum even made professional restoration services available through its Conservation 
Workshop, at no charge.  
The rise in Chinese art prices soon outpaced the museum’s ability to pay, or offer favors. 
Chen Peifen confirmed that “the later things were, the more difficult it became.”
1090  By the mid-
1980s, individuals whom the acquisitions team approached “didn't want to do it anymore...They 
would say oh we want to keep these objects, our ancestors passed it down to us.”
1091  Li Junjie 
1085 Interview with Li Junjie, April 27
th, 2010.
1086 Interview with Li Junjie, April 27
th, 2010.
1087 Interview with Li Junjie, April 27
th, 2010.
1088 Interview with Li Junjie, April 27
th, 2010.
1089 Interview with Li Junjie, April 27
th, 2010.
1090 Interview with Chen Peifen, Feburary 1
st, 2010.
1091 Interview with Chen Peifen, Feburary 1
st, 2010.315
explained that negotiations stalled “because of the money.”
1092  The international market 
demands for Chinese art made prices such that “they sell one of the items they had then it's 
worth fifty million or maybe ten million.”
1093  At those amounts, the Shanghai Museum could no 
longer compete.  Furthermore, the museum collection began to reach the point at which it no 
longer needed objects beyond those which it already had.  Thus, the restitution of confiscated 
property began to proceed with reduced museum interference. 
Substitutions-in-kind
Wang Qianbi and his team thought that restitution would never end.  In addition to the 
320,000 pieces of confiscated property that the Arts and Crafts Company had sent over in 1981, 
the team also dealt the existing inventory at Puxi road, as well as that at eleven other sorting 
stations in the municipality.
1094  The sheer amount of objects, the majority of which post-dated 
1795, overwhelmed Wang's team.  In many cases, restitution packages couldn't provide the 
original confiscated items.  Raid inventories just didn't make specific enough records and sorting 
station attendants failed to distinguish one seized item from the many others in their warehouse. 
As a result, most restitution packages offered substitutions-in-kind.  
Sorting stations used substitutions as a standard solution for the restitution of 
unidentifiable inventory.  According to this policy: “if I had a Wu Hufan painting, then we give 
1092 Interview with Li Junjie, July 7
th, 2009.
1093 Interview with Zhu Junbo, December 17
th, 2009.
1094 Shanghai Gazetteer Zhuanye zhi: Shanghai wenwu bowuguan zhi: Dashiji [Professional Gazetteers: Shanghai 
Cultural Relics Museum Gazetteer: Annals], Available 
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you back a Wu Hufan painting, it may not be yours, but it was still a Wu Hufan.”
1095  In cases 
where “there was no object in kind, then they gave it back in quantity, if you had three paintings, 
then you can have three paintings back.”
1096  Finally, if the municipality had no substitutions-in-
kind at all, sorting stations paid out in cash.  
Cash compensation didn't take antiquities' market value into account.  Wang Qianbi 
explained that “at the first, it was cheap, about one or two RMB per piece.”
1097  By the early 1980s 
the policy shifted to 12 RMB per object.  The municipality justified this price with bad record 
keeping.  “We couldn't see the object anymore, we wouldn't know the quality.  There wasn't 
anything we could do.”
1098  By way of comparison, in the 1980s one RMB bought one kilogram's 
worth of hairtail fish, which most considered a fine dinner for a family of four.  Twelve RMB paid 
for a year's tuition in junior high school.  Therefore, from the municipality's perspective, its cash 
allowances were adequate given existing standards of living in the PRC.   
 The threat of getting cheated through substitutions-in-kind galvanized Shanghai 
residents to get restitution packages approved as soon as possible.  Otherwise, what's theirs 
might get alloted to someone else’s package.  Private citizens leveraged documentation of all 
kinds.  Guo Zhiyu, a Cultural Relics Management Board employee, found a painting that got 
confiscated from his house during the Cultural Revolution when he himself was helping the 
1095 Interview with Li Junjie, April 27
th, 2010.
1096 Interview with Li Junjie, April 27
th, 2010.
1097 Interview with Wang Qianbi, June 29
th, 2010
1098 Interview with Wang Qianbi, June 29
th, 2010317
Sorting Committee clear inventory in the late 1980s.  The sorting station kept the painting in its 
substitutions section because the associated records didn’t indicate any specific owner.  The 
painting, however, had a colophon that read “to Mr. Zhiyu” from the painter, Huang 
Binhong.
1099  When Guo Zhiyu claimed the painting, the station attendant wanted proof.  The 
colophon didn't have a last name.  “Is this Guo Zhiyu or some other Zhiyu?  They couldn't be 
sure.”
1100  Guo had proof indeed.  The painter wrote Guo “a letter, and in the letter he said I have 
attached a small painting.”
1101  Guo brought the letter, and the sorting station attendants “gave 
him back the painting.”
1102
Guo Zhiyu's case was the exception that proved the rule.  Dark rumors about 
substitution fraud flooded Shanghai.  The most common method of fraud was to use 
substitutions-in-kind to get antiquities with a higher value than that which was originally seized. 
“Lots of people asked people with good eyes, people who knew what they were doing, to go pick 
out things for them.”
1103  Other tricks included “pretending to be someone else” and retrieving 
ill-begotten restitutions.
1104  Sun Jiecong, who inventoried the substitutions-in-kind antiquities 
that private collectors eventually sold to the state-run art markets, commented that “If you knew 
what you're doing then you're lucky, otherwise, you're out of luck.  This was the way after the 
1099 Interview with Xia Shunkui, April 26
th, 2010.
1100 Interview with Xia Shunkui, April 26
th, 2010.
1101 Interview with Xia Shunkui, April 26
th, 2010.
1102 Interview with Xia Shunkui, April 26
th, 2010.
1103 Interview with Sun Jiecong, December 20
th, 2009.
1104 Interview with Chen Peifen, Feburary 1
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Cultural Revolution... things were pretty messy.”
1105
The modern Chinese art historical canon
Restituted antiquities that postdated 1795 quickly appeared for sale on the international 
market for Chinese art.  As Jim Lally observed, new wealth in the Special Economic Zones 
(SEZ) opened up “the most voracious appetite in the world for Chinese art.”
1106  On the 
mainland, a SEZ designation made the region available for unprecedented foreign investment, 
incentivized by special tax provisions and greater trade independence.
1107  Shanghai received its 
SEZ designation in 1984.  The subsequent burst in new financial opportunities boosted activity 
in the domestic and export antiquities trade.  Xu Yongxiang, a Shanghai Museum Customs 
inspector, remarked that “before 1978 there wasn't a lot of work at Customs.  After 1978...there 
was more work, more things leaving the country.”
1108  For every collector with an interest in 
buying a piece of Chinese cultural heritage, there was an equally enthusiastic seller who wanted 
to transform their restituted antiquities into investment capital.   
As the inspection entity that regulated all export antiquities, the Shanghai Museum soon 
called for an official block on the nationwide divestment of antiquities postdating 1795.  The 
Cultural Relics Management Bureau, the Shanghai Museum's political arm, wanted to designate 
1105 Interview with Sun Jiecong, December 20
th, 2009.
1106 Interview with Jim Lally, October 28
th, 2009.
1107 Mark W. Frazier “China's Pension Reform and Its Discontents” The China Journal, no. 51, (2004): 97-114; 
Lance L. P. Gore “The Communist Legacy in Post-Mao Economic Growth” The China Journal, no. 41, (1999): 
25-54; Margaret M. Pearson “The Erosion of Controls over Foreign Capital in China, 1979-1988: Having Their 
Cake and Eating It Too?” Modern China, 17, no. 1 (1991): 112-150; 
1108 Interview with Xu Yongxiang, July 8
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select specimens of post-1795 antiquities illegal for export.  It proposed to shift the dividing line 
between Cultural Relics and Arts and Crafts from 1795 to 1911, “so nothing from the Qing can 
get out.”
1109  The organization had already made headway in this endeavor.  Customs 
checkpoints expanded from the original four cities (Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Guangdong) to 
“fourteen entry points for the export of Cultural Relics”, which museum appraisers ran.
1110  The 
expansion of Customs checkpoints gave museum staff more power in municipal arts 
administration, because “we basically took over Customs' job in terms of allowing things to leave 
the country.”
1111  
The tightening of export regulations created two separate canons of modern Chinese 
art: one for the PRC and another for the international market.  Artists active between 1795 and 
1911, and whose creations once passed Customs inspections liberally, became difficult to collect 
outside the mainland.  Regulations on contemporary works of art, such as the Qi Baishi and Xu 
Beihong paintings that Sun Jiecong's German friend bought monthly, also became restrictive. 
“There's a general rule for export about contemporary works.  If there's good works by Qi Baishi 
then you can't sell it.”
1112  Buyers had to get museum staff to stamp all the antiquities they 
intended to export from Shanghai Customs.  Customs maintained specific no-export lists and 
cleared nothing without an appraiser's stamp.  “If they see the name or whatever then they're 
1109 Interview with Zhang Qinghao, December 24
th, 2009.
1110 Interview with Zhang Qinghao, December 24
th, 2009.
1111 Interview with Zhang Qinghao, December 24
th, 2009.
1112 Interview with Sun Jiecong, December 20
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going to look for the stamp.  If they don't see the stamp they won't let it pass.”
1113
By far the most controversial export decision that the Shanghai Museum made in recent 
years is for the Wong Nan-p'ing collection.  Wong (1924 – 1985) was a Hong Kong-based 
painting collector and dealer who fled from Shanghai in 1949.
1114  During the Cultural 
Revolution, the museum raided Wong's Shanghai estate, which contained a collection of 
paintings and calligraphy from the Ming and Qing dynasties.  The paintings predated 1795. 
Restitution stated that Wong could collect his seized paintings and calligraphy from the 
Shanghai Museum, which held them in custody.  As Wong was a Hong Kong resident, however, 
Cultural Relics laws forbade the works of art’s removal from the mainland. 
Wong suggested a trade.  He owned two calligraphy compendia of great value: Wong 
wengong wenji (the Collected Writings Of Wong Anshi) and Song Wang Anshi shu lengyan jingzhi 
yao juan (Essential Scrolls Of Song Dynasty Wang Anshi's Buddhist Scriptural Calligraphy).
1115 
He offered to donate both in return for permission to take two hundred works of art from his 
restitution package to Hong Kong.  The Shanghai Museum considered this a lucrative offer. 
“Both the original print and the colophons” on Wong’s two compendia indicated their 
authenticity.
1116  The museum even sent Xie Zhiliu “to Hong Kong to figure out whether the two 
1113 Interview with Sun Jiecong, December 20
th, 2009.
1114 For more on Wong Nan-p'ing, see Richard M. Barnhart and Qianshen Bai, The Jade Studio: Masterpieces Of 
Ming and Qing Painting And Calligraphy From The Wong Nan-p'ing Collection (New Haven, 1994).
1115 Zheng Zhong “Wang Anshi liang zhong yizuo de huigui” The Return Of Two Relics Of Wang Anshi” Dongfang 
wenyuan [The Eastern Literary World], Available 
<http://news.eastday.com/epublish/gb/paper81/1//hwz30998.htm> [April, 2011]
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calligraphy pieces were real.”
1117  The painting specialist pronounced his approval.  Thus, the 
museum agreed to negotiate with the Ministry of Culture on Wong's behalf.
The negotiation took years.  Shanghai had to rally all its political connections, including 
a favor from National People's Congress member Hu Yaobang, in order to obtain clearance. 
The museum even assembled an official entourage for the exchange.  Zhong Yinlan, Huang 
Xuanpei, and a Customs representative accompanied Wong Nan-p'ing’s restitution package to 
Shenzhen to make sure that the works of art cleared Customs.
1118  Customs rebuffed them. 
“That group of things Customs didn't want to let go of...They weren't the best, but they were 
good, they could not be exported.”
1119  Shanghai had to have the Ministry of Culture call 
Shenzhen, or leave empty handed.
1120  By the time Wong's restitution package finally arrived in 
Hong Kong, he had already passed away.  His wife, Fang Shuyan, accepted and spoke on his 
behalf at the donation ceremony.
1121  
The Shanghai Museum considered the Wong Nan-p'ing affair well worth the trouble. 
Wong's donation gave the museum its first work of art by the calligrapher Wang Anshi.  The two 
compendia's sheer scale overwhelmed expectations.  Zhong Yinlan, who participated in the 
Wong estate raid, remarked that although the two-hundred-piece exchange included “some nice 
1117 Interview with Li Junjie, January 21
st, 2010.  There remains some controversy over the fact that Xie Zhiliu and 
Wong Nan-p'ing are related.  Some believe this relationship helped Wong negotiate with the museum. 
1118 Interview with Zhong Yinlan, January 5
th, 2010.
1119 Interview with Huang Xuanpei, January 12
th, 2010.
1120 Interview with Li Junjie, January 21
st, 2010.
1121 Interview with Jin Jiapin, January 13
th, 2010.  This actions undertaken in this lengthy process resembles that 
found by scholars of the Chinese court mediation process.  Philip C. C. Huang, “Court Mediation in China, Past 
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collections”, getting the two compendia was a better deal.
1122   “They were pretty large, it wasn't 
just one volume mind you, it was twenty some volumes, they stacked really tall, and there were 
colophons by Wang Meng, it was extraordinary.”
1123  In exchange, the Shanghai Museum simply 
let go of some exports that it had no intention of acquiring in the first place.  
So far as overseas collectors were concerned, however, the Wong Nan-p'ing affair 
marked a phenomenal injection of new specimens into the international market for Chinese art. 
“Paintings have the widest possible audience” amongst Chinese art collectors.
1124  Their profit 
margins outperform any other category of art.  In 1994, the Yale University Art Gallery exhibited 
a portion of Wong Nan-p'ing's collection in their exhibition space, with an accompanying 
catalog.
1125  The catalog touted Wong's re-assemblage of his collection in the years following the 
Cultural Revolution, as well as the paintings' significance in the history of modern Chinese art. 
One wonders what the long-term impact of these objects' release will be, both as they reflect the 
distinctions between PRC and non-PRC canons of modern Chinese art, as well as future sales 
potential on the international art market. 
1122 Interview with Zhong Yinlan, January 5
th, 2010.
1123 Interview with Zhong Yinlan, January 5
th, 2010.
1124 Interview with Alvin Lo, June 14
th, 2010.  Lo’s statement describes the situation both on the art market and in 
the field of Chinese art history.  The major scholars of Chinese art, throughout the twentieth century, have 
either focused primarily on Chinese painting or written scholarship that uses Chinese painting as a spring board 
to talk about other categories of Chinese art.  For select examples see James Cahill, The Compelling Image: 
Nature and Style in Seventeenth Century Chinese Paintings (Cambridge, 1982); Richard Vinograd, Boundaries of 
the Self: Chinese Portraits, 1600 – 1900 (Cambridge, 1992); Jerome Silbergeld, Contradictions: Artistic Life, the 
Socialist State, and the Chinese Painter Li Huasheng (Seattle, 1993); 
1125 Richard Barnhart and Bai Qianshen, The Jade Studio: Masterpieces Of Ming And Qing Painting And Calligraphy 
From The Wong Nan-p'ing Collection (New Haven, 1994).323
The International Shanghai Museum
By 1985 the Shanghai Museum's need for a better location outstripped its need for more 
antiquities.  The collection needed a new home, in particular one that offered modern facilities 
that would complement the extraordinary acquisitions that the Shanghai Museum had won 
since its last major move in the 1960s.  #16 South Henan Road had not been renovated since 
1959 and its facilities raised eyebrows.  Visitors accustomed to institutions such as the 
Metropolitan Museum of Art and the British Museum complained.  They opined that 
Shanghai's collection “had been living in a drafty bank building,” in display cases that also 
housed spider webs and dead flies.
1126  
Museum administrators began fund-raising for a new building.  The municipality 
pledged eight million RMB and gave the Shanghai Museum permission to relocate to the middle 
of the People's Square, across Remin boulevard from the People's Park.  The museum, however, 
had to raise the rest of the funds it needed for construction, landscaping, and interior 
modeling.
1127
Jin Jiaping, the museum's head of human resources, used his municipal connections to 
get Museum Presidents Ma and Wang “long term visas...such that any time of the year they 
could go over to Hong Kong.  They could exit and enter freely.”
1128  The museum approached an 
entrepreneur named Xian Xuantang, a collector that the museum had long courted through 
1126 Interview with Jim Lally, October 28
th, 2009.
1127 Interview with Li Junjie, June 29
th, 2009.
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Friends of Cultural Relics.
1129  Xian helped the Presidents set up a foundation called the 
Shanghai Museum New Building Trust, then “went around his friends to gather up money for 
the trust fund.”
1130  The trust campaigned heavily amongst overseas Chinese, in particular those 
living in Hong Kong, London, and New York.  
Li Junjie, who undertook much of the administrative tasks in the campaign for a new 
Shanghai Museum, asserted that the potential donors’ interest in antiquities enabled the 
museum staff to do effective fund-raising.  For example, “every year on the first three days of the 
new years we would organize a cultural relics meeting.”
1131  There, donors, businessmen, and 
politicos mingled in the same space.  Zhang Zhengzong's political pull attracted attendance from 
Hong Kong businessmen who wanted to invest in Shanghai.  Furthermore, Zhang made sure 
that top officials like Jiang Zemin showed up.  “ He wrote, and Jiang Zhemin gave a date...well, if 
Jiang Zhemin came, then everyone else will come too.”
1132  Friends of Cultural Relics made sure 
that antiquities took center stage at these programs.  Donors told stories about the antiquities 
they donated and the Chinese cultural heritage sites they visited on organized trips.  
The museum made its monetary needs clear to potential donors.  “We were doing 
1129 Interview with Li Junjie, January 21
st, 2010.  This example of the monetary connection between the mainland 
and Hong Kong resonates with broader scholarly assessments of this period.  See Amy Liu Mei Heung and 
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th, 2009.
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Chinese Elite Politics” The China Journal, no. 46, (2001): 69-90; Jean C. Oi “Communism and Clientelism: 
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preparation work.  If we don't do this, were they going to give us donations in the end?  No.”
1133 
The trips and ongoing favors all served a purpose.
1134  “This is how we did our long term 
relationships...we could talk about cultural relics...you can't just have small talk for more than an 
hour, you have to have something in common.”
1135  Antiquities, in particular the museum’s 
commitment to making antiquities an integral part of Chinese cultural heritage, held it all 
together. 
As part of its fund-raising efforts, the museum offered to name galleries after specific 
donors.  Each gallery came with a cost.  “The bronze galleries, ceramics galleries, were 1,000,000 
American dollars, the calligraphy and painting gallery was 50,000 American dollars...Sometimes 
the money was pooled together from several different people, and their names can all go on the 
gallery names.”
1136  The museum also solicited funds for outdoor landscaping, as well as a VIP 
room for gala receptions.
1137  
Amongst the donors, overseas Shanghainese proved most willing to contribute.  When 
Shanghai entrepreneur Diane Woo approached Patty Tang, the current head of Friends of the 
1133 Interview with Li Junjie, April 27
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Shanghai Museum in America, she leveraged Tang's Shanghai ancestry.  Woo “said you really 
should go back to China, it's a new country.”
1138  Tang agreed and helped the museum raise 
funds for landscaping, outdoor sculptures, as well as to establish an exchange program with the 
Metropolitan Museum of Art.  
Many different Chinese allowed the lure of a celebrated cultural heritage to draw them 
to Shanghai.  In the words of Jim Lally, “there are people who went back in the 1980s simply 
because they were in their eighties and would rather die in the Jinjiang hotel in Shanghai.”
1139 
After a life time’s worth of wandering overseas, these individuals wanted to return to their 
homeland and reconnect with the happier ghosts of their past.  When I pressed Lally to 
articulate why donors chose the Shanghai Museum over other cultural institutions in the PRC, 
he highlighted the museum's commitment to cultural heritage.
1140  “They were very committed 
to the idea of the art being important and they were struggling to recreate an atmosphere where 
the art could be available to the people and they could fulfill their role as protectors of the past in 
China.”
1141  In other words, the Shanghai Museum successfully established themselves as the 
custodians of Chinese cultural heritage, both in the minds of constituents in the PRC and 
abroad. 
1138 Interview with Patty Tang, October 22
nd, 2009.
1139 Interview with Jim Lally, October 28
th, 2009.
1140 For Chinese museum professionals' articulation of the same see Hu Jianzhong “Shanghai bowoguan xiandaihua 
bowoguan de linian” [Shanghai Museum – The Concept Of A Modernized Museum] Zhongguo wenhuayichan 
[Chinese Cultural Heritage] no. 4, (2005):  58-59; Ma Chengyuan “Shanghai bowoguan gongzuo huibao 
tigang” [An Outline Of The Shanghai Museum's Key Accomplishments] Zhongguo bowoguan [Chinese 
Museums] no. 3, (1991): 10-15.
1141 Interview with Jim Lally, October 28
th, 2009.327
While it seems rash to speculate on the basis of individual testimony, the general sense 
that Shanghai was a leader in cultural heritage maintenance, and was a worthy investment for 
those interested in promoting Chinese cultural heritage,  seem consistent with the museum's 
financial ledgers.  
Figure 5.4. Donation Sums By Self-Proclaimed Location.328
Figure 5.5. Number of Donors By Self-Proclaimed Location.  
The chart entitled Donations Sums By Location (Figure 5.4) indicates that Hong Kong and 
American donors contributed most heavily towards the creation of the new museum.
1142  Hong 
Kong donors gave more than forty-eight million RMB, making up sixty-three percent of total 
contributions.  Philanthropists such as Douglas Dillon and the Starr Foundation pushed total 
American contributions up to more than twenty-one million RMB, or twenty-eight percent. 
The rest of the money, by order of quantity, come from the PRC (3%), Japan (2%), England 
(2%), and Canada (1%).  The chart entitled Number of Donors By Region (Figure 5.4) shows 
1142 Data for these figures comes from the Shanghai Museum Donors plaque, visible from the museum lobby at the 
entrance.  The ledgers illustrate donations in their original currency.  For the purposes of uniformity I converted 
the sums to RMB.  Most donors, however, gave United States Dollars, the most favorable and widely-used 
foreign currency in the PRC during the mid to late 1990s.329
that Hong Kong led the way in headcount.  At thirty-one heads, donors from Hong Kong made 
up fifty-one percent of the Shanghai Museum's major contributors.  In order of quantity, the rest 
of the donors self-identify as being from the PRC (20%), the United States (13%), Japan (11%), 
England (3%), and Canada (2%).  The data in the two charts indicate that PRC donors 
represent a more significant proportion of the donor population than those from England, 
Japan, or further afield.  Overseas donors, however, tended to gave non-Chinese currency, such 
as Hong Kong Dollars, Japanese Yen, American Dollars, and British Pounds, which made their 
contributions more weighty by rate of exchange.  The internationality of the donors at large, and 
the vastness of the sums they donated, however, suggest that philanthropists from the above 
regions supported the Shanghai Museum's custodianship of Chinese cultural heritage, in hard 
cash. 
Compared to the prices for named galleries at the Metropolitan Museum of Art and the 
British Museum, the above-mentioned sums are paltry.  As Patty Tang asserted, “I think they 
didn't know that you don't give something with a name for less than a million dollars, they were 
giving them away for fifty or 100.”
1143  Museum administrators, however, found that favorable 
exchange rates made the value of the donations more than adequate.  Li Junjie boasted that “we 
did the new museum on 5.7 hundred million RMB.”
1144  The staff take particular pride that “it 
wasn't the museum who asked for this money, we had other people help us get the money.”
1145 
1143 Interview with Patty Tang, October 22
nd, 2009.
1144 Interview with Li Junjie, April 27
th, 2010.
1145 Interview with Li Junjie, June 29
th, 2009.330
The Shanghai Museum New Building Trust, and the international set associated with the Trust, 
demonstrated that the museum had won global recognition. 
How much prosperity was good for the Shanghai Museum?  On the face of it, given the 
miserable condition of mainland museums in the twentieth century, this question is absurd.  The 
Shanghai Museum's building, facilities, and collections enjoyed stronger publicity, better 
conservation resources, and more varieties of art than anywhere else in the country.  Their only 
shared issue with comparable institutions on the mainland was the cost of general admissions 
(20 RMB), but even that was resolved by a municipal grant guaranteeing free admissions 
starting in 2009.
1146  The institution's riches seemed invulnerable to the vicissitudes of the Asian 
Financial Crisis (1997 – 1998).  Capital begot fame and fame begot more capital.  
Far from denying itself acclaim, the museum took its collection on the road, shaping 
itself into an international institution in ways that other flagship PRC museums, such as the 
Palace Museum in Beijing and the Shenyang Palace Museum in Liaoning Province, proved 
slower to embrace.  Shanghai establishing ongoing partnerships with the Metropolitan Museum 
of Art, the Terra Foundation for American Art, the Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation, the 
British Museum, and the Walt Disney Company – just to name a few.  At the dawn of the 
twentieth century there seemed no limit, certainly geographically, to the Shanghai Museum's 
reach.   
1146 Tao Tingting “Lun bowuguan mianfei kaifang hou de yingdui zhice” [Regarding Policy Responses To The 
Museum's Cost-Free Admissions] Dazhong wenyi [Literature And Art For The Masses] no. 24, (2010): 198-
199.331
Amongst the museum staff, however, the museum's international turn only deepened 
the existing rift between the old guard and the younger generation of museum employees.
1147 
Although the museum had plenty of cash, the institution no longer privileged practical 
experience as it did in the past.  Employees who want hands-on training bemoaned the fact that 
the museum no longer makes its entire collection, specifically the storerooms, available for 
general study.  New hires “are very good at analytical skills and descriptions, they can say oh 
these are the characteristics of Qing dynasty objects, these are the characteristics of Ming 
dynasty objects...But they've seen very little.  Most of the things they've seen are fakes.”
1148  The 
privileging of credentials over skill has robbed the staff of antiquarianism, specifically the 
appraisal skills on which the old guard built their careers.  “That's a key difference.  The older 
generation didn't write much down, but they knew what they were looking at.”
1149    
Conclusion
However controversial restitution and open campaigns to exchange favors for cash 
remain in the public discourse, one disputes the significance of the Shanghai museum’s 
achievements in terms of acquisition and institution building over the past thirty years.  Three 
generations of museum staff, from disparate backgrounds and often under threat from one 
1147 For more on the impact of institutional culture on PRC employees, see David J. Davies, “Wal-Mao: The 
Discipline of Corporate Culture and Studying Success at Wal-Mart China” The China Journal, no. 58 (2007): 1-
27.
1148 Interview with Shen Minren, September 24
th, 2009.
1149 Interview with Shen Minren, September 24
th, 2009.332
another’s political and administrative ambitions, worked collaboratively to create one of the 
three largest repositories of Chinese art in the world.  In each of its three locations, the Shanghai 
Museum’s physical presence denoted the collection’s significance as a link between mainland 
and overseas collectors, its relevance to regional and international finance, as well as its 
custodianship of cultural heritage.  Many cultural institutions harbor similar ambitions.  Few 
realize these ambitions within a few decades, and fewer still wield that unique combination of 
municipal support, popular interest, and international recognition that differentiate regional 
favorites from international icons.  
Shanghai’s achievement of these ambitions, however, only highlights the tensions that 
its high status has imposed on the very individuals who have brought into being.  While the 
museum’s collection is superb, the staff unanimously complain that the objects themselves are 
more difficult to access than ever before in the museum’s history.  Members of the Class of 1952 
opine that the antiquarian training program that galvanized their professionalization succeeded 
because any employee could simply enter the museum’s storerooms and study whatever 
antiquity they wanted.  The post-1996 institutionalization of new bureaucratic and security 
procedures at the Shanghai Museum, however, keep museum employees, especially younger 
employees, from gaining access to the antiquities they wish to study.  For the older generation of 
museum employees, both the Class of 1952 and 1972, these limitations seem to fly in the face of 
the privileging of hands-on skills that brought the museum to fame in the first place.  How can 333
the nation’s professional art appraisers and interpreters do their jobs if they do not have hands-
on experience with their chosen objects of study?  More importantly, how can museum 
professionals be trusted to purchase authentic works of art if they do not have regular experience 
handling comparable works of art in the museum’s own collection?  
The slackening emphasis on hands-on skills point to a larger shift in skill evaluation 
amongst museum professionals.  Increasingly, the push to internationalize at PRC cultural 
institutions have come hand in hand with a push for museum professionals to publish research. 
In fact, the Shanghai Museum evaluates the distribution of raises, bonuses, and even makes 
hiring decisions based on the number of publications its staff produce each year.  This criteria 
for upward mobility puts employees with limited literacy, specifically those older connoisseurs 
and conservators who have never had to contend with the pressures and politics of obtaining 
publications, in an indefensible position.  As a result, those employees facing reduced upward 
mobility are increasingly marketing their hand-skills on the private sector.  The conservator 
whose dingy kitchen and passionate personal manifesto introduced this chapter is one 
prominent example of this phenomenon.  Similarly, members of the curatorial team take 
commissions for art appraisals from private collectors and companies, while members of the 
administrative staff manage, or run, art auction companies and museum consultancies on the 
side.  
The above-mentioned personnel changes have raised serious questions for the Shanghai 334
Museum's future leadership.  Given the turn towards a closed museum system, particularly 
insofar as the study of artifacts are concerned, the museum staff wonder how the administration 
will train its next generation of connoisseurs.  Similarly, given the turn towards publications, the 
museum staff wonder what will become of those museum departments that require expert hand 
skills, such as conservation and reproduction.  The persistent struggle over the cultivation and 
evaluation of skills, as well as the criteria for professionalization, may well be the Shanghai 
Museum's new link between high culture and ordinary people.  While in the 1950s, museum 
exhibitions provided the lens through which ordinary Chinese engaged with newly nationalized 
artifacts of cultural heritage, in the 1990s, privatized schemes for heritage commodification link 
increasingly passionate art consumers with newly canonized categories of Chinese civilization.  335
Conclusion: Family Values336
The Cult of Consent
The Shanghai Museum portrays the Gu family bequest as one of its great foundations. 
The family traces their collecting legacy back to 1841, when Gu Wenbin achieved a Jinshi 
degree, the highest honor in the Qing imperial exams.  The history of Gu family collecting 
stretched across four generations.  By the end of the Qing dynasty, their Suzhou estate contained 
more than one thousand ancient books, paintings, and calligraphy.
1150  The Gu clan called it the 
Guoyun Lou collection, after the building in which the objects were housed.  
On August 16th, 1937, one of the bombs that the Japanese Imperial Army detonated in 
Suzhou destroyed the Gu family living room.  The clan kept a panic room, a secure space only 
accessible through a tunnel that connected two courtyards.  Gu Gongxiong, the family patriarch, 
dropped a cache of paintings and calligraphy in the room, packed up his wife and kids, and fled 
for Shanghai.
1151  
Shen Tongyue, Gu Gongxiong's widow, contacted the Shanghai Museum in 1951.  She 
donated the Guoyun Lou collection in the name of her husband and five children.  Between 
1951 and 1959, the family presented the museum with 308 pieces of painting and calligraphy, 
1150 Yinlan Zhong, “xiahui yuanying” [Radiant Reflections Over The Abyss] in Shanghai Bowu Guan Ed., Gu 
Gongxiong Jiashu Juanzeng Shanghai Bowu Guan Guoyun Lou Shujua Jicui [Collected Calligraphy And Painting 
From The Guoyun Lou Which The Gu Gongxiong Family Donated To The Shanghai Museum] (Shanghai, 
2002): 8 – 9.
1151 Zhongwu Zhang and Ning Fan, “Guoyun Lou Cangpin De Minyun” [The Fate Of The Guoyun Lou 
Collection], Suzhou zazhi [Suzhou Magazine] no. 3, (2010): 63 – 64.337
which appraisers evaluated at 100,000 RMB.
1152  The Municipality granted the Gu clan a merit 
award of 10,000RMB, as well as a special exhibition featuring select pieces.
1153  As with all 1950s 
donations, the municipality praised the family's nationalism.  The Shanghai Museum continues 
to claim that the family's faith in China spurred the donation.  
The Gu family got raided from all sides during the Cultural Revolution.  The Suzhou 
Museum, Revolutionary Rebels at each of the five descendants' various work units, and even one 
of the daughter-in-laws' work units came and filled seven trucks with the family's possessions, 
which went to the Suzhou municipal sorting committee.
1154  The family was shunned by all 
cultural institutions and the descendants were stripped of their Shanghai affiliations.
1155  When 
Shen Tongyue died, no one visited.
1156   
In 1996, the Shanghai Museum reestablished contact with the Gu clan as part of donor 
relations programming for the inauguration of its new building.  The children looked like 
anybody else by then.  They lived with old furniture and barely had one black and white 
television set between them.
1157  Members of the Class of 1952 reassembled the Gu clan and 
1152 Wenhua bu, Shanghai shi wenhua ju, shi wenguan hui guanyu jieshou juanxian wenwu bin yu ui biaozhang de qingshi 
baogao, pifu [The Ministry Of Culture, Shanghai Municipal Department Of Cultural Affairs, Municipal Cultural 
Relics Management Bureau's Requests, Reports, And Rescripts Regarding The Acceptance of Donations And 
The Granting Of Merit Awards] January 12
th, 1959 – December 17
th, 1959, B172-5-98, SMA, Shanghai.
1153 Wenhua bu, Shanghai shi wenhua ju, shi wenguan hui guanyu jieshou juanxian wenwu bin yu ui biaozhang de qingshi 
baogao, pifu [The Ministry Of Culture, Shanghai Municipal Department Of Cultural Affairs, Municipal Cultural 
Relics Management Bureau's Requests, Reports, And Rescripts Regarding The Acceptance of Donations And 
The Granting Of Merit Awards] January 12
th, 1959 – December 17
th, 1959, B172-5-98, SMA, Shanghai.
1154 Zhongwu Zhang and Ning Fan, “Guoyun Lou Cangpin De Minyun” [The Fate Of The Guoyun Lou 
Collection], Suzhou zazhi [Suzhou Magazine] no. 3, (2010): 65.
1155 Interview with Li Junjie, June 29
th, 2009.
1156 Interview with Zhong Yinlan, July 10
th, 2009.
1157 Interview with Li Junjie, June 29
th, 2009.338
reunited them in Shanghai for an exhibition entitled Guoyun Lou Juanzeng Shuhua Jinpin Huigu 
Zhan (Retrospective Exhibition Of Select Paintings And Calligraphy Donated By Guoyun 
Lou).
1158  The museum paid for everything: “Return plane tickets, living spaces, and when they 
got here we also received them.  Then when they left, I think everyone got 100,000rmb each.”
1159 
That's the equivalent of the Guoyun Lou collection's original evaluated worth.  
In its donation literature, the Shanghai Museum proposes that it takes better care of 
donors than the donors' own families.
1160  After all, the institution has more wealth, stability, and 
infrastructural support.  For example, the museum pays health care costs for one of Shen 
Tongyue's daughters.  Zhong Yinlan, who visits the daughter regularly, explained that “the 
daughter has Alzheimer’s.  She and her husband are in their 80s and 90s.  They're at the hospital 
in Suzhou.”
1161  Shanghai pays for their on-site nurse and “all the medical bills that can't be 
reimbursed” by the state.
1162  As of 2010, the daughter was approaching ninety and the museum 
intended to “pay for her medical bills until she dies.”
1163  When I asked Zhong Yinlan why the 
museum is willing to do this, she told me “their father did a lot for the Shanghai Museum and the 
1158 Xiejun Chen, “qianyan” [Foreword] in Shanghai Bowu Guan Ed., Gu Gongxiong Jiashu Juanzeng Shanghai Bowu 
Guan Guoyun Lou Shuhua Jicui [Collected Calligraphy And Painting From The Guoyun Lou Which The Gu 
Gongxiong Family Donated To The Shanghai Museum] (Shanghai, 2002): 1; The exhibition even traveled to 
Hong Kong.  For details see Yiwen “Shanghai bowuguan Guoyun Lou zhan zai gang juban” [Shanghai 
Museum's Guoyun Lou Exhibition Opens In Hong Kong] Shanghai wenbo luncong [Shanghai Wenbo] no. 2, 
(2003): 96. 
1159 Interview with Li Junjie, January 21
st, 2010.
1160 Fang Weifu, “Fan Jirong jiqi juanzeng de jiu jian qingtongqi” [Fan Jirong And The Nine Ancient Bronze Relics 
He Donated] Shoucangjia [Collector] no. 2, (2010): 16-20; Li Xia, “Shanghai bowuguan chunqiu” 
[Occurrences At The Shanghai Museum] Shanghai dangan [Shanghai Archives] no. 1, (1997): 18-19.
1161 Interview with Zhong Yinlan, July 10
th, 2009.
1162 Interview with Zhong Yinlan, July 10
th, 2009.
1163 Interview with Zhong Yinlan, July 10
th, 2009.339
daughter accompanied the mother to all the big museum functions.”
1164  When I pressed her for 
why the museum supported this daughter as opposed to the four other children, Zhong Yinlan 
explained that this daughter also donated some paintings to the museum.  She had “paintings by 
the Four Wangs, they have four paintings.  During the Cultural Revolution they hid those 
paintings.  Once the revolution was over they donated those paintings to the Shanghai 
Museum.”
1165  When I asked whether health care supplements constituted payment from the 
museum, Zhong Yinlan insisted they do not.  “These people, they're just good people.”
1166  Li 
Junjie added that the Gu's were more than good, they were “real collectors, these guys from the 
old times...these are real collectors.”
1167
Constructing the Gu family as “real collectors” erases density of constituents that make 
up the museological fiction of donation.
1168  The cash awards that the Gus received throughout 
the decades further enshrouds donations with merit and ceremony.  The difficulty here is not 
simply that doing so contrives the erasure of provenance, or that it created cultural heritage in 
provenance's stead.  The difficulty is that both are presumed as natural, and even necessary.  For 
example, when the Guoyun Lou catalog introduces specific paintings, it do not mention which 
member of the Gu family owned, inscribed, or donated the work of art.  The catalog simply 
1164 Interview with Zhong Yinlan, July 10
th, 2009.
1165 Interview with Zhong Yinlan, July 10
th, 2009.
1166 Interview with Zhong Yinlan, July 10
th, 2009.
1167 Interview with Li Junjie, July 7
th, 2009.
1168 Perry Link “The Limits of Cultural Reform in Deng Xiaoping's China” Modern China, 13, no. 2 (1987): 115-
176; Jamie Morgan, “Distinguishing Truth, Knowledge, and Belief: A Philosophical Contribution to the 
Problem of Images of China” Modern China, 30, no. 3 (2004): 398-427; David Shambaugh “China's 
Propaganda System: Institutions, Processes and Efficacy” The China Journal, no. 57 (2007): 25-58340
refers the reader, as well as the gallery visitor, to similar artifacts in the Chinese art historical 
canon: painters such as Zhao Menfu, or the Wu school of painters in Suzhou.
1169  What these 
references conceal are the density of roles that the Gus also played in collecting.  Gu Gongxiong, 
the donor-in-name, was one among many in the Gu clan who sold, commissioned, designed, and 
negotiated the meaning and value of their antiquities with their respective associates, regional 
cultural institutions, and municipal governments.  The Shanghai Museum played no role in 
raiding the Gu estate, but its publications literally seized the Gu bequest's identity.  It 
appropriated the multiple layers of gray that marked the Guoyun Lou bequest by referring to the 
antiquities as donations.  Furthermore, the museum requisitioned the right of identification for 
donors as a population.  Its employees reserve the right to call some donors “real collectors”, and 
others – nothing at all. 
As previously mentioned, the Shanghai Museum calls the various techniques that it uses 
to maintain its donation fictions “collector psychology”.  These techniques include regular visits, 
merit awards, gifts, special ceremonies and exhibitions, as well as inclusion in the museum's 
various celebratory dinners and parties.  In the years following the opening of the new museum, 
these techniques have expanded to ongoing health care payments and even real estate 
allotments.  None of these techniques register with visitors as they walk past the new galleries. 
1169 Yinlan Zhong, “xiahui yuanying” [Radiant Reflections Over The Abyss] in Shanghai Bowu Guan Ed., Gu 
Gongxiong Jiashu Juanzeng Shanghai Bowu Guan Guoyun Lou Shujua Jicui [Collected Calligraphy And Painting 
From The Guoyun Lou Which The Gu Gongxiong Family Donated To The Shanghai Museum] (Shanghai, 
2002): 11 – 12.341
Nevertheless, the techniques glue different constituents together.  Indeed, the museum cannot 
celebrate its successes if donors do not attend its parties, grant interviews, or indeed, need favors. 
Similarly, the donors cannot wear their honors if the museum did not generate publicity, or 
needed exemplars to prove itself worthy of more donors, bequests, and recognition.  In fact, to 
donors, museum staff, and even visitors who bother to read the celebratory plaques, the fact that 
a philanthropic act took place is not a fiction, but a tangible, quantifiable, reality.  Thus, in the 
case of the Shanghai Museum, the fiction of donation has created something absolutely 
verifiable, and that thing is consent.  Consent, on both the museum and the “donor” end, matters, 
precisely because it builds a stage upon which appropriation and incomplete restitution can be 
recast as preservationist, nationalistic, and philanthropic.
1170 
Hence, let us not look upon the Shanghai Museum's operative fiction as a singular event 
that occurs under the autocratic Communist regime, but a new way in which cultural institutions 
justify the creation of cultural heritage internationally.  The PRC's ceremonies, merit payments, 
and special treatment for donors of national patrimony do not differ from “Dation” or 
“Acceptance in Lieu” schemes at British and French national museums, which offer similar art-
for-cash options.  In the French case, the Dation (a legal term for giving something in payment 
1170 For similar findings see Albert Feuerwerker, “Chinese History and the Foreign Relations of Contemporary 
China” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 402, (1972): 1-14; Edward Friedman, 
“Reconstructing China's National Identity: A Southern Alternative to Mao- Era Anti-Imperialist Nationalism”, 
The Journal of Asian Studies, 53, no. 1 (1994): 67-91; Katherine Palmer Kaup, “Regionalism versus 
Ethnicnationalism in the People's Republic of China”, The China Quarterly, no. 172 (2002): 863-884; Anne F. 
Thurston, “Victims of China's Cultural Revolution: The Invisible Wounds: Part II”, Pacific Affairs, 58, no. 1 
(1985): 5-27;342
of another that is due) implements a special tax provision that allows individuals to donate art in 
lieu of paying inheritance tax, with the goal to “promote the conservation of national artistic 
heritage.”
1171  To quote the Musée d'Orsay, whose Collection Development website includes the 
aforementioned “Dation” as one of nineteen different schemes of collection development, a 
French taxpayer may make his offer 
“to the tax authorities, and it is then examined by the Inter-ministerial Commission of approval 
for the conservation of the national artistic heritage. Subject to the recommendation of the 
commission, the Minister for the Budget decides whether to accept or refuse the work offered, 
and notifies the taxpayer, who then acknowledges receipt. Having become the property of the 
State, the work then enters the national collections.”
1172 
All these schemes recognize antiquities providers as philanthropists and their antiquities, once 
vetted and accepted, as property of the national patrimony.  When antiquities obtained through 
these schemes appear in British and French national museums, they also have no provenance. 
At best, they appear with a label advertising the merits of donating national patrimony. 
Furthermore, the antiquities vetting process involves a familiar collaboration of museum and 
market: The Inter-ministerial commission that evaluates offers includes two representatives 
from the Ministry for Budget, as well as two representatives from the Ministry of Culture and 
Communication.
1173 
1171 Musée d'Orsay “Collection Development” Available  <http://www.musee-
orsay.fr/en/collections/acquisitions/collection-development.html> [20 June, 2011]
1172 Musée d'Orsay “400
th Anniversary Of The 'Acceptance In Lieu' Scheme” Available  <http://www.musee-
orsay.fr/en/collections/acquisitions/40th-anniversary-of-the-acceptance-in-lieu-scheme.html> [20 June, 
2011]
1173 Musée d'Orsay “400
th Anniversary Of The 'Acceptance In Lieu' Scheme” Available  <http://www.musee-
orsay.fr/en/collections/acquisitions/40th-anniversary-of-the-acceptance-in-lieu-scheme.html> [20 June, 343
If we recognize the invention of cultural heritage in “Capitalist” institutions like British 
and French national museums, then we are forced recognize the same in the “Communist” 
Shanghai Museum.  Similarly, we are compelled to recognize the fictive quality of donations in 
both.  The Guoyun Lou bequest not only defines the Shanghai Museum's creation of Chinese 
cultural heritage, but also the international creation of a world cultural heritage, one country at a 
time.  Indeed, the elegant fiction of donation is embedded in the very existence of national 
museums, which consistently represent themselves as the custodians of heritage, the innovators 
of preservation, and the global repositories of our mutual past.  This is as true of “democratic” 
cultural institutions as it is of “autocratic” ones, especially as both purport to partake in the 
identification of heritage.  Populated with donors and yet donor-less, the Shanghai Museum 
collection thus enters the world heritage movement. 
No one denies that Chinese people in the PRC have had a difficult twentieth century 
experience.  Shanghai's private collectors found themselves in socially and politically harrowing 
situations, much of which I can never fully comprehend.  In my research, however, I have found 
little to support the presumption that the systematic seizure of art in the PRC marks special sites 
of alienation, redemption, or nationalism.  Nor have I found the many constituents at Shanghai 
Museum more humane or privileged than their equivalents at other museums.  If any of the 
above properties hold for Shanghai, then I have found the same to be true of museum 
employees, art dealers, collectors, visitors, and municipal officials outside the putatively 
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autocratic context of the People's Republic of China. 
In the Shanghai museum, two important processes mediate the Chinese art historical 
canon.  Firstly, the museum and the art market co-create value.  Both add new categories of art 
to the collecting palette, identifying iconic artists and objects for the canon.  The second process 
is restitution, an ambiguous policy that places the ownership of Chinese cultural heritage under 
constant negotiation.  While the restitution negotiations outlined in Chapter 5 claim to have 
resolved lingering issues over appropriation, the Chinese art market's explosive growth since 
1978 has only elicited more dissatisfaction amongst Chinese who feel they sold their restitutions 
for too little, too soon.  This is why framing antiquities as cultural heritage proves so effective – 
so long as objects remain in institutions that revere them as part of a canon and their original 
owners as philanthropists, the fluctuations of the art market disappear and the consolation of 
consent returns.  
Under the banner of national patrimony, the remarkable thing about museums is that 
they seem to distinguish price from value.  Visitors often do not pay for entry, curators do not 
engage with commerce, and dealers have no reach in the museum's hallowed galleries – 
commodities don't exhibit in museums lest the exhibition be seen as part of an advertising ploy. 
Nevertheless, museums openly ask for money though donation campaigns and exhibition tours, 
retired curators authenticate antiquities for a fee or even consult with state-owned auction 
houses like Hantai, and dealers willing to donate specific antiquities can often watch as their 345
titles transform from commercial, to philanthropic, to academic (Take, for example, Wong Nan-
p'ing's transformation from a painting dealer to a collector to the subject of a Yale University 
museum catalog).  For those who seek a concrete answer to what is and is not an irrefutably 
“priceless” object of value, this situation is at once intuitively simple and conceptually complex. 
Indeed, the Shanghai Museum's history reminds us that canonicity is an identifier that different 
individuals, including art dealers, collectors, municipal officials, customs officers,  museum 
employees, and even we ourselves, have long trained each other to accept.  On the one hand, the 
market is what the museum assigns to commodify antiquities outside the canon.  On the other 
hand, the canon is utterly beholden to market transactions. 
As this dissertation has shown, immutable greatest hits, exemplary donors, and a clear 
distinction between museum and market are precisely what Chinese cultural heritage, as 
presented by the Shanghai Museum, lacks.  In this respect, the cast of characters that I have 
presented in conjunction with the museum's history are all part of a larger, co-creative process, 
in which state and non-state actors, from both museum and market, in China and overseas, have 
made up the defining elements of Chinese cultural heritage as they went along.  Yet, for the most 
part, none of these constituents appear immortalized on museum plaques.  Their individual 
histories prove too sensitive for the Shanghai Museum to explore.  The only entities that do 
appear, without fail, are antiquities, which allow us to imagine a cultural heritage without 
provenance, but at the same time full of the labor of different constituents whose identities are 346
erased as a necessity of art appreciation.  Indeed there is something compelling, even liberating, in 
the idea that anyone can enter a museum, observe the objects therein, and leave with the 
intangible, yet indelible, mark of a civilization that extends thousands of years into the past, and 
will exist so long as we consent to its value.  While we may not be able to fix one specific object to 
the entire expanse of Five Thousand Years of Chinese Civilization, consenting to its canonicity 
marks the first step in that process.347
Glossary of Chinese Terms
chadui luohu  插队落户 commune inserts
da shoucangjia  大收藏家 big  collector
danwei 单位 work unit
fencai 粉彩 famille rose
geli shencha 隔离审查 segregated examination
guanxi 关系 relations
guobao 国宝 national treasures
guojia wenwu jianding 
weiyuan hui
国家文物鉴定委员会 national committee of cultural 
relics
Guomindang 国民党 Nationalist Party
Guoyun Lou juanzeng 
shuhua jingpin huigu 
zhan
过云楼捐献赠书画精品回顾展 retrospective exhibition of 
select paintings and calligraphy 
donated by Guoyun Lou
Guwan 古玩 Arts and crafts
huaqiao dasha 华侨大厦 overseas Chinese mansion
hukou 户口 household registration
jianpolan 捡破烂 rag-pickers
jianshang jia 鉴赏家 connoisseurs
jieshou 接收 acceptances
jinshi degree 进士 highest honors on the civil 
examinations
kaiyang 开洋 dried baby shrimp
laobao 老保 old conservatives
laoshifu 老师傅 master artisan
laoxiansheng 老先生 venerable sir
liangbai jian 两百件  two hundred items
luoshi zhengce 落实政策 restitution
momo tou 姆姆头 cleaning staff or nurse 
(Shanghainese phrase)
nianfen 年份 year date
qingyou 青釉  indigo glaze
que 缺 chip or a big crack
sanbai jian 三百件 three hundred items
shang an tong fang sheng 商鞅铜方升 Qin standard
song Wang Anshi shu 
lengyan jingzhi yao juan
宋王安石椤严经旨要卷 essential scrolls Of Song 
Dynasty Wang Anshi's buddhist 348
scriptural calligraphy
tong ci yu za 铜磁玉杂 bronzes, ceramics, jades, 
miscellaneous
Wang wengong wenji 王文公文集 collected writings of Wang 
Anshi
wenwu  文物 cultural relics, and alternately, 
cultural heritage
wenwu zhiyou 文物之友 friends of cultural relics
wubai jian 五百件 five hundred items
yibai jian 一百件 one hundred items
yiqian jian 一千件 one thousand items
zei gaowen 搌高温 baking in heat (Shanghainese 
phrase)
zhaofan pai 造反派 revolutionary rebels
zhuanjia 专家 experts349
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